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Gaus: Was war die bitterste Ent-
täuschung, die Sie in Ihrer Zeit 
als Regierungschef erlebt haben? 
Adenauer: Die bitterste Enttäu-
schung und der größte Rück-
schlag für die gesamte deutsche 
Politik war nach meiner Meinung 
der Rückschlag in der Frage der 
Europäischen Verteidigungsge-
meinschaft. Wie Sie wissen, war 
der Vertrag in der französischen 
Kammer schließlich ohne Dis-
kussion ad acta gelegt worden ... 
Gaus: ... im Jahre 1954. Ade-
nauer: ... und das war ein sehr 
harter Schlag. […]“(Gaus 1965) 
1. Introduction 
In 1965, about two years after having resigned the German chancellorship, Konrad 
Adenauer agreed to an extensive interview with the journalist Günther Gaus for the 
television format “Zur Person”. In the black-and-white broadcast of December 29th, 
Adenauer stated emphatically that the greatest and most bitter disappointment of his 
years in office was the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC).1 In his 
view, the rejection of the treaty in the French Assembleé Nationale was more than a 
mere temporary setback. The EDC, he argued, would have solved all ‘questions’ 
surrounding the best institutional organization of post-war Europe, questions that 
were still an object of struggle and conflict in the mid-1960’s. In his assessment, 
Adenauer was not alone. The French deputies that had supported the EDC – the so-
called ‘cedistes’ – would henceforth refer to the day of their defeat as the ‘crime of 
August 30
th’.2 Paul-Henri Spaak, in his diary, wrote in “enmity, spite, and fury” 
about the news of the vote in the French parliament, accusing the French Prime Min-
ister Pierre Mendès France of seeking to destroy the Atlantic Alliance.3 Robert 
Schuman remarked that the European project faced the “ruins of a demolished edi-
                                                 
1
 For the video footage see < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TV7weYGV6W8&t=5m51s > (Last 
accessed at 05-04 2015). 
2
 ‘Cediste’ is a term referring to the French acronym of the EDC, namely CED (Communauté eu-
ropéenne de defense). After August 30
th
 1954, they referred to their defeat as ‘crime du 30 août’ (e.g. 
Clesse 1989). 
3
 “L’hostilité, la rancune et la fureur. […]. Il [Mendès France, BF] a détruit la CED et s’apprête, j’en 
ai le sentiment, á détruire l’Alliance atlantique. ” (quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 489). 
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fice”.4 Altiero Spinelli, contemplating the timing of the sudden death of former Ital-
ian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi on August 19
th
 1954, retroactively saw in his 
passing away an “ominous sign, the end of an epoch.”5 Henri Brugmans wrote later 
that the “fall of the European Defense Community constituted a turning point in the 
history of the European idea.”6 
In contemporary terminology, it is fair to say that the failure of the EDC constitutes a 
critical juncture in the history of European integration. A widely accepted consensus 
among scholars of post-war Europe has identified the ‘German problem’ as the key 
to the political and economic stability of post-war Europe. Within the emerging Cold 
War, every conception of a viable political post-war order centered on this issue. The 
failure of the EDC and its consequences paved the way for the path of European in-
tegration that is well-known. In terms of security cooperation, Germany and Italy 
entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and were allowed to gradu-
ally build up its armed forces while being restricted, both in terms of the kinds of 
weapons as well as their operational autonomy, through NATO and the Western Eu-
ropean Union (WEU). The institutions of the WEU are a ‘text-book’ case of the real-
ist and transaction-costs based theory of institutional design, solving the issue of 
German rearmament through balancing and credible commitments through pooling 
(a permanent troop commitment by the UK to the continent controlled by a majority 
in the WEU Council) and a WEU ‘agency’ that, in theory, had the right of inspecting 
German arms at any time.
7
 The remaining participating member states pledged a 
number of troops to remain on the continent, their removal being subject to a vote in 
the WEU Council, which made a legal unilateral withdrawal impossible. This ar-
rangement placated fears of a remilitarizing Germany on the continent through ar-
mament restrictions, third party oversight, and straightforward balancing and, there-
by, permitted the peaceful economic and institutional integration of the continent. 
Henceforth, ‘supranational institutions’ would be limited to the regulation of the 
Common Market. 
                                                 
4
 “[…] les décombres d’un édifice démoli […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 380). 
5
 “[…] un signe néfaste, la fin d’une époque […]” (quoted in Vayssière 2007, 327). 
6
 “La chute de la Communauté européenne de défense constitua un tournant de l’idée européenne 
[…]” (quoted in Vayssière 2007, 328). 
7
 See the Protocols No. II and No. IV of the WEU Treaty (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II  1954; WEU 
Treaty Protocol No. IV  1954). 
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The quotes mentioned above, however, make it clear that this solution was by no 
means undisputed or uncontested. A sizable portion of the political elite in post-war 
Europe had invested in the project of creating a European Army, that is, to address 
the ‘German problem’ by means of institutional ‘co-binding’ through pooling and 
delegating “core state powers” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). Both the EDC and 
its associated plan to create a European Political Community (EPC), including provi-
sions for a common market, went far beyond the degree of pooling, delegation, and 
representation that is in place today (Rittberger 2009). 
This dissertation argues that taking the EDC seriously as a puzzle produces potential-
ly more general insights into conditions and factors influencing intergovernmental 
cooperation, international institutions, and regional integration. Consider that the 
very proposal of creating a common army of troops in 1950 – only five years after 
the second world war – was, by all accounts, a quite extraordinary long shot as it 
called for a common army of troops with different languages and different organiza-
tional cultures only a few years after these very troops had been viciously fighting 
against each other. The plan thus raised serious doubts regarding its military effec-
tiveness in an environment in which security and deterrence were truly scarce re-
sources. Moving beyond a mere pre-emption of efforts to recreate a German army, 
the plan went at the very core of all participating nation-states as it implied the dele-
gation of discretion over national troops that could no longer be deployed autono-
mously elsewhere (For an overview see Fursdon 1980). Why did the negotiating 
states pursue such a radical course of action? In addition, the course of the negotia-
tions, at a first glance, seems highly paradoxical. Initially, all of the Allied states 
publicly assented to a proposal by the US that was, in terms of its outline, highly 
similar to the institutional solution of the WEU that was finally adopted in 1954. 
Nevertheless, the European states discarded that option in 1951 and negotiated and 
debated the ratification of the treaty for four years, only to recreate the almost ‘pure-
ly’ intergovernmental solution in the form of the WEU and German membership in 
NATO. Why was the bargain characterized by such seemingly apparent inefficien-
cies and paradoxes? 
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The Suitability of Intergovernmentalism for Post-war Europe 
The present dissertation argues that understanding this early chapter of European 
integration requires revisiting conventional intergovernmental toolkits of explaining 
intergovernmental cooperation and bargaining. I will argue that a sufficient and ex-
haustive explanation of the ‘EDC bargain’ involves challenging the core assumption 
of this framework, i.e. treating the organizational apparatus of the state as a repre-
sentative, rational agent.  
In the post-war world, European decision-makers found themselves in a situation of 
high ‘violence interdependence’ of a globally unprecedented scale (See Deudney 
2007, ch. 8). The political elite in Europe and the US had anticipated this problem at 
an early stage. As a result, calls for ‘European unity’ were ubiquitous in the post-war 
world as the emerging global geopolitical conflict made closer European cooperation 
imperative from a structural point of view. Hence, the questions of the required insti-
tutional designs were debated widely. Behind such calls, however, were widely dif-
ferent ‘causal stories’ that claimed to analyze the sources of the violent confronta-
tions in Europe in the first half of the century and derived different institutional pre-
scriptions for its resolution, in particular with regard to the principle of national sov-
ereignty: radical federalist solutions advocated its complete abolishment, suprana-
tional solutions proposed its containment through limited pooling and delegation 
whereas ‘intergovernmental’ solutions maintained that institutionalized consultations 
between governments were sufficient. The resulting conflict of ideas did not map 
neatly unto the different states or party families. The political elite in post-war Eu-
rope still gravitated around old political forces of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These forces did not have a united or cohesive attitude 
towards the nation. Political Catholicism had never developed a straightforward and 
unquestioning loyalty towards the nation-state (Kaiser 2007). International Socialism 
had a highly contested transnational conflict around that issue ever since the start of 
the First World War (Sassoon 1996). Liberal political forces in Europe always had to 
come to grips with the difficult relation between nationalism and cosmopolitan liber-
al ideology (Greenfeld 1992).  
The conflict over institutional prescriptions was organized in a transnational network 
of political elites in post-war Europe around a number of well-known transnational 
organizations and manifested themselves in intra-party conflicts throughout conti-
nental Europe. Partly due to the institutional volatility of the French party system, 
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these divisions were the most extreme in France (Parsons 2002, 2003), but they were 
present throughout continental Western Europe. It is thus unwise to speak of an early 
‘permissive’ consensus about the institutional organization of Europe (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 5): the constraining power of the post-war conflict showed itself 
straightforwardly when a large portion of the French deputies – Gaullists and Com-
munists alike – in the Assemblée Nationale proceeded to proudly chant the Marseil-
laise after the EDC Treaty had been voted off the agenda in August 1954.
8
 Accord-
ingly, Spaak attributed the failure of the EDC it to pervasive and ‘powerful national-
ist sentiments’.9 This conflict, it is argued, was present in the transnational and trans-
governmental political ‘space’ in Europe from the very beginning. The formation of 
a number of transnational pressure groups and party organizations in post-war Eu-
rope - first studied by Walter Lipgens (Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984a; 
Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990) - provided the organizational basis of an emerging – 
transnational – European conflict among the political elite in Europe whose structure 
cut across the separation of continental Europe into states and parties of the left and 
the right. As a result, domestic conflicts, government preferences and the bargaining 
behavior of the European states negotiating the European Defense Community ex-
hibited patterns that cannot sufficiently be grasped by intergovernmental frame-
works.  
 
The Analytical Contribution 
In order to better grasp the effect of that transnational conflict, this dissertation 
makes an effort to set up a distinct analytical framework that produces hypotheses 
explaining state-preferences and bargaining behavior that are distinct from the inter-
governmental standard account. There are three reasons.  
First, utilizing competing hypotheses is useful in order to exercise due care in chal-
lenging the intergovernmentalist framework. Evaluating competing explanations for 
the evidence and the bargaining processes at hand provides a source of discipline 
when dealing with ambiguous evidence and allows making more concrete statements 
as to how much explanatory value is added to the case at hand. Indeed, the claim is 
                                                 
8
 When the EDC was voted down, “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the 
chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158). 
9
 “[…] die Stärke der noch mächtigen nationalistischen Strömungen […]” (Spaak 1969, 297). 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
6 
 
not that the main factors emphasized by intergovernmentalist accounts – such as ge-
opolitical incentives, desire and competition for power and plenty – did not matter. 
Instead they are indeterminate to account for the specific ‘state behavior’ and thus do 
not provide a sufficient explanation of the case. 
The second reason has to do with the question of the particularity or generality of the 
case. The ‘transnational framework’ that is developed draws extensively on a body of 
literature related to the analysis of contemporary issues of international cooperation. 
Hence, the applicability of the concepts used presumably relies on the technical and 
socio-economic context of a globalizing world in which states have been said to have 
acquired functions noticeably different from their role in post-war Europe (Genschel 
and Zangl 2008). Post-war Europe is, a priori, neither a typical nor a most likely case 
in which to expect a causally important role of transnational networks. At the same 
time, it cannot be said that it is a least likely case, since the issue touched on power-
ful symbols of national sentiments such as the national armies and since the Ameri-
can reconstruction efforts explicitly supported and incentivized transnational cooper-
ation (Hogan 1987). Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that the analytical lessons 
learned in this dissertation may prove useful for the analysis of other bargains in the 
history of European integration. After all, the transnational organizations analyzed in 
this dissertation, such as the European Movement and the Union of European Feder-
alists, still exist today. The political and economic conditions of a globalized and 
economically and technologically increasingly interdependent world would equally 
suggest that the lessons learned in this dissertation might travel further than post-war 
Europe. 
The third reason lies in the fact that the implications of dense transnational and 
transgovernmental networks for intergovernmental cooperation have not been suffi-
ciently conceptualized in the literature. Although the concept of transnational and 
transgovernmental networks and their implications are by no means new (Nye and 
Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 1974), the literature is still characterized by an 
unfortunate methodological divide: quantitatively minded scholars utilize increasing-
ly sophisticated methods to focus on identifiable network structures, but tend to ig-
nore the content and the meaning of networks for the involved actors (McLean 
2007). Qualitatively minded scholars do focus in the meaning of rhetorical and idea-
tional commitments that are exchanged through networks; however, by overlooking 
the fundamental effects of network structures and their relation to ideological con-
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flicts on outcomes, this line of research has produced largely ambiguous results 
(Kohler-Koch 2002). Combining insights from both perspectives reveals a more dif-
ferentiated account of intergovernmental cooperation that, at least in the case of the 
EDC, outperforms the conventional intergovernmentalist framework. In particular, it 
is argued that the key ‘currency’ exchanged in transnational networks are rhetorical 
commitments (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003). Similar norms and values provide the 
rhetorical means of committing to similar political goals across states and parties: 
hence, rhetorical commitments can generate trust (McLean 2007). Trust, in turn, con-
tributes to transnational and transgovernmental coalition formation. As a result, 
transnational networks, under certain conditions, affect ‘state preferences’ for institu-
tions – both in terms of their demand and supply – as well as the ‘bargaining behav-
ior’ of states. As such, the mechanism relies on an expanded individual logic of con-
sequences: provided that the behavioral consequences of rhetorical commitments are 
transparent, observable, and a long shadow of future interaction exists, trust is an 
optimal strategy for rational actors (Bowles 2004, 248). As a result, standard inter-
governmentalist theories of the formation of institutional preferences and bargaining 
behavior need qualification. 
Start with the demand conditions for common institutions (Mattli 1999b, 1999a). The 
argument adopts the conventional assumption that transnational networks play an 
important role in channeling the exchange of ideas and the building of trust between 
actors from competing countries (e.g. Risse 2002). Since the ‘efficiency’ of institu-
tional designs depends on expected transaction costs, ideas and trust strongly influ-
ence institutional demands and preferences with regard to institutional designs. Polit-
ical actors driven by ideological conflicts and mutual suspicions of defection have 
systematically different institutional preferences than those with similar ideological 
attachments, similar normative orientations, and mutual expectations of future coop-
erative behavior, and hence, mutual trust. Since ideas “do not float freely” (Risse-
Kappen 1994), such conflicts are manifested in network structures and transnational 
political exchanges. Accordingly, transnational networks in post-war Europe provid-
ed the organizational basis for frequent contacts among like-minded actors across 
states that found themselves frequently at odds with domestic party colleagues on 
similar issues – notably ‘the nation’ – thereby reinforcing the transnational formation 
of actor coalitions across the “container-state” (Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364), 
further exacerbating domestic conflicts, and thus, it is argued, contributed to the for-
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mation of trust within certain transnational groups. As a result, transnational coali-
tions of actors had a distinct set of institutional preferences and, hence, influenced 
the formation of institutional preferences of the negotiating states. 
Since divergent subjective assessments of similar material situations weakened the 
direct responsiveness of actor preferences to material and geostrategic factors, a suf-
ficient explanation of specific governments’ preferences requires taking into account 
both structural or domestic circumstances as well as the shifting ties of domestic 
governmental actors to transgovernmental networks and transnational coalitions. 
Depending on their standing within and their influence on specific governmental 
cabinets, governmental preferences shift in response to changing patterns of “embed-
dedness” within specific transnational clusters or groups of actors (Granovetter 
1985). As a consequence, it is not only domestic changes, such as new governing 
coalitions, that are responsible for shifts in government preferences. Hence, trans-
governmental networks and coalitions can affect the ‘supply conditions’ for common 
institutions. 
Finally, this dissertation argues that dense transgovernmental networks affect the 
dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining under uncertainty. Drawing on formal and 
experimental work on learning in networks (Jackson 2008; Golub and Jackson 2010; 
Lorenz, et al. 2011), it is argued that the structure of transgovernmental networks 
deeply affects the beliefs and the learning behavior of negotiators. Specifically, net-
work structures that are based on mutual trust may put certain individuals and groups 
of actors in positions of disproportionate influence over the beliefs of other negotiat-
ing actors. This line of reasoning draws on the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect (Galton 
1907). The higher the influence of one particular group within transgovernmental 
networks, the higher the scope for biases to rule over entire bargains as errors and 
biases from a ‘single source’ are less likely to be contradicted by alternative evi-
dence, arguments, and even errors (Lorenz, et al. 2011). As a consequence, individu-
al influence over an adversary’s beliefs, specifically beliefs over possible outcomes 
may be a more important source of influence than the coercive capabilities of the 
state or its ‘outside options’, reflecting the old wisdom that “the definition of the al-
ternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (Schattschneider 1960, 66). Thus, 
under specific conditions, intergovernmentalist views of the determinants of varying 
‘state influence’ over bargaining outcomes become misleading. At the same time, 
there is no warrant for the optimistic hope of attaining increased efficiency in a ‘new 
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world order’ of ‘network governance’, as a prominent scholar has expressed it 
(Slaughter 2004). Depending on structures of trust and influence, networks may con-
tribute to inefficiencies and the proliferation of highly biased information (Golub and 
Jackson 2010). 
In sum, this dissertation argues that understanding and explaining the EDC requires a 
differentiated account of international cooperation, institution building, and regional 
integration that is, so far, only implicit in a the contemporary literatures on institu-
tional design and regional and European integration (Moravcsik 1998; Koremenos, et 
al. 2001; Rittberger 2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006; Cooley and Spruyt 
2009), as well as the study of transnational networks and its effects, both contempo-
rary and historical (Risse 2002; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009; 
Kaiser, et al. 2010). Figure 1.1 below contrasts the two theoretical frameworks. 
Figure 1.1 Overview of the Argument 
 
It is important to stress the complementarity of both the transnational dynamics and 
the ‘traditional’ factors emphasized by realist and liberal intergovernmentalism. In-
dividual actors are not assumed to follow a logic of appropriateness: a ‘rationalist’ 
actor assumption – in its subjective variant - is retained throughout although based on 
more recent perspectives from institutional and behavioral economics (Bowles 2004; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012). Actors in leading government positions still 
seek to define and act strategically on the basis of a perceived ‘national interest’. 
Ideological similarities across borders allow the transnational formation of trust, af-
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fecting actors’ institutional reasoning about transaction costs, but not their predilec-
tions for political power. Hence, although preferences – the goals or ends of political 
behavior – may be related to normative values and political ideologies, actors are 
assumed to choose their political means in a strategic and ‘opportunistic’ manner. 
 
The Empirical Contribution 
The main empirical results of the dissertation as well as its analytical thrust map suit-
ably unto four “fault lines” in current scholarship on the Paris Treaties in post-war 
Europe, i. e. the EDC as well as the Treaties on the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) (Glockner and Rittberger 2012; Rittberger 2012, 80). Empirically, 
the literature disagrees on four points: whether the most influential and key actors 
were states or individuals and groups embedded in transnational networks; whether 
the sources of actor interests were material or ideational; whether geopolitical or do-
mestic constraints influenced changes in bargaining behavior and outcomes; and 
whether preferences for institutional design followed efficiency concerns or norms of 
democratically appropriate institutions. Using this differentiation, the theoretical and 
empirical contribution of the present study can be mapped accordingly (see Table 
1.1). 
Table 1.1 Context of the Argument 
 Intergovernmentalist framework Transnationalist framework 
Actors State centric 
Transnational actors in transnational 
and transgovernmental networks 
Preferences 
Materialist and/ or ideational explana-
tions: national interests and geopoliti-
cal ideologies 
Ideational explanation: embeddedness 
of ‘value driven agents’ in transna-
tional ‘communities’ 
Bargaining and 
ratification 
Systemic and/ or domestic pressures 
exogenous or endogenous to the state: 
outside options and domestic uncertain-
ty (two-level game) determine influ-
ence of states on bargaining outcomes 
Network structure and learning: im-
balanced transgovernmental networks 
lead to inefficient bargaining; network 
centrality of transnational actors af-
fects their influence on bargaining 
outcomes 
Institutional  
Design 
Rational design and democratic norms: 
reputation as conflict resource 
Rational actors with ideological/norm 
related preferences (value driven 
transnational agents) 
Note: Table adapted from Rittberger (2012, 80)   
In a nutshell, the empirical results – both the quantitative collected here and the qual-
itative evidence collected by historians - suggest that the story of the EDC is partially 
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a story of a collective ‘misunderstanding’ that barely turned reality (Clesse 1989). Its 
sources appear to be systematically related to the rise and fall of a transnational coa-
lition of ‘value driven agents’. The empirical chapters will combine methods of qual-
itative historical research and quantitative network analysis to identify an ideologi-
cally heterogeneous transnational coalition of supranationalist and federalist actors 
that was already in the making by the late 1940’s. This loose coalition is a heteroge-
neous collection of actors: it included, naturally, Jean Monnet whose access to US 
decision-makers proved crucial (Duchêne 1994); it included a number of high profile 
Christian Democrats such as Konrad Adenauer, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Robert Schu-
man, Georges Bidault, and Alcide De Gasperi (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 
2001; Gehler, et al. 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2004); additionally, it comprised radical 
federalists formerly associated with Resistance movements that were particularly 
strong in France and Italy and were exemplified by figures such as Altiero Spinelli or 
Henry Frenay (Vayssière 2002; Belot 2003; Vayssière 2005, 2007, 2011); it com-
prised Social Democrats such as Paul-Henri Spaak and Marinus van der Goes van 
Naters (Griffiths 1993b; Dumoulin 1999), and republican liberals such as Jean Mon-
net or Ugo La Malfa. By 1950 and early 1951 – during the negotiation of the Paris 
Treaties – it enjoyed considerable influence over the formulation of government 
preferences and bargaining strategies between 1950 and 1952. This coalition was in a 
privileged position since it consisted of major political figures from the continental 
governments and since its members had unique access to the US foreign policy es-
tablishment. Because its actors were ideologically committed to the same form of 
European unification – in the form of the least common denominator – these actors 
took a calculated risk when the Korean War broke out: utilizing all available political 
means, at times outright manipulation of governments, they managed to steer the 
negotiations in the direction of a European Army when the EDC Treaty was signed 
by mid-1952. The concomitant risks, however, were considerable. By the time the 
EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952, protests against the treaty started to gain 
ground, particularly in France and Germany. By early 1954, oddly enough, the two 
countries that had been at the forefront of pushing the negotiations in the direction 
they took – France and Italy – were the only countries left that had not ratified the 
treaty, as their governments were increasingly composed of more nationally inclined 
French Gaullists and Italian Monarchists. In the wake of increasing resistance, most 
proponents of the EDC Treaty – including the transnational coalition – cast their bets 
on efforts to envelop the controversial treaty in a more democratic institutional 
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framework in the form of the European Political Community. By 1954 these efforts 
faltered as public protests in France, coinciding with the disastrous defeat of the 
French colonial forces in Điện Biên Phủ, brought a new government under the 
French leader Pierre Mendès France into power. Until now, most of the governments 
involved in the negotiations of the EDC, including the US, had operated under the 
assumption that the EDC was the only viable form of German rearmament that 
would be accepted by the French. This dissertation argues that the EDC did not pri-
marily fail because the French government allowed the treaty to be voted down. Ra-
ther, it failed because the leaders of the remaining Six and the US emphatically re-
jected Mendès France’s final offer of a revised EDC Treaty in early August of 1954. 
That offer was the result of arduous bargaining within the Mendès France govern-
ment between the cedistes and the anti-cedistes, an internal least common denomina-
tor of the French governmental coalition that had significant chances of passing 
through the Assemblée Nationale. European and American leaders, however, sus-
pected foul play: mistrusting the intentions of Mendès France and being convinced 
that the EDC alternative would ultimately muster sufficient votes, they roundly re-
buffed Mendès France’s offer. The subsequent months amply demonstrated that the 
working assumption of the European and American EDC proponents – that there was 
no alternative to the EDC – was fatally flawed. In the final analysis, it appears that 
the influence of the transnational coalition was strong enough to suppress, for several 
years, the consideration of a possible and quite obvious bargaining solution that 
emerged within months after the EDC Treaty was rejected. 
 
Plan of the book 
The analytical and empirical argument of this dissertation unfolds over six chapters. 
The subsequent second chapter presents the two theoretical frameworks as dependent 
on a set of conditions. Intergovernmentalist assumptions, notably the treatment of the 
state as a corporate actor, are presented as predicated on a world of sovereign states 
divided by national-identities and mistrust. Several factors, it is argued, contribute to 
the unsuitability of such assumptions and, consequently, make the transnational 
framework necessary. These are: interdependence generating mutual benefits provid-
ed that collective action problems can be solved through common institutions; a 
dense set of transnational and transgovernmental networks connecting significant 
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portions of the political and cultural elite of interdependent states; the formation of 
transnational networks along similar ideological dispositions that imply some degree 
of detachment from the nation-state as a desirable model of political organization; 
and finally, that the latter similarities create political divisions that cut across states 
and parties and thus undermine that national demarcation of individual relationships 
of political trust. Reconstructing their main arguments, the chapter derives directly 
opposed hypotheses on the formation of institutional demands, factors influencing 
the supply of common institutions – i.e. the factors and constraints government pref-
erences are responsive to – as well as the usage of information underlying the choice 
of bargaining strategies. These hypotheses are intended as tools to weigh the evi-
dence presented in this dissertation. As a secondary purpose, they provide directions 
for further research.  
The third chapter focuses on the design logic used as well as the methods employed 
to gather evidence. As mentioned above, the case study of the EDC does not consti-
tute a systematic attempt at ‘falsifying’ or testing the hypotheses. On the basis of the 
plausibility of the presented transnational framework, it asks whether the latter pro-
vides a better explanation of the EDC period which, on the basis of the qualities of 
the case, would suggest that a wider applicability is plausible. In order to answer this 
question, the design follows a logic of ‘mixed methods’ (e.g. Greene 2007). One the 
one hand, it combines qualitative historical evidence to reconstruct patterns of rhetor-
ical commitments to particular political and ideological institutional concepts of 
post-war Europe, the nature and content of beliefs circulating publicly and behind 
political stage, domestically as well as transnationally. Due to the emphasis on uncer-
tainty and learning as bound together with issues of power and influence, the ‘pro-
cess analysis’ of the bargain (Hall 2006), while drawing on game theoretic concepts, 
is more in line with what has been termed ‘negotiation analysis’, focusing on aspects 
of learning, the usage of beliefs in efforts to ‘change the game itself’ (see Sebenius 
1992). In addition, qualitative ‘process tracing’ allows drawing on wide sources of 
information which becomes central in cases of ‘equifinality’, i.e. when the used hy-
potheses produces identical outcome expectations (George and Bennett 2005).  
This qualitative information is combined with a quantitative analysis of transnational 
networks in post-war Europe in order to identify central actors and offer alternative 
evidence of transnational conflict structures. In particular, this chapter presents the 
way in which the network data was sampled. In order to reconstruct transnational 
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networks among the political elite in post-war Europe, this dissertation draws on the 
sociological analysis of interlocking electorates (Mizruchi 1996), combining several 
sampling strategies to yield networks based on individuals’ overlapping member-
ships in the eight transnational organization that existed in post-war Europe. These 
are: the European Movement, the European League for Economic Cooperation 
(ELEC), the European Union of Federalists (UEF), the European Parliamentary Un-
ion (EPU), the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE), the 
Socialist International (COMISCO/ SI)
10
, the Christian Democratic Nouvelles 
Equipes Internationles (NEI), and the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle (e.g. 
Braunthal 1971; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993; Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004; Kaiser 2007; Vayssière 2007).  
The toolkit of network analysis has significantly expanded over the last decades 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Newman 2010). Traditional analyses of centrality 
measures allow identifying prominent and hypothetically influential individuals and 
groups within transnational and transgovernmental networks. Second, methods of 
identifying structural clusters of more densely connected actors are particularly use-
ful (Newman 2010, ch. 11). Such methods of identifying structural clusters of dense-
ly connected actors have been used widely recently in studies of legislative polariza-
tion among others and thus allow identifying transnational clusters of actors who, 
hypothetically, share similar dispositions and ideologies. In sum, while the affiliation 
used provides an imperfect but sufficient source to describe transnational conflict 
structures and gauge transgovernmental embeddedness, combining the analysis with 
qualitative information on the conflicts within and across these organizations yields 
the evidence needed for the transnational argument. 
The fourth chapter serves two purposes. A first step establishes the broad contours of 
the explanandum of this dissertation. Interstate bargains may be described by a ‘ne-
gotiation dance’ (Raiffa 1982, 66, 68). It describes the ‘give and take’ of communi-
cated positions, threats, and compromises as expressed by the leadership at the top of 
the organizational hierarchy of the state and its agents. Thus, ‘state behavior’ within 
interstate bargains can be reconstructed as a succession of ‘different positions’ that 
states or the representatives have rhetorically and publicly adopted as their ‘goal’ or 
                                                 
10
 The International was reconstituted after the war in London as the Committee of the International 
Socialist Conference (COMISCO), until 1951, when it was relabeled Socialist International at its 
inaugural congress in Frankfurt, Germany. 
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condition for mutual agreement. Focusing on positions over institutional design, this 
chapter reconstructs at least four different and persistent conflict constellations be-
tween the governments negotiating the EDC between 1950 and 1954. The task is 
thus to explain this ‘course of the bargain’ by reconstructing adopted bargaining po-
sitions as reflecting shifting preferences or strategic adaptations. Second, this chapter 
evaluates the analytical power of existing intergovernmentalist explanation with a 
specific view to the explanandum thus described. In addition, this chapter focuses on 
two main intergovernmentalist explanations. After demonstrating the insufficiency of 
realist explanations, it provides an intergovernmentalist first cut of explanations fo-
cusing on domestic politics by demonstrating that explanations focusing on party 
ideologies, differing national values between states, or interest group politics cannot 
account for the bargain either. 
Having demonstrated the insufficiency of intergovernmentalist approaches, the three 
subsequent chapters evaluate the added value of the transnational framework.  
Chapter 5 is concerned with the quantitative structural analysis of the transnational 
networks. First, it is shown that the rather dense transnational network exhibits a no-
table ‘elite’ of individuals who are disproportionately active across the transnational 
networks, and thus presumably influential in the transnational sphere. In addition, 
both the density of the network as well as its composition suggests that the transna-
tional organizations constituted important ties among the political elite in post-war 
Europe across countries as well as across party families. Drawing on recent work in 
the identification of network clusters (Reichardt and Bornholdt 2006), the chapters 
identifies six distinct transnational groups of actors that share more similar cross-
affiliations with each other than with the rest of the network. Of the six clusters iden-
tified, three are distinctly oriented towards party families: whereas the Christian 
Democrats form a single group, the transnational Social Democrats are split into two. 
The latter fact is taken as evidence of internal polarization that should span across 
Social Democratic parties on the continent. The remaining three clusters concern 
non-party family related transnational pressure groups, equally indicating an ideolog-
ical polarization. Moreover, the composition of these clusters reveals that their com-
position is sufficiently similarly distributed across countries and party families to 
warrant the conclusion that their influence – if it exists – cuts across state borders and 
party organizations within the respective states. In addition, the identified clusters are 
used to reconstruct the embeddedness of governmental actors – the transgovernmen-
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tal networks – between 1950 until 1954. The most important result established is 
somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgovern-
mentally best connected group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide 
margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Connect-
ing most of the governments of the Six most of the time between 1950 and 1952, it is 
argued that transgovernmental networks reconstructed in this dissertation were ‘im-
balanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the dominance of the Christian Democratic clus-
ter was sufficiently high to expect their influence over the basic beliefs and argu-
ments structuring the bargain in during this time to be predominant. Due to a number 
of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 
1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to have had a similar sort of influence. 
In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embed-
dedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France 
and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other 
hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community 
and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary 
attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community. Thus, French and 
Italian governments were ardent supporters of a European supranational army in the 
early stages of the bargain whereas the fact that the ratification of the EDC stalled 
subsequently in both countries is reflected in a shifting transnational embeddedness 
of French and Italian governments after 1953. 
The subsequent sixth chapter gives meaning to these structural analyses by arguing 
that the indications of internal differentiation and polarization found in the previous 
chapter are best understood as indications of transnational lines of conflict resem-
bling post-war political cleavages in certain respects (save for their lack in distinctly 
organized political camps). The chapter focuses on formal as well as informal trans-
national exchanges. In addition to the transnational organizations in Europe, transat-
lantic exchanges between European and US elites are considered, as major sources of 
funding for the eight transnational organization were located in the US Foreign Poli-
cy establishment (Aldrich 1995, 1997). Analyzing rhetoric commitments and rea-
soned exchanges – public and private ones – that were passed along within these 
‘networks’, certain ideological patterns emerge. By drawing on the existing literature 
on the main institutional ideas driving the European project in the 1950s (Lipgens 
1968; Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984b; Jachtenfuchs, et al. 1998; Thiemeyer 
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1998; Jachtenfuchs 2002; Parsons 2002, 2003), this chapter identifies three different 
‘typically’ expressed attitudes and lines of reasoning about European institutions: an 
intergovernmental model seeking to preserve the autonomy of the nation-state; a fed-
eralist model seeking to abolish the nation-state; and a supra-nationalist model that 
sought to contain the nation-state. Commitments to such models emerged on the ba-
sis of diverse analyses of the causes of the violent confrontations in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Yet, they yield typical institutional prescriptions. Intergovern-
mentalists praise the continuing relevance of national governments; on the other side, 
federalists denounce nationalism as the prime ‘evil’ that caused the war. Both ex-
tremes come with concrete institutional commitments: a ‘Council of States’ on the 
one hand, a completely new federated political community on the other hand. ‘Su-
pranationalism’ is a more amorphous medium category that nonetheless contains 
distinct elements: partially sharing the federalist diagnosis, it seeks novel institutions 
to co-bind and thus to ‘preserve’ the nation-state. For this category, public commit-
ments to curtailing the nation’s sovereignty – through pooling and delegation – are 
essential.  
Analyzing the content of these commitments yields two results. First, in line with the 
structural analyses of the previous chapter, the ‘distribution’ of transnationally active 
actors committed to the different models of Europe cuts across party families and 
countries. The internal structural differentiation presented in the previous chapter is 
consistent with this observation: Social Democrats are characterized by intense inter-
nal conflicts between actors subscribing to all three models; Christian Democrats 
present a more uniform picture: a concern for the preservation of the ‘Abendland’ 
requiring the containment of European nationalism in the form of supranational insti-
tutions. Radical federalists, their members being recruited from all sides of the politi-
cal spectrum, advocate a distinct institutional solution in the form of a European fed-
eration. Actors clustering around the ELEC limit their concerns to the effects of na-
tionalist competition on European welfare and are thus drawn to ‘functional’ supra-
national solutions in the economic sphere. Finally, it is shown that transatlantic ex-
changes were dominated by the federalist and, to a certain extent, the supranational 
model. At the same time, the ideological divisions, in particular in the transnational 
European space are considerable. Thus, the European Movement, as the overarching 
organization assembling the most influential transnational pressure groups and indi-
viduals, was characterized by an extreme divide. As a result, although it may have 
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disposed of the most significant resources, no uniform political pressure in a single 
direction would emanate from this organization. Thus, the dominant conclusion is 
one of a complex overarching transnational conflict that cannot be reduced to party 
ideologies and provided ample room for conflict dynamics. Moreover, even the fed-
eralist community – largely seen as ideologically homogenous in the previous chap-
ter – was based on a political compromise between rather diverse factions. Combined 
with the relative organizational weakness of these organizations, any transnational 
coalition formed on the basis of the transnational networks would be temporary, 
formed to achieve a specific political goal and dissolve afterwards rather quickly. 
As rhetorical commitments are conceptualized as the building-blocks of transnational 
trust, the chapter continues by reconstructing the transnational dynamics of coalition 
formation between the late 1940’s and the early 1950’s. Up until 1950, a tenuous 
compromise organized in the European Movement had overshadowed foundational 
differences between intergovernmentalists and federalists in particular. Persisting 
ideological differences – within Social Democracy and between the continent and the 
UK in particular – caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 within its 
main institutional forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Spurred by the succeeding negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a continen-
tal parliament, mobilized by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the strat-
egies of the major federalists and supranationalists finally began to converge: Feder-
alists put pressure on the Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the 
initiative of Paul-Henri Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded 
the ‘Action Committee for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 
1953); Christian Democrats put increasing pressure on Dutch and Belgian repre-
sentatives to lobby for a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; final-
ly, an identifiable elite of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact 
with Jean Monnet, successfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use 
to leverage of aid conditionality to effect a compromise. Documenting evidence from 
common written exchanges, meetings and conference attendance shows sufficient 
evidence of strategic coordination: the transnational coalition dominated the trans-
governmental scene, in particular between 1951 and 1953. After having realized a 
radical draft treaty for a European Political Community, the coalition began to disin-
tegrate: conflicts within the Federalist community and the failure of the EPC Draft 
Treaty to find support among the governments of the Six exposed the non-existent 
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organizational basis of the coalition. Lacking a viable common political goal, it dis-
integrated quickly. 
As a reflection of the transnational dimension of the political conflict over the EDC, 
however, there are traceable effects. Chapter 7 argues that these effects can be identi-
fied in two dimensions.  
First, since actors engaged in the transnational coalition pursued similar if not identi-
cal political goals domestically, the degree of domestic conflict and differences over 
preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within 
and across parties, was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the for-
mation of state preferences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on 
the quality of domestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every 
country. Consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Social-
ist parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of inter-
nal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger conti-
nental countries, were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institu-
tions with appropriate democratic institutions to create a European Army. The extent 
of the conflict varied and depended on national conditions. It divided the French 
SFIO heavily and reinforced divisions between the two existent Italian Social Demo-
cratic Parties. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the Social 
Democratic party leadership seemed decisive: whereas the leadership in Germany 
and the Netherlands was relatively remote from the Europeanist transnational net-
works, the leadership in Belgium (Paul Henri Spaak) was part of its most active core. 
While not negating differences in institutional demands between, for example, larger 
and smaller continental, there is a sufficient disconnect: for example, the Christian 
Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar objectives as the Dutch 
multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the Social Democratic leader-
ship under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the distribution of capabili-
ties and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the dominant demands on the 
other hand, which cannot be explained otherwise. Domestic elites that are active in 
the transnational communities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war 
Europe tend to do so with regard to the problem of German rearmament within do-
mestic political conflict. Domestic elites that are remote from these communities 
tend to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and 
German elites tend to view the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as 
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increasing the international influence of their countries, whereas others favor classic 
Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserve national sovereignty (i.e. the 
Gaullists in France), or deny the existential threat posed by the Soviet government 
and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. .some Brit-
ish, French and German Social Democrats). 
Thus, actors continue to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material cir-
cumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. Without the outbreak of the Korean 
War, no Western government would have considered German rearmament at the 
time, certainly not via the creation of a European Army. In this sense, geopolitical 
incentives provide the necessary conditions. Without US pressure exerted on Euro-
pean governments to come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken 
longer. Without French internal differences that allowed the credible signal of do-
mestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have taken the course that was 
seemingly preferred by all governments except the French in 1950, namely German 
entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional safeguards as suggested by 
the ‘package deal’.  
These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that geostrategic considerations 
require interpretable and causal analysis, which in turn left ample space for the trans-
national conflict to have its mark. Thus, the French divisions implied that a particular 
version of the French national interest – shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – 
vehemently pushed for a European army against mounting domestic scepticism and 
at considerable risk, in particular whether it would be possible to muster sufficient 
domestic support for their own project. The supranational option, initially considered 
and discarded by the US government, was taken in 1951 then largely on account of 
the activities of Monnet and Schuman in France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a 
French-German agreement on institutional equality – the outlines of which had been 
exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous chapter has 
demonstrated - and federalist pressure on the Italian government to reconsider its 
position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were ideologically 
close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices to be in accord-
ance with in the national interest; in every case, there were other compatriots – espe-
cially in the military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in 
as much as French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assess-
ment transmitted within and coordinated by transgovernmental and transnational 
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circles pushed the bargain along a supranational track. The positions of the bigger 
three governments in Paris thus shifted in 1951 partially as a result of maneuvering 
to convince the US government to reconsider its position on the European army; par-
tially as a result of changing embeddedness as De Gasperi explicitly appointed a fed-
eralist leader of the Italian delegation and a principled opponent of German rearma-
ment – Jules Moch – left the French government. This created a new situation in 
which the EDC was supported by the leadership of the US and the three larger conti-
nental countries. In consequence, a new line of conflict over the institutions of the 
EDC between the governments of the smaller states and the larger state emerges. 
However, the risk that was taken was as considerable as the proposed solution was 
radical. The final treaty violated two of three conditions for ratification that the As-
semblée National had put forward in 1952. The Treaty, as indicated by Art. 38, did 
not submit the Army to a complete political authority yet, nor was British participa-
tion obtained. While the widely perceived lack of a proper subjection of the new mil-
itary authority to democratically ‘appropriate’ institutions necessitated, as Article 38 
put it, ‘confederal or federal’ structures, the British government suggested the ‘Eden 
Plan’ to provide for both conditions. This confederal alternative, however, was dis-
carded, in favour of the path advocated by the new transnational coalition of federal-
ists and European supranationalists around Spaak.  
The irony is that although the intention behind the creation of the Ad Hoc Assembly 
was to increase the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty, it would arguably affect 
the opposite in France. By 1953, domestic changes in France and Italy affected these 
governments: underlying ideological convictions of both the French and the Italian 
governmental coalitions shifted by 1953, as indicated by the structural analysis per-
formed in chapter 6. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed to the federalist inter-
pretation of the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied support in Trieste and rely-
ing on increasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratification procedure was 
delayed significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on Gaullist support and 
public agitation against the EDC Treaty. In both cases, thus, geopolitical incentives 
and a shifting proximity of governmental cabinets to the transnational coalition mat-
tered. The latter ensured that ideological preferences for supranational solutions to 
the German problem became less salient as geopolitical developments such as Sta-
lin’s death made it seem less and less imperative. Again, geopolitical incentives are 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
22 
 
necessary, but insufficient: thus, Stalin’s death and the perspective of détente did not 
alter the ratification prospects in Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. In France 
and Italy, domestic instability shifted the control of parliamentary majorities and 
governments away from the influence of individuals in proximity to the transnational 
coalition. 
These shifts, however, were not taken into account adequately by the remaining gov-
ernments. The US government in particular began to exhibit a peculiar ideological 
bias: whereas the Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the suprana-
tional army solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that 
had, earlier, been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal 
to consider, internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of 
senior officials in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic 
planning preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which 
had in fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to 
delay ratification particularly in France and Italy. In as much as the influence of su-
pranational and federalist ideas advocated by core actors of the transnational coali-
tion led the bargain along the EDC track, they effected a peculiar bias in the ways in 
which actors particularly in Germany and the US processed information. US decision 
makers seemed to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the 
German leadership seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the 
increasingly bleak assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Bel-
gian Foreign Minister, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors, 
providing evidence that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments. 
As a result, the French government under Pierre Mendès France, who was voted into 
power with the explicit commitment to seek a renegotiation of the treaty, was met 
with extreme mistrust and accusations of having made secret deals with Soviet lead-
ers to demolish the EDC Treaty. The conditions that Mendès France put forward – 
most importantly the abolishment of Art. 38 and a moratorium of eight years on ma-
jority decisions in the EDC Council of Ministers – were not even considered serious-
ly by the assembled foreign ministers in Brussels in early August 1954. By sticking 
to a widely held view that there was a majority in the French Assemblée Nationale, 
actors such as Adenauer and Spaak rejected an institutional compromise they would, 
grosso modo, agree upon four years later in Messina and Rome. In as much as these 
actors ideological proximity and mutual trust successfully provided for an astonish-
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ing degree of mutual trust, in particular among former enemies of the war, it provid-
ed for inefficiencies as well. As the final months of 1954 showed, the insistence on 
the creation of a supranational army had done little but prolonged the negotiations for 
four years. 
 
Lessons learned and implications for further research 
The results of this dissertation add additional credibility to the argument that Europe-
an integration can be analyzed in terms of an emerging transnational and suprana-
tional polity from the beginning (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008). The 
present dissertation thus seeks to contribute to this debate by considering the EDC 
from a distinct analytical framework that allows for devising testable hypotheses that 
can be directly juxtaposed to the main theoretical rival of intergovernmentalism. 
Thus, a primary result of this dissertation is that the conflict of ideas that Craig Par-
sons has analyzed for the case of France was in actuality a transnational conflict 
among the political elite of Europe (Parsons 2002, 2003). That conflict did not mani-
fest itself equally across the main party families of Christian Democracy and Social 
Democracy and was mediated by specific national contexts. In this sense, this disser-
tation contributes to an emerging view of post-war Europe that reemphasizes the role 
of ideas and transnational networks for the origins of European integration (Lipgens 
and Loth 1977; Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010). Thus, 
future research on the role of ideas and transnational networks in the history of Euro-
pean integration may benefit from combining a distinct theoretically informed ap-
proach with a mixed-methods design that identifies both the structural aspects of 
networks as well as the content of rhetorical exchanges transmitted within them. A 
particularly interesting question consists in continuing to trace the possible impact 
that transnational contacts and efforts at building and maintaining trust had during 
the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome and throughout the remaining key stages in 
the history of European integration. 
Second, this dissertation emphasizes that quantitative and qualitative empirical 
methods can be and should be combined. As it was beneficial for the specific histori-
cal problem to combine theoretically guided research drawing on theoretical argu-
ments and methods across the theoretical and methodological divides of the disci-
pline, a similar approach is recommended for work studying the role and impact of 
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transnational networks on other problems. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the 
structural aspects of learning in networks yielded the consideration of a mechanism – 
related to the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004) – that 
showed that a naïve treatment of transnational or regulatory networks that discounts 
questions of trust structures is deeply problematic. Thus, situations in which key de-
cision makers rely on ideologically homogenous sources of information may tend to 
produce errors of judgment and suboptimal outcomes. In the present case, it pro-
duced an error of judgment that, essentially, prevented the creation of a specific con-
figuration of institutional elements, judged from a normative perspective, was far 
more superior with regard to its envisioned degree of democratic representation, than 
any solution proposed thereafter. 
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2. Theoretical Context, Review, and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the basic outlines of two alternative theoret-
ical frameworks: first, the intergovernmentalist frameworks as the analytical ‘work-
horse’ for understanding international dynamics; second, an alternative ‘transnational 
framework’ that aims to straighten out two weaknesses of intergovernmentalism. I 
argue that, under certain conditions, intergovernmentalism tends to produce mislead-
ing characterizations both of the preference formation as well as bargaining dynam-
ics between states. In particular, intergovernmentalism relies, implicitly or explicitly, 
on the effectiveness of the institutions and values of the nation-state: nationalist val-
ues and identities as well as domestic institutions such as parties provide the glue for 
domestic conflict to remain ‘contained’ within the organizational apparatus of the 
state, discourage transnational formation of trust and, by extension, the formation of 
coalitions across states among actors with potentially similar interests. Whereas this 
state of affairs arguably describes major parts of international history adequately, the 
post-war world, I will argue, was different. Actors with similar interests and ideas 
found it advantageous to organize across borders. Loose but existent mutual en-
gagement in transnational networks may lead to the formation of trust among like-
minded actors through rhetorical commitments to common values. Domestic actors 
gain international political capital in exchange for domestic programmatic commit-
ments and, as a result, political conflict acquires a partial transnational dimension 
through the formation of transnational coalitions. 
I argue that two consequences follow. First, by ‘embedding’ governments in transna-
tional and transgovernmental networks, institutional preferences are less affected by 
power differences between states and more affected by the dominant ideologies that 
shape the institutional preferences of governments. A second implication concerns 
the relationship of ‘bargaining efficiency’ and transnational and transgovernmental 
networks respectively. Whereas the standard intergovernmentalist view of bargaining 
ignores the role of transgovernmental networks for the distribution of information 
among governments, much of the current literature on transnational networks does 
not adequately address the relationship between network structure and learning out-
comes. Conceptualizing network structure adequately implies rejecting a naïve but 
widespread interpretation of transnational networks as efficient information transmit-
ters. By reviewing the insights from the formal and experimental literature studying 
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the ‘wisdom of crowds’, I argue that transgovernmental networks of trust may yield 
not only influence but impede bargaining inefficiency if the beliefs of a few dispro-
portionately well connected – ‘central’ – individuals and groups have a dispropor-
tionate impact on the beliefs of all participants of the bargain. 
The main thrust of the argument is not to dispute the suitability of the broad inter-
governmental framework in a variety of empirical settings. Transnational coalitions 
based on transnational networks are relatively fluid and weak associations. They do 
not overwhelm the incentives provided by national identities, domestic institutions, 
international material circumstances and geopolitical incentives, or domestic con-
cerns of political actors for their own political survival. At the same time, their effect 
is far from unsystematic and, if ignored, leads to erroneous accounts of ‘state behav-
ior’ that remain wedded to an overly idealized image of the “container-state” 
(Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364). 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the explanandum, distinguishing 
preferences and strategies that make for the ‘negotiation dance’ of intergovernmental 
bargains in which actors seek to negotiate agreements through the exchange of offers 
and counteroffers, i.e. ‘bargaining positions (section 2.1). The subsequent section 
deals with the intergovernmentalist framework (section 2.2). It begins by outlining 
the basic conditions for intergovernmentalist assumptions to hold (2.2.1), provides a 
brief review of two kinds of sources of state preferences, i.e. Realist (2.2.2) and Lib-
eral Intergovernmentalism (2.2.3), and proceeds to formulate basic hypotheses for 
the formation of state preferences (2.2.4) and bargaining behavior (2.2.5).  
The subsequent section develops the transnational framework (section 2.3). It begins 
by reviewing the current literature on the role of transnational networks for explain-
ing ‘state behavior’, arguing that there is untapped potential in the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches – both analytically as well as empirically – as 
there are complementary shortcomings (2.3.1). The subsequent section (2.3.2) then 
specifies the concepts of transnational and transgovernmental networks uniting actors 
common purposes, values, and goals. Provided that actors in these networks are em-
bedded in the governmental hierarchy, focusing on the state as a coherent and corpo-
rate actor may lead to erroneous conclusions. The subsequent sections build on these 
arguments, maintaining that under such circumstances, intergovernmentalist hypoth-
eses do not explain state preferences sufficiently: governments whose actors are em-
bedded in similar networks will tend to form similar preferences (2.3.3), and will 
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tend to deal with information differently as a defining feature of transnational net-
works is trust (2.3.4). A summary (2.4) contrasts both sets of hypotheses. 
2.1 Definitions: Preferences and Strategies 
I assume that all actors – be they individual or corporate actors – behave ‘rationally. 
Thus, I first need to briefly sketch and define the key components of rational behav-
ior: desires, preferences and strategies (Elster 1989).
11
 Rational decisions depend on 
a range of possible alternatives and outcomes. Rational actors are assumed to evalu-
ate outcomes in light of their desirability and their likelihood of becoming reality. 
These valuations are called preferences. Rationality implies actors that formulate 
preferences over outcomes so that they conform to certain formal requirements, such 
as transitivity and completeness (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein 1994: xi). Being theo-
retical concepts, preferences are unobservable: they are “developed by first imposing 
rationality axioms on the decision-maker’s preferences and then analysing the conse-
quences of these preferences for her choice behaviour (i.e. decisions-made)” (Mas-
Colell, et al. 1995, 5). Given certain desires and beliefs, rational behaviour seeks to 
realize the actor’s most preferred outcome in the most efficient way. 
Desires may be related to ‘objective’ material factors – i.e. desires for power and 
wealth – or subjective factors related to deep seated values or ideologies. The former 
approach has been described as ‘thick rationality’, while the latter has been described 
as ‘thinly rational’ (Green and Shapiro 1994, 17, 18). One reason is that ‘thick ra-
tionality’ provides an account of simple and constant desires. Thus, the analysis of 
behaviour is more straightforward as fewer motives of action are possible. In the 
context of ‘thin rationality’, subjective factors enter into the equation. The literature 
has a diverse terminology for such factors: ‘mental models’, ‘beliefs’, ‘ideas’, 
                                                 
11
 I do not consider a number of theories that are usually referred to as constructivist or ‘radical con-
structivists’ (Wendt 1999). Rather, all actors are assumed to be rational actors. The reason: while both 
moderate and radical constructivists emphasize the role of values and ideas shaping behavior, explana-
tory strategies are usually of two kinds. Either, the analysis is agnostic concerning “the constraint/ 
conversion divide” (Parsons 2003, 16) and readily admits that actors behave strategically (e.g. Blyth 
2002). In such cases, actors may be assumed to pursue ideological goals, but such behavior may be 
readily amenable to categories commonly described as ‘rational choice’. More radical approaches 
content that discourse and language shape behavior a deeper level. Such accounts do not offer ‘theo-
ries of behaviour’, i.e. they do not provide an account of how actors with similar ideas or in similar 
discursive formations act and react differently to differing incentives and are thus not useful for my 
purposes (Esser 1996, 1999). 
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‘frames’, etc. (Goffman 1974; Goldstein and Keohane 1993a; Denzau and North 
1994). In the rationalist versions, ideas are ‘toolkits’ available to make sense of the 
environment (Swidler 1986; DiMaggio 1997). According to this argument, actors are 
predisposed to ‘interpret’ their situation (their chances for reelection, the prospects of 
success of a specific policy proposal etc.) according to dominant ideas or frames 
(Esser 1996, 1999). Thus, by linking action to certain outcomes rather than others, 
they influence rational behavior. The difficulty lies in the fact that, first, the range of 
possible motives is significantly larger and that subjective factors, (i.e. learning on 
account of new information or through deeper processes of socialization and mutual 
influence) may change and are less readily observable. 
On way to classify the subjective factors further is to distinguish between different 
levels of generality of beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993a, 8). Thus, world views 
(i.e. religions, sovereignty, and the nation) describe deep-seated ‘ontologies’ by 
which actors understand the political world. Principled beliefs or “conceptions of the 
desirable” (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28) similarly provide constraints over 
desirable and undesirable outcomes. Causal beliefs connect actions to outcomes and 
manifest themselves in ‘causal stories’ (Stone 1989). A final subjective element con-
cerns strategic beliefs that encompass information and beliefs about the motives, 
preferences, and beliefs of other actors and thus inform strategic behaviour as well. 
In sum, desires, and beliefs combine to produce actor behavior. In the context of this 
dissertation, the explanandum is more accurately called ‘state behavior’: in interna-
tional strategic interaction and particular in interstate bargains, the ‘state’, as repre-
sented by the leadership at the top of the organizational hierarchy, reveals ‘its’ pref-
erences through ‘bargaining behavior’, the empirical manifestation of which has 
prominently been called a ‘negotiation dance’ (Raiffa 1982, 66, 68). It describes the 
give and take of communicated positions, threats, and compromises- i.e. ‘positions’ 
that actors take on a certain issue. Thus, ‘state behavior’ within interstate bargains 
can be reconstructed as a succession of ‘different positions’ that states or the repre-
sentatives have rhetorically and publicly adopted as their ‘goal’ or condition for mu-
tual agreement. They can be either qualitatively reconstructed or measured quantita-
tively over time (Thurner 2006, 189). In both cases, explaining a bargain is to analyt-
ically reconstruct that ‘negotiation dance’ by reference to actor preferences and their 
strategic choices (c.f. Sebenius 1992). 
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Adopting the ‘negotiation dance’ of the EDC as my explanandum, will focus pri-
marily on the issue of institutional design. In order to categorize different position 
and describe their change, I can rely on a wide literature on institutional design both 
in international relations and European integration. The differences in the categories 
capturing institutional variations used in the literature largely relate to different theo-
retical interests. Thus, following Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Börzel distin-
guishes between the level and scope of authority to characterize institutional change 
overtime (Börzel 2005). Koremenos and colleagues distinguish between member-
ship, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility (Koremenos, et al. 2001). Pollack 
emphasizes the issue of control in a more detailed manner through application of 
contract theory and the implied theorization of principal-agent relationships (Pollack 
1997, 2003). A different approach distinguishes between centralization, functional 
scope, and territorial extension, all of which may vary in different according to re-
spective policy related fields (Leuffen, et al. 2012, 8). A further important element is 
the degree to which parliamentary representation is included or not (Rittberger 2003, 
2005, 2009). Finally, institutions may vary according to the degree of legalization 
(Keohane, et al. 2000).  
I do not seek to address the complete bargain. Rather, I focus on a number of key 
issues that cut at the normative core of the nation-state and institutional issues related 
to the pooling and delegation of authority. Thus, for my purposes, it suffices to assess 
the positions taken over time by reference to three categories. I concentrate, first, on 
differences in the degree to which actors seek to pool decision-making; second, on 
differences in the degree to which decision-making is centralized or decentralized 
over multiple units; third, I consider differences in the degree to which actors call for 
parliamentary representation and control. Apart from simplifying the existing 
measures, I will leave out the issue of legalization for two reasons. First, I do not 
wish to systematically and exhaustively test competing hypotheses on institutional 
design, but rather seek to identify blind spots within the current theoretical literature 
on interstate bargains. Second, I seek to uncover the relationship between transna-
tional networks and political conflict over European institutions in post-war Europe 
with regard to the EDC. A limited number of categories suffice to capture the main 
variation with regard to the EDC bargain as well as key differences between the two 
theoretical frameworks. They are summarized in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Explanandum I: Institutional Design 
Pooling/ Control 
 
None Low Medium High 
Decision Rules 
All decisions 
by unanimity 
Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV) 
decision for limited 
number of low 
salience issues 
QMV for several 
issues of medium/ 
high salience (e.g. 
strong distributive 
consequences) 
QMV is the rule; 
Unanimity only 
in cases of treaty 
changing deci-
sions 
Delegation 
 
None Low Medium High 
Executive  
Centralization 
Preparation of 
decisions is left 
to national 
delegations 
Independent body, 
secretariat and 
gathering infor-
mation to monitor-
ing compliance 
Monitoring, Agen-
da setting, partial 
implementation, 
limited sanctioning 
Sanctioning non-
compliance 
Parliamentary 
Representation/ 
Legislative  
Control 
No parliament 
National delegates, 
meetings sporadi-
cally, advisory role 
Regular meetings, 
delegates or elect-
ed representatives, 
consulting/ limited 
co-decision (need 
to be overruled) 
Co-decision on 
high salience 
issues, appoint-
ment and control 
of Commission/ 
Executive 
 
The first dimension comprises the pooling of decision-making that Koremenos and 
colleagues describe as control since unanimity implies that individual states, through 
their veto, can block decisions they do not find beneficial (Koremenos, et al. 2001). 
Degrees of difference are here reduced to voting rules and their scope. At the lowest 
level, no pooling implies unanimity, a case in which each state has a veto over essen-
tially all common decisions. Majority decisions may then gradually be extended over 
a number of lower salience issues – i.e. issues that concern the implementation of 
decisions or such as regulatory decision with little distributive consequences. A new 
qualitative step occurs when majority decisions are introduced for high salience is-
sues with significant distributive consequence. At the end of the spectrum, all deci-
sions are made by the majority of votes, perhaps exempting more fundamental treaty 
changes. 
Executive centralization refers to the degree to which an independent body is in-
volved in the preparation and implementation of common decisions. Next to no in-
volvement, the use of independent agencies for gathering information on the compli-
ance of contracting states with their contractual obligations is the “least intrusive 
form of centralization” (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 771). The next qualitative step in-
volves an independent body in the decision-making process within international or-
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ganizations through shared or exclusive agenda-setting rights and delegates the pow-
er of implementation over some issues to that body, while leaving the implementa-
tion of other issues to the contracting states. It may imply limited sanctioning capa-
bilities. At the extreme end, complete centralization founds a new supranational ex-
ecutive that fully implements common decisions and monopolizes sanctioning over 
the issues involved. 
For heuristic purposes, the degree of parliamentary representation can be divided 
roughly into four categories. Next to the absence of any parliamentary body, repre-
sentative institutions may be present, but meet sporadically with their rights and in-
volvement in common decision-making processes limited to an observing or merely 
consulting role. A further stage requires more frequent meetings of delegates or di-
rectly elected representatives and expands their rights. It minimally involves co-
decision, that is, vetoes regarding certain issues have obligatory consequences unless 
overruled by other institutional players. At the extreme end of the spectrum, elected 
representatives are involved in deciding high salience issues, amounting to an effec-
tive veto and the appointment of the central ‘executive’ body. It implies effective 
parliamentary control including the rights to force it to resign. 
These four dimensions roughly correspond to the spectrum between interstate coop-
eration on the one hand and the hierarchical governance and separation of powers in 
democratic states on the other hand – apart from the judiciary of course. It suffices to 
track changes in the ‘bargaining positions’ of those states involved in the EDC bar-
gain over time and allows a better exposition of the two competing theoretical 
frameworks to which I turn in the next section. 
2.2 Intergovernmentalism, a Review 
Intergovernmentalist or state-centered frameworks share the assumption that interna-
tional relations can adequately be described as competition between states for scarce 
resources (e.g. Pollack 2012). Thus, governments are treated as the ‘representative 
agent’ of the state as a corporate actor (e.g. Scharpf 1997, ch. 6). As an analytical 
‘tradition’, it contains many ‘classic’ influences from ‘grand theories’ of internation-
al relations, mostly realism and liberalism. It comes in two variants: a realist perspec-
tive represented largely by classical realist and neorealist arguments (Morgenthau 
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1948; Hoffman 1966; Waltz 1979); and a liberal variant (Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 
2008). Classical realist arguments are implicit in a number of diplomatic and eco-
nomic histories of post-war Europe emphasizing the central role of the state as actor 
while identifying material as well as ideological ‘state interests’ as primary explana-
tory factors for the institutional landscape in post-war Europe (Hoffman 1966; 
Milward 1984, 2000). Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a classic and standard theory 
claiming to explain the outcomes of major intergovernmental conferences in the his-
tory of European Integration (Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 2000b, 2000a). In the field of 
international relations, the focus on state actors having specific and largely material 
interests plays a central part in the literature on international institutions, institutional 
design as well as associated regional integration theories (e.g. Keohane 1984; Mattli 
1999a; Koremenos, et al. 2001; Cooley and Spruyt 2009). Intergovernmental as-
sumptions regarding the centrality of the state as an actor are influential in institu-
tionalist analyses of intergovernmental bargaining, institutionalist integration theo-
ries as well as in the scholarship on legislative decision-making in the EU insofar as 
material governmental preferences and rational ‘state bargaining behavior’ are im-
portant building blocks (Milner 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001; Pollack 2003; 
Thomson, et al. 2006). In short, intergovernmentalism comprises the dominant as-
sumptions through which the world of international relations is usually understood. 
These assumptions can, by and large, be reduced to four (Rittberger 2012, 80). The 
first assumption holds that states are the primary actors in world politics. The second 
assumption may be more controversial when spelled out explicitly: states act at least 
somewhat rationally on the basis of their material or ideological interests. Third, in-
tergovernmentalism assumes that states anticipate cooperation problems and design 
institutional solutions to them on the basis of efficiency, distributional, and norm 
based concerns. This assumption is the main tenet of so-called Liberal and Neo-
liberal theories of international regime formation and institutional change. Fourth, 
the Liberal paradigm equally stipulates that governments – as the ‘representative 
agents’ of ‘the state’ – need to adjust to the two-level’ game of international politics 
and domestic political conflicts. Section 2.2.1 will argue that these assumptions are 
suitable to a world in which nationalist values are widespread and seen as legitimate 
and the organization of the state is effective at enforcing hierarchical decision-
making.  
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Although committed to a similar framework, Realists and Liberalist tend to disagree 
on the main incentives to which state-preferences respond: Realists emphasize the 
role of the material distribution of capabilities, power, and geopolitical threats (sec-
tion 2.2.2) whereas Liberals emphasize the role of domestic conflicts, economic in-
terests and political ideologies (section 2.2.3). In order to inform preferences on insti-
tutional design, there are further differences concerning the central concerns that 
states care about: there are arguments emphasizing concerns for efficiency, relative 
power, as well as norms and core ideologies for appropriate institutions (section 
2.2.4). Finally, there are substantial differences regarding the main determinants of 
bargaining behavior: realists, as an implication of their theory of preferences, main-
tain that power differences determine success at the bargaining table, discard domes-
tic changes and emphasize changes subjective threat assessments and geopolitical 
events as sources of strategic adjustment. Liberals emphasize the role of the ‘two-
level game’, i.e. the domestic constellation of conflict as a potentially paradoxical 
source of bargaining power and argue that domestic shifts in the dominant coalition 
may lead to strategic adjustments as well (section 2.2.5). 
A summary (section 2.2.6) briefly recaps the arguments of the intergovernmentalist 
framework. 
2.2.1 When Are Intergovernmentalist Assumptions Plausible? 
As already pointed out, intergovernmentalism as a theory of state preference for-
mation and ‘rational state behavior’ hinges on the treatment of the state as a ‘repre-
sentative agent’ – a coherent rational actor. This assumption analytically simplifies 
the task of the researcher and, as its pervasiveness demonstrates, explains a large 
number of issues related to international cooperation. Occam’s razor would dictate 
that, if an interstate bargain may be described and analyzed by reference to a dozen 
corporate actors, without loss of explanatory power, as compared to the interaction of 
several hundred or potentially thousands of individuals, the former should be pre-
ferred. 
Assessing the empirical plausibility of the intergovernmentalist actor assumption has 
two sides: it involves both the treatment of the state as a site of processes of collec-
tive preference formation well as the ability of the state, as a corporate actor, to enact 
strategies. The former concerns the ways in which the international incentives com-
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bined with domestic institutionalized conflict provide the ‘input’ of the political sys-
tem by a process of demand formulation that remains within the “container-state” 
(Genschel and Leibfried 2008, 364). The latter concerns the formal hierarchy of the 
organization of the state to enforce coherence in external appearance and to disci-
pline its ‘agents’ – its individual actors within the hierarchy – to adhere to the agreed 
upon strategies (Scharpf 1997, 54, 55). How plausible is that ‘containment’ of con-
flict and will formation, that is, the confinement of conflict and its resolution to the 
territory of the state in a process of domestic conflict in which transnational relations 
play an analytically negligible role? How plausible is it to assume the ability of the 
organization of the state to act rationality, that is, to maximize a given end in com-
plex environments – such as international negotiations – including the ability to ac-
quire information as to the strategically best way to behave based on knowledge of 
others’ intentions (strategic uncertainty) as well as the ability to solve technical, le-
gal, and socio-economic problems to select the causally effective policies or institu-
tions (causal uncertainty)? 
From a sociological perspective, the ‘confinement’ of domestic conflict during pro-
cesses of preference formation seems entirely appropriate in the presence of strong 
national identities. Nationalism, simply put, is a notion of collective identity that co-
incided historically with the formation of the modern state (Gellner 1983; Bayly 
2004, 206 ff.). Whether in its ethnic or civic variant (Kohn 1944), its defining feature 
is the “principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” 
(Gellner 1983, 1). Hence, nationalism is a “conception of the desirable” (Van Deth 
and Scarbrough 1995, 28). It confers legitimacy to the state and its territory as an 
expression of political self-determination of those belonging to the citizenry as an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). It thereby gives an imagined unity, but only 
to those who ‘belong’. Nationalism has a ‘mythological content’ that narrates collec-
tive identities through “stories of trust and worth” (Smith 2003, 56). Hence, apart 
from its more or less ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), the cultural 
repertoire of nationalism comprises ‘ethically constitutive stories’ (Smith 2003 ch. 
2), i.e. a collective identity that prescribes normatively relationships of trust and 
worth between the members of a nation. Accordingly, nationalism and exclusive na-
tionalist identities have been empirically linked to patterns of trust formation and 
demarcation (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Hence, from a sociological perspective, 
nationalism is a normative principle that finds expression in formal institutions or-
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ganizing and delineating membership and access to processes of collective prefer-
ence-formation within ‘national’ borders. On the international level, it legitimizes 
norms of ‘national sovereignty’ and thus contributes to the ‘organized hypocrisy’ of 
that norm in international relations (Krasner 1999). 
Going further one might say, it is also a world of ‘organized mistrust’, a demarcating 
line of authority and loyalty the crossing of which is considered ‘inappropriate’.12 
The persistence of such values implies little meaningful transnational contact and 
thereby decreases expectations of repeated play among actors; different normative 
attachments or ‘conceptions of desirable’ forms of behavior – norms – decrease the 
subjective expectation of meeting ‘cooperating’ actors; different languages and cul-
tures raise the transaction costs of verifying reputations, i.e. whether professed norms 
of behavior match observable behavior. Under such conditions, research in behavior-
al micro-economics suggests, mistrust is an ‘equilibrium outcome’, likely to remain 
absent in ‘anarchical fields’ such as markets or international interaction (Bowles 
2004, 248). It is thus feasible to speculate that, even in the face of strong economic 
integration and partially converging economic interests among actors across states, 
mistrust due to nationalist divides may be resilient due to cultural and linguistic bar-
riers. Nationalist divisions thus contain the formation of political coalitions within-
states: political conflict remains organized at the national level. 
While the process of collective will formation provides the ends of state-behavior, 
the second side of the state-as-actor assumption implies the ability of the state to con-
form to requirements of rational action, justifying to posit ‘state-behavior’ as ex-
planandum, the object of which is the organizational output of the state in the form 
of public declarations, etc. At a first approximation, the requirements that need to be 
fulfilled are threefold. First, the ‘input’ of collective will-formation must be translat-
ed into a set of preferences that are transitive and complete over possible outcomes. 
Second, as a corporate actor, the state must be capable of discipling members to 
comply with and carry out certain decisions, even if they disagree individually. 
Third, the state must be capable to deal with uncertainty and complexity in a rational 
manner, that is, its organizational capacities must approximate the ‘computational 
                                                 
12
 Quote from an ‘experienced summiteer’ (G7), “If someone in Washington wanted to play one part 
of my government against another, I would tell him, ‘Get out immediately; it’s none of your business.’ 
So I wouldn’t like to interfere in any other friendly government’s internal controversies. As long as it 
doesn’t become known, okay, but once it became known, everyone would think that it was totally 
inappropriate.” (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 210). 
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demands’ that rational decision-making implies, as well as the ability of the state as a 
‘principal’ to hold its agents in check. 
The traditional challenge to the formal requirement of rationality is the psychology 
of decision-making that, through framing and other effects, violates formal rationali-
ty maxims (Kahneman and Tversky 2000).The state as an organization, however, is 
characterized by a set of qualities that, arguably, contribute towards organizational 
decision-making conforming to those requirements and working against individual 
psychological factors preventing the ‘rational’ formulation of goals and the specific 
ordered implementation of particular strategies (Geser 1990). As a distinct product of 
Western modernization, the state, in its organization, embodies the myths and pre-
scriptions of formal rationalized decision-making as the repertoire of modern organi-
zational forms (Meyer and Rowan 1977). As a modern organization, the capability to 
appear as international actor is incorporated through the bureaucratic division of la-
bor to deal with work-load, standardized routines are part of an specific organiza-
tional culture of decision-making that conforms to the demands of being a state in the 
Westphalian system, capable of conducting ‘foreign policy’ (Allison and Zelikow 
1999, 145, 146). These considerations lend plausibility to the assumptions of states 
conforming to formal requirements of rational action.  
The supposed ability of any rational actor to deal with uncertainty and complexity in 
a rational manner is equally rooted in the ‘rational’ organizational form of the state. 
First, the organizational ability for the division of labor that is characteristic of mod-
ern organizations, equipped by ‘specialized’ personnel, should allow the gathering 
and utilization of considerable amounts of information (Geser 1990). This ability 
relates both to issues of causal as well as strategic uncertainty. Causal complexity is 
addressed through specialized and compartmentalized bureaucratic structures in 
which the respective specialized and ‘qualified’ personnel is tasked to find solutions 
to given problems. Strategic uncertainty is addressed through a traditional institu-
tional structure of embassies and other organizational units that are tasked with in-
formation-gathering and thus to provide a picture of any strategic situation that is as 
complete as possible (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 145, 146). 
Moreover, the ability of this organization to enforce rules hierarchically is apparent. 
Having emerged at least partially through interstate competition (Tilly 1975, 38), its 
key features are standing armies, an ‘adaptation’ to these conflicts; states, at first, are 
no more than a means to build and retain organizational structures that sustain armies 
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and employ them successfully in war (Tilly 1985, 1993). The material ‘monopoly of 
force’ domestically then provides an effective legal framework or other public goods 
that encourage wealth generation and the emergence of markets, especially property 
rights (Spruyt 2002, 139). This ability corresponds to the ability to exhibit highly 
strategic and rational ‘behavior’ internationally, be it diplomatically or in war. The 
hierarchical organizational structure equally allows a clear definition of preference 
orderings as well as their enforcement, even in the face of possible internal conflict. 
At the same time, bureaucratic politics can lead to distinct dynamics that decrease the 
control of the leadership over the bureaucratic apparatus. Liberal intergovernmental-
ism in principle deals with the Principal-Agent problem that may, under certain con-
ditions, lead to a loss of control, for example of governments (principals) over dele-
gations tasked with the negotiation of international treaties, for example (Milner 
1997). 
Nevertheless, institutional and identity related arguments lend a high plausibility to 
intergovernmentalist assumptions. If, however, the empirical conditions undermine 
either one of them, one would expect that the empirical usefulness of Intergovern-
mentalism declines. From the preceding considerations, it emerges that interactions 
between individuals across states that are based on similar political ideologies and 
create political trust among them would call these assumptions into question. The 
confinement of political conflict into nation-states would be undermined as actors 
with similar ideological preferences face incentives to form coalitions across states 
and the role of domestic institutions, in particular parties, to provide structure to po-
litical conflict would be diminished. 
Having summarized preconditions for the usefulness of intergovernmentalist as-
sumptions, I now turn to two substantive versions of the framework, beginning with 
the Realist variant. 
2.2.2 Realist Intergovernmentalism: Material Capabilities and Geopolitics 
Realist theory is at home when analyzing the foundational source of conflict in inter-
state relations: security. The foundation of the realist perspective consists in the 
‘Hobbesian tradition’ in international relations theory (Vincent 1981; Doyle 1997, 
ch. 3). That tradition comes in two variants that characterize the basic ‘security inter-
ests’ that inform state security preferences. One tradition consists in the classical 
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realist school (Morgenthau 1948; Hoffman 1966; Carr 2001 [1945]). Focusing on 
interstate competition for scarce resources in a hostile international world, this broad 
framework in effect explains the choices made by political leaders by reference to 
hypothesized geopolitical ‘state interests’ and figures prominently in the historiog-
raphy of post-war Europe. The second rationalist interpretation of the Hobbesian 
view is Neorealist theory: international anarchy being the structural ordering princi-
ple, states are the only (rational) actors who, in the absence of functional differentia-
tion, must primarily be concerned for their own survival (Waltz 1979). As the distri-
bution of material capabilities is the only qualification distinguishing states – and as 
power as the only safe source of security – the distribution of material capabilities 
‘objectively’ induces state interests (Waltz 1979, 97). Competition for scarce re-
sources in this competitive environment induces dynamics of alliance formation, 
defined as “formal associations of states for the use of […] military force” (Snyder 
1990, 104), in which states make promises of support to other states, either to bal-
ance the distribution of capabilities by aligning with weaker states, or to ‘bandwag-
on’ by aligning with the strongest in the international ‘system’ (Walt 1987, 17; 
Snyder 1997). 
Neorealism, as the more recent version, has spawned considerable criticism as well 
as an influential debate regarding its usefulness to explain individual state behavior. 
Organizationally, states need to adapt the incentive structure of the international sys-
tem and develop appropriate organizational structures in order to survive, but there is 
no inherent law dictating that they in fact do so. They may fail, but are likely to suf-
fer the consequences (Elman 1996). Arguments to the contrary point out that, pro-
vided that the assumption of the state as a rational actor is adequate, one would ex-
pect that Foreign Policy makers are sufficiently equipped to perceive their interests 
accurately and thus they should inform foreign policy choices (Fearon 1998). As-
suming the latter thus implies assuming that states can formulate and act upon ‘ob-
jective’ interests - i.e. they possess an ability for ‘thick rationality’ (Green and 
Shapiro 1994, 17, 18).  
In the same vein, dedicated theories of state preferences with regard to alliances usu-
ally start with a simple consideration. Provided that a number of states find them-
selves under a similar threat to each of them, as was certainly the case in post-war 
Europe, cooperation through alliance formation has obvious benefits. Alliances, 
however, are deeply problematic: promises of cooperation are ‘covenants without the 
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sword’, a mere window-dressing of the distribution of capabilities within the interna-
tional system (Mearsheimer 1995). Additional drawbacks consist in the fact that alli-
ances pose a considerable collective action problem that is highly salient since the 
security dilemma persists within alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Snyder 
1984). Hence, rational state-actors should anticipate such problems and design insti-
tutions that address such cooperation problems (Keohane 1984, 80 ff.). The sources 
of institutional preferences of states then replicate the Hobbesian logic: if the hierar-
chy of the state is, originally, an institutional solution to a security problem, there are 
conditions in which states would react according to a similar logic and construct lim-
ited hierarchies. This argument was first expounded in classical realist context with 
the advent of nuclear weapons (Herz 1957). More refined characterizations take into 
account the fact that collective action problems within alliances are structurally simi-
lar to cooperation problems in the economic sphere of human activity. Here, eco-
nomic institutions allow them to handle information asymmetries, decrease transac-
tion costs, and provide for solutions of collective action problems (e.g. Akerlof 1970; 
Williamson 1985).  
Theorizing such questions has brought realist arguments about states’ geopolitical 
interests in connection with institutional economics, in particular with Williamsons’ 
characterization of transaction costs to security issues leads to the consideration of to 
solve cooperation problems by providing credible commitments (Williamson 1979; 
Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). Centralized institutions – through pooling and delegation 
–provide credible commitments for alliance partners through ‘co-binding’ (Deudney 
and Ikenberry 1999, 182 ff.). The loss of autonomy that is entailed by committing to 
centralized institutions varies with context. Thus, ‘violence interdependence’, de-
fined as the increasing “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another” 
(Deudney 2007, 35), directly influences the degree to which states are willing to 
submit to common institutions: if the ability of the state to survive is no longer given, 
ensuring that cooperation is mutually beneficial becomes the primary goal. In sum, 
two factors influence the demand for centralized alliance institutions: objectively, 
increasing levels of violence interdependence, i.e. increasing technological and mate-
rial capabilities for destruction, imply incentives to move away from hierarchy to-
wards more centralized common institutions (Deudney 1995; Weber 1997, 331; 
Deudney 2007). Subjectively, the sense of threat directly influences the immediate 
demand for such institutions. The main realist reference is thus the direct interaction 
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between preferences for institutions, geopolitical threats and the distribution of mili-
tary and material capabilities.  
The difficulty in delineating ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ factors is reflected in the 
fact that a number of allegedly Realist argue that similar ideology may be a main 
factor in shaping the alliance choices of states (Walt 1987). However, incorporating 
subjective factors within a Realist framework is a matter of some controversy in the 
literature (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Genuine Neorealism is a materialist theory: 
Realists do not deny ideological motives exist but rather contend “that they will in-
variably align well with the power-politics motives of the state. Either the two do not 
diverge or, when they do, ideology will not drive policy because the resulting policy 
would not be in the interest of the state.” (Braumoeller 2013, 48). However, there are 
numerous examples of alleged ‘Realist’ scholars drawing on ideological arguments. 
Hoffman’s influential piece on post-war Europe is a case in point as is Walt’s study 
of Alliance formation (Hoffman 1966; Walt 1987). Moreover, there is a considerable 
formal literature focusing on security issues and alliance formation which, by intro-
ducing factors situated at the domestic levels such as ‘audience costs’, sits uneasily 
between Realism and Liberalism (Fearon 1994). Having identified material capabili-
ties and geopolitical threats as the main realist factors, I will return to these issues 
briefly in the next section that focuses on the Liberal variant of intergovernmental-
ism. 
2.2.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Interests, Ideas, and Domestic Conflict 
The distinctiveness of Liberal Intergovernmentalism results from the focus on do-
mestic political conflict: key factors are economic interests and interest group poli-
tics, domestic institutions, party competition, and ideologies (Milner 1997; 
Moravcsik 1998, 2008). It thus incorporates multiple and highly different assump-
tions concerning the sources of actor preferences and the institutional variation im-
pacting upon generate domestic political conflict (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2012). As summarized by Moravcsik, domestic actors can be motivated by consider-
ations of economic benefits, of domestic power related goals (i.e. political office), as 
well as ideational and identity related goals that pit domestic actors against each oth-
er (Moravcsik 2008). The ‘national interest’ as pursued by governments is an out-
come of domestic conflict: it can change whenever a new domestic coalitions takes 
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power and reassesses the national interest in light of a different geopolitical ideology 
or responsiveness to different set of interest groups. Thus, “more intense, certain, and 
institutionally represented and organized interests” render liberal Intergovernmental-
ism more determinate and vice versa (Moravcsik 1998, 36). 
The first source of state preferences - economic interests – resonates with traditional-
ly liberal works by Schumpeter, Bentham and Kant (Doyle 1997). In the modern 
formulation, the impact of competing domestic economic interests follows the differ-
ential interests for market access or protection from external competition that differ-
ent economic sectors have, depending on their international competitiveness (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman 1995). Such conflicts between different sectorial lobbies 
affect domestic political conflicts, in particular coalitional alignments (e.g. Rogowski 
1989). Accordingly, lobbying competition between representatives of different eco-
nomic sectors results in ‘state-interests’ that are fragmented along economic sectors, 
with varying interests for international liberalization of trade according to variables 
of economic interdependence and comparative advantage (Moravcsik 1997, 1998). 
However, whereas this logic is straightforward on economic issues, it is less clear in 
the area of security issues, since markets logics work out differently. First, security is 
more salient than welfare: in an insecure world, reaping economic benefits may be-
come impossible rather quickly. Second, although the economics of military defense 
certainly imply economies of scale, the scope for benefits from the functional differ-
entiation of markets for security is context dependent since governments will seek to 
retain their capabilities as much as possible in order to provide for autonomous de-
fensive capabilities (e.g. Caverley 2007; DeVore 2013). In addition, the negotiation 
of alliances implies the negotiation of security commitments and defensive expendi-
tures: once an Alliance agreement has been reached, every alliance partner will need 
to decide how much resources to contribute to the alliance and spending decision 
need to be coordinated within the alliance (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, 268). In so 
far as the production of goods intended as contribution to the alliance is involved in 
the alliance negotiations, the logic of competitive domestic lobbying and different 
sectoral interests thus should apply: states should be at least somewhat responsive to 
domestic industrial lobbies seeking either protection from external competition or 
lobbying for contracts to produce military goods.  
The second source of state preferences ties state preferences to domestic institutions 
and actors’ desire for power and influence, in short ‘office’. Democratic institutions 
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in particular shape state preferences in several ways. The most direct institutional 
link concerns the Kantian democratic peace (Doyle 1997, 252 ff.). Due to democratic 
leaders’ dependence on electoral fortunes – and leaders’ interest in office – demo-
cratic leaders tend not to engage war with each other and are expected to be more 
selective in choices for engaging conflict since their electoral survival directly hinges 
on success (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999). Moreover, political leaders’ ‘domestic 
audiences’ – i.e. voters – are often assumed to monitor negotiating performances and 
reward reputations for resolve and success (Guisinger and Smith 2002). Leaders’ 
inability to pursue announced public commitments are assumed to incur ‘audience 
costs’ (Fearon 1994). Competition for voter attention similarly induces an institu-
tionalized conflicts between the branches of governments (Milner 1997, 33 ff.). Po-
litical actors in the opposition are expected to seek to formulate alternative Foreign 
Policies and criticize the priorities of their government. In other words, the fact that 
political conflict is organized publicly in democracies implies that mere the interest 
in political office induces leaders and actors of the political opposition to engage in 
competition for foreign policy goals. Such conflict can be traced back to actors mate-
rial interests in office, in particular given the fact that party constituencies are tied to 
distinct economic sectors or factors of production (Rogowski 1989; Hiscox 2002).  
Competing for domestic attention introduces incentives for differing domestic ac-
counts of what the ‘national interest’ may be. These considerations lead to the final 
domestic source of state preferences, namely differing geopolitical ‘ideologies’ and 
identities (Moravcsik 2008, 241). Ideal-typically, there are three sources for ideolog-
ical differences: “national identity, political ideology, and socioeconomic order.” 
(Moravcsik 2008, 241). Competing national identities may exacerbate domestic con-
flict over the appropriate scope of competing states sovereign jurisdictions (e.g. Van 
Evera 1994). Political ideologies – normative or causal views of the world – can in-
fluence leaders’ strategic and causal thinking and thus affect the formation of state 
preferences and the preferred shape of international institutions (Snyder 1991; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; Rittberger 2003). Finally, foundational conceptions 
of what constitutes the building-blocks of the world heavily influence state prefer-
ences (Wendt 1999). Most pertinently, specific ideas or ideologies of socio-economic 
order influence domestic and international conflicts over economic institutions 
(Blyth 2002, 2013). 
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Depending on the nature of ideas, ideologies can be organized at the state level as 
well as the domestic level. In other words, national identities themselves may allude 
to similar values, thus making certain governments more likely to enter into binding 
alliance agreement with each other (Adler and Barnett 1998). Other conflicts, such as 
those pertaining to legitimate political and socio-economic orders may pit domestic 
actors against each other: in such cases, conflicts are organized in domestic conflicts 
by intermediary organizations, primarily parties, interest groups, and civil society 
(Moravcsik 1997, 1998, 2008). Finally, ideologies may cut across parties as well as 
states, as emphasized in Craig Parsons’ recent work (Parsons 2002, 2003; Parsons 
and Weber 2011). Although compatible in principle with the ideological variant, it is 
difficult how a systematic pattern of ideological differences may exist without a dis-
tinct organizational basis 
2.2.4 Three Perspectives on Institutional Design: Power, Credible Commit-
ments, and Norms 
What are the implications of the Realist and Liberal arguments for the institutional 
preferences of states? Given that states are assumed to be primary actors, their pref-
erences are accounted for by reference to institutionalist theories in Political Science. 
Institutional preferences are commonly based on two sources of motivations for ac-
tors’ behavior and thus their institutional preferences: the ‘logic of consequences’ on 
the one hand; a ‘logic of appropriateness’ on the other hand (March and Olsen 1989, 
160).  
The logic of appropriateness implies an unequivocal proposition stating that actors 
react and think according to shared norms of behavior and collective decision-
making that shape their conceptions of appropriate institutions (cf. Wendt 1999). 
Hence, democratic leaders – as the representative agents – are expected to design 
institutions that respect minimal standards of democratic representation even if com-
peting goals – such as the efficiency of decision-making – suffer (Rittberger 2003, 
2005). 
The utilitarian assumption – i.e. the logic of consequences – leads to two perspec-
tives on institutional designs that are not entirely compatible. As Douglass North puts 
it with respect to Political Economy, there is a “persistent tension between the own-
ership structure which maximized the rents to the ruler (and his group) and an effi-
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cient system that reduced transaction costs and encouraged economic growth” (North 
1981, 25). The former implies the competitive pursuit of power and plenty within 
asymmetric power relationships: more powerful actors are expected to exploit their 
position and design institutions for their own benefit, ruling out ‘efficient’ institu-
tional designs (Knight 1992; Acemoglu 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The 
latter perspective is based on the Coase theorem stipulating that, in the absence of 
transaction costs, actors are always able, through negotiations, to find some alloca-
tion of property rights or other forms redistribution that internalize ‘externalities’ and 
thus find the most efficient solution to any cooperation problem. Since transaction 
costs are considerable in the real world, actors are expected create a variety of insti-
tutional and organizational forms that improve the efficiency of decision-making 
(Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967; Williamson 1979, 1985).  
The difference is crucial. In the efficiency based view, institutions are ‘technical’ or 
‘neutral’ instruments, formed to ‘solve’ social and political problems. However, as 
Acemoglu argues, there can be no equivalent to the Coase theorem in politics be-
cause the commitment problem looms large (Acemoglu 2003). Those who are more 
powerful have the capability and thus the incentives to adjust existing institutions – 
such as property rights or formalized venues for political access – to their own bene-
fit. Hence, the formation of ‘inclusive’ political and economic institutions – allowing 
for the emergence of competitive markets, guaranteed property rights, and stable 
democratic institutions – presupposes a certain balance of power between the politi-
cal and economic rulers and the ruled.  
A similar reasoning applies to inter-state politics. Accordingly, some accounts em-
phasize the need for credible commitments and efficient designs for decision-making 
(for an explicit application to the EDC see Weber 1997; Pollack 2003). Others em-
phasize the role of the distribution of power for institutional preferences in which 
more powerful states seek to institutionalize their own advantages whereas less pow-
erful states seek institutional more credible commitments, control mechanisms, and 
equality of rights (Cooley and Spruyt 2009; for an application to alliance design see 
Mattes 2012). 
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Demand and Supply Conditions 
Walter Mattli’s distinction between the demand and supply conditions for regional 
integration incorporates these different incentives (Mattli 1999b, 1999a). For eco-
nomic issues, the demand side conditions capture the effects of interdependence on 
the processes of domestic preference formation: interdependence implies that eco-
nomic processes in one country have strong externalities which, if unaddressed, lead 
to mutually detrimental outcomes affecting the welfare of both countries. Actors di-
rectly affected by such outcomes will lobby the state to push for international institu-
tions effectively reducing these externalities. Common institutions then allow reap-
ing welfare gains from trade liberalization through specialization, increased division 
of labor, and economies of scale. An analogous reasoning applies to security. A high 
degree of ‘violence interdependence’ can be understood as a situation in which states 
have strong potential to destroy each other quickly, creating incentives to institution-
alize interaction (Deudney 2007). In such an environment, behavior within alliances 
produces strong ‘externalities’: in the face of a high external threat, any failure to 
cooperate creates high security risks for all potential partners. Hence, a high level of 
external threats should lead to domestic demands for common alliance institutions 
that formalize alliance investments and allow for credible commitments through hi-
erarchical control (Weber 1997). The security dilemma within alliances implies that 
commitments to cooperation need to be credible and reliable. Hierarchic alliance 
institutions are a means to ensure cooperation as they allow more efficient control of 
defection. Hierarchy entails costs in autonomy. Demands for centralized institutions 
should thus increase and decrease with the external threat (Lake 2009, 275 ff.). This 
problem increases in salience with the degree of outside threats: the more a country 
requires alliance partners to contribute deterrence capabilities, the higher the need for 
secure commitments. 
In sum, the key factors that induce specific levels of demands for international insti-
tutions are violence interdependence and security externalities, such as geopolitical 
threats. As a general precondition, geopolitical threats lead to balancing demands. 
Threats imply a structural aspect – the distribution of relevant military and economic 
capabilities – and a contextual aspect relating to explicit declarations of intent from 
adversaries as well as strategic assessments of external threats from other countries. 
In the realist reasoning, demands for balancing via the mobilization of capabilities 
and alliance cooperation directly vary with both factors.  
Chapter 2 Theoretical Context, Review, and Hypotheses 
 
46 
 
Violence interdependence, i.e. “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one an-
other” (Deudney 2007, 35), then implies geographic proximity and technological and 
material capabilities for destruction: the more imminent a threat is objectively, the 
less feasible unilateral deterrence becomes. As a result, the higher the demand for 
alliance institutions that secure adequate contributions to common survival, 
(Deudney 1995; Weber 1997, 331; Deudney 2007). States under a similar material 
threat should thus exhibit similar patterns of demands for common institutions to 
govern alliance behavior, to regulate negative externalities, and to solve collective 
action problems through monitoring and credible commitments (Weber 1997; Weiss 
2012). Security threats relate both to external issues as well as to the security dilem-
ma within alliances: the higher a sense of threat within an alliance, the higher the 
transaction costs stemming from uncertainty of cooperation commitments. ‘Co-
binding’, from a transaction cost perspective, is a means to address the security di-
lemma within alliances and ensure cooperation. It is a function of two factors: uncer-
tainty regarding the behavior of other actors, and asset specificity of the investments 
alliance partners contribute (Williamson 1979; Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). The higher 
the perceived potential for defection, the higher the demand for more centralized 
institutions since states will seek assurances against potential defectors, resulting, in 
extreme cases, for preferences for institutional ‘co-binding’ (Weber 1997). 
Uncertainty is addressed through centralized institutions (Williamson and Masten 
1999; Williamson 2000). At the lowest level, delegating powers of information gath-
ering provides a credible form of monitoring of alliance investments and compliance 
with joint agreements. Independent agencies can be involved to gather information 
on the compliance of contracting states with their contractual obligations as infor-
mation collection is “least intrusive form of centralization” (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 
771). Delegating more extensive agenda-setting rights may provide a form of credi-
ble commitment that contributes to the efficiency of decision-making by reducing the 
possibility of ‘cycling’ as available agreements are reached more efficiently (Pollack 
1997). Finally delegating and pooling substantial sovereign prerogatives - such as 
policy decisions to majority voting or submitting to more powerful centralized insti-
tutions, including a power to issue sanctions for violating joint agreements, provide 
institutionally credible commitments (Moravcsik 1998). Hence, from these consider-
ations, it follows that the higher the security externalities between any two states 
under a common threat, the higher the demand for credible commitments and central-
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ized institutions regulating security cooperation. Moreover, perceived intentions and 
reputation may matter (Mattes 2012). States can be expected to take the past behav-
ior of other states into account when judging their status: the more a state has, in 
past, complied with its alliance obligations, the less other states are concerned with 
its prospective behavior in the future, and vice versa (Mattes 2012). 
The term ‘asset specificity’ equally relates to problems of credible commitment: it 
may be used to conceptually grasp the problem of functional differentiation within 
Alliances (Weber 1997; Weiss 2012). Asset-specificity describes “political-military 
structures that can or cannot be redeployed for alternative purposes”, for example, in 
alternative Alliance arrangements (Weiss 2012, 667). Conversely, if command struc-
tures and technological arrangements are easily adaptable to an alternative, ‘deter-
rence equivalent’ alliance, asset-specificity is low and the need to submit to fully 
spelled out centralized institutions is less salient. Hence, demands for functional dif-
ferentiation in capabilities within alliances may be used to signal the credibility of 
investments to assay the security dilemma within alliances. 
In sum, the demand side from an intergovernmental perspective can be summarized 
thus: 
H1 The higher the security threats to a particular country, the higher the de-
mand for balancing through mobilization of capabilities and alliance cooper-
ation. The higher the ‘violence interdependence’ between any two Alliance 
partners and the higher the perceived potential for defection of Alliance part-
ners, the higher the demand for credible commitments and centralized institu-
tions. 
Turning to the supply side, one turns to the “incentives to be more concerned with 
the distributional consequences of coordination.” (Mattli 1999b, 15). In other words, 
because conflict over resources persists between alliance partners, asymmetries in the 
distribution of capabilities within the alliance are expected to structure the conflict 
over specific institutional forms between the negotiating states, in particular because 
power asymmetries make the enforcement problem and the commitment problem 
more severe (Koremenos, et al. 2001; Mattes 2012). Thus, stronger states will seek to 
realize institutions in which their influence and control over future outcomes reflect 
their relative standing (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 791). As weaker states will seek to 
address resulting enforcement problems, differences in the ex ante distribution of 
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power should be reflected in the constellation of conflict between the negotiating 
states. 
Pursuing their individual advantage, more powerful countries will seek to institution-
alize power asymmetries through rules and decision-making procedures stacked in 
their favor (Cooley and Spruyt 2009). Thus stronger states will seek to secure their 
influence by structuring decision-making rules – i.e. the distribution of votes – to 
their advantage. Moreover, stronger states can be expected to benefit from incom-
plete contracts and thus to reject neutral third party enforcement (Ibid.). Smaller and 
less powerful states, in turn, should opt for more complete contracts and elaborate 
control of independent agencies: if hierarchical, centralized intuitions do not come 
with proper controls, smaller states will reject them (Koremenos, et al. 2001, 789, 
790). Smaller powers, fearing a de facto loss of influence once a bargain has been 
formally fixed in contracts, thus seek commitments primarily through third party 
adjudication and demand less centralization. Moreover, smaller powers should seek 
ex ante controls through detailed contracts as well as ex post control through retain-
ing unanimity – and thus veto rights as much as possible (Pollack 2003; Cooley and 
Spruyt 2009). In sum, the distribution of power between negotiating states should be 
reflected in the conflict structure between states in the following manner 
H2 More powerful states are less worried about the control of centralized in-
stitutions and care more about efficiency and their influence. The more rela-
tive power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more it will prefer ben-
eficial pooling of decision-making. Less powerful states are more worried 
about the control of centralized institutions and care more about their auton-
omy. The less relative power a state has within an alliance bargain, the more 
it will prefer unanimity and veto rights. 
In addition, the role of norms in the design of supranational institutions is best situat-
ed on the supply side since its core argument conflicts with the design goal of institu-
tional efficiency but may work complementary with the power related logic. Eschew-
ing a purely constructivist as well as a purely materialist logic, the argument relies on 
the concept of strategic action in a community environment in which norms are as-
sumed to be resources in conflict. To be successful in political conflicts, actors need 
to use “ethos-based arguments to strengthen the legitimacy of their own goals against 
the claims and arguments of their opponents.” (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006, 
1158, 1159). Insofar as these claims are made within a community of democratic 
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states, failing to comply with rhetoric standards affects leaders’ reputation, both 
within an international community as well as, potentially, within the domestic demo-
cratic political conflict. Hence, this particular line of reasoning is compatible in prin-
ciple with a liberal account of state preferences that allows for norms to play a role in 
political conflict, both domestically as well as within an international community, 
provided that the negotiating states are organized democratically. 
The argument presupposes given “divergent or adverse constitutional member state 
preferences” for the pooling of delegation of decision-making authority (Rittberger 
and Schimmelfennig 2006, 1161). On the basis of the preceding considerations, the 
question of salience should be more relevant for larger powers insofar as they are 
systematically expected to display a higher tendency for implementing institutions 
that pool and delegate decision-making authority. In addition, larger powers stand to 
gain in influence from including representational institution: as much as they gain 
from weighted majorities, they gain through parliamentary representation. In so far 
as larger states are more populous, representative institutions benefit by them poten-
tially helping to generate policies in their favor, provided that delegates follow ‘na-
tional interests’. 
 
When and to What Do State Preferences Adapt? 
Having specified the content of ‘state-preferences’, a final set question concerns the 
issue of change. As already described in the introduction, the EDC bargain was char-
acterized by a number of position shifts and changes in the basic conflict constella-
tion between the negotiating states. As argued in section 2.1, ‘bargaining positions’, 
as strategic choices themselves, can change easily. Preferences, however, do not 
change without shifts in desires. Preferences may be said to ‘adapt’ if beliefs change 
on account of new information or if the range of feasible outcomes changes on ac-
count of novel or unforeseen events. Given the preceding remarks about the realist 
and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts of state preferences, it is clear that they 
provide differing but nonetheless genuine intergovernmental accounts of the ways in 
which states adapt their preferences to changing environments.  
In the Realist perspective, states are coherent actors with coherent desires, i.e. they 
possess ‘thick rationality’. Thus, the two sources of adaptation are changing geopolit-
ical threat levels and shifts in the distribution of material capabilities. Thus, geopolit-
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ical crises – much similar to economic crisis – may trigger a higher demand for cen-
tralized institutions and a higher willingness of governments to sacrifice individual 
gains for the assurance of common safety (Mattli 1999b). 
In the Liberal version, governments may be expected to react rationally and thus in a 
similar vein provided that the main desire is security. The key difference, however, is 
that desires may ‘change’ provided that the dominant domestic coalition changes and 
introduces different ideological goals and thus a different definition of the national 
interest. Moreover, any domestic political change that affects the ratification con-
straint, available agreements and outside options, are likely to affect a government’s 
bargaining position. (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997). Thus, in the liberal version, do-
mestic actors pursuing ideological goals matter.  
The key is the ability of domestic institutions to structure conflict. Thus, the timing 
of shifts should reflect differences in the composition of governments and any devel-
opments in the composition of domestic legislative institutions that affect the chances 
of the ratification of agreements. Moreover, since assessments of threat levels are 
partially subjective, they are– in the liberal view – affected by domestic political ide-
ologies as well. Party ideologies – as causal belief systems – may be associated with 
different assessments of threat levels, the effectiveness of institutional arrangements 
or the interpretations of intents of other states. Hence, domestic changes may affect 
‘state preferences’. 
Both the Realist and the Liberal account of position shifts can thus be summarized. 
H3 Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to changing geo-
political threat level (‘security crises’), changes in the distribution of material 
capabilities or domestic shifts in the party composition of the governing coa-
lition. 
Having characterized the sources, directions, and dynamic of state-preference for-
mation from a Realist and a Liberal point of view, I turn to strategy formulation and 
bargaining behavior in the next section. 
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2.2.5 Intergovernmental Bargaining Behavior: Outside Options, Domestic 
Constraints, and Uncertainty 
The present section considers the Realist and Liberal determinants of bargaining be-
havior and bargaining success. The former largely boils down to the question of the 
uses of information, the latter to the main sources of leverage that actors can success-
fully bring to bear at the bargaining table. Bargaining success in the Realist account 
is a question of material capabilities. The Liberal version is more in line with the 
expansive formal work on bargaining theory, the causes of war, and other issues of 
interstate cooperation that has dominated scholarly work since the early 1990’s 
(Powell 2002; Reiter 2003). Two key claims include the emphasis on the role of do-
mestic institutions and domestic political conflict. Most prominently, bargaining 
power may, in addition to available outside options, result from the exploitation of 
the ‘paradox of weakness’ that can arise under certain conditions (Schelling 1960). 
Finally, obtaining accurate information is a key precondition of bargaining success as 
the choice of means to achieve desired ends depends on available information. Gov-
ernments need to make assessments of the intentions of their counterparts at the ne-
gotiation table: what are they willing to accept? What is their ratification constraint? 
These strategic beliefs are part and parcel of bargaining behavior and acquiring accu-
rate information a key condition for success. Whereas Realists are largely silent on 
this matter, Liberals point to principal-agent problems and the role of domestic insti-
tutions that can contribute to or undermine the efficient attainment and usage of 
available strategic information. 
The realist version of bargaining theory follows straightforward materialist reasoning 
and applies conventional bargaining theories. The basic elements of any situational 
logic of bargaining power are their basic interests for ‘power and plenty’ and the 
existing distribution of material capabilities. Both determine the outside options, i.e. 
“what the bargainers obtain if they fail to reach an agreement because they terminate 
the bargaining” (Powell 2002, 4). In the Realist account, the less material capabilities 
and viable geopolitical alternatives a state possesses, the more dependent it will be 
on cooperative agreements with other states, i.e. alliances. The higher that depend-
ence is, the more the state will need to acquiesce to less beneficial agreements. In 
turn, the lower that dependency is, the more a state can credibly threaten to leave he 
negotiations and, consequently, the higher will be its ability to shape the bargaining 
outcome. Thus, apart from this structural logic of power, geopolitical considerations 
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– such as geography– may come into play as well by affecting the relative potential 
exposure to attacks and thus the valuation of outside options. In sum, the same fac-
tors that influence preferences, affect states’ influence on bargaining outcomes. 
Recent work on interstate bargaining has demonstrated, however, that “source of 
power drives only one of the causal mechanisms that bargaining theory suggests” 
and that simple realist reasoning is “overly simplistic” (Schneider 2005, 677). Bar-
gaining outcomes have been analyzed to depend on a host of factors, some of which 
are difficult to verify empirically. First, formal work has amply demonstrated that 
small details of the bargaining protocol can have large effects on outcomes (Muthoo 
1999). Moreover, uncertainty is associated with inefficiency: bargains may fail to 
reach the Pareto Frontier if actors base their strategies on false information in the 
same way as uncertainty is a major factor that impedes the efficient functioning of 
markets (Akerlof 1970). Applying this insight, Fearon has shown in an influential 
article that a uncertainty may be a primary source of bargaining inefficiency causing 
wars even if actors do not seek it (Fearon 1995; Fey and Ramsay 2011). 
How do (state) actors deal with uncertainty in the intergovernmentalist framework? 
In the simplest case, actors that are uncertain about each other’s’ disagreement value 
(outside options) will ‘test’ each other’s’ resolve in an interplay of threats, offers and 
counteroffers. Thus, under uncertainty, “bargaining is a form of communication.” 
(Morrow 1989, 941). Since every negotiator has an incentive to misrepresent her 
valuation of available outside options, negotiators seeking their advantage run the 
risk of a breakdown of negotiations. In other words, states as representative agents 
face the “negotiators dilemma” between “creating value” and “claiming value”, the 
former requiring “openness” and revealing one’s preferences, the latter calling for 
“manipulating alternatives and aspirations” (Lax and Sebenius 1986, 154). In this 
sense, the impact of uncertainty on negotiations has observable implications for the 
process of intergovernmental negotiations. Seeking their advantage, actors should 
refuse to compromise while threatening to call the bargain off, thus signalling strong 
resolve but, at the same time, risking failure. This testing of resolve – or ‘bargaining 
deadlock’ – is thus a learning process that may produce ‘avoidable’ inefficiencies, 
bargaining failure, and even wars as a more or less probable outcome of negotiations  
In addition, the valuation of outside options – and thus bargaining power – may be 
affected by domestic conflict and institutional constraints. Thus, within the ‘two-
level game’ of international negotiations (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997), domestic con-
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straints and formal rules can be utilized as a ‘commitment device’ in order to rig “the 
incentives so that the other party must choose in one’s favor.” (Schelling 1960, 37). 
Formal constitutional constraints or unavailable domestic majorities – as ratification 
constraints – may allow leaders to credibly commit to an agreement that is more fa-
vorable to them by pointing out that remaining alternatives are non-attainable. 
Hence, by allowing states to confront their negotiation partners with such a ‘take-it-
or-leave-it’ offer, constitutional constraints or a powerful domestic opposition may 
be sources of bargaining power. In this sense, a small domestic zone of agreement 
that passes ratification hurdle may be highly beneficial (Putnam 1988, 441). 
Both the Realist and the Liberal account thus summarize the intergovernmental view 
of bargaining power. 
H4 The higher the military capabilities of a state and the more attractive its 
outside options to the alliance bargain, the higher the influence of its prefer-
ences on the course and outcome of the bargain. The higher and the more in-
fluential the domestic opposition to cooperation within the alliance, the high-
er the influence of that government’s preferences on the course and outcome 
of the bargain. 
However, both the simple Realist view of bargaining power as well as the ‘Schelling 
conjecture’ equally depend on a large number of modeling assumptions regarding 
actors’ ideal points and institutional settings (a brief overview in Bailer and 
Schneider 2006, 155 ff.). More importantly, uncertainty plays a critical role as well 
since no commitment can be credible if it is not believed in by other negotiating 
partners (Iida 1993; Mo 1994; Milner 1997; Tarar 2001). Since every government 
will have substantially more knowledge concerning the preferences of its domestic 
coalition than any external observer, negotiators face an incentive to portray the 
chances of ratification as more tenuous than they actually are if it allows pushing the 
international compromise more closely to their most preferred outcome. Being aware 
of this problem, all negotiators will mistrust extreme signals of domestic constraint. 
From a liberal point of view, both supranational as well as domestic institutions may 
reduce the impact of uncertainty on negotiations. International institutions, through 
third party monitoring, serve to alleviate distrust among states by providing third 
party information on the domestic compliance with international agreements 
(Keohane 1984). In addition, domestic democratic institutions organize political con-
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flict in a more public and transparent manner than autocratic institutions as the ob-
servation of the public behavior of organized political opposition in other states re-
veals information about the governments’ resolve, possible ratification constraints, 
and thus the governments’ valuation of gains (Eyerman and Hart 1996; Schultz 1998; 
Prins 2003; Ramsay 2004). Moreover, public declarations of intent and commitment 
by democratic leaders are – ceteris paribus – more credible than those of autocratic 
ones since reputations for resolve and foreign policy consistency are an electoral 
asset and backing down from publicly announced commitments incurs ‘audience 
costs’ (Fearon 1994; Guisinger and Smith 2002). Moreover, the formal accountabil-
ity of ministers and governments to the legislature, as well as public formal rules that 
structure political conflict ease the identification of ratification constraints of the ne-
gotiating parties (Martin 2000, 168 ff.). Nevertheless, “[even] among governments as 
well known to one another as the Western Allies are, officials are often surprisingly 
misinformed about domestic alignments abroad, and they are skeptical of their own 
ability to maneuver effectively in a foreign game whose rules they do not fully un-
derstand” (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 210). 
In addition, governments appoint delegates for negotiations to make contact with 
foreign governments and conduct negotiations through privileged institutionalized 
and formalized venues, mostly diplomatic exchanges. Delegation invites classic prin-
cipal-agent problems that may result in a loss of real authority for the principal if 
agents have adverse preference and shirk the given mandate (e.g. Aghion and Tirole 
1997). Lenient rules or mandates, urgency of the decisions to be made, invasive and 
badly incentivized performance measurement, and the presence of multiple princi-
pals with diverging preferences contribute to agency loss and decrease the real au-
thority and influence over decisions by principals and thus governments (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997; Miller 2005, 213, 214). As a result, bargaining inefficiencies and ratifi-
cation failures can occur if the negotiating agents of the state agree to compromises 
that government principals or domestic actors do not find beneficial. For govern-
ments, agency loss in such situations is an information problem. Hence, in order to 
prevent these problems from affecting their ability to effectively deal with uncertain-
ty, principals need high quality information, “any additional information about the 
agent's action, however imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the 
principal and the agent.” (Hölmstrom 1979, 75). Apart from formalized ex ante and 
ex post oversight mechanisms, using multiple sources of information – or distributing 
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information gathering tasks among multiple agents – is an important and ‘rational’ 
possibility to address the issue of asymmetric information (Salanié 2005, 140, 141). 
To deal with such issues, the intergovernmental framework prescribes that actors rely 
on internal multiple sources, not sources emanating from states that, within an inter-
governmental – national – paradigm, are expected to have adverse preference mech-
anisms. Government actors rely on privileged diplomatic channels – embassies, 
members of delegations, organizational resources of the governments ministries, and 
in the case of security cooperation in particular the military – as well as domestic 
interest groups to provide credible, i.e. trusted information that may be used to vali-
date alternative, sources of information (cf. Milner 1997, ch. 3). The possibility of 
agency loss implies nevertheless, that a treaty negotiated as a result of agency loss 
due to asymmetric information and/ or adverse preferences may be, so to speak, ‘new 
domestic information’ once presented to the government. A similar reasoning applies 
to domestic institutions, such as parliaments, tasked with mandating governments 
and ratifying international treaties (Ibid.). 
H5 Bargaining strategies change on account of novel information that is ob-
tained through institutionalized and trusted sources comprising domestic ac-
tors, interest groups, and institutionalized formal diplomatic and ministerial 
channels. Multiple domestic principals, lenient mandates and adverse prefer-
ences between governments and their delegates increase the likelihood of rat-
ification failure. 
2.2.6 Summary 
This section has presented the intergovernmental framework. It has argued that it 
rests, analytically and empirically, on three conditions: an effective organizational 
hierarchy, effective domestic institutions structuring conflict, and national values that 
contain conflict within state borders. Common identities and ideologies ensure that 
organized political conflict remains within the confines of the nation-state. Effective 
institutions comprise two aspects. An effective hierarchy ensures that individuals or 
agents act in the interest of the principal – i.e. the government leadership independent 
– and the division of labor ensures that information is processed efficiently by state 
institutions. Under such circumstances, states form preferences for alliance institu-
tions in accordance with their relative power and in response to outside threat levels. 
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Shifts in the party composition of domestic governing coalitions may affect these 
preferences, whereas the ability to insert these preferences into final agreements de-
pends on state power and credible domestic constraints.  
If ideological commitments cross borders and domestic conflict inhibits the effec-
tiveness of domestic institutions, a different picture may emerge. 
2.3 Transnational Networks: An Alternative to Intergovernmentalism? 
The observation that political mobilization occurs across frontiers is nothing new and 
has, with the advent of internet and technology, acquired new impetus. Recently, 
students of global movements have increasingly looked at the impact of transnational 
organizations and networks on a range of outcomes in international relations. This 
section critically reviews this scholarship, focusing on two aspects: taking up the 
literature on transnational relations, it argues that the concept of embedded action, as 
developed by Granovetter (1985), provides a more realistic view of the impact of 
value-oriented transnational networks on state-behavior. Second, it argues that a 
widespread view sees transnational and transgovernmental networks as ‘efficient’ 
transmitters of information. As shown below, that is not the case. Combining both 
arguments, I argue that the impact transnational networks depends on the nature of 
individuals within them, in particular their domestic influence, i.e. their position to 
influence, within the hierarchy of the state and the dynamics of domestic conflict, the 
preference formation and the choice of bargaining strategies. In sum, it is the embed-
dedness of actors within transnational networks that matters. Second, high influence 
may be associated with a propensity to influence the transmission of information 
within a bargaining setting and to contribute to bargaining inefficiency. 
Again, this is not to say that ideas ‘travelling’ through networks trump structural fac-
tors, or basic desires for power, in terms of actors’ motivations. The argument is ra-
ther that under such conditions intergovernmentalist theories “whether realist or lib-
eral-are underdetermining and cannot account for […] the specific content of the 
change” in governmental preferences (Risse-Kappen 1994, 185).  
I begin by reviewing the literature on transnational relations and transnational net-
works and its main insights (section 2.3.1). Second, I specify the concepts of ‘trans-
national networks’ and ‘transgovernmental networks’ (section 2.3.2). Third, relating 
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the conditions for impact of transnational networks on the formation of state prefer-
ences to intergovernmentalist assumptions, I develop competing hypotheses regard-
ing state-preference formation (section 2.3.3). Fourth, I develop competing hypothe-
ses regarding the use of information and choice of bargaining strategies of states 
(section 2.3.4). 
2.3.1 Transnational Networks in International Relations: A Review 
Quantitative social network analysis has a long tradition in both sociology and eco-
nomics (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Easley and Kleinberg 2010). Advances in ana-
lytical methods of network analysis have led to numerous quantitative applications in 
Political Sciences and the subfield of International Relations in recent years (for an 
overview see Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Kahler 2009). Scholars have reexamined 
the structure international system, international trade patterns, alliance formation, 
and the diffusion of regulative standards (e.g. Maoz 2006; Hafner-Burton, et al. 
2009; Maoz 2012b).  
Part of the problem with this literature, however, is that the concept of networks suf-
fers from an underspecified use (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009). Thus, the types of ac-
tors that are considered in the literature on transnational networks vary considerably 
from states, to international organizations, to multi-national cooperations, social 
movements, governmental agencies and individuals. As a consequence, it is difficult 
to pinpoint current knowledge regarding the precise roles and the mechanisms that 
different types of transnational networks may facilitate, the impact – if any – they 
can have and, in particular, the structural prerequisites of such claims (Risse 2012). 
The ambiguity, to a certain extent, is a result of a foundational difficulty: what ex-
plains network formation? Why do actors engage some types of actors, and not oth-
ers? Do actors choose their environment and thus their social and political relations? 
Or are actors rather a product of their environment, and thus their social and political 
relations? When and how do networks enable or constrain actors’ capabilities to act? 
These are difficult questions that are not definitively solved (Risse 2012). Thus, 
scholarship using the concept of networks in Political Science and International Rela-
tions is highly disparate: some treat networks as a resource and tool of efficient gov-
ernance (Slaughter 2004), some describe transnational networks as instruments of 
powerful states to reproduce hegemony (Cox 1987); some analyze transnational net-
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work structures as outcomes or expressions of social and interstate conflict (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998); some argue that transgovernmental networks affect political and 
social outcomes and thus state preferences and seek to identify the conditions for 
such an impact (for an overview see Risse 2012). 
Consider the governance literature: here, transnational networks have been argued to 
provide an important mechanism of in international ‘governance’ in the post-Cold 
War world (Rosenau 1992). Thus, some see the ‘networked polity’ as a form or re-
gional political organization suitable to modern, industrialized, fragmented, Western 
Europe (Ansell 2000). In particular, it is often maintained that globalization led to a 
change in the relationship between public and private actors: networks are thus con-
sidered an apt organizational form of decision-making in the absence of hierarchy 
and where knowledge is fragmented and support hard to mobilize, both in Europe 
(Kohler-Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999), as well as globally (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002; Cutler 2003). In this sense, transnational and transgovernmental 
networks are seen as a novel means by which a more fragmented, multipolar, modern 
world characterized by unprecedented mobility and technological connectedness can 
be governed. More flexible than hierarchy, more ordered than anarchy or markets, 
networks have thus been described as resources of “information, expertise, financial 
means, or political support” (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009, 141). 
Others focus on the role that social and political relationships – i.e. networks – have 
in socializing actors, thus transmitting norms and ideas, and, as a result, effecting 
change. Early work by Karl W. Deutsch’s already analyzed the emergence and per-
sistence organized political power of the state as “dependent on the highly uneven 
distribution of social communication facilities and of economic, cultural, and geo-
graphic interdependence.” (Deutsch 1953, 187). In this sense, the nation-state – the 
basis for the suitability of the intergovernmental framework – is a historically con-
tingent result of specific patterns of interaction transcending the political boundaries 
that preceded it. A recent trend in historiography, for example, has analyzed the 
transmission of ideas and norms in the 19
th
 century through transnational networks 
that contributed to an early rise of ‘internationalism’: These scholars share the com-
mitment to write ‘transnational histories (Geyer and Paulmann 2001; Bayly, et al. 
2006; Osterhammel 2011). Conceptually, they oppose the tradition of ‘diplomatic 
history’ that corresponds directly with the realist framework as described above 
(Iriye 2007). 
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Additionally, there are influential arguments holding that the European Union is a 
site of ‘transnational socialization’ (Schimmelfennig 2005). Others maintain that 
transgovernmental networks can be important carriers of democratic norms, thus 
contributing to democratization (Freyburg 2014). These arguments are kin to those in 
the governance literature, maintaining that networks provide superior access points 
for private actors early in decision-making processes, allow information, socializa-
tion, and thus the ‘upgrading of the common interest’ (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 
2009, 143). Finally, recent arguments have similarly emphasized the role of transna-
tional networks in the formation of post-war European institutions (Kaiser and Starie 
2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010). 
Apart from transmitting ideas, a special emphasis concerns the role that networks 
may play in the transmission of information. Thus, they are said to effectively dis-
seminate information, provide for the diffusion of best regulatory standards, improve 
compliance by socializing actors into ‘network norms’ that provide for a propensity 
of self-regulation through enhancing reputation based mechanisms for cooperation 
(Slaughter 2004, ch. 5). The role of transnational communities and networks of pri-
vate actors in shaping global economic regulation has been equally emphasized 
(Djelic and Quack 2010; Büthe and Mattli 2011). Structural distances between gov-
ernments in transgovernmental networks established through global regulators have 
been argued to explain patterns of policy convergence (Bach and Newman 2010). 
Others find that proximity in transgovernmental contacts encourages policy learning 
and adoption of best practices (Cao 2012).  
A different argument relates the rise of transnational networks – and thus the for-
mation of a transnational elite – as structures of power. Scholars from different tradi-
tions such as Robert Gilpin and Robert Cox have argued that the mechanisms of 
transnational governance are mechanisms of US hegemony (Gilpin 1975; Cox 1987) 
In this view, the global political system expressed in transnational relations stems 
from the global hegemony of the US state. Far from being a ‘neutral’ response to 
new problems of governance, this view holds that the built up of a tight web of inter-
national institutions after the Second World War, staffed with individuals with a sim-
ilar mindset, were a strategic choice: ‘transnational relationships’ are thus a deliber-
ate design (Krasner 1995) 
An additional interesting approach is to utilize network analysis as a means to de-
scribe political conflict. Reflecting the sociological insight that individual prefer-
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ences and network embeddedness are highly correlated, studies of the US congress 
have shown that shifting ideological polarization is reflected in changing cooperative 
networks in congress (Zhang, et al. 2008), and the UK parliament (Maoz and Somer-
Topcu 2010; Heaney, et al. 2012). Moreover, quantitative measures of network dis-
tance – based on bill co-sponsorship – seem to provide better correlates of voting 
behavior in Congress than ideal-point estimates (Fowler 2006). Analogously, net-
works reconstructed from state memberships in IGO’s show clustering patterns of 
states into disparate communities that reflect global conflicts (Hafner-Burton and 
Montgomery 2006; Maoz 2006, 2012a, 2012b). In the same vein, clustering in trade 
networks is equally well suited to provide indicators of interstate conflicts (Lupu and 
Traag 2013). In the context of the EU and its intergovernmental conferences, trans-
governmental networks – at least in the case of the Treaty of Amsterdam – have been 
found to follow patterns of economic interdependence (Thurner and Binder 2009; 
Thurner and Pappi 2009; Thurner and Binder 2011).  
Finally, there is ample scholarship that has studied the ways in which transnational 
networks and organizations may impact state policies and preferences. The scope for 
such impact is considerable: for example, transnational networks have been ascribed 
an important role in ending the Cold War (Risse-Kappen 1994). Other studies trace 
the impact of transnational actors committed to common values in diverse issue areas 
such as human rights (Risse, et al. 1999), environmental politics (Schreurs, et al. 
2009), and norms of warfare (Price 1998). Building upon Deutsch, Adler and Barnett 
argued that ‘security communities’ develop between states under conditions of 
shared identities, intense transnational contact, and emerging norms of reciprocity, 
making cooperation stable over time and excluding violence as means for pursuing 
conflicting interests among such states (Adler and Barnett 1998, 31).  
The most important contribution in this line of research concerns the conditions for 
such impacts that can be differentiated according to international and domestic fac-
tors (Risse 2012). Effective political action requires capabilities and resources to deal 
with collective action problems (Olson 1971). Transnational networks are resources 
for actors engaged in diverse transnational and international organizations that pro-
vide the organizational and social resources for coordinating action effectively 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Smith 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999). On the ideational 
plane, the argument of ‘frame resonance’ has been advanced: the higher the internal 
coherence and ‘the fit’ between the values and norms behind the political advocacy 
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of a transnational coalition with those of domestic discourses, the higher the scope 
for impact (Checkel 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Second, it has been argued that 
the higher the international institutionalization of a specific issue, the higher the 
scope for transnational coalitions to impact state behavior (Risse-Kappen 1995a).  
Analyzing the domestic conditions, the literature pays particular attention to Liberal 
theory by considering the “domestic balance of political power forces” (Kaufmann 
and Pape 1999, 632). If transnational coalitions seek to influence state behavior, they 
need to influence decision-makers. Since these actors face diverse incentives and 
pressures in domestic political conflict, domestic institutional factors and the ‘oppor-
tunity structures’ that open or close in the dynamics of conflict matter. One argument 
has established a link between the potential for impact and the ‘openness’ of domes-
tic structures (Risse-Kappen 1995b; Evangelista 1997). Openness implies that do-
mestic conflict consists of multiple and competing voices and a lower ability of the 
decision-making centers in parties or domestic governments to discipline and enforce 
decisions. Thus Evangelista argued that authoritative structures provide little access 
for transnational influence but a high potential impact if individuals at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy are affected. Conversely, pluralist systems and systems with 
a high number of veto points are more ‘open’ to influence but provide less scope for 
impact (Evangelista 1995). 
Thus, while there is ample research on conditions for successful influence on state 
preferences, the literature tends to suffer from two weaknesses. First, being heavily 
geared towards case study research, there is still a lack of studies of instances of 
failed impact. Moreover, the overall picture is ambiguous: for example, early com-
mon claims regarding the fact that networks contribute to efficient information dis-
semination in international and European governance were qualified by largely am-
biguous findings (Héritier 2003). 
A clear advance in recent years has been increasing attention to structural methods of 
social network analysis. The analysis of influence is enriched by revealing structural 
positions within transnational networks as well as through structural description of 
potential access of transnational actors to governments (Moore, et al. 2003; Lake and 
Wong 2009; Murdie and Davis 2012). However, on a conceptual level, there is very 
little recognition of the insights provided by formal literature on network formation, 
information transmission that goes beyond using centrality as an indicator for power 
and influence. 
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The quantitative literature, however, has its own problems. It’s strength is to provide 
unique means to describe the structure of international and transnational cooperative 
networks among states and individuals, showing that there are strong structural cor-
relates to a number of important outcomes. Unfortunately, most quantitative designs 
give little information as to what is ‘happening’ in networks. Counting contacts be-
tween individuals does not provide information on the content of exchanges, on the 
meaning of particular networks for participants, what types of information are ex-
changed, which contacts ‘mean’ more to actors and whom they trust or distrust, etc. 
(McLean 2007). Thus, quantitative analyses could benefit immensely from qualita-
tive insights – such mixed designs are, however, hard to come by in the literature.  
The next section will focus on concept specification, while the subsequent sections 
will draw together the existing literature on transnational networks, and formal 
methods to provide hypotheses in impact of preferences and bargaining behavior. 
2.3.2 Transnational Networks: Definitions 
This section specifies the concept of ‘transnational networks’. Starting from the basic 
definition of networks in general, I introduce the conceptual definition of social net-
works, opposing them to two alternative forms of social organization: markets and 
hierarchies. I derive their capacity as a social resource allowing for the formation of 
trust. I continue by reviewing an explicit definition of transnational and transgov-
ernmental networks as consisting of ties between actors across states and govern-
ments who share similar values and ideologies and who seek to influence ‘state be-
havior’. I then characterize their analytical and descriptive potential: placing actor 
behavior within specific networks that share similar values and ideologies allows an 
empirically sound social characterization of their preferences. Utilizing this ad-
vantage requires a concrete analysis of ‘practices of networking’, i.e. the rhetorical 
and discursive strategies by which social and political ties are gained and maintained. 
I conclude by arguing that a formulation of the conditions for a traceable impact on 
preferences and bargaining strategies has to take into account both the structure as 
well as the political dynamics within transnational networks 
In order to understand the network concept, distinguish a descriptive meaning of the 
term ‘network’ from its conceptual meaning. At a descriptive level, a network is a set 
of objects and a set of relations among these objects, or, more prosaically “[…] a 
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collection of points joined together in pairs by lines.” (Newman 2010, 1). This defi-
nition covers the exact mathematical meaning of a network as well as empirical man-
ifestations, from technological networks between computers (such as the Internet), 
biological networks (biochemical, neural, ecological), as well as relationships be-
tween social or political actors. Thus, in a descriptive sense a social network merely 
describes feasible kinds of relationships among a set of actors and can thus refer to 
formal relationships of authority – i.e. an organizational chart of a government or an 
international organization constitutes a network – as well as informal relationships 
like kinship and patronage, common membership in various executive boards, 
friendship, trust, or mere frequency of interaction (Ibid.). 
At a conceptual level, networks may be described as ideal-typical forms of interac-
tion between actors that need to be distinguished from markets and anarchic fields on 
the one hand and organizational hierarchies on the other hand. In this sense, networks 
constitute relationships among actors that are more stable or intense than one-shot 
quasi-anonymous interactions (for example in anonymous markets), yet informal, 
more infrequent and not rule governed as institutionalized relationships in hierar-
chical organizations: they are “neither fish nor fowl, nor some mongrel hybrid, but a 
distinctly different form” (Powell 1990, 299). Such forms of informal relationships 
are beneficial to political and economic actors because they allow for higher flexibil-
ity than hierarchies and higher commitment and reliability than anonymous one shot 
interactions in markets because actors meet each other more frequently and can es-
tablish more personal relationships. Powell argues that such structures are more con-
ducive to emergent norms of reciprocity and trust (Ibid.). In this sense, dependable 
trust networks have a number of advantages for political actors in particular. For ex-
ample, in any archetypical situation resembling prisoner dilemma type situations, 
trust allows reaping gains from cooperation that cannot be reached in anarchic situa-
tions or only enforced in hierarchies by costly threats and sanctions. Granovetter am-
ply summarized that view by taking the extreme case: “In the family, there is no 
Prisoner's Dilemma because each is confident that the others can be counted on.” 
(Granovetter 1985, 490). 
Trust in the political world is risky, or rather, trusting implies taking a risk by defini-
tion. Thus, trust may be defined as “[…] ramified interpersonal connections, consist-
ing mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term 
resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.” 
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(Tilly 2007, 81). It constitutes a political form of social capital, that is, a resource 
based on mutual obligations, norms, and information (Coleman 1988, 103, 104). 
When is trusting others a good strategy? Theoretical and empirical research on the 
development of informal trust in market-like transactions – where formal institutions 
guaranteeing and enforcing property rights are absent – suggests that three factors 
contribute to trust relationships among rational actors (Bowles 2004, 248). These are: 
the presence of the possibility of retaliation (1), that is, an expectation of repeated 
play that is associated with the possibility of sanctioning of defectors in the next 
round (tit for tat); (2) segmentation between cooperators and defectors, i.e. the expec-
tation that one is likely to encounter ‘like-minded’ cooperating types of actors (ethnic 
or linguistic segmentation for example or strong presence of in-group norms based 
on a common identity), and (3) a possibility to establish a reputation that is easily 
(cost-free) verified. It is easy to see that the conceptual definition of networks covers 
such relationships. Networks that contribute to trust relationships need to be based on 
frequent interaction between actors that are like-minded or share values and ideas 
and in which interaction is transparent. Insofar as transnational networks form be-
tween actors sharing similar ideological or normative goals, they conform to a pat-
tern of ‘homophily’, that is, individuals with similar characteristics as identities being 
more likely to have more intense contacts (McPherson, et al. 2001). 
On a descriptive level, the fact that such sociological forms of ‘capital’ are reflected 
network structures is an old insight from social network analysis. Early sociological 
classics using methods of graph theory developed into social network analysis to 
situate individual action in social structure and study how the specific properties of 
social structures reflect social outcomes such as group conflicts,, influence or social 
mobility (e.g. Granovetter 1973; Zachary 1977). In addition, the main thrust of these 
arguments was that patterns of relationships between actors, that is, their ‘embed-
dedness’ in different groups with differing norms, differing allegiances and so forth 
allow to avoid, conceptually, both the over-socialized ‘homo sociologicus’ as well as 
under-socialized ‘homo oeconomicus’ (Granovetter 1985). Moreover, describing 
cohesive groups of individuals on account of their contacts allows identifying those 
norms, frames, or ideas that are more dominant in some groups than in others and 
thus giving a ‘social’ account of their preferences and goals since basic preferences, 
including those relevant for political behavior, do not develop ‘within individuals’ 
themselves in isolation from their social and political environment (Kenny 1992). 
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Thus, networks, in a descriptive and analytical sense, allow identifying the collective 
causal and normative ideas that affect actors’ formulation of their goals as well as the 
‘definition of the situation’, that is, their understanding of the strategic situation in 
which they find themselves (Esser 1996, 1999). 
Based on these considerations, it appears that ‘transnational networks’ may provide 
an analytical and empirical challenge to the suitability of intergovernmentalist as-
sumptions. While the use of the term may refer to a broad range of sociological and 
economic phenomena, the most prominent definition of transnational networks de-
scribes them as “[…] contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries 
that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government.”(Nye and 
Keohane 1971, 331). This definition thus includes actors such as “[…] multinational 
business enterprises and revolutionary movements; trade unions and scientific net-
works; international air transport […].” (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). At a more 
specific level, it is instructive to consider the more special case of transgovernmental 
networks: 
“We define transgovernmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-units 
of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the 
cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top 
leaders as our bench- marks of ‘official government policy’”. (Keohane and Nye 1974, 
43). 
In a sense, then, transnational and transgovernmental relations establish the potential 
for actors within the administrative hierarchy of the state to influence or even change 
‘official government’ policy. Hence, in the same way as transnational networks un-
dermine the ‘containment’ of distinct patterns of political conflicts within states, 
transgovernmental coalition-building undermines the state: 
“[…] transgovernmental coalition building takes place when sub- units build coali-
tions with like-minded agencies from other governments against elements of their own 
administrative structures. At that point, the unity of the state as a foreign policy actor 
breaks down” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 44) 
Note that this definition leaves open the ways in which contacts are constituted. The 
relationships between actors may be formed in way various ways: membership in 
similar organizations, acquaintance, attendance of similar events, etc., as long as long 
as actors can expected to interact repeatedly in the future. The second, more im-
portant aspect consists in the presence of a similar and distinct set of “[…] shared 
values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services” as a 
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core characteristic (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2) Thus, the concept of a transnational 
network in this sense has a more limited meaning, than the usage of the term in the 
broader sociological and economic debate: a key characteristic is the goal to change 
policy outcomes as well as terms and frames of political debate or discourse (Ibid.). 
According to this definition, then, transnational networks are likely to be associated 
with trust because they are based on the three conditions presented above. Insofar as 
networks represent frequent and intense contacts between individuals, they increase 
the likelihood of repeated interactions. Second, frequent interaction implies that ac-
tors expect to meet others who profess to a similar identity, joined values, and a 
common discourse. Finally, for it to be possible to establish whether actors adhere to 
their professed identities, common commitments need to be associated with “strong 
behavioral consequences” (McLean 2007, 225). 
Thus, transnational and transgovernmental actors are defined as communities of ac-
tors sharing similar political goals, beliefs and values among whom, as a result, rela-
tionships of trust evolve that allow transnational political coordination and coalition-
building across states and to influence, if necessary and possible, the hierarchical 
organization of the state to adopt and enforce those preferences in line with the goals 
of the transnational coalition. While these considerations apply to the presence or 
absence of transnational networks, a similarly important question concerns the dy-
namics by which network ties are upheld. After all, transnational networks are social 
relationships: as such, they are not “merely given, nor do they have a simple fixed 
meaning.” (McLean 2007, xi). In this sense, maintaining political networks as re-
sources requires ‘investments’, that is, networks are  
“[…] the product of investment strategies, individual or collective […] aimed at establish-
ing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, 
[…] that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt 
(feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights)” 
(Bourdieu 1986, 249).  
In Bourdieu’s account, these strategies consist of ‘exchanges’ – material or rhetorical 
– that provide economic, political, or social benefits for the members of a group and 
carry ‘symbolic’ meaning, acknowledging mutual obligations and memberships 
(Ibid.). ‘Networking’ consists of discursive and rhetorical strategies that seek to es-
tablish a reputation for trustworthiness within a particular social or political group. In 
sum, actors “[…] negotiate their way into relationships by means of words.” 
(McLean 2007, 33). 
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One particular strategy consist in rhetorically expressing adherence to a common 
‘logos’ – political reasoning – and ‘ethos’ or set of values of the community 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003). Provided that the sincerity of such commitments can 
be credibly observed – for example by putting electoral fortunes at risk in domestic 
conflict – such commitments may be more or less credible. A second prominent set 
of strategies of mobilization and establishing interpersonal relationships has been 
analyzed as ‘frame alignment processes’ in the social movement literature, that is, 
the “linkage or conjunction of individual and [collective] interpretive frameworks.” 
(Snow, et al. 1986, 467). Such practices are aimed at establishing and maintain valu-
able networks ties and contacts thus involve the manipulation of meaning and other 
resources from the available cultural ‘toolkit’ (Swidler 1986). 
As a result, it is important to take into account a more elaborate definition of struc-
tures of influence in particular the notion of embeddedness. As the previous section 
has argued, the conceptual notion is eminently suitable for both the quantitative and 
the qualitative tradition. 
2.3.3 Transnational Embeddedness and Governmental Preferences 
In the transnational perspective, I take as actors the individuals that make up transna-
tional and transgovernmental communities. In terms of their basic motives, I reject 
the usual dichotomy between strategic actors following the logic of consequences 
and value driven actors following a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 
1989). An emphasis on rationality and thus strategic behavior does not exclude the 
possibility of preferences informed by ‘values’: “Self-interest is not presumed by 
rationality (one could have transitive and complete altruistic or masochistic prefer-
ences), but it is commonly treated as axiomatic in economics (and sometimes con-
fused with rationality).” (Bowles 2004, 96). Thus, I remain within a ‘utility maximi-
zation’ paradigm, whereas utility is heavily dependent on ideology. Actors are ra-
tional but base their choices on subjective and, inter alia, normative reasons (Shafir, 
et al. 1993). These include, apart from considerations for power and plenty, concep-
tions of what is causally feasible as well as valued “conceptions of the desirable” 
(Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28). Since resources are always scarce, political 
power need not be the paramount end of political action. Any actor committed to 
normative political change will require power to achieve given ends. Thus, while 
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material and power related interests are objective sources of preferences and incen-
tives, they ‘compete’, so to speak, with given subjective motives: ideas, norms, val-
ues, and so on.
13
 Most importantly, I do not expect ideas and values to make geopo-
litical incentives and interests – such as security – or domestic considerations – such 
as power and plenty – irrelevant. I do expect them to be important but indeterminate 
factors unable to explain state behavior sufficiently. 
Political actors tend to influence each other through exchange of ideas and argu-
ments. Such influence can be expected to be proportional to the amount of interac-
tion. At the same time, actors choose their relationships to a certain degree, they “in-
fluence each other through their interactions, [they] seek out others of like-
mindedness to interact with.” (Krackhardt 1998, 246). Choices of networking may be 
due to multiple motives: information, exchanges of favors, mutual commitment to 
common norms and thus the creation of social and political capital (Coleman 1988, 
103, 104; McPherson, et al. 2001). 
Norms and obligations, however, are multiple and usually conflicting. In terms of the 
scope of the argument, a corollary of maintaining the ‘rationality assumption and 
assuming multiple motivations, is that transnational commitments, if existent, are one 
of multiple commitments and obligations that elite political actors make. Moreover, I 
assume they are made not out of sheer convictions but with a definite goal in mind. 
The precondition is not identity but similarity of values, ideas, and strategies. By 
definition, their goal is to influence state behavior according to shared goals and 
strategies. It suffices that actors from a set of countries agree on the desirability of a 
certain set of policies or institutions and are willing to take political risks in their 
domestic arenas. Given the different incentives actors from diverse countries face, 
such coalitions must “traverse [large] gaps in power, wealth, ideology, culture, stra-
tegic interests, and organizational forms.” (Bandy and Smith 2005, 231). 
The literature on transnational movements, reviewed above, already contained a 
number of conditions that specify when and under what circumstances transnational 
movements and networks may have an impact on state preferences. The higher the 
resources, the higher the ability to organize, and the higher the capability for action. 
                                                 
13
 “Wer Politik treibt, erstrebt Macht: Macht entweder als Mittel im Dienst anderer Ziele (idealer oder 
egoistischer), – oder Macht “um ihrer selbst willen“: um das Prestigegefühl, das sie gibt, zu genie-
ßen.“(Weber 1988b, 507). 
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Given the collective action problem, cohesive ideologies that bind actors together are 
important carriers of influence. Rhetoric allows the negotiation of commitments, 
sticking to commitments in the face of potential political costs builds mutual trust. 
Thus, the basis for the successful construction of transnational communities and coa-
litions is ideological similarity and available resources. 
H6 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a transnational coalition and 
the material resources at its disposal, the higher will be the potential impact 
its activities can have on the preferences and bargaining strategies of state 
governments. 
While these conditions capture the general conditions for impact, a closer look at the 
domestic institutions and concrete entry points is needed. Regarding the domestic 
conditions, the literature has emphasized the role of domestic institutions that struc-
ture political conflict. Employing the logic used by Evangelista (1995, 1997), it fol-
lows that the less the party leadership of domestic parties is able to enforce party 
discipline, the easier it is for any transnational coalition to gain access and make its 
voices heard in the processes of demand formation, that is, to be a particular voice 
among many, seeking to gain attention and to influence the demand side of the pro-
cesses of preference formation. 
Vice versa, the higher the capability of the party leadership to enforce party disci-
pline, the harder it is for a transitional coalition to attain that status; at the same time, 
if core members of the party hierarchy are central actors within an ideologically co-
hesive transnational coalition, the scope for impact widens dramatically. Moreover, if 
the party leadership attains governmental power, the potential impact on the supply 
conditions is equally increased. Finally, if the leadership of several state governments 
is embedded in similar transgovernmental coalitions of actors with similar political 
goals, their preferences should be similar, depending on the degree to which gov-
ernment leaders are able to enforce their views. 
At the same time, the implication for shifting conflict constellations, i.e. shifting bar-
gaining positions is different from the intergovernmentalist proposition. The less 
domestic institutions and parties structure political conflict, the less government 
preferences will be affected by domestic changes in the party composition of gov-
ernments and, conversely, the higher the potential impact of a changing embed-
dedness of governments in transnational coalitions. 
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H7 The higher the embeddedness of domestic party members in transnational 
coalitions and the lower their capability to structure conflict and enforce col-
lective decisions domestically, the higher the potential impact of transnation-
al coalition on the formation of political demands. The higher the embed-
dedness of the transnational coalition in domestic governments, the higher 
the potential impact on supply conditions as similar causal beliefs and nor-
mative beliefs lead to similar preferences across countries. 
H8 Governments’ bargaining positions change in response to any domestic 
changes affecting the embeddedness of governments in transnational coali-
tions. 
Since the ideological cohesiveness of transnational coalitions is presumed to mediate 
impact and since that impact is dependent on the embeddedness of governments 
within those coalitions, the supply of centralized institutions is dependent on gov-
ernment embeddedness. As a corollary, individuals’ normative considerations come 
into play in the same manner as presented in the intergovernmental section. Under 
the condition of widespread acceptance of democratic norms, actors seek to design 
institutions meeting requirements of democratic representation (Rittberger 2001, 
2005, 2006). This tendency may be partly attributed to concerns for democratic 
norms and partly to concerns for political support. A major role may be due to ‘sali-
ence: within democratic societies, political actors pushing for international institu-
tions that seem to violate core principles of democracy are likely to be punished elec-
torally and reputationally (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006). Thus, groups 
should exhibit a consistency in their institutional demands: the higher the centraliza-
tion of demanded institutions, the higher the degree of representation. 
Having treated state preference formation, I now turn to bargaining strategies and 
strategic beliefs 
2.3.4 The Wisdom of Crowds and the Paradox of Influence: Network Struc-
ture and Uncertainty 
Whereas the previous section has dealt with preferences, this section deals with be-
liefs and bargaining strategies. As mentioned above, transgovernmental networks are 
often associated with the efficient distribution of information among governments. 
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The prevalence of such views may be due, partially, to a naïve transfer of ‘the wis-
dom of crowds’ argument to concepts of network governance. In principle, the ar-
gument is powerful (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004). Decision-making under condi-
tions in which many actors can have their perspectives be heard and their beliefs and 
information can influence decision-making may indeed be characterized of higher 
quality. Provided that the sources of errors and biases are distributed normally, the 
larger the crowd, the more accurate the outcome; hierarchies, in which a small num-
ber of individuals take final decisions, are bound to be more error prone. With the 
rise of information technology and the internet, the effect has received increased at-
tention (Surowiecki 2004).  
On the other hand, numerous studies on the effects of group think, for example, have 
demonstrated that group decision-making may be prone to errors (Esser 1998). In-
deed, the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect depends on disagreement and non-systematic 
sources of errors. If many members of a group share similar world views, goals, or 
causal and strategic beliefs, this effect should not occur. Moreover, with regard to the 
literature studying learning in networks, there is a long tradition of formal work link-
ing network structures to specific outcomes, for example by showing how the suc-
cessful diffusion of economically beneficial technical innovations is facilitated or 
hindered by specific network structures, just as much as the spread of diseases is fa-
cilitated or hindered by certain network structures (see Jackson 2008, ch. 7; Easley 
and Kleinberg 2010, ch. 19).  
To consider the effect of network structures on learning under uncertainty, the formal 
literature draws on a family of models that analyze the structural effects of trust rela-
tionships among actors trying to reach a consensus on a matter of personal and sub-
jective beliefs about some uncertain issue and thus give a more substantial interpreta-
tion to notions of network centrality and the conditions for the effect to occur 
(DeGroot 1974; Jackson 2008, 228 ff.). The most important result: networks can both 
make learning robust to extreme opinions or wholly prevent the learning ‘wisdom’ of 
a group: ‘network effects’ are thus effects of varying network structure. For individ-
uals and groups alike, it is their position, the quality of their ties – their centrality – 
that matters.  
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One considers a group of 𝑛 actors, who have initial subjective beliefs regarding a 
certain issue, e.g. the likelihood for a certain event to occur (for the following see 
esp.  Jackson 2008, chapters 7, 8).
14
. The relationship among the actors is modeled 
by assuming that the members of the group have varying trust towards each other, 
which can be represented as a network in the form of an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 𝐓 so that the 
entry 𝐓𝑖𝑗 is the trust that agent 𝑖 has in the belief of agent 𝑗. This matrix 𝐓 needs to be 
‘row-stochastic’, meaning that all row entries sum to 1, which merely implies that 
each actor divides his total trust among others as well as himself (i.e. possesses ‘self-
confidence’). Figure 2.1 below displays such a possible completely connected trust 
network among six actors. 
Figure 2.1 Completely Connected Trust Network 
 
In order to capture the learning process, the model simplifies the process by assump-
tion, namely assuming a ‘naïve’ learning process in which actors copy the (weighted) 
beliefs of other actors as observed in the current round in order to form their belief in 
                                                 
14
 The initial beliefs at 𝑡0 are represented by a vector of probabilities p(0) = (p1(0),… , pn(0)) 
where each individual value lies within the unit interval pi(0) 𝜖 [0,1]. 
 (𝑛  1) 
1   
Note: Each actor places an equal amount of trust  (𝑛  1)  on all other  
actors and has (positive) self -confidence of 1    with   𝜖 [0,1]. 
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the next round.
15
 On such assumptions, actors will reach a consensus in finite time 
under the condition of aperiodicity (Jackson 2008, 233, 234).
16
  
Since this process amounts to actors taking a weighted average of the opinions of 
others, the structure illustrated in Figure 2.1 above will lead to the popularly known 
‘wisdom of crowds’ effect, described above. Assume that actors’ initial subjective 
beliefs are the result of each actor receiving a noisy signal about the ‘true state’ of 
affairs 𝜇 of some unknown variable accompanied by a random error, drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean value 𝜇 = 0. Allowing such a group of actors to be-
come arbitrarily large (𝑛 → ∞), the Central Limit Theorem ensures that the final 
beliefs of the actors will converge to the true value since actors take simple and equal 
averages of the opinion of others (Jackson 2008, 250).
17
 The process of learning in 
such a network thus illustrates the “wisdom of crowd effect […] a statistical phe-
nomenon […] based on a mathematical aggregation of individual estimates” (Lorenz, 
et al. 2011). Thus, the graph above is an example of an ‘efficient network’ in which 
accurate information processing is easily achieved as the network grows (Jackson 
2008, 157 ff.). However, such structures are unlikely. 
In order to investigate the effect of alternative network structures on such learning 
outcomes, recent work by Golub and Jackson use a definition of social influence that 
is derived from the trust networks introduced and has a direct meaning in terms of 
the standard centrality measure of Eigenvector Centrality (Jackson 2008, 238; Golub 
and Jackson 2010, 121; see also next chapter). In order to illustrate the argument, 
Figure 2.2 below displays a substantially different network structure. In this case, the 
most ‘central’ actor still trusts every other actor equally with a weight of  (𝑛  1) , 
whereas the remaining actors do not trust each other and place an arbitrary but simi-
lar weight 1  𝜀 on the central actor.  
  
                                                 
15
 This updating process over time can be represented as p(𝑡) = 𝐓 p(𝑡  1) =  𝐓t p (0) (Jackson 
2008, 228). 
16
 A network is aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of all directed cycles is 1. If this technical 
condition is not present, beliefs ‘cycle’: actors keep updating according to weighted copies of their 
neighbors’ beliefs without ever reaching a steady state in which every actor has the same belief and 
disagreement persists (Jackson 2008, 232, 233). 
17
 lim𝑛→∞  Pr  [|p
𝑛(∞)  𝜇| ≥ 𝜀] = 0 
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Figure 2.2 Extremely Imbalanced Trust Network: The Star Grap 
 
Note: Taken from Golub and Jackson (2010, 129) 
As can be seen, in this network there is a strong imbalance. There is a single actor 
that is disproportionately more trusted than any other actor in the network. In order to 
analytically capture the influence such network structures have on learning out-
comes, Golub and Jackson show that for every trust network that fulfills the condi-
tions for convergence, there is an influence vector s that assigns an ‘influence value’ 
to each actor. This vector s captures the relative influence each actor has on the final 
learning outcome since it gives the weights with which the resulting vector of beliefs 
can be computed directly.
 18
 
In the case of the completely connected network, displayed in Figure 2.1, that value 
is identical for every actor. In the case of the imbalanced network shown in Figure 
2.2, the vector is (Golub and Jackson 2010, 128): 
                                                 
18
 The influence of each actor is captured by a vector s (𝑠 ∈ [0,1]𝑛 and ∑ 𝑠𝑖 = 1)𝑖  so that the final 
stationary vector of beliefs after the updating has converged is composed of the initial vector of beliefs 
p𝑛(0) weighted by s so that p
∞ = s ∙ p(0) = ∑ s𝑖𝑖 p𝑖(0) (Jackson 2008, 238). The vector s then as-
signs an influence value to each actor. Golub and Jackson prove that s corresponds to this vector is the 
unique (row) Eigenvector v of T with a corresponding Eigenvalue of 𝜆 = 1 (Golub and Jackson 2010, 
137 ff.). 
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s𝑖(𝑛) =
{
 
 
 
 
1  𝜀
1  𝜀 +  
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1
 
(𝑛  1)(1  𝜖 +  )
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 > 1
 
In the latter case, the group of actors is bound to arrive at a false conclusion. As the 
network grows (𝑛 → ∞), the influence value of the central actor s𝑖=1 remains unaf-
fected whereas the values of the remaining actors s𝑖>1 become vanishingly small as 
the denominator in this case grows with larger n. The relatively stark result that 
Golub and Jackson thus demonstrate is that learning in such a network will never 
converge to true values, irrespective of the initial belief vector 𝑝(0) since the (rela-
tive) difference of influence between the central actor (and the associated error with 
his signal) and the remaining network grows larger with larger n (Golub and Jackson 
2010, 128). Growing the network thus only adds to the imbalance in the network and 
makes the relative influence of the central actor more extreme. This structural prop-
erty extends not just to individuals but to the overall group structure of networks in 
general (Ibid). In general terms, Golub and Jackson identify structural conditions that 
prevent such biased learning outcomes: the condition of balance implies that no 
group in a network is trusted by another group infinitely more than it trusts back as 
the network grows; minimal dispersion implies that groups retain sufficient trust 
connections to other groups containing all agents as the network grows (Jackson 
2008, 252; Golub and Jackson 2010, 130, 131). To put it in simple terms: The higher 
the relative influence of a particular individual or group, the higher the likelihood of 
the whole group being wrong. 
Despite the simple assumption of learning within this setup, the influence of network 
centrality on information processing in groups has been demonstrated experimentally 
(Lorenz, et al. 2011). Moreover, as mentioned above, although the projected outcome 
of such a biased learning process resembles phenomena commonly labeled group-
think in the context of foreign policy analysis (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 283), the 
updating is “boundedly rational […]” as the assumption implies actors “ failing to 
adjust correctly for repetitions and dependencies in information that they hear multi-
ple times.”(Golub and Jackson 2010, 113). Accordingly, similar efforts in studying 
learning in networks with fully Bayesian actors do not study trust network structures 
“in a substantial way”, as ‘sociological’ notions such as trust are somewhat remote 
from their assumptions (Jackson 2008). 
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In sum, network structures matter. In particular, structures of transgovernmental net-
works should have a direct impact on learning processes within intergovernmental 
negotiations. If they are ‘balanced’, approximating the first structure, learning should 
occur ‘efficiently’ and no specific transnational actors should have a disproportionate 
influence on the beliefs of the negotiating actors. If, on the other hand, the structure 
of transgovernmental networks approximates an imbalanced state, as the latter graph 
indicated, the position within transgovernmental networks should matter. Provided 
that actors trust individuals with similar ideological predispositions more than others, 
privileged groups – or transgovernmental coalitions - within such networks can dis-
pose of substantial influence over the kind of information governments base their 
strategic decisions on. Whereas these considerations assume that every government 
is equal, such influence may vary in accordance with the power and influence of spe-
cific governments the coalition has access to. 
These considerations thus draw a decidedly different picture of the ways in which 
governments deal with information. Transnational and transgovernmental coalitions 
may have influence on beliefs of governments if they are in a privileged position 
within the transgovernmental networks. At the same time, common ideology may 
lead to error through common bias. High influence may thus be paradoxical as gov-
ernments are, as a result, likely to base their decisions on false information. Ideologi-
cal bias in information processing, moreover, need not be irrational under asymmet-
ric information (Calvert 1985; Kydd 2003). Depending on actors’ embeddedness 
within transnational and transgovernmental networks, bargaining inefficiencies 
might no longer be due to situational contingencies, but rather of a systematic kind, if 
highly connected transnational actors base their views on erroneous and biased 
judgments. 
H9 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a group in transnational net-
works, the higher it’s potential to provide for trustful relationships among its 
actors. The higher the centrality of a group in transgovernmental networks, 
the larger its influence on the beliefs of governments and thus on the course 
and outcome of the bargain. 
A precondition for these considerations to apply is thus that actors within govern-
ments deal with information differently, depending on whether the source is ideolog-
ically close or distant. 
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H10 Bargaining strategies may change on account of novel information. In-
formation from individuals with similar ideological commitments is treated as 
more credible than information from individuals with different ideological 
commitments. 
2.4 Summary 
This section has synthesized two theoretical frameworks from the available literature 
on state preference formation and bargaining behavior. It has argued that transna-
tional networks may undermine the conditions upon which the empirical precision of 
intergovernmentalist theories is predicated. This argument is based on the claim that, 
first, transnational networks connect groups with similar ideologies across states and 
thus contribute to the organization of similar patterns of demands for common insti-
tutions across states; second, that the ‘embeddedness’ of governments in transnation-
al and transgovernmental networks affects the supply conditions for common institu-
tions by affecting the dominant ideologies that shape the institutional preferences of 
governments; third, that transnational and transgovernmental networks that are based 
on similar ideologies contribute to the formation of relationships of trust among state 
officials and thus affect both the ways in which governments deal with uncertainty as 
well as the ‘efficiency’ of the bargain. In particular, it is the structure of networks 
that matters: the beliefs of few disproportionately well connected – ‘central’ – indi-
viduals and groups can potentially have a disproportionate impact on the beliefs of 
all, independent of the accuracy of these beliefs. 
In order to contrast the implications of these claims with an intergovernmental views, 
Table 2.2 below contrasts the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of Competing Hypotheses 
Intergovernmental Framework Transnational Framework 
H1 The higher the security threats to a particu-
lar country, the higher the demand for balancing 
through mobilization of capabilities and alliance 
cooperation. The higher the ‘violence interde-
pendence’ between any two Alliance partners 
and the higher the perceived potential for defec-
tion of Alliance partners, the higher the demand 
for credible commitments and centralized insti-
tutions. 
H6 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a 
transnational coalition and the material resources 
at its disposal, the higher will be the potential 
impact its activities can have on the preferences 
and bargaining strategies of state governments. 
H2 More powerful states are less worried about 
the control of centralized institutions and care 
more about efficiency and their influence. The 
more relative power a state has within an alliance 
bargain, the more it will prefer beneficial pooling 
of decision-making. Less powerful states are 
more worried about the control of centralized 
institutions and care more about their autonomy. 
The less relative power a state has within an alli-
ance bargain, the more it will prefer unanimity 
and veto rights. 
H7 The higher the embeddedness of domestic 
party members in transnational coalitions and the 
lower their capability to structure conflict and 
enforce collective decisions domestically, the 
higher the potential impact of transnational coali-
tion on the formation of political demands. The 
higher the embeddedness of the transnational 
coalition in domestic governments, the higher the 
potential impact on supply conditions as similar 
causal beliefs and normative beliefs lead to simi-
lar preferences across countries. 
H3 Governments’ bargaining positions change in 
response to changing geopolitical threat level 
(‘security crises’), changes in the distribution of 
material capabilities or domestic shifts in the 
party composition of the governing coalition. 
H8 Governments’ bargaining positions change in 
response to any domestic changes affecting the 
embeddedness of governments in transnational 
coalitions. 
H4 The higher the military capabilities of a state 
and the more attractive its outside options to the 
alliance bargain, the higher the influence of its 
preferences on the course and outcome of the 
bargain. The higher and the more influential the 
domestic opposition to cooperation within the 
alliance, the higher the influence of that govern-
ment’s preferences on the course and outcome of 
the bargain. 
H9 The higher the ideological cohesiveness of a 
group in transnational networks, the higher it’s 
potential to provide for trustful relationships 
among its actors. The higher the centrality of a 
group in transgovernmental networks, the larger 
its influence on the beliefs of governments and 
thus on the course and outcome of the bargain. 
H5 Bargaining strategies change on account of 
novel information that is obtained through institu-
tionalized and trusted sources comprising domes-
tic actors, interest groups, and institutionalized 
formal diplomatic and ministerial channels. Mul-
tiple domestic principals, lenient mandates and 
adverse preferences between governments and 
their delegates increase the likelihood of ratifica-
tion failure. 
H10 Bargaining strategies may change on ac-
count of novel information. Information from 
individuals with similar ideological commitments 
is treated as more credible than information from 
individuals with different ideological commit-
ments. 
 
These hypotheses will inform the analysis of the EDC bargain. The next chapter will 
lay out the logic of the research design utilized to inform these hypotheses. 
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3. The EDC as a Case and the Rationale of the Research Design 
The present chapter has two tasks. First, it presents the current state of research on 
post-war Europe in general and the European Defense Community in particular and 
discusses the status of the EDC as a case by asking what the EDC bargain is a case of 
(section 3.1). I argue that there is a peculiar consensus early scholarship of post-war 
Europe that has identified an unexplained convergence of attitudes among the Euro-
pean political elite across states and parties, an insight that is no longer treated as 
significant by later scholarship that falls more neatly into the categories of the inter-
governmentalist and the transnational framework presented in the previous chapter. 
Taking this observation as a point of departure, the second section (3.2) focuses on 
the research design of the dissertation following the logic of a ‘mixed design (e.g. 
Greene 2007). I delineate the ways in which the network data was sampled from 
available public records (3.2.1) as well as the analytical and descriptive tools I rely 
upon to analyze the data (3.2.2). Finally, I characterize the qualitative and quantita-
tive sources of information that are utilized for studying the bargaining process (sec-
tion 3.3). 
3.1 The EDC and its Status as a Case-Study 
This section reviews the scholarship on the EDC mainly in light of the theoretical 
frameworks presented in the previous chapter (section 3.1.1) and situates the EDC as 
a case by asking: what is the EDC a case of (section 3.1.2)? 
3.1.1 Two Stories about Post-War Europe and the EDC 
Why did the European states first negotiate unsuccessfully a supranational army for 
four years only to discard it and to agree on a NATO solution for the ‘German prob-
lem’ within mere months? The present section reviews the available answers in the 
scholarship on the EDC and post-war Europe in a condensed way. It identifies, in 
line with the two frameworks presented in the previous chapter, two basic types nar-
ratives, intergovernmental and transnational. Reviewing the literature, I argue that 
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there is a lack of systematic analysis of the impact of prominent transnational organi-
zations and networks on the post-war European bargains. 
 
Intergovernmental Narratives: Geopolitical Threats or Domestic Ideas? 
The intergovernmental framework encapsulates a number of arguments that focus on 
geopolitical constraints, the national interests, and different types of motivations for 
‘national leaders’, ideas and domestic conflict, and finally democratic values for the 
formation of preferences for institutional design. The heterogeneity stems from the 
fact that the vast historical literature, difficult to categorize, largely follows the inter-
governmental framework only implicitly, in particular scholars operating in the 
framework of ‘diplomatic history’ stipulate that governmental leaders in post-war 
Europe made the institutional choices they did as a response to the internal geopoliti-
cal situation and economic situation after the war. Loth has distilled four distinct 
challenges which posed themselves to virtually all decision-makers at the time: the 
challenge to secure peace in Europe, the challenge to incorporate Germany within 
such an architecture, the challenge to ensure economic reconstruction and thus to 
rebuild European trade flows, and the challenge of preserving autonomy within the 
emerging confrontation of the two superpowers (Loth 2014). 
Thus, the most prominent geopolitical line of reasoning sees the EDC bargain as a 
series of adaptations to a shifting geopolitical context, and in particular the emerging 
confrontation between the two blocks. European states were motivated by a desire to 
preempt German resurgence while seeking to address an impending Soviet continen-
tal hegemony (Hitchcock 1998; Creswell 2006). Thus, those countries most directly 
threatened by German reconstruction – i.e. the Six, but most notably France – had to 
find a way out of the dilemma by integrating Germany in the alliance to balance 
against the Soviet threat (e.g. Gillingham 1991; Herbst 1996; Hitchcock 1998; 
Trachtenberg 1999; Creswell 2006). One argument holds that the course of the bar-
gain over German rearmament is captured by a shifting geopolitical context in line 
with intergovernmentalist reasoning: whereas the sense of threat was highest when 
the Korean War broke out, the sense of threat declined by 1953 with Stalin’s death 
and the end of the Korean War. Hence, the Pleven Plan was a sincere effort to inte-
grate Germany into the Alliance through co-binding in the aftermath of the outbreak 
of the Korean War; after Stalin’s death, autonomy became more salient, in particular 
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for the French government (McAllister 2002; Dinan 2004). Germany assented be-
cause it could thereby gain recognition and groped one step closer to sovereignty and 
full integration in the West (Herbst 1996). The US administration preferred the EDC 
because it opened the possibility of reducing the US burden of defending the conti-
nent, but was content with the WEU as long as German resources were tapped and 
thus utilized its considerable leverage to push European elites along the integration 
path (Leffler 1992; Schwabe 1993, 1995; Trachtenberg 1999). European elites as-
sented and even welcomed US influence in light of the Soviet threat (Lundestad 
1986, 2003). In terms of specific country preferences, one argument adds that, hop-
ing for US support and seeing the war in Indochina escalate, the French government 
simply delayed any decision on German rearmament until the war in Indochina was 
resolved (Wall 1991; Aimaq 1996, 2000). Italy sought to gain influence within the 
Alliance by following the integration path (Magagnoli 1998, 1999). The Benelux 
countries, fearing continental hegemony by France and Germany, were sceptical 
about the plans but assented for lack of alternatives and US pressure; as a result, the 
rejection of the EDC and its replacement by the WEU was welcomed (Van der Harst 
1990; Coolsaet 2002). British interests were equally focused on increasing US en-
gagement on the continent. Although there were considerable doubts as to the effi-
ciency of the EDC, the British government supported it from the outside and, once it 
failed, quickly acted to safeguard it by a British troop commitment to the WEU, thus 
minimizing the potential damage to the alliance (Ruane 2000, 55). 
Hence, from a geopolitical view, the EDC is seen is the response to a high threat in 
reaction to the Korean War, necessitating a quick build-up of allied forces, which 
involved high transaction costs, especially regarding the viability and reputation of 
the German partner. High transaction costs and reputation concerns thus lead to pro-
posals for the hierarchic and centralized institutional design of the EDC (Weber 
1997; Mattes 2012). As all countries doubted the reliability of the Germans, credible 
commitments were required (Mattes 2012); the creation of a supranational army pro-
vided such commitments in an extreme form, but created considerable transaction 
costs, the response to which is the creation of centralized hierarchies (Weber 1997). 
Thus, whereas under a high external threat, the need for external balancing was the 
supreme concern, once the threat situation lessened and autonomy became more sali-
ent, different design solutions were preferred and the WEU seemed preferable 
(recently Rosato 2011). These arguments straightforwardly correspond to the realist 
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intergovernmental hypotheses that emphasize material and ‘objective’ geopolitical 
constraints, the intergovernmentalist hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, 
and, at a first approximation, offer reasonable explanation of the EDC bargain, its 
failure, and the outcome in form of the WEU treaty. 
However, much of the historical scholarship, including the literature reviewed above, 
explicitly recognizes the fact that there was ample conflict both internationally as 
well as domestically over the question of post-war international European institu-
tions. This fact does not easily square with the notion of a ‘national interest’. The 
general problem with arguments based on notions of ‘national interest’ is that their 
demonstration, ideally, would require the demonstration of “patterns in which many 
people within a state—ideally, even people who disagree on other things—arrive at 
similar views of geopolitical challenges and responses.” (Parsons 2013, 794, 795). 
Significant and prolonged domestic conflicts over foreign policy issues cast a doubt 
on the very existence of a clearly identifiable ‘national interest’. 
An early influential analysis by Stanley Hoffman argued that responses to the geopo-
litical situation depended on subjective attitudes and nationalist values, which, in 
turn, were deeply affected by the war experience. The populations of the ‘winners of 
the war’ (especially France) were more inclined to value national sovereignty as a 
means of defense in the emerging global conflict whereas for the ‘losers of the war’ 
(Germany and Italy), nationalism was totally discredited (Hoffman 1966, 871, 872). 
In addition, he argued that there were different types of attitudes towards European 
integration, recognizable among the governmental elite in every continental country: 
there were those who sought European unity as a means to gain independence from 
the US and the Soviet Union, those who sought it as a means to ensure continued US 
support and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and those who thought that both 
would be possible without sacrificing essential parts of national sovereignty 
(Hoffman 1966, 874). Depending on whether individuals in government would be-
long to any one category, governments would accordingly pursue different strategies. 
Hoffman does not explain the existence of these different attitudes, nor does he men-
tion the transnational organizations or their possible impact. 
Two recent analyses of the French case equally take issue with the notion of the na-
tional interest. These can, explicitly or implicitly, be grouped as ‘liberal intergov-
ernmental’ arguments as they emphasize domestic conflict. Craig Parsons document-
ed domestic conflicts that cut across and divided French parties and centered around 
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different preferred institutional models for Europe, namely a traditional, a confederal, 
and a federal model (Parsons 2003, 43 ff.). As a result, there was ample domestic 
disagreement and no coherent and widely shared formulation of the French ‘national 
interest’ existed. Thus, the conditions in France call into question that basic assump-
tions of the intergovernmentalist paradigm since the French state constituted “[…] 
the limiting case of the most fragmented state imaginable making a series of contest-
ed decisions to which no one rallied at all.”(Parsons 2013, 797). The fate of the EDC 
in France was inextricably tied to the ‘third force coalition’ between the Christian 
Democratic MRP, the Socialist SFIO, and the Radical party. Noting that after the 
French elections in 1951, as the Socialists left the governing coalition for good 
French governments increasingly preferred traditional (Gaullist deputies) or confed-
eral models and the ratification of the EDC Treaty became ever more unlikely 
(Parsons 2003, 74). Overall, Parsons submits that there were three different typical 
attitudes that were highly influential for French politics but he does not explain 
them.
19
 The reader is left wondering whether they were a French peculiarity or part 
of a larger picture that is not addressed.  
A similar argument focusing on domestic conflict is offered by Helen Milner. 
“Changes in domestic politics thus shifted the governing majority against the EDC” 
(Milner 1997, 195). According to this argument, shifting coalitional alignments 
changed the parameters of the ‘two-level game’ played as the 1951 elections for the 
French Assemblée Nationale changed the position of the median voter away from the 
EDC (Ibid., 200). Additionally, domestic groups – for example the military – were, 
in Milner's account, much more opposed to the EDC than to the ECSC. Thus, Milner 
claims that more positive attitudes of interest groups towards the ECSC provided 
affirmative ‘information’ concerning the contractual details and eased ratification, 
whereas the harsh opposition by interest groups and the military towards the EDC 
provided ‘negative information’, thus contributing to the rejection (Ibid., 199). 
Moreover, not only did the overall ideological outlook of French governments shift 
over time against a supranational army, but the delegation that negotiated the treaty 
deliberately overstepped its mandate as a function of conflicting preferences within 
                                                 
19
 The argument is that after “the French consensus on European policies dissolved” in 1948, French 
elites developed these three models without explaining – or even speculating on the origins of – these 
models (Parsons 2003, 43). 
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the French government and the Quai d’Orsay (Massigli 1978, 287; Milner 1997, 195; 
Parsons 2003, 73; Creswell 2006, 63). 
A final argument concerns specific preferences for institutional design and the differ-
ent levels of parliamentary representation associated with the EDC, the EPC, and the 
WEU. Rittberger argues that democratically elected governments operating within a 
community of states with shared democratic norms formed preferences for institu-
tional designs on the basis of an antecedent preference to delegate or pool sovereign-
ty (Rittberger 2001, 2003, 2006). The higher this antecedent preference, the higher 
the potential ‘democratic deficit’ that would emerge without ‘appropriate’ concomi-
tant representative institutions. Hence, the levels of representation and parliamentary 
influence envisioned in the EDC Treaty were, compared to any institutional initiative 
in the history of European integration, very high because the EDC envisioned un-
precedented amounts of delegation and pooling. At the same time, governments re-
acted negatively to the EPC Draft Treaty proposed in 1953 because they felt that the 
implied level of parliamentary control and influence exceeded the requirements 
(Rittberger 2006). This mechanism can be linked with a diverse range of antecedent 
motives: the latter may result from different levels of preferred institutional centrali-
zation associated with shifting geopolitical threats and institutional demands or it can 
be based on specific ideological preferences, such as actors from the German delega-
tion utilizing a ‘federal state’ analogy as a yardstick for appropriate ‘institutional 
design’ (Rittberger 2012, 89). 
By way of a summary, it is notable that the intergovernmental arguments, particular-
ly those advanced by Hoffman and Parson, raise open questions that may conceiva-
ble be addressed by considering the transnational dimension. Hoffman notes the ex-
istence of at least three different typical attitudes towards the European project across 
countries, but does not explain why they existed. Parsons noted three types of atti-
tudes towards European institutions in France, but does not explain them either. In 
both instances the authors argue that the types of attitudes that prevailed in European 
governments at any given time account for specific government preferences and thus 
‘government behavior’. The next section will turn to transnational arguments to see 
whether there are any clues to answer this question. 
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Transnational Narratives 
Transnational approaches contend that the ‘four incentives’ influenced not only gov-
ernments, but that they heavily affected European political elites on a transnational 
scale. However, while the scholarship examined so far has virtually ignored the po-
tential impact of transnational networks and organizations on major initiatives of 
European integration in general and the EDC in particular, Walter Lipgens’ classic 
work may have overstated it (e.g. Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens 
and Loth 1988, 1990). Lipgens emphasized the role of the emerging transnational 
organizations and in particular federalist actors for the early origins of the European 
project (e.g. Lipgens and Loth 1977; Lipgens 1984b). Thus, Lipgens and Loth pro-
vided invaluable documentation of the different ‘ideas of Europe’ that circulated in 
the resistance movements during and after the Second World War (Lipgens 1984a), 
in the various transnational organizations immediately after the war (Lipgens and 
Loth 1990), as well as in the domestic parties and interest groups in the European 
countries (Lipgens and Loth 1988). Offering a comprehensive picture of the transna-
tional conflicts over post-war Europe in the immediate years after the war, Lipgens’ 
work, unfortunately, did not surpass the point of documenting the ideas circulating 
within the transnational organizations and did not demonstrate a systematic influence 
of these organizations beyond 1950. Thus, Alan Milward maintained that Lipgens 
only provided the “the chronicle of fringe political groups” (Milward 2000, 17). One 
exception is the publication of key documents relating to the negotiations of the Six 
in December 1951, in which the conflict about the question of complete parliamen-
tary control of the budget and the political authority came to a climax between the 
larger and the smaller states negotiating the EDC, documenting at least a temporary 
influence of Italian federalists over the Italian government (Lipgens 1984b, 655, 662; 
Pistone 2008). Beyond that invaluable documentation, however, it remains unclear 
how to relate this documentation to the overall impact of the transnational organiza-
tions on European bargains, both analytically as well as empirically. 
A second particularly influential work is the argument developed by Ernst B. Haas in 
order to account for the early origins of European integration (Haas 2004 [1958]). 
Analysing the ratification debates within the national parliaments over the ECSC and 
the EDC Treaties, Haas came to the conclusion that no “[…] common dedication to 
European principles [can] be isolated as a unifying element.” (Haas 2004 [1958], 
153). Comparing the party families across the negotiating states, Haas noted that 
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while there was no unifying element in Socialist and Liberal parties, Christian Dem-
ocratic parties were notable for their “commitment to a united and peaceful Europe, 
commonly shared by all six parties and cemented with Church teaching.” (Ibid.). 
Overall, he stated that there was initially an “elusive majority, based on convergent 
rather than homogenous motives and ideologies” that provided for the ratification of 
the ECSC Treaty (Ibid., 155). Haas generalized this convergence of motives and ide-
ologies to a basic condition for the emergence of supranational institutions. Accord-
ingly, states need to be conform to democratic principles and have reached relatively 
high state of industrial development. The last condition consists in a sufficient simi-
larity of political cleavages, since the process of conflict mediation and ‘spill-over 
“fares best in situations controlled by social groupings […] divided among ideologi-
cally homogenous lines” (Haas 1961, 378). Hence, the expansive study of transna-
tional parties and, in particular, trade unions and party groups conducted in the origi-
nal monograph on the political dynamics set in motion by the ECSC (Haas 2004 
[1958]). Haas argument is thus that there was a convergent majority of different po-
litical forces which produced the major European initiatives that formed the early 
European institutions. These supranational institutions set in motion dynamics of 
transnational organization that work against the containment of political conflict 
within the nation state by supplying a distinct organizational form that allows the 
‘upgrading of common interest’. This account implies that institutional change is 
more than mere ‘competence creep’ due to the informational advantages of a supra-
national agent slipping or shirking her original mandate from member-state princi-
pals (Pollack 2003). ‘Supranationality’ in this sense a set of transnational and trans-
governmental relationships among actors that, due to the formation of mutual trust, 
allows for bargaining modes that ‘upgrade the common interest’ although actors stick 
to a logic of consequences and pursue ‘egoistic interests’ throughout. In a sense, the 
transnational framework presented in the previous chapter is a lopsided version of 
Haas’ neo-functionalism: his theory is predicated on supranational institutions – for 
parties and governments alike – working to produce a convergence of views over 
time whereas a transnational argument emphasizes that networks provide for loose 
ways to organize an embryonic political conflict that provides for convergent mo-
tives, ideologies and trust. 
Recent contributions have taken up the arguments of Lipgens and Haas in different 
ways and thus added to the plausibility of the applicability of a ‘transnational ap-
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proach’ to the origins of the first European treaties. A number of recent publications 
have documented historical evidence about the influence of the post-war Christian 
Democratic network as well as informal transatlantic contacts on early Treaty negoti-
ations (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser 2007; Kaiser and Leucht 2008; Kaiser, et al. 
2008; Kaiser, et al. 2010; Leucht 2010). This line of research has a common denomi-
nator: basing their work on the ‘policy network’ perspective relying on  
 “[…] a shift from centralized ‘government’ by cohesive state institutions exercising their 
clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision-making towards decentralized 
and informal forms of political communication and decision-making by sets of state and 
non-state actors in less hierarchically structured or even non-hierarchical relationships” 
(Kaiser and Leucht 2008, 37).  
Taking up Haas’ emphasis on the unity and pro-integration stance of Christian Dem-
ocrats, the argument here is that Christian Democratic networks had five functions: 
the creation of trust and political capital, the monopolization of party contacts and 
muting of internal dissent, the development of common policy objectives, and the 
identification of suitable allies. Thus, Christian Democrats used their networks for 
“constructing a transnational coalition for their supranational core Europe without 
Britain” (Ibid. 39 ff.). As important as these insights and the reported evidence are, 
open questions remain. As Haas wrote already in 1958, “[…] the Christian Demo-
cratic votes, after all, did not suffice […]” (Haas 2004 [1958], 154). Thus, when dis-
cussing the failure of the EDC Treaty, Kaiser concurs with arguments that see the 
EDC failure in the “increasingly difficult circumstances” that characterized the geo-
political landscape – due to Stalin’s death – as well as French domestic realignments 
(Kaiser 2007, 256, 258). The EDC hence failed despite the Christian Democrats. No 
concrete analysis of an impact on the negotiations is given because as “ […] forums 
of collective self-reassurance, the NEI congresses and the Geneva meetings obvious-
ly did not have a direct and immediate influence on inter-state negotiations.” (Gehler 
and Kaiser 2001, 795). Moreover, the focus on Christian Democracy exclusively 
begs the question what was different about Christian Democracy as opposed to the 
other transnational organizations, and why the alleged impact of ideological reassur-
ance was strong in the case of Christian Democracy but not in the remaining transna-
tional organizations. 
In addition, Kaiser and his colleagues have considered transatlantic transgovernmen-
tal networks between the US embassy group at in Paris and the delegations negotiat-
ing the ECSC Treaty. These transgovernmental contacts are said to have fulfilled key 
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functions during the negotiations (Kaiser and Leucht 2008, 45). Thus, they “facilitat-
ed links to a wider circle of academics” and provided information and political capi-
tal to construct “transnational alliances to prevent national administrations and inter-
est groups from impeding the interstate negotiations” (Ibid.). 
In sum, there is significant scholarship emphasizing the role of European transna-
tional, Christian Democratic, and transgovernmental networks as constituting a 
source of political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become 
a source for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic 
analyses of the impact of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, 
however, is lacking and thus does not provide a suitable answer to the question 
where the different attitudes emphasized by Hoffman and Parsons come from.  
 
Summary 
This section has presented two basic lines of reasoning in the existent scholarship on 
the EDC and post-war Europe that provide answers as to why the European states 
first negotiated unsuccessfully a supranational army for four years only to discard it 
and to agree on a NATO solution for the ‘German problem’ within a couple of 
months. Among the intergovernmentalist narratives, I have presented two basic lines 
of reasoning. Geopolitical accounts argue that the intense threat in 1950 led particu-
larly the French government to value security from Germany more than the autono-
my of disposing of a French army. Thus, whereas under a high external threat, the 
need for external balancing was the supreme concern, once the threat situation less-
ened with Stalin’s death and the opening of a possible détente with the Soviets, au-
tonomy became more salient, and different design solutions, i.e. the WEU, were pre-
ferred. Other accounts complement this view by stressing the significance of domes-
tic conflicts, differing nationalist values between the winners and losers of war, dif-
fering ideological preferences among the government leadership of European states, 
France in particular, and, finally, the possibility that the French government may 
have been unable to ensure that the French delegation negotiated in accordance with 
its mandate. Intergovernmentalist views, however, are at a loss to explain apparently 
widespread conflict in Europe over preferred European institutions. 
Other views, more in line with the transnational perspective, stress the significance 
of federalist ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations. There is 
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significant scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian 
Democratic, and transatlantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of 
political capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source 
for ‘political entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of 
the impact of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, however, is 
lacking. Moreover, there is a peculiar complementarity. Classic analyses stress the 
convergence of attitudes among European elites, whereas Parsons notes that in 
France, ideological differences cut across parties and produced a distinct ideological 
conflict that is reminiscent of the different ideas circulating in the transnational or-
ganizations as analyzed by Walter Lipgens. Addressing this lack is a key purpose of 
this dissertation, which may add to our understanding of a particular source of do-
mestic conflict among the political elite in post-war Europe and its significance for 
the early bargains. 
3.1.2 Implications: the Status of the Case of the EDC 
In order to delineate the significance of the results, it is necessary to know what EDC 
is a case of? How ‘typical’, ‘extreme’, or ‘deviant’ was the EDC bargain? (Gerring 
2007, 89, 90)? There are three relevant references: a debate about the primary politi-
cal forces in post-war Europe, a debate about the primary explanatory factors for 
intergovernmental bargains in European integration, and a debate about the major 
forces explaining intergovernmental bargains between democracies in general (Fig-
ure 3.1). 
First, there is the debate over the most influential political forces in post-war Europe 
and their impact on the outcome, reviewed in the previous section (3.1.1). As de-
scribed in the previous section, there is a curious lack of a systematic study of the 
influence and significance of the transnational organization studied extensively by 
Walter Lipgens for the post-war European bargains. From the point of view of the 
dependent variable, selecting the EDC for such a study is unusual. Contrary to the 
major bargains in post-war Europe, (such as the ECSC Treaty and the Treaties of 
Rome) the question of German rearmament dominated domestic conflicts. 
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Figure 3.1 Three Layers of References: The EDC as a Case 
 
Economic issues were secondary, largely contained in the EPC Treaty, or in other 
initiatives at the time such as the Green Pool proposal (Thiemeyer 1999). This differ-
entiates the EDC and the Pleven Plan from every single post-war European initiative, 
failed or successful. Although security questions were at the heart of the ECSC Trea-
ty as well, it did not concern the terms under which German soldiers would be al-
lowed to bear arms. In this sense, the EDC is not a ‘deviant’ case as the German 
question was certainly implicit in any potential or actual negotiation among the 
Western powers after the Second World war. Since the EDC, however, directly ad-
dressed the issue by calling for delegation and pooling in the sphere of security and 
the military - i.e. the ‘core state powers’ that are provide the foundation of the mod-
ern state – it was surely of an ‘extreme’ character. Consequently, the EDC bargain 
was bound to be more controversial than the ECSC Treaty or the subsequent Treaties 
of Rome and conclusions drawn here do not automatically travel to other European 
grand bargains. 
Seen from a different perspective, the EDC bargain is arguably a ‘most likely’ case 
for both the ideational and the realist intergovernmental narratives. It is a primary 
candidate for realist explanations of state-preferences and bargaining strategies since 
it was a clear cut case of alliance bargaining on security matters. It is equally a most 
likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist and federalist ideo-
logies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation and pooling of ‘core 
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state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sovereignty.20 As a result, 
ideological differences should acquire higher salience. For the same reasons, the 
EDC Treaty is a least likely case for the neo-functionalist and liberal intergovern-
mentalist narratives that focus on economic interest or touch primarily economic 
issues respectively. First, security matters under conditions of a high subjective sense 
of threat are more salient than economic matters since wealth is meaningless when 
acquired in a fundamentally insecure environment. Thus, the influence of economic 
interest groups may be expected to be considerably lower than in the case of a nego-
tiation of a trade agreement. Hence, any finding of a considerable impact on prefer-
ence formation cannot be generalized to post-war Europe without further examina-
tion. 
On the other hand, the EDC constitutes a case of particular interest since it is fair to 
say that the failure of the EDC constitutes a critical juncture in the history of Europe-
an integration. Had the Treaty been ratified, the path of European Integration, in 
terms of its institutional arrangements, would have looked somewhat different. The 
EDC Treaty itself contained remarkably different degrees of pooling and delegation 
– including prerogatives of the European parliament – than much of the subsequent 
European Treaties across the most conflictual political issues (Rittberger 2006). It 
was only after the EDC failure that the dualism between ‘high level’ security issues 
being relegated to NATO and economic ‘low level’ issues relegated for EU institu-
tions became obvious. Thus, failure of the EDC and its consequences paved the way 
for the path of European integration as it is known. Henceforth, ‘supranational insti-
tutions’ would be limited to the regulation of the Common Market. 
It is difficult to characterizing the significance of the case beyond this historical time 
frame. Both in reference to intergovernmental bargains throughout European integra-
tion as well as more general questions of cooperation between democracies, this is a 
single outcome study. To consider generalizability is to have an idea whether the 
insights regarding the role of transnational conflict, transnational embeddedness and 
state preferences as well as the relationship between structure of transgovernmental 
networks of trust, bargaining influence and bargaining efficiency gained for the EDC 
                                                 
20
 As Maurice Faure later put it, “Les traités de Rome se réfèrent évidemment à un tout autre domaine, 
puisqu’ au lieu de se référer au domaine politique suprême, qui est celui de la sécurité, l'armée, le 
drapeau, la patrie, avec tout l'honneur, tout que c’a ancré au cours des âges dans le cœur des nations” 
(see Faure 1987, 4). 
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are worth considering for other times and places. Given the fact that the European 
post-war environment was a peculiar place, it is thus difficult to establish wider gen-
erality. As subsequent chapters will show, the resources underlying the transnational 
networks, particularly the European Movement were heavily indebted to American 
funds organized through transatlantic networks. 
Finally, however, the argument related to transgovernmental networks potentially 
being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predicated on a particular time and 
place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to the existence of the mechanism 
and thus its significance is not affected by the fact that it is established in a single 
case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit further attention. 
3.1.3 Summary 
This section has given a brief overview of the current literature on post-war Europe 
and given an account of the EDC as a case. It was shown that even the vast historical 
literature that operates within an intergovernmental perspective emphasizes very dif-
ferent aspects of post-war Europe and the international landscape. First, there is the 
argument stressing the geopolitical context and national interest: the heightened 
threat induced by the Korean War produced radical conceptions for a European Ar-
my whereas a lessening of the threat after the end of the war and Stalin’s death made 
sovereignty concerns more salient and thus led to the WEU. Second, there is the ar-
gument regarding changing domestic coalitions: it holds that in the early 1950’s, 
governmental coalitions were positively disposed towards European solutions advo-
cating substantial pooling and delegation, whereas changes in domestic coalitions – 
particularly in France – in the mid 1950’s were less positively disposed and thus re-
negotiated the WEU solution. Third, there is an argument in the literature adding that 
the internal conflicts in France may have led to the French delegation overstepping 
its mandate and thus negotiating a Treaty that did not muster domestic support. 
However, both classic and contemporary analyses point out that, first, there is evi-
dence of significant ideological conflict in France across multiple parties and that, 
second, the mid 1950’s saw a peculiar convergence of attitudes among the govern-
mental elite in Europe. 
The analyses operating within a transnational perspective stress the significance of 
ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations, There is significant 
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scholarship emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, 
and transatlantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political 
capital for the construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘polit-
ical entrepreneurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of the impact 
of the remaining transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking. This 
fact is peculiar since the existing arguments by Haas and Hoffman, emphasizing a 
‘convergence’ of attitude that is unexplained otherwise unexplained, as well as the 
observation of cross-cutting conflicts in France points to the possibility that transna-
tional factors may have been influential across the European states. 
In addition, this section has characterized different frames of reference for the analy-
sis of the EDC. As a critical juncture in European integration history, a ‘sufficient’ 
and exhaustive understanding of its failure constitutes worthwhile knowledge. I ar-
gued further that the EDC bargain is a ‘most likely’ case for both the ideational and 
the realist intergovernmental narratives since its topic was security cooperation. In 
addition, it is a most likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist 
and federalist ideologies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation 
and pooling of ‘core state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sover-
eignty. For similar reasons, one should not expect explanation focusing on clearly 
identifiable economic interests and significant interest group activity to fare well. In 
terms of the generality of the framework developed, the insights produced may or 
may not travel beyond the EDC. At the same time, the argument related to transgov-
ernmental networks potentially being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predi-
cated on a particular time and place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to 
the existence of the mechanism and thus its significance is not affected by the fact 
that it is established in a single case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit fur-
ther attention. 
3.2 Research Design 
This section discusses the research design of the dissertation and the methodological 
trade-offs that it implies. Addressing the puzzle of the EDC by investigating the rela-
tionship between the European transnational networks and the behavior of the states 
or governments negotiating the EDC requires, first, an idea of the composition and 
the structure of the most important transnational networks; second, information on 
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their relationship towards the states and governments involved in the Treaty negotia-
tions; third, information on degree to which actors subscribed to similar or conflict-
ing ideologies; fourth, an understanding of the transnational dynamics of coordina-
tion, trust, information sharing, and coalition-formation over time; fifth, sufficient 
information on the domestic conflict over the EDC in the key states negotiating the 
treaty; and, finally, information on the preference formation within the negotiating 
conflicts as well as an understanding of the ways in which governments made strate-
gic choices during the EDC bargain. 
I draw on both quantitative and qualitative means to address these issues. In order to 
assess the structural dimension of the transnational networks, I conducted a network 
analysis utilizing the membership patterns of actors in the European transnational 
organizations as a structural indicator of contact. Qualitatively, I use available prima-
ry documents, memoirs, and information gained from secondary historical literature 
to reconstruct both transnational and transgovernmental exchanges as well as domes-
tic conflicts and the preferences and strategic choices of governments. 
3.2.1 Transnational Co-Affiliation Networks: Measurement and Analysis 
Recall that the term network has two meanings in this dissertation. On the conceptual 
level, I refer to transnational and transgovernmental networks in the sense delineated 
in the previous chapter: they are defined as communities of actors sharing similar 
political goals, beliefs and values among whom, as a result, relationships of trust 
evolve that allow transnational political coordination and coalition-building across 
states and to influence, if necessary and possible, the hierarchical organization of the 
state to adopt and enforce those preferences in line with the goals of the transnational 
coalition. The operationalization of this concept has multiple dimensions. It implies 
the identification of actors, a characterization of the structural relationships among 
them, a description and assessment of their ideological commonalities, and an evalu-
ation of the degrees to which they coordinate and trust each other. Thus, I propose 
operationalizing the concept using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
first quantitative step involves identifying the transnational co-affiliation network 
constituted by membership in the main European transnational organizations that 
existed in post-war Europe. This step allows identifying, first, the main actor popula-
tion, their party affiliation and nationality; second, the identification of potential clus-
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ters among these actors across the transnational organizations; and, finally, the em-
beddedness of European governments within these communities over time. I focus 
on the European organizations because organizational membership provide a simple 
criterion for the identification of European transnational networks and, second, it is 
here where structural information is most relevant, especially with regard to the 
composition of the transnational network in terms of actor nationalities and party 
affiliation. A structural description of the transatlantic network is more difficult as no 
clear-cut criterion for the identification of a relationship exists. Since the number of 
relevant actors is smaller in this case, relying on qualitative information suffices. 
I begin by discussing the sampling method employed, continue by describing the 
measures and methods used to analyze the emerging network, and conclude by dis-
cussing the advantages and limitations of the method employed. 
 
Sampling the Network 
The goal of the quantitative network analysis is threefold: first, to identify the key 
transnationally active European elite actors that are relevant and have been hypothet-
ically politically influential in the post-war years; second, to identify structural rela-
tionships among them; third, to evaluate the embeddedness of the negotiating gov-
ernments within these networks over time. The relationship between actors can be 
based on different concepts and thus measured differently. In Political Science, ap-
plications have been based on different indicators such as the intensity of contacts as 
established through surveys (Thurner and Binder 2009), the co-sponsorship of bills 
in Congress (Fowler 2006), and many more.  
For present purposes, I study the co-affiliation network constituted by individuals’ 
activities and membership in the main transnational organizations as studied, for ex-
ample, by Walter Lipgens (Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990). To put it 
simply, an “affiliation network is a network in which actors are connected via co-
membership of groups of some kind.” (Newman 2010, 53). The study of co-
affiliation networks is widely established in sociology, going back to Wight Mills’ 
analysis of the US power elite by identifying the ‘interlocking directorates’ of large 
US corporations to Galaskiewicz’s analysis of the “urban grant economy” of the city 
of Chicago constituted by the CEO’s of companies in Chicago and their attendance 
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of similar clubs (Mills 1956, 8; Galaskiewicz 1985; Burris 2005). Table 3.1 provides 
an example of a matrix constituting an affiliation network. 
Table 3.1 Affiliation Matrix Example 
Actor 
Institution 
A B C D E 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
2 1 0 1 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 
4 0 0 1 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 1 
7 0 0 0 1 0 
8 0 0 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The criterion of membership provides a reasonably clear form of addressing the 
‘boundary problem’ arising in reconstructing social networks from different archival 
records since the criterion for the existence of a relationship is straightforward in this 
case (Burt 1983). The information is thus easily collectable and allows drawing in-
ferences about relationships between individuals as well as between institutions and 
organizations. However, the method is based on a relatively strong assumption: 
membership in a similar organization equals contact, similar affiliations patterns in 
different organizations imply more intense contact. It is thus a relatively crude meas-
ure: common membership may very well coexist with a lack of significant interac-
tion and even considerable conflict. A related issue is that the procedure largely ig-
nores different positions of authority or hierarchy within common institutions and 
organizations: an individual is either ‘in’ or ‘out’. However, reweighting ties accord-
ing to external information is not an option. It would be extremely dependent on the 
assumptions made, there is a lack of information that could inform a choice among a 
large set of possible assumptions, it is not clear what a general and guiding principle 
could be that would perform equally for the different organizations and, most im-
portantly, this would increase the problem of equivalence since governments do not 
function similarly across dissimilar countries. In combination with qualitative infor-
mation as to the quality of the identified relationships and the ideological disposi-
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tions of individuals, it is nevertheless a reasonably suitable approach for the task at 
hand. 
The organizations that were considered constitute the ‘universe’ of transnational Eu-
ropean organizations existed in 1950 as displayed in Table 3.2 with one exception. 
Given the scarcity of available documentation, the ‘Liberal World Union’ is not con-
sidered. Its publications suggest only highly sporadic and unevenly attended meet-
ings that did not concern themselves to a significant degree with questions of Euro-
pean integration (Jacobson 1962, 585 ff.). 
Table 3.2 Organizations of the European Transnational Network 
Transnational Group Party Affiliation Abbreviation 
Nouvelles Équipes Internationales Christian Democrats NEI 
Geneva Circle Christian Democrats Geneva Circle 
Mouvement Socialiste pour les 
États-Unis d'Europe 
Largely Socialist but  
membership is open 
MSEUE 
Socialist International Socialist COMISCO 
European Parliamentary Union Not affiliated EPU  
Union of European Federalists Not affiliated UEF/EUF 
European League for Economic 
Cooperation 
Not affiliated ELEC 
United Europe Movement Not affiliated European Movement 
 
A second issue is that membership varies over time, as does activity. Collecting and 
analyzing information on the dynamics of the network would have complicated the 
data collection significantly as yearly data is not readily available in published 
sources. Moreover, the primary research interest for the quantitative analysis focuses 
on the structural underpinnings of transnational conflict and its potential impact, via 
the actors, on domestic conflict and government preferences and strategies. The dy-
namics of trust, coordination, coalition formation, and information exchanges are 
addressed by qualitative means. For this reason, the decision was made to use 1950 
as the cut year and collect data for the transnational organizations from the founda-
tion until 1950. Thus, the structural information largely concerns the transnational 
European network during the heyday of genuine transnational conflict after the war 
before supranational institutions (Council of Europe and ECSC) complicate the pic-
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ture significantly and allows drawing extensively on the available published docu-
mentation. 
In terms of the individual actors, I did not sample the complete network as exhaus-
tive membership lists were not available but instead rely on an adapted version of 
snowball sampling that likely creates an elite bias within the sample network. That 
bias, however, is an acceptable shortcoming since the primary purpose of the analy-
sis is to identify exactly that elite. 
The data was collected in a two-step process. The first step seeks to identify a com-
plete set of institutions/ groups and actors. 
1. Identify all individual Cabinet members of all governments (coalitions) of the 
Six and the UK between 1949-1958 at the ministerial level. 
2. Identify members in official functions of all of the international organizations 
of the Western Alliance of which these countries were part of. 
3. Identify the leading members (i.e. organizational executives/ secretariats) of 
all transnational organizations (i.e. Europeanist and the federalists and trans-
national party organizations). 
The result was a preliminary affiliation matrix containing 1,209 individuals with 
their respective function or membership as summarized in Table 3.3. 
These steps give a preliminary affiliation matrix with the complete set of institutions/ 
groups and actors. The second step was to use available primary sources, biograph-
ical sources and the secondary literature to cross-check and code memberships of the 
individuals identified with the organizations in the dataset (i.e. lower level member-
ship) and include information on individuals’ party membership.21  
                                                 
21
 The most useful sources, apart from the secondary literature, have been the online editions of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS) which contain 
exhaustive person indices as well as the online editions of the Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregier-
ung which provide useful biographical information (http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/ 
0000/TextSucheKaPr.html). The main biographical sources used for are the Munzinger Archiv 
(http://www.munzinger.de/search/start.jsp), for France the archival sources of the Assemblée Natio-
nale (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/), for Belgium the online presence of the Académie 
Royale (http://www.academieroyale.be/cgi?usr=kqua99wegx&lg=fr&pag=903&rec=0&frm=363&id 
=3418&flux=34356366), for the Netherlands the homepage of the national parliament 
(http://www.parlement.com/9291000/biof/01867), for Europe the European navigator 
(http://www.cvce.eu/), the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Europe can be found here 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/Doc/Online_en.asp#p85_2384 source>. 
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Table 3.3 List of Institutions and Organizations Used for Sampling the Network 
Name Members 
Committee of Ministers  
(Council of Europe) 
Foreign ministers of Member States 
Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe 
Delegates from National Parliaments of the Member States 
Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation  
(OEEC) Council 
Foreign ministers of Member States. Some Countries (i.e. 
Germany) appointed a special representative or delegated 
special ministers. Includes OEEC Secretary General 
OEEC Ministerial Council 
Yearly meetings of ministers of the economy or delegated 
special ministers. 
NATO Security Council 
Foreign ministers of Member States and Heads of Govern-
ments (participation varies). Includes NATO Secretary 
General. 
High Authority (ECSC) Appointed Members 
Council of Ministers (ECSC) 
Varying participation by Heads of State, Foreign ministers, 
or delegated special ministers. 
Common Assembly (ECSC) Delegates from National Parliaments of the Member States 
Ad Hoc Assembly (EPC) 
Delegated Members from the Common Assembly and  
National Parliaments 
 
Membership in transnational groups comes with a problem of equivalence as well. 
The Geneva Circle was a largely informal ‘gathering’ per invitation from the secre-
tariat in Switzerland, inaugurated by informal contacts between French, German, and 
Swiss Democrats. Here I drew on the published documents and included the individ-
uals participating in meetings during the period used for the other organizations as 
well (from foundation to 1950). The NEI meetings were attended partially by formal-
ly delegates actors from those Christian Democratic parties that had become formal 
members; others attended on an individual basis because some Christian Democratic 
parties – notably the French MRP – did not become formal members until later. In 
this case, I coded attendance of meetings as indicated by the secondary literature and 
the published collections of meetings, conference protocols (primarily Lipgens and 
Loth 1990; Papini 1996; Gehler and Kaiser 2004). For the other organizations, a 
combination of utilizing secondary sources and available primary records of the 
meetings and conferences was necessary as well; the main sources include for the 
Socialists (Steininger 1979a; Lipgens and Loth 1990; Dreyfus 1991; Griffiths 1993b; 
Castagnez 2004), for the federalist groups (Lipgens and Loth 1990; Vayssière 2007; 
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Pistone 2008), for the ELEC (ELEC 1957 ; Lipgens and Loth 1990; Dumoulin and 
Dutrieue 1993), and for the European Movement (Zurcher 1958; Lipgens and Loth 
1990; Tordeurs 2000). Finally, when checking for membership of individuals that 
entered the data-set in the first step (mostly the members of the supranational parlia-
ments), the biographical sources usually contain references with formulations such as 
‘was active in …’ or similar expressions, in which cases I coded actors as members. 
Finally, I limited the actors of the network to actors from the Six and the UK. In 
principle it would have made sense to extend this procedure to all OEEC / Council of 
Europe member countries. Thus, reportedly influential individuals – such as Denis de 
Rougement (Switzerland) or Joseph Retinger (Poland) – would have been included. 
It would also have included the Swiss and Austrian members of the NEI, and, more 
significantly, many more nationalities for the Socialist International. If there had 
been information on the complete population of the transnational network, it would 
have made sense to do otherwise. Nevertheless, the resulting data allows identifying 
possible structural underpinnings of transnational conflict among the transnational 
elite and the most central actors within that elite. With additional qualitative infor-
mation on the actual ideological reflection of this structure and the dynamics follow-
ing 1950 and throughout the bargain, it is possible to evaluate the impact on domestic 
conflict and governments. 
 
Analyzing the Network 
The main issue is that available possibilities to analyze two-mode networks are lim-
ited. To alleviate this problem, it is possible to ‘project’ the two-mode network into a 
one-mode network, that is, to create a standard network in one dimension (i.e. the 
nodes comprising either the individuals or the institutions) and utilize the information 
about membership to define the edges. Thus, common membership of two actors in a 
single organization will constitute an edge between these two actors, or conversely, 
at least one identical member in two organizations constitutes an edge between these 
two organizations. While this traditional projection would create a unipartite network 
(that can be analyzed more easily), it discards a large amount of information and 
heavily biases results in favor of actors in large institutions (say, the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe) because every actor a being a member of insti-
tution 𝑎𝑖 will create 
𝑎𝑖(𝑎𝑖−1)
2
 pairwise ties between institutions.  
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The alternative chosen here is to assume that common membership in a small group 
should constitute a stronger link between individuals than membership in a large 
group and thus let the weight of the edge between two actors for a given common 
membership be inversely proportional to the number of members within that group 
or organization (Newman 2001). Creating a projection on this basis avoids the bias in 
favor of membership in large organizations and thus retains some information from 
the two-mode network that would otherwise be lost (Opsahl, et al. 2010). 
3.2.2 Identifying the Central Actors, Identifying Cohesive Subgroups 
The technical sophistication of Social Network Analysis has advanced significantly 
in recent years. Tapping this potential, in light of the theoretical framework, I con-
sider, on a descriptive level, three centrality measures to identify the transnational 
elite and its composition with the transnational network. Analytically, I draw on 
methods that identify clusters of densely connected subgroups within the overall 
network to evaluate the degree to which substructures within the overall transnational 
network may be indicative of ideological polarization. 
Centrality measures are, by and large, relatively robust to missing observations if 
networks are sufficiently dense, that is, if individuals have, on average, a relatively 
high number of ties to other individuals (Borgatti, et al. 2006). In terms of specific 
centrality measures, there is a large and growing menu available from which one 
may choose (compare Wasserman and Faust 1994; with Newman 2010). For the pre-
sent purposes, three indicators are arguably sufficient. First, Degree Centrality, a 
‘brute measure’ based on the number of connections a node has. It can easily be 
combined with edge weights – the strength and ties – and gives a basic understanding 
of the number of ‘connections’ a particular node had. Second, Eigenvector centrality 
takes into account both the number of nodes any particular node is connected to as 
well as their centrality and is mathematically closely related to the Page Rank meas-
ure employed by Google. More importantly, it is, as shown in the previous chapter 
(section 2.3.4), directly related to the notion of the weight of influence employed by 
Golub and Jackson (Golub and Jackson 2010). Finally, I propose to consider the 
measure of Betweenness Centrality that emphasizes the ‘bridging position’ of a spe-
cific node between different sparsely connected clusters of a network and thus heavi-
ly focuses on the structural position of a specific node in the network. Betweenness 
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Centrality thus measures how important a given node is in connecting all other nodes 
of the network to each other (Jackson 2008, 37 ff.).While the measure cannot be used 
to compare actors across different graphs as its value is heavily dependent on the 
specific graph structure, it is useful to consider for comparing the positions of indi-
viduals in a particular graph with a known structure. 
In addition to centrality indices, there are methods that allow identifying subgroups 
of more densely and thus presumably closely related actors. Thus, the analysis of 
‘clusters’ or subgroups of individuals has been successfully employed to reveal the 
ideological polarization in legislative chambers (Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010). 
Finding the objectively ‘best’ partition of a network is difficult and, in particular for 
dense networks, “prohibitively costly in terms of computer time” (Newman 2010, 
359). There are several different algorithms that seek to tackle this issue of computa-
tional complexity in different ways, thus returning different results. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, the choice of used algorithms was restricted to those applicable to 
valued networks and implemented in the igraph library that is available in R (Csárdi 
and Nepusz 2006; R Core Team 2012). These include: the ‘Springglass’ Community 
algorithm that is based on simulations of the network (Reichardt and Bornholdt 
2006); the ‘greedy’ modularity optimizing algorithm (Clauset, et al. 2004); two algo-
rithms based on random walks, namely the ‘walktrap’ community finding algorithm 
(Pons and Matthieu 2006) as well as the information flow mapping algorithm 
(Rosvall and Bergstrom 2008). In order to compare the results by reference to an 
objective criterion, it is possible to draw on the concept of modularity (Newman and 
Girvan 2004). The modularity score is a simple measure of the degree to which simi-
lar individuals are more strongly connected to each other than to dissimilar individu-
als. It can be interpreted similar to Pearson’s correlation coefficient, its range being 
defined from strictly less than one to strictly higher than minus one, with higher val-
ues indicating higher presence of clustering and thus a better separation of the net-
work into separate groups (Newman 2010, 223, 224). 
In addition, visual inspection is utilized since the projection of bipartite network to a 
unipartite network may result in in loss of information and thus lead to misleading 
inferences concerning the underlying structure of the network (Spanurattana and 
Murata 2011, 835). For these purposes, I draw on the statnet library that is available 
in R (Handcock, et al. 2003). In terms of the visual presentation of network graphs, it 
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allows drawing on ‘force directed’ graphing methods that place nodes with similar 
structural properties close to each other (e.g. Fruchterman and Reingold 1991). 
 
A Caveat on Causality 
As already indicated in the previous chapter, the analysis of these network structures 
is useful to identify the carriers of ideological exchanges across states and to identify 
certain structural underpinnings of transnational ideological conflict. Such infor-
mation can inform and enrich the analysis of preference formation within states and, 
as expressed in transnational hypotheses, serve as an independent source of infor-
mation regarding government preferences and their change. At the same time, how-
ever, it is important to point out that, when speaking of the ‘impact of the transna-
tional conflict’, it is difficult to establish the precise direction of causality, as it is in 
the analysis of political networks in general, in particular when dealing with a ‘snap-
shot’ view of these structures (Fowler, et al. 2011). Analytically, the general problem 
in observing network structures is that “homophily and contagion are generally con-
founded” (Shalizi and Thomas 2011). Thus, actors may have opted to engage in cer-
tain organizations rather than others because of preexisting ideological convictions 
and dispositions (homophily), or the mutual exchanges may have reinforced, ampli-
fied, altered, or perhaps even transformed such dispositions (contagion). With the 
present design, there is no way by which one can determine, beyond ex post specula-
tion, whether the former or the latter or both occurred. While the qualitative analysis 
of the dynamics of coalition formation over time may provide additional insights, it 
is not among the central tasks in this dissertation to deal with this original question of 
causality as there are multiple confounding factors across states and time. Rather, the 
question is whether the analysis of structure of the network may inform an analysis 
of the degree of transnational conflict and the ways in which the domestic politics 
and the governments of the states negotiating the EDC may have been responsive to 
that conflict. 
3.3 The Independent Variables 
The present section describes the data-sources relied upon in operationalizing the 
explanatory factors that both theoretical frameworks imply beyond transnational 
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networks. Stated, briefly, there are three kinds of factors: one concerns the material 
structures, i.e. state defensive capabilities meaning – military and economic capabili-
ties states have or do not have objectively. The second concerns domestic party con-
flict, party programs and the shifting composition of governments as a result of do-
mestic conflict. The third concerns subjective beliefs – or ideas, ideologies, ‘mental 
models’ – and the ways in which they impact processes of preference formation and 
behavior. Section 3.3.1 deals with the first two kinds, section 3.3.2 with the latter. 
3.3.1 International Structures and Domestic Conflict 
This section addresses the structural geopolitical factors as well as domestic varia-
bles. The structural aspect relates to the objective side of ‘threat levels’. The subjec-
tive element concerns beliefs and assessments of other actors’ intentions and will be 
treated below. The objective elements concern the relative military capability of 
states and their geographical proximity, i.e. the ease and speed by which available 
military capability can be used by state A to attack state B. The higher the material 
capabilities and geographical proximity, the higher the ‘violence interdependence’ 
among two states.  
Since the number of states under considerations is low and territorial changes absent, 
geographical proximity is trivial to assess.  
The standard indicator of relative military capabilities – the Composite Index of Na-
tional Capability – has been maintained by the Correlates of War project for several 
decades (Singer, et al. 1972; Singer 1987). It is based on six ‘raw’ indicators attribut-
able to individual states: their military personnel, military expenditures, total popula-
tion, urban population, iron and steel consumption, energy consumption. In order to 
compute relative defensive capabilities, the indicator for each state is the mean of a 
state’s percentages of the global total in each category, for every year. In other 
words, it represents a state’s share in the global defensive capabilities of every year. 
The six categories used for the index represent a mixture of a state’s potential capa-
bilities (i.e. population, energy consumption, etc.) as well as the degree to which that 
potential is mobilized. For the purposes of this dissertation there are two minor is-
sues. First, the data-set includes values for Germany only from 1955 onwards, as this 
is the first year in which West-Germany was recognized as a sovereign state. Of 
course, potential defensive capabilities existed before 1955. However, since the value 
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for 1955 represent German potential plus the amount that could be mobilized within 
a year – after the WEU Treaty went into effect – the value for 1955 is a good proxy 
for German capabilities in the previous years. The second issue concerns nuclear 
weapons that are excluded from the index. This issue is somewhat problematic: the 
US had a nuclear monopoly until 1949, when the first Soviet nuclear bomb test was 
conducted and both sides intensified their testing programs thereafter. Hence, threat 
assessments have to take into account the question of nuclear weapons when analyz-
ing the subjective element, i.e. beliefs regarding Soviet intentions. 
The second aspect – domestic conflict – relates to two issues. The first aspect is rela-
tively straightforward: domestic political changes, especially government composi-
tion. A useful resource is the Parlgov dataset, containing information about parties, 
coalitions, election results, and a categorization of party families that I adopt as well 
(Döring and Manow 2011). 
In order to acquire information regarding party commitments and programs with re-
gard to security issues and European integration at the time, I draw on the Compara-
tive Manifesto Project (CMP) data (Budge, et al. 2001). This information is required 
to add additional plausibility to the question whether the issue of ‘Europe’ was a con-
flict largely between states, different party families, or whether the issue cut across 
these dimensions transnationally. The dataset contains information on party pro-
grams of all countries under consideration throughout the time period, including par-
ty scores on a left-right scale, an item with regard to international politics as well as 
an item on European integration. In particular, the items used in this context are 
 International Peace, a constructed category containing positive/ negative 
declarations with regard to peaceful international cooperation, peaceful solu-
tions of international crises, negative/ positive references to the use of mili-
tary power, and negative/ positive references to imperial behavior (Budge, et 
al. 2001). 
 Europe counts favorable or negative mentions of European integration and 
union aggregated from the two items on European Community as contained 
in the dataset (Items 108 and 110, see Budge, et al. 2001) 
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 Nationalism counts favorable/ unfavorable references to national values and 
symbols as reconstructed from two items on nationalism in the dataset (Items 
601 and 602, see Budge, et al. 2001) 
 Left-Right is composite index constructed by the CMP team from multiple 
items of the coding scheme to place parties along an socio-economic left-
right spectrum (Budge, et al. 2001). 
Although the dataset has received some criticism – in particular regarding the ques-
tion whether it measures political positions or political salience (Gabel and Huber 
2000; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) – it constitutes a useful additional source of in-
formation. 
3.3.2 Ideas, Beliefs, Trust, Networks, and Process-Tracing 
The idea of mixed methods stems from the consideration that both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches have their distinct strengths and shortcomings. The rational 
for combining methods is to have each one complement the other. For present pur-
poses, qualitative techniques – as usually employed by historical scholarship – are 
employed since a crucial part of this dissertation involves the subjective element of 
decision-making. In this sense, there are two functions. First, I need to complement 
the structural analysis of the transnational networks with an account of the actual 
exchanges, in particular ideological similarities and differences within and across the 
transnational organizations, to provide an analysis of transnational coalition-building 
in the early 1950s beliefs, while looking for evidence of coalition formation and stra-
tegic coordination across states that is indicative of mutual trust or distrust. Second, I 
need to evaluate the implications of that conflict for national preference formation 
and the choice of bargaining strategies. Do actors engaged in similar transnational 
communities adopt similar – if not identical – positions in the domestic conflicts? Do 
actors draw on strategic assessments coordinated in transnational circles while in 
leading governmental positions? 
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Subjective Factors: Beliefs, Trust, and Threats 
The core qualitative information I will draw upon are actors revealing their assess-
ments of threats, their beliefs, and trust and distrust. This information is taken from 
published primary sources, such as published editions of records of Foreign Minis-
tries and Government Cabinets, the collections, speeches and documents relating to 
the European transnational organizations and European political parties (e.g. 
Braunthal 1971, 1974; Lipgens 1984a; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990), the documen-
tation of the exchanges in the NEI and the Geneva Circle published by Wolfram Kai-
ser and Michael Gehler (Gehler and Kaiser 2004), additional collections of docu-
ments relevant for the topic (e.g. Jacobson 1962), available memoirs, collections of 
letters and diaries of key actors (e.g. Eden 1960; Acheson 1969; Spaak 1969; Baring, 
et al. 1974; Monnet 1976; Speidel 1977; Massigli 1978; Adenauer 1980; 
Blankenhorn 1980; Adenauer 1983, 1984; Mensing, et al. 1985; Adenauer 1987; 
Mensing, et al. 1987; Adenauer 1995; Mensing, et al. 1995), and the collection of 
interviews conducted in the EUI in late 1980’s and early 1990’s with key actors that 
is available online. A full list of the consulted primary and secondary sources may be 
found in the bibliography. This information is complemented with information 
gleaned from historical scholarship. 
The task is thus to assess whether actors consistently, both publicly and privately, 
adhere to certain ‘typical’ lines of reasoning. Such typical lines of reasoning can be 
identified and assigned to actors or group of actors as their ideology’, ‘ideas’, ‘men-
tal models’, or ‘beliefs’. Following Goldstein and Keohane (1993a, 8), I distinguish 
between world views (religion, sovereignty, the nation), principled beliefs (political 
values such as democratic values), typical causal beliefs expressing ‘causal stories’ 
or narratives about cause and effect relationships in the political world that inform 
actor preferences by linking actions to outcomes, and add strategic beliefs, i.e. beliefs 
about the motives, preferences, and beliefs of other actors.  
Second, using the above mentioned qualitative sources allows identifying subjective 
threat assessments fairly easily. The issue of trust is more elusive as I can only rely 
on direct evidence of voiced trust or distrust or indirect evidence as to what infor-
mation from what source is credible, mutual affirmations of trust, and, finally, credi-
ble signals of trust such as sharing of sensitive information that puts the actor sharing 
information at political risk. At the same time, assessments of trust will have to rely 
on the interpretation of incomplete evidence. 
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Process-Tracing and Impact 
The term ‘process tracing’ has varying labels and many critics. When taken too liter-
ally as ‘Causal-Process Observation’, the term is indeed an oxymoron (Beck 2006). 
Causality is, after all, a theoretical concept. It does not come knocking on the door. A 
prominent definition thus defines ‘process-tracing’ as a technique that “attempts to 
identify the intervening causal process […] between an independent variable (cause) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As a 
principle, it relies on multiple sources of information and their interpretation in light 
of competing theories linking causes to outcomes. In more prosaic terms, process-
tracing means reconstructing processes from the available evidence which is inher-
ently incomplete. By generating multiple observations from different sources and 
confronting them with alternative hypotheses as to the contours of the process to be 
reconstructed, it allows addressing the problem ‘equifinality’ arising when expecta-
tions from differing theories ‘expect’ similar outcomes (Van Evera 1997, 65, 66; 
George and Bennett 2005, 224). The underlying principle of research design is often 
compared to the work of a detective as it implies identifying key observations or “a 
new fact [that] will dramatically support a theory (much like a smoking gun) or dra-
matically undermine a theory (much like an air-tight alibi)” (Mahoney 2010, 128). 
Thus, it is not so much a ‘technical method’, but more of an approach to ‘data’ gath-
ering and interpretation. In this sense, it conforms to historical research with the add-
ed requirement of formulating explicit hypotheses (Collier 2011). 
There are disadvantages: interpretation is less constrained than in quantitative ap-
proaches, associated errors and uncertainties cannot be quantified, and the operation-
alization and measurement of concepts is less reliable. The assertion of the presence 
of a particular causal mechanism can thus be equally misleading, especially as the 
empirical record consulted is incomplete. This, however, is almost by definition a 
problem for the explanation of single case studies of historical outcomes (Gerring 
2007, 187 ff.). 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has had two objectives. First, to give an overview of the current re-
search on the EDC in particular and, second, to give an account of the EDC as a case. 
It was shown that the vast historical literature that operates within an intergovern-
mental perspective emphasizes very different aspects of post-war Europe and the 
international landscape. First, there is the argument stressing the geopolitical context 
and national interest, stating that the heightened threat induced by the Korean War 
produced radical conceptions for a European Army whereas a lessening of the threat 
after the end of the war and Stalin’s death made sovereignty concerns more salient 
and thus led to the WEU. Second, there is the argument regarding changing domestic 
coalitions: it holds that in the early 1950’s, governmental coalitions were positively 
disposed towards European solutions advocating substantial pooling and delegation, 
whereas changes in domestic coalitions – particularly in France – in the mid 1950’s 
were less positively disposed and thus renegotiated the WEU solution. Third, there is 
an argument in the literature adding that the internal conflicts in France may have led 
to the French delegation overstepping its mandate and thus negotiating a Treaty that 
did not muster domestic support. At the same time, both classic and contemporary 
analyses point out that, first, there is evidence of significant ideological conflict in 
France across multiple parties and that, second, the mid 1950’s saw a peculiar con-
vergence of attitudes among the governmental elite in Europe, an apparent conver-
gence that is not addressed in the literature. 
The analyses operating within a transnational perspective stress the significance of 
ideas exchanged in the transnational European organizations. There is scholarship 
emphasizing the role of European transnational, Christian Democratic, and transat-
lantic transgovernmental networks as constituting a source of political capital for the 
construction of transnational coalitions that become a source for ‘political entrepre-
neurship’ and thus afford influence. A systematic analysis of the impact of these 
transnational organizations and networks, however, is lacking. This fact is peculiar 
since prominent arguments emphasize a ‘convergence’ of attitudes among the Euro-
pean political elite that is unexplained. In conjunction with the observation of cross-
cutting conflicts in France, these facts point to the possibility that transnational fac-
tors may have been influential across the European states, an issue addressed in this 
dissertation. 
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In addition, this section has characterized different frames of reference for the analy-
sis of the EDC. As a critical juncture in European integration history, a ‘sufficient’ 
and exhaustive understanding of its failure constitutes worthwhile knowledge. I ar-
gued further that the EDC bargain is a ‘most likely’ case for both the ideational and 
the realist intergovernmental narratives since its topic was security cooperation. In 
addition, it is a most likely case for explanations focusing on the impact of nationalist 
and federalist ideologies on the formation of state preferences since the delegation 
and pooling of ‘core state powers’ touched the most basic symbols of national sover-
eignty. For similar reasons, one should not expect explanations focusing on clearly 
identifiable economic interests and significant interest group activity to fare well. In 
terms of the generality of the framework developed, the insights produced may or 
may not travel beyond the EDC. At the same time, the argument related to transgov-
ernmental networks potentially being sources of bargaining inefficiency is not predi-
cated on a particular time and place. Moreover, it is largely an argument related to 
the existence of the mechanism and thus its significance is not affected by the fact 
that it is established in a single case study. If confirmed, this insight would merit fur-
ther attention. 
The second task of this chapter was to lay out the logic of the research design. The 
design follows a logic of ‘mixed methods’ (e.g. Greene 2007). It combines qualita-
tive historical evidence to reconstruct patterns of rhetorical commitments to particu-
lar political and ideological institutional concepts of post-war Europe, the nature and 
content of beliefs circulating publicly and behind the political stage, domestically as 
well as transnationally. Due to the emphasis on uncertainty and learning as bound 
together with issues of power and influence, the ‘process analysis’ of the bargain 
(Hall 2006), while drawing on game theoretic concepts, is more in line with what has 
been termed ‘negotiation analysis’, focusing on aspects of learning, the usage of be-
liefs in efforts to ‘change the game itself’, processes that are central to bargaining 
dynamics (see Sebenius 1992). In addition, qualitative ‘process tracing’ allows draw-
ing on wide sources of information which becomes central in cases of ‘equifinality’, 
i.e. when the used hypotheses produce identical outcome expectations (George and 
Bennett 2005).  
This qualitative information is combined with a quantitative analysis of transnational 
networks in post-war Europe in order to identify central actors and offer alternative 
evidence of transnational conflict structures. In particular, this chapter presents the 
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way in which the network data was sampled. In order to reconstruct transnational 
networks among the political elite in post-war Europe, this dissertation draws on the 
sociological analysis of interlocking electorates (Mizruchi 1996), combining several 
sampling strategies to yield networks based on individuals’ overlapping member-
ships in the eight transnational organization that existed in post-war Europe in 1950. 
These are: the European Movement, the European League for Economic Cooperation 
(ELEC), the European Union of Federalists (UEF), the European Parliamentary Un-
ion (EPU), the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE), the 
Socialist International (COMISCO/ SI)
22
, the Christian Democratic Nouvelles 
Equipes Internationles (NEI), and the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle (e.g. 
Braunthal 1971; Lipgens and Loth 1988, 1990; Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993; Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004; Kaiser 2007; Vayssière 2007).  
The toolkit of network analysis has significantly expanded over the last decades 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Newman 2010). Traditional analyses of centrality 
measures allow identifying prominent and hypothetically influential individuals and 
groups within transnational and transgovernmental networks. Second, methods of 
identifying structural clusters of more densely connected actors are particularly use-
ful (Newman 2010, ch. 11). Combining the analysis with qualitative information on 
the conflicts within and across these organizations and their impact on domestic con-
flicts within states yields the evidence needed for the transnational argument. 
                                                 
22
 The International was reconstituted after the war in London as COMISCO, until 1951, when it was 
relabeled Socialist International at its inaugural congress in Frankfurt, Germany. 
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4. The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist First Cut 
The present chapter has two tasks. The first task is to describe the explanandum, i.e. 
the ‘negotiation dance’ of the EDC/ WEU bargain between 1950 and 1954, focusing 
on the positions on institutional design espoused by the governments under consider-
ation (section 4.1). The second section (4.2) will specify the degree to which a plau-
sible intergovernmentalist explanation can be offered. The last step is necessary be-
cause the existent scholarship provides influential arguments for the case of the EDC 
but does not explicitly and consistently address the issues raised by the specification 
of the problem as a ‘negotiations dance’. Thus, I evaluate the basic geopolitical in-
centives that the governments under consideration were faced with over time. In ad-
dition, I evaluate changes in the composition of domestic cabinets and whether there 
are discernible differences in party positions on nationalist values between countries 
and whether there are discernible differences. The finding that none of these factors 
offer a consistent intergovernmental explanation sets the stage for evaluating the 
transnational explanation in the subsequent chapters and provides a more refined 
yardstick by which to evaluate the added value of an alternative explanation based on 
the transnational framework described in the previous chapter. 
4.1 Characterizing the Explanandum: Bargaining Positions between 1950 and 
1954 
This section describes key aspects of the explanandum by presenting the EDC bar-
gain in terms of its main sequences of changes in bargaining positions of the negoti-
ating countries. It presents the EDC as a ‘negotiation dance’ mainly by recurrence to 
governments’ main bargaining ‘positions’ in terms of their expressed preferred insti-
tutional designs. What institutional provisions were argued for by which govern-
ments at what points in time? What was the course of the bargain and what were the 
main conflict constellations between 1950 and 1954?  
In order to answer these questions, it is useful to divide the bargain of the EDC into 
four periods that correspond to turning points in which major compromises between 
several states lead to a shift in the constellation of conflict between the negotiating 
countries around the most salient issues. A first period, beginning with the outbreak 
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of the Korean War, in which the institutional proposals on the bargaining table were 
so far apart in terms of their provision, that two ‘negotiation tracks’ – an intergov-
ernmental ‘package deal’ and the supranational ‘Pleven Plan – were pursued simul-
taneously as no substantial agreement on the terms of German rearmament seemed 
available; a second period, beginning in mid-1951, in which substantial compromises 
– largely between the three larger continental European governments and the United 
States – led to an exclusive focus on the supranational alternative, eventually culmi-
nating in the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952. The third period between, last-
ing until the rejection of the EDC Treaty in August 1954 in the French Assemblée 
Nationale was marked by domestic ratification conflicts and international efforts to 
renegotiate the terms of the treaty and substantially bolster its institutional structure 
with a European Political Community. The final period, lasting no longer than five 
months, was marked by a new intergovernmental conference in London, the outcome 
of which was the WEU Treaty that, having been ratified in all countries by Decem-
ber, finally solved the problem of German rearmament and integration into the West-
ern Alliance. 
4.1.1 A German Army or a European Army? The EDC Negotiations, 1950-
1951 
Serious negotiations over German rearmament started with the outbreak of the Kore-
an War and the US proposal of the ‘package deal’ to integrate German forces into 
NATO in September 1950. Although the institutional debate in post-war Europe, in 
particular after the Brussels Treaty of 1947, had introduced the question of German 
rearmament in the international discussions, the Korean War was the clear turning 
point: a heightened fear of a Soviet attack caused immediate concerns and demands 
for an increased American troop presence on the continent while US officials sought 
for ways to tap German resources for the Alliance. The result was the so-called 
‘package deal’ (FRUS 1950 III, 273 ff.). It was proposed to the European states on 
September 12
th
 1950. Its core was, on the one hand, the bolstering of European de-
fense by increased European military expenditures and US aid. On the other hand, it 
called for the rearmament of German troops and their integration in the Alliance. 
Being concerned for the efficiency of a multi-national (and multilingual) force that 
would be composed, inter alia, of troops that had fought against each other not long-
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er than five years ago at the time, the US Department of State proposed that German 
units should be mobilized and made available under NATO institutional structure 
that would have to be created, including a supreme commander and central decision-
making boards that would oversee the recruitment and the mobilization of European 
Armies and thus constituting part of the organizational core of NATO. These pro-
posals were part of an initiative to raise the military spending of all NATO countries. 
In order to oversee German compliance with international treaties, these boards 
would oversee both the production and procurement of weaponry throughout NATO 
and they could make sure that ‘vital armaments’ would not be produced by Germany. 
Moreover, the package deal stipulated that German divisions would be at the direct 
disposal of the NATO commander: no integrated German units higher than this oper-
ational level were to be allowed, no German ‘General Staff’ would exist that could, 
even in principle, coordinate all the German divisions autonomously. The German 
army would thus be monitored and integrated, at the operational level, into the Alli-
ance without the organizational or material capabilities that armies of ‘sovereign’ 
nations could in principle possess. In return for a German contribution to Allied ca-
pabilities, Germany would be given the prospect of becoming a NATO member.
23
 
                                                 
23
 The package deal proposed the “[…] creation of a European defense force within the North Atlantic 
Treaty framework […] the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations 
and to provide as well a framework in which German contribution of a significant nature could be 
realized.” (FRUS 1950 III, 274). It stipulated that that “national contingents [operate] within overall 
NATO control and under immediate commanders of their own nationalities.[…]” and that “German 
units larger than the balanced ground Division should not initially be authorized. […] These German 
Divisions, at least initially, would be integrated with non-German units in the corps and higher units 
but should be nationally generated and so integrated as not to impair their morale or effectiveness.” 
(FRUS 1950 III, 275). In addition, there “[…] should eventually be a Supreme Commander for the 
European Defense Force who would be provided with sufficient delegated authority to insure that the 
separate national forces are organized and trained into one effective force in time of peace and who 
would be prepared to exercise the full powers of the Supreme Allied Commander over that force in 
time of war” (FRUS 1950 III, 274/275). Thus, the “nations concerned should make firm commitments 
as to the forces that would pass immediately to the control of the Supreme Commander, when ap-
pointed, and additional commitments as to-the forces which would be placed under his command in 
event of war” (Ibid.). In terms of the supply of weaponry and the coordinated production of military 
goods, the package deal argued that “greater central direction should be provided in the fields of mili-
tary production and procurement of major items of supply. This should be done within the framework 
of the present NATO Military Production and Supply Board by-necessary changes in its terms of 
reference and by setting up an executive, directing a group highly qualified in the production field, 
and supported by an integrated staff so as to be able to provide the-necessary guidance for military 
production and supply. While the maximum contribution would be expected from Germany in the 
production field, we believe that German forces should be dependent upon other nations for certain 
vital military equipment which should not be produced by German industry” (FRUS 1950 III, 276). 
The upshot of this proposal was German membership in NATO “as soon as possible” (FRUS 1950 III, 
277). 
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While the European governments warmly received the implied organizational and 
material commitment of the US to a Western Alliance in the form of a US command-
er and additional troops on the continent, none of them were enthusiastic about the 
creation of German armed forces. Taking the ‘package deal’ as a proposal to begin 
negotiations, almost all Cabinets, with various qualifications, reluctantly agreed to 
negotiate along its principles (Herbst 1996, 88; Creswell 2006, 30). Even Konrad 
Adenauer indicated to the Allied High Commissars at the Petersberg that the Ameri-
can proposal was a useful starting point for negotiations Germany provided that 
German troops were treated on an equal footing and negotiations on Germany re-
gaining its sovereign status would equally begin (AAPD 1949/50; FRUS 1950 III, 
355; 1950 IV, 658). 
In sum, European governments reluctantly agreed to the American ‘Package Deal’ in 
principle, whereas the French government wholeheartedly rejected the idea.
24
 Taking 
issue with both German NATO membership and the prospect of setting up German 
divisions, the French government responded with the proposal of the Pleven Plan on 
24
th
 October 1950 in which French Minister of Defense René Pleven proposed a su-
pranational army, whose institutional structure resembled the ECSC that was being 
negotiated at the time (Pleven 1950). The core of the plan was the creation of a Eu-
ropean Minister of Defense, responsible to a Council of States and an Assembly, who 
would implement the directives he received, thereby overseeing the recruitment, mo-
bilization, and integration of a supranational army. While the proposal itself was 
vague, its main outlines caused serious concerns regarding the efficiency and even 
sincerity of the idea. Pleven stipulated that only German troops should be fully inte-
grated in the new army, whereas the other participating states would retain the sover-
eign control over a large amount of theirs. Moreover, the Plan called for troops to be 
integrated at “the smallest possible unit”, in effect, a level significantly lower than 
                                                 
24
The package deal was first proposed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, the UK and the 
US in New York in September 12
th
 1950 (FRUS 1950 III, 1191). Protocol records Schuman as saying 
“Regarding the participation of Germany in the defense effort, Mr. Schuman said it would seem illog-
ical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without contributions from Germany. He 
said that there was a serious psychological problem in France, however, and that it would create seri-
ous difficulties if we force the French to take a position too early. He said that the French felt that 
there were limited resources available for common defense. In their opinion, these resources must be 
distributed between the NATO countries. Only when a minimum level is reached in these countries 
would it be easy for the French to take a definite position on the matter. When the combined staff and 
the Supreme Commander have been created the difficulty will be much lessened for the French and 
the Government might be in a position to consider the German matter on a different basis. Mr. Schu-
man urged that the other Foreign Ministers be patient on this matter.” (FRUS 1950 III, 1200). 
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the threshold of nationally homogenous divisions as called for in the US package 
deal, thereby raising serious concerns regarding the military efficiency of the plan.
25
 
The reaction was uniform. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, upon the an-
nouncement of the Pleven Plan, echoed widespread sentiments by stipulating that 
“France has put forth a plan which is considered mil[itarily] unsound by mil[itary] 
experts of NAT[O] countries” (FRUS 1950 III, 428). Reactions by the British cabinet 
were altogether more hostile: here was a rejection of the Pleven Plan ‘in principle’, 
without indicating any willingness to ‘study’ the Pleven Plan.26 The Dutch govern-
ment shared that view (Harryvan and van der Harst 2000, 171). Although the Ger-
man and Italian governments were far less hostile to the idea of a supranational army, 
the plan’s military inefficacy and its blatant unequal treatment of Germany implied 
rejection by both governments (Adenauer 1950; Varsori 1992, 273). 
After US Secretary of State Dean Acheson explicitly threatened that the US would 
withhold any additional troop commitments to Europe (FRUS 1950 III, 426-431, 
429, 430), negotiations continued in the North Atlantic Council, chaired by US rep-
resentative Charles M. Spofford. These negotiations lead to a weak compromise that 
would largely remain in place until mid-1951. It was decided that the negotiations 
should continue along two ‘tracks’. One the one hand, the Allied High Commission-
ers in Germany would negotiate with the German government the possible military 
contribution to the Alliance, to be anchored in a peace treaty that would specify the 
terms under which the country would regain its sovereignty (‘Deutschlandvertrag’). 
Negotiations would take place on the Petersberg (FRUS 1951 III-b, 990, ff.). At the 
same time, the French government would invite ‘interested countries’ to a confer-
ence, to be held in Paris, that would discuss the possibility of creating the European 
Army called for in the Pleven Plan. As France accepted the Spofford compromise, 
the United States agreed to provide additional US divisions and appointed a supreme 
                                                 
25
 Specifically, battalion sized German units would be integrated in divisions, divisions being the 
lowest possible union size capable of autonomous operation. The result would have been that every 
division in the European Army – nationally homogeneous – would have its own one or two German 
battalions. This would obviously create serious problems of communication and coordination, national 
resentment notwithstanding, thus seriously impeding the military effectiveness of such troops (Elgey 
1993a, 573). 
26
 “The French plan is entirely out of line with the broad principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. [...] it 
seeks to divide the North Atlantic forces into American and Canadian forces on the one hand and 
‘European’ forces on the other. […] The plan also appears designed to postpone for a long time any 
possibility of German contribution.” Preparatory memo for a meeting of the British cabinet, October 
26
th
 1950 (DBPO II: III, 217) 
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commander for the NATO troops in Western Europe (Schwartz 1991, 145-155; 
Leffler 1992, 390). 
In sum, one could characterize the conflict constellation throughout the first year 
informally as ‘France versus the rest’. Few of the Western governments thought the 
EDC to be a viable option. Even Germany and Italy, the two countries that expressed 
at least some sympathy with the idea, did not endorse the French proposal as its inef-
ficiency and intention to delay the negotiations seemed obvious. The Dutch govern-
ment – as the British – only sought observer status for the negotiations in Paris. 
However, no serious offers of compromise on the key issues, such as German troop 
size and institutional equality – were put forth until March 1951. 
4.1.2 Negotiating and Signing the EDC Treaty, 1951-1952 
Due to the delay produced by this situation, it became clear rather quickly that the 
compromise formula suggested by Spofford was counterproductive. As the first talks 
on the Petersberg – the first track of the Spofford Compromise – began, it was still 
unclear what exactly should be agreed upon, since the three Allied powers represent-
ed by their High Commissioners (France, UK, US) did not agree among themselves, 
even in principle, on the institutional terms under which Germany would be rearmed. 
Additionally, the leader of the German delegation at the Petersberg, Theodor Blank, 
stipulated from the beginning that larger division sized national troops – including 
armored vehicles and tanks - were the conditio sine qua non for an effective military 
alliance and thus of German participation (FRUS 1951 III-b, 1000). Since the issue 
of German sovereignty was inextricably linked to German rearmament, the German 
delegation immediately sought a concrete revision of the occupation statute in ex-
change for such a military contribution, a request Adenauer had expressed to the 
High Commissioners already in August 1950 (Adenauer 1976, 358 ff.). First con-
crete results were obtained only in March 1951, allowing the creation of a German 
Foreign Ministry.
27
 
                                                 
27
 135. Kabinettssitzung, March 13
th
 1951, TOP A, Errichtung eines Auswärtigen Amtes. URL <  
http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1951k/kap1_2/kap2_23/para3_15.html >. Last 
accessed on April 29
th
 2015. 
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The negotiations showed little signs that other agreements could be found quickly by 
early 1951.
28
 The contents of the ‘Spofford Compromise’ had scheduled two ‘interim 
reports’ – one from the negotiations in Paris, one from the High Commissioners in 
Germany – to be distributed in early 1951, before the impending French elections on 
June 17
th
 1951. Several developments coincided with the report issued from Peters-
berg. On April 19
th
 1951, the ECSC Treaty was signed in Paris. French Foreign Min-
ister Schuman and Adenauer started making headway into a resolution of the Saar 
question (Poidevin 1986, 283).
29
 With the impending publications of both reports, 
the main line of conflict started to shift drastically.  
The interim report on the negotiations on the EDC in Paris contained several com-
promises. It stated that the “treaty will involve no discrimination whatever among the 
member states.” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 844).The five negotiating states thus agreed that 
“the final aim is the fusion, under joint supranational institutions, of the armed forces 
of the participating countries with a view to assuring the defense of Europe on a 
permanent basis.” (Ibid.). The key qualification had become that the “forces neces-
sary for the defense of the overseas territories of the participating countries would be 
excluded.” (Ibid.). The last provision was to ensure that troops responsible for the 
control of European colonies could be retained under national control whereas Ger-
man troops would be integrated into the new organization completely. The negotia-
tions between military experts in NATO produced the desired compromise regarding 
the military effectiveness of a supranational army, stipulating that the size for mili-
tary effectiveness was a ‘groupement du combat’ of about 12.500 to 14.500 men.  
Remaining institutional differences were, however, still considerable. The Belgian 
government had by no means abandoned its position on the limited character of ‘su-
pranational institution’ it would agree to. Moreover, the amount of resources, possi-
bly a budget as demanded by the French delegation, under centralized control was 
still disputed. The report merely stated that the “European Defense Community will 
                                                 
28
 Ulrich de Maizière, military advisor to the German delegation at the EDC negotiations, described 
the initial situation in an interview with Richard Griffiths in Florence in 1990, “I didn't feel that all 
European countries in this conference were very enthusiastic. […] And I told you that in the first 
months it was Franco-German talk and the others were listening [...]. Italy and the Benelux, they had 
doubts that mixed divisions and non-national homogeneous divisions could function […] they had the 
possibility to wait and not to expose themselves with assessments.” (De Maizière 1990). 
29
 “Schuman hatte mit mir am 18. April 1951 Briefe gewechselt, in denen ausdrücklich ausgeführt 
wurde, daß der endgültige Status an der Saar von keiner Seite präjudiziert werden sollte.“ (Adenauer 
1976, 520). 
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have at its disposal certain resources” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 844). Nevertheless, the US, 
including the highly reputed NATO supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
not only approved of but started actively lobby and apply diplomatic pressure for the 
European Army solutions which proved decisive for subsequent events (e.g. 
Creswell 2006, 61). Because of these compromises, as an American observer of the 
negotiations noted in August 1951, a consensus in principle was emerging by mid-
1951 to ‘copy’ the key institutional features of the recently signed ECSC treaty and 
apply it to the EDC (FRUS 1951 III, 862 ff., FRUS 1951 III-b; Adenauer 1976, 461, 
462; Götze and Rittberger 2010). Thus, a broad outline of a possible agreement was 
emerging, entailing the institutional blueprint of the ECSC and applying it to the Eu-
ropean Army.  
Once this agreement in principle had been obtained, two new lines of conflict formed 
that persisted for over two years: one relating to the powers and specific institutional 
design of the EDC; the second one relating to the relationship between the European 
Army and NATO, including the UK and the US. Both persisted for the remaining 
three years and, essentially, were only resolved through the WEU in late 1954. 
The question of institutional design – and thus the powers and the resources that the 
new organization would yield – was the major cleavage among the prospective EDC 
member states themselves. Once the troop level question had been resolved, the 
Dutch government joined the negotiations as participant and now declared that the 
“the Netherlands Government are prepared to support the idea of linking the Europe-
an armies together, although on a basis different from that proposed during the Paris 
Conference”.30 Both the Belgian and the Dutch government adopted a similar stance 
with regard to this question.
31
 In essence, both the Dutch and the Belgian govern-
ments sought to limit the delegation and pooling of state powers: both countries were 
against the formation of a common budget, both sought a multi-member college of 
                                                 
30
 As the Dutch delegation put it, it “would seem imperative to limit, at least for the time being, the 
responsibilities of the High Authority to such harmonization of the organization, tactical procedures 
and technical measures as is strictly necessary to ensure the effective cooperation of national contin-
gents in a balanced and integrated force . […] A complete common budget appears to be unnecessary 
[…]” in the same way as the Dutch governments declared a common armament program unnecessary. 
(Dutch Government 1951). 
31
 As a member of the Belgian delegation wrote to Brussels in December 1951, “As regards the pow-
ers of the Commissioner: he can only have an executive role, though without being reduced to the 
status of chairman of some delegate authority, hence more of a coordinator or director.” (Papeians de 
Morchoven 1951). 
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commissioners instead of a single European ‘Minister of Defense’, both sought to 
reduce its prerogative to an agency responsible for coordinating common standards 
of production, armaments, and training, and both insisted on a powerful Council of 
States within the European Army that would decide, on all matters of importance, 
unanimously. Due to the little amount of pooling and delegation on offer, both did 
not envisage a common assembly with substantial rights. The Dutch delegation even 
proposed to limit the institutions to a Council of Ministers and an Executive Board 
only, preempting a common budget altogether, keeping the mobilization and mainte-
nance of troops a national affair, and delegating operational control to the Allied 
headquarters within NATO.
 32
 
Against this ‘minimalist’ stance that sought a low level of centralization and repre-
sentation, the three larger countries – Germany, Italy, and France – adopted a differ-
ence stance and this confrontation almost lead to a failure of the negotiations by the 
end of 1951. The Italian government, to begin with, adopted a radically different 
stance toward the question of institutional design by announcing that the institutional 
blueprint advocated by the Benelux violated “every sense of responsibility as well as 
the fundamental rules of the parliamentary system of government”.33 The Italian del-
egation further stated that, to fill this gap, one needed “a parliament, appointed 
through general and direct European elections” (Lipgens 1984b, 666). The Italian 
delegation further stated that this parliament could “exert comprehensive control 
over the European budget and the office of the High Commissioner. The High Com-
missioner would be responsible to the parliament in the same way as a minister to his 
national parliament.”34 The German government was largely in agreement: the ‘par-
tial federation’ that was being constructed essentially required the parliamentary con-
                                                 
32
 “1) The armed forces allocated or to be allocated to SHAPE by the States, participating in the Euro-
pean Defence Organisation, shall be grouped in an integrated European Force in accordance with 
principles to be laid down in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Defence 
Organisation. The principles will provide for integration above division level. As organs of the Euro-
pean Defence Organisation will be established: a Council of Ministers and an Executive Board. 3) 
Suitable provisions will have to be made with regard to the settlement of disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty” (Dutch Government 1951). 
33
 Own translation from “Es widerspricht jeglichem Verantwortungsbewußtsein und den fundamenta-
len Regeln des parlamentarischen Regierungssystems.” (quoted in Lipgens 1984b, 665). 
34
 Own translation from “Ein Parlament, […], könnte ohne Frage umfassende politische Kontrollge-
walt über den europäischen Haushalt und die gesamte Amtsführung des Kommissars ausüben. Der 
Kommissar wäre gegenüber dem Parlament in gleicher Weise verantwortlich wie ein Minister gegen-
über seinem Parlament.” (quoted in Lipgens 1984b, 667). 
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trol of the executive.
35
 The French delegation had already acknowledged that its key 
demand – a common budget – required a minimal degree of parliamentary control.36 
Schuman, insisting on majority decisions, hesitantly argued that an influential par-
liament was required, but he was unsure about the concrete normative implications.
37
 
These differences between the minimalists and the maximalists, so to speak, were 
entirely incompatible, and extended over multiple issues: whether or not there would 
be a common budget, whether the central authority would be composed of a single or 
multiple commissioners, the degree to which majority voting would be used in the 
Council, the decisions on the procurements of contracts and awarding promotions, 
the degree to which NATO headquarters would direct the Army (Fursdon 1980, 105 
ff.; Rittberger 2006). In all of these cases, the line of conflict had shifted since the 
beginning of the negotiations: the early isolation of France was replaced by a conflict 
between Belgium and the Netherlands (the ‘minimalists’) on the one hand and the 
larger ‘maximalists’ (Germany, France, and Italy) on the other hand. 
The three maximalist countries had an important ally, however. Ever since Eisen-
hower had endorsed the EDC as a viable military option, the US increased its pres-
sure, via conditionality threats related to continued economic and military aid, that a 
                                                 
35
 Calling for a ‘decisive contribution‘ to European Unity in his speech in front of the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, Adenauer argued that with the requirement of a common budget “stellt sich auch 
unabweisbar die Frage nach einer europäischen parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Exekutive […]. 
Schon das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik enthält eine Bestimmung, die die Übertragung von Souve-
ränitätsrechten auf größere Gemeinschaften vorsieht, und darin liegt zugleich ein Auftrag an die Bun-
desregierung […]. Noch können wir kein exaktes Bild dieser Föderation zeichnen, [aber man] muß, 
wenn das Ganze nicht erreichbar ist, den Teil davon verwirklichen, der möglich ist.“ He further 
pointed out that “all diese Einzellösungen auf eine Koordinierung, ja Verschmelzung hindrängen […]. 
Handeln wir rasch! Morgen könnte es zu spät sein!” (quoted in Lipgens 1984b, 658). Lower level 
officials functioning as Adenauer’s representatives, such as Blankenhorn, Hallstein, and Ophüls, 
agreed that the design of EDC institutions had to conform to the Italian demands for a constituent 
including executive control exercised through parliament (AAPD 1951,538 ff., 556-559, 603-606). 
36
 “The budget, adopted by the Commissioner in conjunction with the Council, acting by a majority to 
be determined, and approved by the European Assembly, will determine the total burden” (French 
Delegation 1951). 
37 “Man stelle sich ein Komitee vor, in dem jede Regierung durch einen Minister vertreten ist. Gründ-
liches Nachdenken erweist die Schwierigkeit des Problems: Das Erfordernis der Einstimmigkeit für 
ein solches Minister-Kollegium würde zur Folge haben, daß jeder Mitgliedstaat die Verwendung der 
gemeinsamen Armee durch ein Veto verhindern könnte. […] sei. […] Die effektive Übertragung von 
Souveränität auf eine einzige Exekutive genügt also nicht für die europäische Armee. Es wäre gleich-
zeitig notwendig, ein gemeinsames Parlament und gemeinsame Ressourcen zu schaffen, aber dies 
würde das Problem nicht zufriedenstellend lösen. Die Minister, die Mitglieder des Rates sind, bleiben 
ihrem nationalen Parlament verantwortlich. Wären sie es in gleicher Weise vor der gemeinsamen 
Versammlung? Wie soll man sich vorstellen, daß eine europäische Versammlung die Demission eines 
Ministers erzwingen könnte, wenn er das Vertrauen seines nationalen Parlaments nicht verloren hat? 
Ich stelle die Frage; aber ich habe im Moment keine Antwort” (quoted in Lipgens 1984b, 658). 
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treaty on the EDC should be signed by May 1952 (Duchin 1992). It was only through 
US pressure and substantial compromises from all sides that he remaining differ-
ences were resolved until the ECC Treaty was signed in Paris on May 27
th
 1952. The 
treaty, in essence, was a compromise between the three larger states on the one hand 
and Belgium and the Netherlands on the other hand.  
The disagreement over the role of a parliament was resolved with the so-called ‘fed-
eralist’ Article 38 of the EDC Treaty. No federal organization of powers would be 
used as the Italian delegation had demanded. Rather, the article stipulated that within 
a specified time of six months after the signature of the EDC Treaty, EDC parliament 
should study the possibility of a final constitutional design of the EDC “capable of 
constituting one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure” (Art. 
38, EDC Treaty). The EDC Treaty endowed the EDC parliament itself with relative-
ly wide-ranging powers (see Rittberger 2006). Apart from its ability to call on the 
court (Art. 57, EDC Treaty), it was invested with powers of censure: by a two-thirds 
majority of all members of the assembly, it could force the commissariat to resign as 
a whole (Art. 36, EDC Treaty). In terms of the legislative process, it could only sug-
gest measures, without obligations of on part of the Council to follow its lead (Art. 
36, EDC Treaty). It had, however, significant rights in the budgetary process: once 
the Council had approved the budget unanimously, the Assembly by “a two thirds 
majority of the votes cast and a simple majority of its membership may propose the 
rejection of the entire budget” (Art. 87, EDC Treaty). The maximalists and the min-
imalists had, essentially, met in the middle. 
The EDC budget, included in the EDC Treaty against the initial skepticism of the 
Benelux, was composed of member state contributions – not taxes as the maximalists 
had initially proposed – and military aid from other countries (Art. 93, EDC Treaty). 
The budget would serve to purchase “common armament, equipment, supply, and 
infrastructure programs of the European Defense Forces” (Art. 101, EDC Treaty). 
Contracts for procurement of weapons, standardization, supplies, infrastructure, and 
programs for research and development were issued by the Council with a two-thirds 
majority, prepared under a two-thirds approval of the Commission as well (Art. 102 
and 106, EDC Treaty). 
The Benelux had some substantial success in safeguarding a few but salient institu-
tional provisions such as a multimember commissariat consisting of nine commis-
sioners, appointed by unanimous agreement of the member states for six years, with 
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no more than two commissioners of the same nationality (EDC Treaty Art. 21). On 
their insistence, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), i.e. the NATO 
headquarters, would be Supreme Commander of the European Force (EDC Treaty 
Art. 13 and 18). 
Finally, the Council became a relatively powerful institution. It shared agenda setting 
powers with the Commissariat, deciding either by call from the Commissariat or on 
‘invitation of one of its members’ (Art. 46, EDC Treaty). Its highest prerogative was 
the issuing of binding directives, always unanimously, ‘for the action of the Com-
missariat’ (Art. 39, EDC Treaty). Otherwise, it was to take decisions and concur-
rences with a two thirds majority “which the Commissariat shall be bound to obtain 
before making decisions or issuing recommendations” (Art. 39, EDC Treaty).38 Fi-
nally, the level of adjudication was initially uncontested entailing direct transfer of 
the responsibilities of the Court of Justice inaugurated with the ECSC Treaty to the 
new community (Art. 8 and 52, EDC Treaty). An extensive jurisdictional protocol 
was added to the treaty, regulating in a more detailed manner the cooperation proce-
dures. It concluded several sensitive issues such as the question of regulating the 
authority of the Military Police in one state over soldiers of the EDC from a different 
nation. The conclusion was that this authority was to be negotiated separately under 
the maxim that the authority of the Military Police was to “be subordinated to an 
agreement with the authorities of the receiving State and shall take place in liaison 
with these authorities.”39 
Insofar as the EDC constituted a compromise, it was a tenuous one. Partially because 
the agreement was drawn up under US pressure, the closing days of the negotiations 
saw a second issue appear that would stay with the negotiating governments until 
finding its resolution in the WEU Treaty, namely the UK troop presence. A credible 
commitment of UK troops was demanded by many as a proper balance against a re-
covering Germany that still possessed economic dominance on the continent. Hence, 
a French parliamentary debate on the EDC on February 11
th
 1952 set forth two con-
ditions for ratification: proper democratic control and the ‘participation of the United 
Kingdom’, a solution that ‘would greatly contribute to assure the success’ of the trea-
                                                 
38
 The distribution of votes within the Council was as follows: Germany, France, and Italy three votes, 
Belgium and the Netherlands two votes, Luxembourg one vote (Ibid.). 
39
 See Art. 6, Convention relative to the Status of European Defense Forces and the Tax and Commer-
cial Regime of the European Defense Community (Jurisdictional Protocol, EDC Treaty). 
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ty.
40
 Essentially all countries sought some form of guaranteeing of a continental 
troop presence that would mitigate fears of a possible German dominance and, at the 
same time, serve as an additional deterrent against the Soviet Union, and thus sought 
by all prospective EDC members. Partially due to Churchill becoming Prime Minis-
ter again in November 1951, there was some hope that the UK would associate itself 
with the EDC in a manner. This hope, however, was ill placed: internally, Churchill 
himself had expressed grave reservations against the ‘military efficiency’ of the 
‘sludgy amalgam’, as he had labelled the EDC.41 Before the treaty was signed, the 
United States and the United Kingdom agreed to attach a declaration of support to 
the EDC Treaty that was unilateral in character, thus, non-binding and non-
enforceable (Massigli 1978, 317, 318; Parsons 2003, 76). Thus, the treaty was signed 
under difficult circumstances on May 27
th
 1952 partially as a result of an ultimatum 
put forth by US secretary of state Dean Acheson. The French government, unknown 
to the other partners, decided to sign the treaty knowing that it could and would not 
ratify it in that form (e.g. Fauvet 1956, 28; Duchêne 1994, 233; Creswell 2006, 90). 
4.1.3 Ratifying the EDC: European Democracy, a Common Market, and the 
Cold War, 1952-1954 
Thus, once the treaty had been signed, it was already becoming clear that its ratifica-
tion would be an up-hill battle. Paradoxically the country that initiated the suprana-
tional army – France – rejected the treaty while the country demanding a complete 
federation initially – Italy – was the only country left not having ratified the treaty. In 
                                                 
40
 The key points in the resolution were, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit mis en œuvre pour assu-
rer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique supranational à compétence 
limitée mais réelle, responsable devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des peuples européens, et 
invite le gouvernement à prendre dans ce sens toutes initiatives nécessaires. (2) la stricte limitation et 
l’énumération précise des cas où peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que l’établissement d’un budget 
commun est voté par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle maintient son opposition à la 
reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. Elle invite le gouvernement à 
renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en voue d’obtenir la participation dans 
a Communauté européenne de Défense autres nations démocratique, et notamment de la Grande-
Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement aux soucis exprimés par 
l’Assemblée national et comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point des institutions et des 
modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (quoted in Fauvet 1956, 26, 27, orignal 
italics). 
41
 A cabinet protocol from November 29
th
 1951 records Churchill, “I should doubt very much the 
military spirit of a sludgy amalgam of volunteers or conscripts to defend the EDC.” (quoted in Jansen 
1992, 65). 
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addition to shifts in the Dutch government’s position and later in the Belgian gov-
ernment as well, the cleavage between the big and small states dissolved by 1953. 
In order to achieve ratification throughout the subsequent two years, three avenues 
were tried: First, bolstering the political superstructure by democratically controlling 
the generals as provided for in Article 38 of the EDC Treaty; second, France sought 
revisions of the treaty, largely related to the escalating war in Indochina and the pos-
sibility of, limited in the treaty, of withdrawing troops from the army into national 
control; third, all countries, repeatedly, urged the UK the commit at least some of its 
troops to the EDC.  
Focusing on Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, the Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi 
circulated a memo on June 11
th
 1952 to the foreign ministers of the Six, calling on 
the ECSC Council not to wait for the ratification process and to begin consultations 
immediately. In reaction, Schuman and De Gasperi submitted a joint memorandum 
to the ECSC Council meeting in July 1952 and the Council agreed to convene an Ad 
Hoc Assembly to draft a treaty on a European Political Community in the manner 
specified in Article 38 (FRUS 1952-1954 VI, 182, Jacobson 1962, 921-923; Griffiths 
2000, 69; Kim 2000, 75, 76). This initiative by the three larger powers was heartily 
welcomed by the US. The resulting document – the EPC draft treaty – corresponded 
to radical federalist demands by calling for a political community, respecting the 
separation of powers and downgrading the rights of governments to their representa-
tion in a senate that had similar rights as the parliament (see EPC Treaty, and chapter 
6, section 6.2.2). 
The reluctant reception of this draft treaty by governments in early 1953 not only 
caused wide-spread irritation in the Ad Hoc Assembly but also indicated that the old 
line of conflict between the three larger and the three smaller states was dissolving 
by early 1953. Whereas the Italian and German governments – represented by Aden-
auer and De Gasperi – suggested that the Treaty was suitable for ratification as pre-
sented, the Dutch, Belgian, and French governments disagreed. In December 1952, 
Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen had circulated a memo calling for the addition of a 
project for the construction of a common market into the EPC (Beyen 1952). Within 
a short period, Beyen was supported by the Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland 
arguing that any mandate to negotiate the EPC Draft Treaty should include matters of 
economic integration, in particular a customs union (Griffiths 2000, 69; Kim 2000, 
75, 76). Making economic integration a conditio sine qua non for the formation of a 
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political community, both countries clashed heavily with the French government that 
utterly refused to contemplate any form of expanded liberalization of trade among 
the Six within the EPC (Ibid.). In addition, the new French Foreign Minister Bidault 
complained that the EPC Draft Treaty exceeded the original mandate by constructing 
‘une Europe presque totale’ (Griffiths 2000, 113). Due to this difficult constellation, 
it became clear that the Draft Treaty would not be passed on directly to national par-
liaments. Bidault and Van Zeeland initially even sought to exclude the original 
members of the Ad Hoc Assembly completely from the agreed upon process of fur-
ther discussing the Draft Treaty in intergovernmental meeting.
42
 These differences 
stalled any progress in the series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that were 
held sporadically throughout late 1953 and early 1954 on the EPC Draft treaty. The 
only significant agreements in these negotiations largely centered on the ‘Senate’ 
which, in the Draft Treaty, was composed of delegates elected by national members 
of parliament. Agreement was reached by early 1954 that the Senate would be com-
posed of national ministers and that the Senate, rather than the parliament, that would 
appoint and invest the Executive Council (Griffiths 2000, 158; Rittberger 2006, 
1225). 
However, the divisive nature of the ratification debates, especially but not only in 
France, increasingly proved that these negotiations were futile, although initially, 
progress towards ratification was made against significant opposition. In Germany, 
the early debates on the EDC and the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’ had already produced an 
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 The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) in Paris to the 
Department of State on March 12
th
 1953, “Ministers meeting in Strasbourg under Bidault's chairman-
ship was something of a fiasco. Van Zeeland was real obstruction, but because of Bidault's attitude, 
blame was unanimously attributed to him. Advisers present say that Bidault arrived 40 minutes late, 
was ill-mannered; distorted and confused discussions intentionally; indulged in frivolity and bad 
jokes; and seemed to wish to be as disagreeable as possible. I understand that both Adenauer and De 
Gasperi left Strasbourg irritated and angry. 2. No mention was made of EDC Treaty or ratification 
problems. Adenauer-Bidault talks on Saar were apparently without results except that Bidault con-
cluded by stating he would like to talk to Hallstein about question in Paris. Ministers were only in 
Strasbourg Monday afternoon and evening. 3. Van Zeeland, apparently motivated by fear of Spaak's 
role, prevented any decision on further participation of members of Ad Hoc Assembly in development 
of EPC Treaty. He insisted task of Ad Hoc Assembly was now completed and that it should be dis-
banded. He would admit that exact language of Article 38 of EDC Treaty should be followed calling 
for a conference within three months to examine proposals made by Ad Hoc Assembly and that each 
government could consult its representation in Ad Hoc Assembly if it wished. 4. De Gasperi, Adenau-
er and Beyen, with De Gasperi taking the lead, managed to keep question open for continued partici-
pation by members Ad Hoc Assembly. They also pressed for immediate consideration by govern-
ments of Assembly's proposals and succeeded in imposing a decision for Council of Ministers to meet 
again in Luxembourg on May 12. This was only positive decision of entire meeting.” (FRUS 1952-
1954 VI-b, 296). 
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acerbic debate. Even before the EDC Treaty was formally submitted to be read in the 
Bundestag, the SPD had filed a complaint with the German Constitutional Court 
challenging the constitutional legality of rearmament (Large 1996, 155 ff.). The on-
going debate as well as the legal challenge were unsuccessful, especially as the 
CDU/ CSU around Adenauer overwhelmingly won the Bundestag elections in late 
1953, giving the coalition the power to change the constitution (Ibid.). Thus, despite 
demonstrations in the streets against the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’, the treaty was finally 
ratified by early 1954.  
Efforts to achieve ratification were, in all cases, accompanied by significant US pres-
sure making continuing aid dependent on successful ratification of the EDC Treaty 
(cf. FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 577). As a result, the two countries that had been the most 
skeptical towards the treaty submitted it for ratification to their respective parlia-
ments rather quickly: the Dutch government did in July 1953, the Belgian govern-
ment in November 1953. In both instances, ratification was accompanied by notable 
references to the ‘necessity’ of ratification in terms of the respective ‘national inter-
ests’ (Van der Veen 2009). 
In contrast, the two countries that had been at the forefront of pushing for a suprana-
tional army – Italy and France – now seemed to have become its highest stumbling 
blocks as the EDC, in both cases, became linked with disputes over, in the Italian 
case, national territory, in the French case, a colonial war.  
Shortly after the EDC had been signed, Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi had al-
ready insinuated to US officials that the question of an eventual return of the territory 
of Trieste to Italy would have to be resolved before the treaty could be signed.
43
 Hav-
ing been divided between the two blocks after the war, this conflict risked a potential 
confrontation between the blocks, as Yugoslavian leader Tito seemed more inclined 
towards escalation than Stalin was. Escalation fueled nationalist sentiments in the 
Italian public debate until the issue was resolved in a memorandum of understanding 
in October 1954 (Judt 2005, 174). As the conflict over the EDC ratification became 
                                                 
43
 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State in London on Sep-
tember 25
th
 1952, “FonOff advises that Eden asked De Gasperi in Strasbourg if Italian ratification 
EDC ‘could not be accelerated.’ De Gasperi, taking advantage of the fact that they had been previous-
ly discussing Trieste, replied that so long as the problem of Trieste remained unsolved there wld be 
difficulty in persuading the Italians that their armed forces cld be merged in a European defense com-
munity. According to Eden's report of the conversation, the matter was left there.” (FRUS 1952-1954 
V-b, 692). 
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linked to the issue of Trieste and disputes over budgetary allocations, conflicts within 
the Italian Christian Democrats during the national elections in June 1953 made it 
impossible for De Gasperi’s longstanding coalition to sustain power (see chapter 7, 
section 7.2.2). Suffering from ailing health, De Gasperi relinquished power and the 
Christian Democrats entered a coalition with the Italian right who argued even more 
forcefully against binding troops in the EDC before the conflict around Trieste had 
been resolved (Di Nolfo 1992, 531, 532). 
The ratification conflicts were worse in France. Increasing political pressure had 
started to build up once the treaty had become known domestically. The escalating 
colonial war in Indochina provided further fuel for fears that the EDC would institu-
tionalize a permanent disadvantage against Germany. Already by January 1953, the 
French government had put forth new conditions for an EDC ratification which 
would henceforth come to be known as ‘additional protocols’ or, named after then 
French Prime Minister René Mayer, the Mayer protocols (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 
702-704). These stipulated that the weights of the votes in the EDC council should 
remain at their current level independent of a country’s financial of military contribu-
tion to the European Army. The protocols called for the right to withdraw French 
troops from the EDC in case of emergency without a being subject to a majority veto 
in the council. The longer the ratification debates took, the more the French chamber 
seemed to perceive in the EDC as a loss of national sovereignty rather than a gain. 
Mounting voices in the domestic debates started to warn of a possible German he-
gemony on the continent that was enshrined in the EDC Treaty (Clesse 1989, 147; 
Soutou 1993, 503). To combat these trends, the Mayer protocols, again, asked for a 
British security guarantee, a ‘binding’ guarantee for the duration of the EDC Treaty. 
Finally, the French government let the United States know that “a general under-
standing would have to be reached with the United States on administration, organi-
zation and procedures in connection with end-item assistance.” – a blatant call for 
increased military support in the escalating war in Indochina (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 
702-704; Elgey 1993b, 365). All of these stipulations were granted through negotia-
tions in mid-1953, except the demand for a British troop guarantee. Ensuing negotia-
tions in London only resulted in a new ‘declaration’ by the British government that 
British troops were to be maintained ‘as long as necessary’ (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 
746-747). There was no significant British commitment beyond such ‘cheap talk’ 
(Massigli 1978, 361, 369). 
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In addition, the relationship between Germany and France was increasingly taxed by 
the ongoing dispute over the Saar territory that raged, inter alia, within Germany as 
well (Elzer 2008, 909 ff.). A proposal to turn the Saar a European territory – pro-
posed by the Dutch Socialist Marinus van der Goes van Naters – was linked to the 
electoral fate of the EDC and the EPC and thus lingered in the background awaiting a 
resolution (Ibid.). The delay was further complicated by events that were triggered 
by Stalin’s death in March 1953 that set in a short period of uncertainty over his suc-
cessor and the course of Soviet policy. Thus, some thought it possible that the Sovi-
ets would acquiesce to a truly neutral Germany. On May 11
th
 1953, Churchill deliv-
ered a speech in the House of Commons calling for an ambiguous ‘Locarno’ solution 
to the German question, essentially advocating a four-power conference exploring 
this option (Larres 2002, 223).
44
 In reaction to the Churchill speech on May 11
th
, the 
anti-cediste fraction of the SFIO introduced a motion in the Assemblée Nationale 
obliging the government, which was by April still opposed to Churchill’s advances, 
to approach the US government and follow Churchill's proposal (Elgey 1993b, 373; 
Young 1996, 166). Probing Soviet intentions, the Allies thus issued a call for another 
four-power conference to the Soviets. Further progress was delayed because the So-
viet Union took its time to respond. The four-power conference on Germany finally 
opened in Berlin in January 1954 and American officials were anxious to prevent the 
Soviet Union from disrupting efforts to leverage the obstinate Europeans into ratifi-
cation of the EDC Treaty (e.g. FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 781). Even by January 1954, 
Italy and France had not yet scheduled a ratification debate as the treaty was still not 
out of parliamentary committee in either country. 
  
                                                 
44
 Churchill had in April 1953 started to write repeated personal notes to Eisenhower, asking to hold a 
four-power conference; US policy was to wait for a reaction to that speech and Eisenhower became 
increasingly less diplomatic in rebutting Churchill’s demands (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 975, 976; 
1952-1954 VIII, 1167; Young 1996, 153). On May 11
th
 1953, Churchill then held a speech in the 
Lower House asking for a four-power conference, and exploring the solution of a neutralized Germa-
ny. On insistence by French Prime Minister Mayer – obliged by a vote in the Assemblée Nationale – 
and partly because of the effect the speech had on the German public, the US administration agreed to 
coordinate on the possibility of a four power conference (Young 1996, 167; Larres 2002, 238). 
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4.1.4 Endgame 1954: A European Army (EDC) vs. NATO (WEU) 
In sum, by early 1954, the situation was paradoxical. On the one hand, four of the six 
states that signed the EDC Treaty had successfully ratified it. On the other hand, the 
ratification prospects in Italy and especially in France were becoming increasingly 
uncertain and, domestically, increasingly tied to international geopolitical issues. The 
mounting opposition against the EDC, contrary to the successful ratification efforts 
in four of the Six signatories, increasingly cast doubt on the ambitious project While 
the US administration reiterated its insistence that the EDC should be ratified if mili-
tary aid should continue to flow, this insistence was met, especially by the French 
government, with repeated pleas for British or American troop guarantee.
45
 Italy and 
France were especially dependent on US support: Italy depended on US diplomatic 
help in resolving the Trieste conflict, whereas France heavily depended on US mili-
tary aid to conduct an escalating colonial war in Indochina. Other skeptical voices, 
especially the UK government, repeatedly urged the consideration of any alternative, 
including a neutral Germany. These incentives contributed to the EDC to lingering in 
bargaining deadlock (Fleischer 2013). 
The deadlock unraveled in May 1954. On May 7
th
 1954, the defeat of French troops 
at Ðiện Biên Phủ caused motions in the Assemblée Nationale to topple the French 
government. On June 9
th
, Pierre Mendès France from the Radicals led the assault on 
the government (Elgey 1993b, 636). On June 17
th
, Mendès France was invested as a 
Prime Minister assembling a new government based on a coalition with the Gaullists. 
The aftermath of the French defeat was negotiated at an international conference in 
Geneva – separating North and South Indochina at the 38th parallel, a settlement that 
was rather satisfactory, given that the French forces had just been utterly defeated 
(Eden 1960, 117; Roussel 2007, 242).  
However, solving the EDC issues seemed an impossible task. Without a colonial war 
to pursue, opponents of the EDC no longer needed to appeal to the US administration 
for immediate military help. Given that his Cabinet contained a sizable number of 
‘cedistes’ as well, Mendès France tried to find a compromise between EDC propo-
                                                 
45
Dulles send a long telegram to the US embassy in France commenting – in the manner of in-depth 
literary criticism – on what the apparently ‘new’ US position was. He basically rearranged some for-
mulations and commented on the choice of words in the US ‘declaration’ - paragraph by paragraph, 
word by word - and demanded that this should be conveyed to the French government. (FRUS 1952-
1954 V-b, 959-965). 
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nents and opponents within his government to mobilize sufficient support for ratifi-
cation (Elgey 1992, 205; Roussel 2007, 291). That compromise stipulated not to re-
ject the EDC outright, but to seek renegotiations with the Allies.
46
 Apart from asking 
Britain again for a formal troop commitment on the continent, the French offer called 
for a purely intergovernmental transition period for eight years in which the powers 
of the EDC Commissariat were limited and majority voting would be suspended. In 
addition, the compromise called for the deletion of ‘federalist’ Art. 38 of the Paris 
Treaty and thus to abort the lingering EPC Treaty negotiations (Hitchcock 1998, 254; 
DDF 1954, 147-150). These proposals were submitted to the Allies in order to rene-
gotiate the EDC at a conference in Brussels. The ensuing conference in Brussels 
ended in a short but painful disaster leaving Mendès France totally isolated: none of 
the French conditions were accepted, further negotiations refused, and European 
governments urged the French government to ratify the EDC Treaty as it stood 
(Massigli 1978, 448; Elgey 1992, 216 ff.; Roussel 2007, 306). 
In hindsight, the utter rejection of the French offer is puzzling. It must have been 
apparent to any observer at the time how explosive the issue of the EDC ratification 
in France had become by early 1954. Subsequent statements by decision-makers, 
quoted in the introductory chapter, indicate that even a toned down EDC would have 
been preferred, if not by all, certainly by several key decision-makers such as Aden-
auer
47
 and Schuman.
48
 In his memoirs, Paul-Henri Spaak reveals not regret but anger 
and a feeling of betrayal, accusing Mendès France of not ‘being enough of a Europe-
                                                 
46
 One July 30
th
, Bourgès-Maunory, associated with the ‘cedistes’ in the Radical Party, suggested to 
‘avoir un drame’ with the proponents of the EDC to win over the moderate opponents of the EDC by 
proposing a temporary suspension of the supranational powers of the commissariat and demanding a 
transitional period in which the EDC would remain purely intergovernmental (Roussel 2007, 292, 
293). This was, in effect, a compromise that strikingly resembled the conditions called for by the 
French generals throughout 1953. The proposals that Mendès France suggested to the Cabinet a cou-
ple days later followed this prescription. 
47
 Thus, Adenauer said in an interview in 1965, “Wenn Sie sich jetzt aber vorstellen, wie anders es in 
Europa gekommen wäre, wenn der Vertrag seinerzeit von allen Beteiligten angenommen worden 
wäre! Die Annexverträge zu dem Vertrag, die mit England und mit den Vereinigten Staaten abge-
schlossen waren, waren lange ratifiziert, da schwebte es noch immer zwischen den Hauptbeteiligten – 
das waren Frankreich und Deutschland – und schließlich zerbrach das Ganze. Das war ein furchtbarer 
Schlag. […]in dem EVG-Vertrag waren ja alle die Fragen, um die man sich jetzt streitet seit Jahr und 
Tag, enthalten und wären gelöst gewesen.” (Gaus 1965).  
48
 After the rejection of the EDC in the Assemblée Nationale, Schuman held a speech at a congress of 
the German section of the federalist UEF, Europa Union, in Hannover, calling the WEU “une façade 
londonienne en style anglais, décorée a la parisienne” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 382). He went even 
further at an MRP congress in 1956, explaining that the WEU “[…] est un animale utile, mais qui 
pareil au mulet n’a pas de fécondité procréatrice […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 383). 
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an to fight the battle’.49 In retrospect, the core contents of Mendès France’s offer - 
the deletion of Art. 38 and the call for a transitionary period during which all majori-
ty decisions in the Council were suspended - is certainly in line with, for example, 
the agreements reached in the Treaties of Rome. The main obstacle, as voiced by the 
participants, was that the French offer was too expansive and would have required a 
second round of ratification moves in the countries that had signed the Treaty.
50
 
While formally reasonable, it is difficult to ascertain how problematic that move 
would have been. It seems a far stretch, however, to categorize it as impossible: after 
all, the Benelux governments had already successfully submitted the EDC Treaty to 
ratification despite major misgivings, the German CDU coalition had a sufficient 
majority in Germany to even effect constitutional changes after the elections in late 
1953, and the Italian parliament had not voted yet. 
If the idea behind the rebuff of the French offer was to increase pressure on the 
French government to effect ratification of the treaty, the strategy backfired. Mendès 
France had arranged for talks with Eden and Churchill after the Brussels conference 
in Chartwell on August 23
rd
 1954 (MAE 1955, 135-138). In these talks, Mendès 
France indicated that he was not going to turn the vote on the EDC into a vote of 
confidence and that a quick alternative solution would have to be found to prevent 
the US from adopting a ‘peripheral’ strategy and withdrawing military support from 
its European Allies.
 51 
Thus, it was only after the Brussels conference, when it had 
become clear that the conditions for the EDC would never be met, that the eventual 
WEU solution began to take shape behind closed doors. Although no explicit records 
of the meetings exist, the following events indicate that the British signals – explicit-
ly or implicitly – surely must have been positive. 
                                                 
49
 Spaak wrote in his memoires “Mendés-France war nicht genug Europäer, um den Kampf zu führen. 
Hätte er, anstatt sich über den ihm zuteil gewordenen Empfang zu beklagen, wie er es tat, besser zu 
schätzen gewußt, was seine Partner ihm alles zugestanden hatten, dem wirklich guten Willen, seinem 
Standpunkt entgegenzukommen, dann wären die Dinge wohl anders verlaufen.” (Spaak 1969, 215). 
50
 Instructions for the Belgian delegation in Brussls maintained that “1) Ce système étant un système 
provisoire en réalité, consacre une suspension du Traite dans une de ses parties essentielles pour huit 
ans. Cela oblige tous les partenaires à retourner devant leur Parlement.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 374). 
51
In a memo to the US ambassador, Mendès France is reported of saying that “there was no possibility 
of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabi-
net would not be able to reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said that 
this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have to 
decide how they would vote. […].” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074). 
Chapter 4 The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist First Cut 
133 
 
Provided that he knew that alternatives were indeed available, it is no wonder that 
Mendès France did not press for a vote of confidence on the EDC. Instead, the 
French government refrained from challenging a motion in the Assemblée Nationale 
that demanded that the EDC Treaty be removed from the legislative agenda. There is 
no need to recount in detail the well-known and tumultuous process by which the 
EDC was rejected in the Assemblée Nationale (Roussel 2007, 312).
52
 
The British government was more or less prepared and the obvious conclusions from 
the failure of the EDC were reached quite fast (Mager 1990, 49; Jansen 1992, 172). 
A week after the French vote, the British cabinet was already debating to revive the 
Brussels Treaty, to create a “European box inside an Atlantic box” (Dockrill 1991, 
142; Macmillan 2003, 353). The Brussels Treaty had the advantage of not ‘seeming’ 
supranational, whereas the nutshell of the institutional solution was, in fact, partially 
supranational. Britain would station troops on the Rhine to allay French security con-
cerns; the right to withdraw these troops, as well as control over German military 
organization would be exercised by the NATO, the Council of the Brussels Treaty 
and an associated agency. The essential solution had materialized.
53
 While the Quai 
d’Orsay had reached the same conclusion (Creswell 2006, 160; Massigli 1978, 461), 
Eden toured European Capitals to mobilize support for German integration into 
NATO under the control of the Council of the Brussels Treaty. Although Eden and 
Churchill still had doubts – thus Eden did not mention the specific stage of planning 
to Mendès France in Paris – the British cabinet, with the exception of Churchill, 
slowly began realizing the necessity of a British troop commitment (Mager 1990, 
113; Deighton 1998, 191; Hitchcock 1998, 198). Meeting with Mendès France in 
Paris, Eden obtained a tentative French acceptance of German NATO (Large 1996, 
216 ff.). Once this agreement in principle had been obtained, the negotiations on the 
WEU went relatively smoothly. The WEU Treaty was signed on October 23
rd
 1954 
and went into effect in May 1955. 
The WEU thus provided a way for Germany to enter NATO. The governments sign-
ing the WEU Treaty – including the UK - pledged mutual assistance in case of attack 
                                                 
52
 When the EDC was voted down “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the 
chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158). 
53
 On September 27
th
 1954, Eden prepared the memorandum for the Cabinet, “[…] it will be necessary 
for the French to face some unpleasant realities. They will have to accept German sovereignty and 
German membership of N.A.T.O. and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If they 
are to do this, they must be given some striking quid pro quo.” (Mager 1990, 118). 
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(Art. 5 WEU Treaty Protocol No. I  1954). Core institutions of the WEU were: the 
Council of Western European Union that would convene only at the request of one of 
the member states; the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe reduced to 
the delegates of WEU member states whose rights were limited to receiving an annu-
al report on WEU activities; the International Court of Justice responsible for dispute 
settlement: and the Agency for the Control of Armaments (WEU Treaty Protocol No. 
I  1954). Given that German troops would be mobilized autonomously by a German 
Minister of Defense, the key purpose of the organization was to provide institutional 
and material safeguards. Rights to inspect and verify German capabilities were given 
both to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, i.e. NATO, and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II  1954; WEU Treaty Protocol 
No. IV  1954). The main purpose of the Agency was to inspect whether the deploy-
ment and status of WEU member states forces complied with the rules set forth by 
SACEUR and agreed to by the WEU Council. Its personnel was “accorded free ac-
cess on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall 
be made available to them.” (WEU Treaty Protocol No. IV  1954). Thus WEU and 
NATO officials could, at least formally, inspect German troops at will. These inspec-
tions were to make sure that the size, composition, and armament of German troops, 
stipulated to be similar to those foreseen in the EDC Treaty, complied to the WEU 
Treaty. (WEU Treaty Protocol No. II  1954). 
The second key element was that the UK was not to withdraw its committed troops 
of four armored divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force “against the wishes of 
the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the 
knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.” (WEU Treaty 
Protocol No. II  1954). This was the only matter envisioned to be decided by majori-
ty within the Council. The sole purpose of the WEU was thus to provide a credible 
and trustworthy German commitment to the rules of the Alliance, while equally 
providing a credible safeguard for British troops to remain on the continent. It did so 
successfully. 
4.1.5 Summary 
With the WEU Treaty entering into force in May 1955, the western bargain over the 
terms of German rearmament had come full-circle since 1950. While key issues – 
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unrelated to institutional issues such as the terms of German sovereignty – had to be 
agreed upon throughout the four years, the institutional dimension had produced 
shifting lines of conflict between the negotiating states: the ‘end result’, the WEU 
treaty was not altogether different in nature from the ‘package deal’ proposed by the 
US in 1950. It differed in terms of its institutional setup of limited centralization and 
oversight as well as the implied British troop commitment. However, the main con-
flicts had been fought over an architecture that was different ‘in principle’, namely a 
supranational army. Only when it was discarded after four years of arguing, did the 
Allied governments return to the intergovernmental option, producing an agreement 
on the WEU in extremely efficient fashion. In other words, there is a distinct ‘course 
of the bargain’ or ‘negotiation dance’, that can be divided in distinct periods that are 
associated with different structures of conflict between the bargaining states, summa-
rized by Table 4.1 below. The table seeks to illustrate the paradoxical bargaining 
course that was aptly described as a ‘comedy of errors’ by the contemporary French 
ambassador in London, Massigli (Massigli 1978). In particular, it illustrates the shift-
ing conflict constellations on issues related to the EDC/ WEU bargain.  
In the first period between 1950 and 1951, all countries except France accepted the 
idea in principle that Germany was to enter NATO, under restrictions to be negotiat-
ed. These restrictions would come in the form of some contractual arrangement that 
was to follow the lines of the nascent NATO arrangements. The French government 
objected, and instead insisted on a supranational army, i.e. a proposed level of hierar-
chical centralization resembling a ‘national army’. Although the German and Italian 
governments indicated openness towards the idea, they agreed with the remaining 
negotiating governments that the proposal was militarily ineffective and discrimina-
tory. In order to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations, a temporary compromise 
was reached that lasted until mid-1951. Until that time, all governments except the 
French pushed for a solution of relatively low centralization – envisioning only low 
and limited degrees of pooling and delegation, whereas the French proposal, alt-
hough asymmetrical in nature, advocated the opposite: a high level of centralization 
in the form of a European Minister of Defense, whereas the remaining dimensions of 
institutional design where still left vague. 
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Table 4.1 State Bargaining Positions, 1950-1954 
 1950 – 1951 
The Beginning: A German army in 
NATO vs. a European Army? 
1951 – 1952 
Negotiating the EDC Treaty 
1952-1954 
Ratification of the EDC? 
1954 
Endgame: A European Army 
(EDC) vs. a German army in 
NATO (WEU) 
Salient 
Issues 
Equality of Rights, Efficient inte-
gration of multinational units; 
rules for mobilization and re-
cruitment of German soldiers; 
weaponry available to Germany 
Degree of Centralization of the 
EDC; Democratic Control and fi-
nality of the Union (‘Art. 38’); 
common budget; national exemp-
tions for colonial troops; UK troop 
presence 
EDC Treaty compromise among the 
continental countries; ‘federalist’ 
EPC Draft Treaty and Beyen Plan for 
a common market; ‘emergency’ with-
drawing rights; UK troop presence 
Failure of the EDC Treaty; Re-
negotiation in form of WEU 
Treaty; oversight mechanisms 
for German mobilization and 
weapons production; UK troop 
presence 
France 
Pleven Plan: Highly centralized 
mobilization and recruitment of a 
European Army; integration of 
units at lower Battalion Level; 
unequal rights for Germany 
EDC Treaty: similar positions on 
equal rules, high centralization and 
pooling, medium representation 
(France) to high (Italy, Germany), a 
common budget; UK troop com-
mitment 
Some disagreement about exemp-
tions for colonial forces; concrete 
restrictions for Germany and proce-
dures for awarding production con-
tracts 
Ratification conflict: withdrawing 
rights for colonial troops; lower EDC 
centralization; no common market for 
the EPC; UK troop commitment 
WEU Treaty: Low centraliza-
tion, pooling, and delegation. 
Creation of a semi-sovereign 
German army with autonomous 
mobilization and recruitment; 
German entry into NATO in 
exchange for UK troop presence. 
Independent oversight of mobili-
zation, recruitment, and weapons 
production in Germany through 
WEU agency. Continued US 
military and financial aid in 
exchange for the mobilization of 
German capabilities and their 
integration into NATO. 
Italy 
Package Deal: US financial and 
military aid in exchange for mobili-
zation of German resources. Low 
centralization, no pooling, overall 
very little delegation: integration of 
rearmed Germany into NATO 
command structure; integration of 
units at higher division levels (effi-
ciency); autonomy of mobilization/ 
recruitment; agreement in principle 
with France on restrictions of wea-
ponry available to Germany 
 
“Spofford Compromise”: Negotia-
tions continue for the Package Deal 
and the Pleven Plan simultaneously 
Ratification conflict: solving Trieste 
conflict before EDC ratification; 
common market no sine qua non for 
the EPC; UK troop commitment 
GER 
EDC Treaty ratified: Common Mar-
ket no sine qua non for the EPC; UK 
troop commitment 
Benelux 
EDC Treaty: low centralization, 
pooling, and representation; high 
control through staffing and NATO; 
UK troop commitment 
EDC Treaty ratified: Beyen Plan and 
a Common Market as sine qua non of 
the EPC; UK troop commitment 
UK 
Eden Plan: No membership of or 
troop commitment to a supranational 
EDC, possible alignment through 
the Council of Europe, efficiency 
concerns 
No membership of or troop commit-
ment to a supranational EDC; effi-
ciency concerns 
USA 
EDC Treaty for Europe: military 
aid conditional on a signing of the 
EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop 
commitment, efficiency concerns 
EDC Treaty for Europe: military aid 
conditional on a ratification of the 
EDC Treaty, no permanent US troop 
commitment, efficiency concerns 
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In the second period between 1951 up to the signing of the treaty in 1952, Germany, 
Italy, and the US adopted the French point of view of preferring a supranational – 
centralized – army in response to two concessions by the French government which 
accepted the principal of institutional equality and raised the level of nationally ho-
mogenous units above thresholds deemed necessary to ensure the military functional-
ity of the army. 
As a result, negotiations concentrated on a supranational alternative and a new con-
flict constellation emerged: the three larger continental governments, backed by the 
US, sought much higher levels of centralization and particularly representation than 
Belgium and the Netherlands whereas the UK refused to consider even limited direct 
involvement in the organization. 
The negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty were thus characterized by a 
prolonged conflict over institutional design issues. The compromise, produced under 
significant US pressure, resulted in the EDC Treaty. Contrary to initial French calls 
for a single European Minister of Defense, the EDC would be administrated by a 
multinational ‘Commissariat’. Against the initial strong Belgian and Dutch objec-
tions, the EDC would have its own budget. Its composition, against the wishes by the 
larger states, would not be made up of taxes but of individual contributions from the 
member states and directly allocated military aid. The core institution for decision 
making, the Council, would, against the wishes of the larger states, issue binding 
directives unanimously, including the uses of the budget, which the Commissariat 
was bound to adhere to. Other decisions and concurrences – for example regarding 
contracts for equipment, would be made by a two-thirds majority. Additionally, the 
Dutch and Belgian governments succeeded in inserting in the treaty that the EDC 
would be directly integrated into the military hierarchy of NATO. With regard to 
representation, the EDC was a compromise as well: the three larger states, and in 
particular Italy, had tied the demand for a budget to the direct institutionalization of a 
federalist system of representation including significant rights for the prospective 
parliament. The EDC compromise retained the principle of a powerful parliament. 
Although it would not be directly elected, it had a veto over the annual budget and 
was powerful enough the force the Commissariat to resign. Finally, the EDC Treaty 
was explicitly incomplete. Upon requests by the three bigger states it contained the 
controversial Article 38 that required the signing states to task the parliament with 
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proposing a complete political ‘superstructure’ that would review and complete the 
‘final’ design of the organization. In sum, the period leading up to the EDC Treaty 
had been characterized by differences between the smaller and the larger countries 
on virtually all institutional dimensions.  
Once the treaty had been signed, views of governments that were closely aligned 
during the negotiation phase drifted apart over the main issues debated during the 
ratification period, except one aspect, namely the British troop commitment. In fact, 
the only issue on which the signing states agreed was the demand for British or 
American troops to be credibly and permanently stationed on the continent. Neither 
the UK nor the US were to grant this wish. Instead, the ratification conflicts within 
the signing countries were associated with a shift in the positions of their govern-
ments. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany ratified the treaty, whereas Italy and 
France, amid mounting domestic resistance, did not. Not being able to secure a ‘bal-
ancing’ troop commitment to the EDC by the UK or the US, efforts to secure ratifi-
cation and appease domestic resistance focused on the federalist Article 38, leading 
to the convocation of an Ad Hoc Assembly that produced a draft treaty for a Europe-
an Political Community which, in terms of its level of centralization and representa-
tion, went far beyond the initial EDC Treaty. The Belgian and the Dutch govern-
ments insisted on the inclusion of provisions of a Common Market, a proposition that 
was utterly rejected by the French government(s). The latter delayed ratification of 
the treaty and sought to renegotiate its terms by securing, inter alia, additional uni-
lateral rights to withdraw troops from the EDC. Thus, the coalition of the big three 
continental governments had dissolved. The German and Italian governments re-
mained steadfast, insisting on taking the EPC draft Treaty as a basis for further nego-
tiations whereas the Belgian and particularly the French government delayed pro-
gress towards an agreement on these matters to the point of being perceived as ob-
structionist. On the other hand, the Dutch government, supported by the Belgian For-
eign Ministry, put forth a proposal to create a customs union under the umbrella of 
the new political union, a proposal which was utterly rejected by the French govern-
ment. In sum, there was no longer a clear line of conflict. As the ratification conflicts 
intensified, pressure on the French government to ratify the treaty as it stood in-
creased to the point that the offer for a revised EDC Treaty put forth by the French 
was unanimously rejected in 1954. Although based on a hard won domestic com-
promise within the French cabinet, the remaining European countries – as well as the 
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US – no longer saw it necessary to acquiesce the repeated French pleas for a revision 
of the Treaty. 
The final period in which the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Assemblée Na-
tionale resolved the seemingly intricate problem of German rearmament relatively 
quickly. Remarkably, the terms of the WEU Treaty, negotiated within a couple of 
months at a conference in London, resembled the initial package deal in so far as the 
main substantial provision of the US offer of 1950 – German entry into NATO under 
terms of limited sovereignty, restrictions of available weaponry and operational au-
tonomy – were taken up. The French government accepted the terms it had vehe-
mently opposed in 1950: instead of German soldiers in European uniforms, there was 
to be a German Army and a German Defense Ministry. Institutionally, the WEU pro-
vided two mechanisms that sealed the deal. First, it added to NATO inspection pre-
rogatives an agency that was to oversee German compliance with the terms of the 
treaty. Second, although decisions were on the whole made by unanimity, the WEU 
Council provided a means for the UK to credibly commit a limited amount of troops 
on the continent. Both solutions solved the bargaining gridlock. Simple as they were, 
these solutions seem to have eluded the negotiators for about four years. On the other 
hand, the dismay over the WEU solutions voiced by figures such as Adenauer and 
Spaak indicates that a number of key individuals would, nevertheless, have preferred 
even a weak EDC solution to the one which actually transpired. 
In short, the overall course of the bargain was characterized by a remarkable ineffi-
ciency. Given that the institutional solution found in the end was so simple, it is thus 
puzzling why the negotiating states took four years debating a complicated and risky 
solution. Moreover, the shifts in the bargaining positions are remarkable, indicating 
that substantial shifts either in government ideologies or external circumstances were 
at work so as to effect major reconsiderations of the ‘national interest’.  
4.2 Re-Evaluating Intergovernmentalist Explanations, Realist and Liberal 
In order to identify more clearly what, in terms of the EDC bargain, can be suffi-
ciently explained by the intergovernmental hypotheses, the present section tries to 
pinpoint more precisely what aspects of the bargain are puzzling at all and what 
should be expected in terms of actors’ threat perceptions and domestic beliefs.  
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As already summarized, in the intergovernmental paradigm state preferences and 
state bargaining behavior respond to three kinds of factors. First, material-structural 
differences between the negotiating countries imply differences in available and fea-
sible outside options, and thus their affect states’ institutional preferences (in terms 
of material threat levels and power asymmetries) and bargaining influence. Second, 
domestic political changes, in particular changes in governing coalitions and interest 
group influence may produce domestic shifts and, accordingly, changes institutional 
preferences. Finally, bargaining behavior is based on causal and strategic beliefs that 
provide threat level assessments, assessments of institutional efficiency and assess-
ments of possible bargaining solutions. Thus, changing beliefs result in changing 
behavior without changing bargaining goals. 
4.2.1 Material Context  
The present section reviews the material and geostrategic context of the Western 
countries of post-war Europe. There are several major but stable structural differ-
ences between the Allies in post-war Europe that were conducive to produce conflict 
at the bargaining table. First, there was the asymmetry between the European coun-
tries and the US, the former being utterly dependent on American financial and mate-
rial aid for the reconstruction of their economies and, accordingly, for the mainte-
nance of their defensive capabilities as well. A second major difference concerns the 
European countries themselves, namely the distinction between large and small 
countries, that is, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy on the one hand, the Benelux 
countries on the other. Finally, there is a geographic factor, as a conventional Soviet 
attack would threaten Western Germany immediately whereas the barrier of the 
Rhine, being the first natural line of defense, would at least somewhat shield the 
Benelux and France. Finally, the UK was more sheltered by the channel and thus less 
threatened both by the Soviet Union and Germany (e.g. Himmenroder Denkschrift 
1950, 9-16). 
The dependence of the formerly imperial European powers on the resources of the 
United States is obvious. On the economic plane, the post-war reconstruction efforts 
were predicated on the flow of US dollars to the continent in the form of Marshall 
Plan aid, institutionalized through the OEEC and the European Payments Union 
(Killick 1997; Eichengreen 2007, ch. 3). In terms of the distribution of material ca-
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pabilities constituting a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union, the picture is 
similar. The asymmetry between the US and the continental states can be illustrated 
by considering the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores that factor 
in economic, technological conditions as well as the degree of the mobilization of 
armed forces (Singer, et al. 1972; Singer 1987; Sarkees and Wayman 2010).  
Figure 4.1 Correlates of CINC Score Averages, 1950-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays CINC scores from the Correlates of  War project (Singer,  et 
al.  1972; Singer 1987; Sarkees and Wayman 2010).  The values represent the average 
values between 1950 and 1954. The value for (West)Germany is taken from 1955 as 
there are no previous recorded values since Germany was formally still  occupied te r-
ritory until 1955. The value “Six + UK” adds the relative score of the Six signatories 
of  the Paris Treaties and the UK. “Five + UK” is the same f igure without Germany.  
From the point of view of the US, mobilizing a dormant German potential potentially 
implied that the Western European could create a credible deterrent to a Soviet attack 
on their own, provided that the US extended a nuclear commitment (Six and UK). 
From the point of view of the continental European states, a credible commitment by 
the US or the UK was needed to preempt the material possibility of German conti-
nental hegemony. 
In short, the German problem was one of trade-offs. An economically prospering 
Germany was needed for continental trade-flows and economic recovery but too 
much prosperity, as illustrated by the figures above, might reconstitute German con-
tinental dominance. German military capabilities resources were, if not desperately 
needed, nevertheless in demand, for it would mean fewer burdens to other states for 
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defense and more resources for their reconstruction. On the other hand, allowing the 
resurgence of a German army might invite worse problems, incentivize Germany to 
seek reunification, and geopolitical destabilize the continent. This is the basic struc-
tural situation that did not change significantly in the 1950s, as Figure 4.2 below 
demonstrates. 
The situation for the individual countries created different incentives for institutional 
demands. American global hegemony implied that the American government had the 
only feasible ‘exit option’: based on initially global nuclear superiority, it could pro-
vide limited ‘nuclear cover’ to the European allies, and withdraw its troops from the 
continent, a view that was particularly popular among isolationist factions within the 
Republican Party (Reichard 1975). From the point of view of realist intergovernmen-
talism, this material preeminence and asymmetric dependence should translate into a 
overwhelming American influence and bargaining power.  
Figure 4.2 CINC Scores over Time 
 
The second notable difference separates the smaller Benelux in opposition to the 
larger continental states, both on security and economic issues. In terms of continen-
tal trade, both countries, being smaller, were structurally and traditionally more de-
pendent on continental trade patterns (Milward 1984; Griffiths 1990, 12ff.). Addi-
tionally, having little room to maneuver in terms of an autonomous foreign policy 
and being more vulnerable to threats of aid withdrawal, both countries should be 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
C
IN
C
 S
co
re
s 
USA
SU
UK
France
Italy
Belgium
Netherlands
Chapter 4 The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist First Cut 
143 
 
more susceptible to US leverage than the larger countries. Due to their small size and 
high vulnerability and geographical proximity both to Germany and the Soviet Un-
ion, the geopolitical situation of the Benelux is relatively precarious. On the demand 
side, the call for US troops and common institutions should be most vocal. On the 
supply side, they should insist on rules preventing the dominance of the alliance in-
stitutions by larger powers. Traditional fears of continental dominance, not just by 
Germany but also by France, were thus heavily present in Foreign Policy circles in 
both countries. 
For the larger winners of the war, the UK and France, the situation was only slightly 
different. Although disposing of higher capabilities relative to the Benelux, the rela-
tive inferiority to the US was still substantial. A major difference between the UK 
and France concerns their geographical positions as France shared a direct border 
with Germany and was much more vulnerable to a potential Soviet threat. The Brit-
ish situation, being separated from the continent, structurally implied less of a threat 
than the French situation, both with regard to Germany as well as with regard to the 
Soviet Union. Accordingly, the trade-off between utilizing German capabilities for 
the Alliance and establishing security from Germany is more salient for France. 
Moreover, France in particular was hit substantially the destruction of the war and 
quickly launched itself into an escalating colonial war in Indochina by 1946 (Wall 
1991). Exacerbating the material dependence on the US, American military support 
began by 1950 as the war increasingly escalated without the French army being able 
to achieve its objectives (Ibid.). French governments hardly had the resources to back 
the increasing escalation of the war in Indochina and survive a vote on the costs that 
such a decision would have entailed. Figure 4.3 shows the origins of the material 
resources used in the war. It is estimated that, overall, the United States ended up 
providing about 80 per cent of the resources committed in Indochina (Rioux 1983, 
35; Wall 1991, 188). 
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Figure 4.3 French Expenditures in Indochina and US Aid 
 
Note: According to Bossuat,  the American percentage does not entail mater ial help in 
form of ‘end items’ . The reason for delivering material aid can be found in the ‘dollar 
gap’.  In order not to drain French foreign reserves,  it  was simply more expedient 
economically as well as politically if  the US bought the material and delivered it to 
France. Adding the f inancial aid and the net value of  the ‘end item’ delivery roughly 
accounts for the 80% of total expenditure mentioned above.  Source: (Bossuat 1992, 
856). 
In sum, the demand for centralized institutions should be lowest in the UK and at 
least as high in France as it is in the case of the Benelux countries. In the French 
case, being larger than the Benelux countries implies the prospect of relative gains of 
influence through the pooling of decision-making and institutionalization of repre-
sentative institutions. Thus, French governments should be less worried about con-
trol: seeking power gains, it is clear why French leaders would seek to institutional-
ize a French advantage over German rights as long as a beneficial post-war disparity 
in power and influence persists. 
The remaining two countries, Italy and Germany, were in the most precarious situa-
tion as insofar as they emerged from the war weakest and their geographic exposure 
to the Soviet Union was largest. For Italy, the situation was, relatively speaking, bet-
ter than that of Germany by the late 1940’s. In 1948, there had been Peace Treaty 
between the Italian government and the Allies, settling the sovereign status of the 
Country and providing for eventual military remobilization and allowing Italy to be-
come one of the initial members of NATO (Mistry 2014, 143). Territorially speak-
ing, however, there was still the issue of the, formerly Italian, ‘Free Territory of Tri-
este’ that involved Italy in a direct territorial dispute with Yugoslavia under Tito. 
Being officially a territory of the United Nations, half of it was administrated by an 
Allied Military Government under US leadership whereas a second ‘zone’ was under 
administration of Yugoslavia. The majority of the population of Trieste being Italian, 
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this territorial dispute remained an extremely contentious issue in Italy, much like the 
issue of the Saarland in Germany (Hametz 2005). Being larger than the Benelux, but 
sharing a border with the Soviet sphere of influence, the geopolitical situation of Ita-
ly is thus roughly the same as that of France. 
The losses due to the war as well as the post-war situation were worst for Germany. 
By 1950 the country was still occupied and, although a formal government was in 
office, sovereign power in Germany – both de jure and de facto – resided on the Pe-
tersberg in Bonn where the three Allied High Commissioners had set up their shop. 
Moreover, being territorially divided, it was directly and immediately exposed to a 
potential Soviet threat. By the late 1940’s, military planners in NATO still did not 
believe that a Soviet attack could be halted before it reached the natural barriers of 
the Rhine or the Alps (Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 9-16). Hence, the threat level 
for Germany was, structurally, highest among the Allies. Given that there were no 
German defensive capabilities whatsoever, German dependence on US aid and sup-
port was highest among the Allies as well. Apart from that, there was still the unre-
solved territorial question of the Saarland that was still under French control. At the 
same time, the potential capabilities of the West German state and its prospect for 
recovery were sufficiently high to pose a long-term threat to the continental Europe-
an states, east and west. On the economic front, although the German economy had 
been badly hit late in the war, the German industrial capital stock was in good shape 
and there was some scope for growth as productivity was relatively high and wages 
relatively low in the early 1950’s (Eichengreen 2007, 96). The whole recovery, how-
ever, rested upon a peace treaty with the Allies. Production quotas for security sensi-
ble products (such as Coal and Steel) were still in place by 1950. Given this situation, 
German demands for centralized institutions and additional balancing capabilities 
should be highest among the European countries insofar as its security situation is 
weakest. Additionally, given the situation of the country, any form of institutional 
recognition that alleviates its formal situation and grants additional rights should be 
welcomed. 
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Table 4.2 Material Position and Expected Institutional Demands 
 US UK France Italy BL/NL Germany 
Material 
position, 
security 
threats 
Lowest Medium High High High Highest 
Global material and 
nuclear superiority. 
Geographically least 
threatened by poten-
tial Soviet attack. 
Available outside 
option of ‘peripheral 
defense’ of the conti-
nent. 
Significantly less 
capabilities than US. 
Interests similar to 
continental European 
states although least 
exposed geograph-
ically. Dependent on 
US aid and deter-
rence. 
High dependence on 
US aid and deter-
rence. Geographic 
exposure to Soviet 
attack. Shared Border 
with Germany. Hard-
ly any outside op-
tions. 
High dependence on 
US aid and deter-
rence. Geographic 
exposure to Soviet 
attack. Shared Border 
with Germany. Hard-
ly any outside op-
tions. 
High dependence on 
US aid and deter-
rence. Geographic 
exposure to Soviet 
attack. Shared Border 
with Germany. Small 
size implies least 
defensive capabilities. 
Hardly any outside 
options. 
Total dependence on 
US aid and deter-
rence. Direct geo-
graphic exposure to 
Soviet attack. No 
viable outside op-
tions. 
High Bargaining  
Power/ influence 
Medium Bargaining 
power/ Influence 
Medium/ Low  
Bargaining power/ 
Influence 
Medium/ Low  
Bargaining power/ 
Influence 
Low Bargaining  
power/ Influence 
Lowest Bargaining 
power/ Influence 
Demands 
for Exter-
nal Balanc-
ing and 
Centralized 
Institutions 
Low Low/ Medium Medium/ High Medium/ High Medium/ High Highest 
Containing Soviet 
influence on the Eu-
ropean continent. 
Efficiency of utiliza-
tion of resources and 
military organization. 
German resources 
required for deter-
rence. Little threat 
from Germany. 
German resources 
required for deter-
rence. Direct expo-
sure to both Soviet 
and potential German 
threat. 
German resources 
required for deter-
rence. Direct expo-
sure to both Soviet 
and potential German 
threat. 
German resources 
required for deter-
rence. Direct expo-
sure to both Soviet 
and potential German 
threat. 
Occupation statues 
implies lack of any 
armed forces. Direct 
exposure to potential 
Soviet attack. 
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Table 4.2 above summarizes the expected link between material positions and their 
expected institutional demands based on objective material factors: the weaker the 
material and geopolitical position of a country, the higher the expected demands for 
central institutions and balancing within the alliance. Comparing Table 4.2 with the 
bargain described in the first section of this chapter, it is relatively obvious that mate-
rial factors can account for the outcome of the bargain but not for the way it was 
reached. 
In principle, the WEU treaty is easily explicable on the grounds of the material struc-
tures alone. Sufficient deterrence from a potential attack of the Soviet Union on the 
continent was in theory available in the form of American and West European capa-
bilities. For obvious reasons, the US was not inclined to shoulder that burden alone. 
Mobilizing German troops for balancing purposes, however, created a problem of 
particular salience to the continental states as there was little reason to trust the pro-
fessed motivations of German leaders. Placing British and US troops on the continent 
to allay such security fears was insufficient without being accompanied by a credible 
commitment that these troops were there to stay. Mobilizing even limited German 
troops without adequate institutional safeguards was equally insufficient. As long as 
there was no reason to suspect a Soviet attack, there was, accordingly, little reason to 
run the risk of recreating a German army. The Korean War changed this assessment: 
surely, if Stalin had allowed North Korea to attack the US backed regime in South 
Korea, there was at least some reason to suspect similar moves in Europe, at least 
given the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority. Under such conditions, an imme-
diate WEU style outcome would have been perfectly reasonable. As explained in the 
previous section, the treaty provided for both a credible commitment by the UK to 
keep troops on the continent that safeguarded France and the Benelux from a resur-
gence of German ambitions, it contained provisions that limited the weaponry avail-
able to Germany and tied the mobilization and operation directly into NATO com-
mand, and it created an independent agency that could oversee German compliance 
with its provisions. In sum, the outcome of the negotiations does not constitute a 
puzzle at all. 
However, it is unclear why the bargain took the path the EDC Treaty negotiations. 
With regard to the first phase of the negotiations until 1951, it is unclear why France 
and not the weaker Benelux and particularly Germany issued the most intense de-
mands for a European centralized military organizations; with regard to the second 
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phase, it is unclear why the US, Germany, and Italy assented although the transient 
conflict between the larger and the smaller continental powers over issues of institu-
tional control is expected. Finally, it is inexplicable why the ratification failure ema-
nated from France, having insisted on the European Army in the first place. The only 
feasible account for these patterns from an intergovernmental point of view consists 
in an explanation that considers domestic aspects. 
4.2.2 Domestic Politics 
Seeing that the geopolitical material conditions do not add up to a sufficient explana-
tion of the key aspects of the EDC bargain, the present section probes the domestic 
political conditions in the countries negotiating the EDC Treaty. Thus, the present 
section evaluates, first, changes in the governing coalitions of the negotiating states 
to identify the timing of potential new assessments of the ‘national interests’ due to 
governmental changes and coalitional realignments. Second, using qualitative infor-
mation on interest groups positions, this section rules out interest group politics as a 
possible source of shifting positions. Third, using revealed positions of party mani-
festos at the time, this section investigates whether there are consistent differences 
between the European party families on European issues or whether there are nation-
al discrepancies. 
 
Domestic Coalitions between 1950 and 1954 
In order to evaluate the composition of domestic coalitions, Figure 4.4 below pro-
vides a first approximation to the domestic changes occurring the in the negotiating 
European countries between 1950 and 1954 by listing governments according to their 
dominant party family. It plainly illustrates Christian Democratic dominance on the 
continent. Moreover, it gives a first indication that the party compositions of the gov-
ernment coalitions of a number of countries remained stable. Notably Italy, Germa-
ny, and Belgium were dominated by Christian Democratic parties. Belgium saw a 
major change brought about by domestic elections in early 1954 only, after the EDC 
had been ratified. A second major shift occurred in the UK in late 1951, when the 
Conservative Tories won the British elections, giving war time Prime Minister Win-
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ston Churchill a last term in office. None of these shifts are, in terms of their timing, 
associated with major shifts in the bargaining positions of these countries. 
Figure 4.4 Dominant Party Families in the Governments of the Seven, 1949-1954 
 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
ITA 
      GER 
      LUX             
BEL             
NL             
FRA             
UK             
       
 
  Christian Democracy 
   
 
  Conservative 
   
 
  Social Democracy 
   
 
  No Dominance 
         
Note: The graph displays the party family of  the party having the majority of  se ats 
within the governing coalition as well as the leadership of  the government.  ‘No dom i-
nance’ implies that majority of  seats in the governmental coalition and government 
leadership are not held by the same party (Source: Döring and Manow 2011). 
In two countries, the Netherlands and France, government coalitions were never 
dominated by any particular party. In the Dutch case, domestic institutions – ‘verzuil-
ing’ (Lijphart 1975) – implied that governments were necessarily composed of mem-
bers from across the different ‘pillars’ of Dutch society. In the Netherlands, however, 
the governing coalition remained stable, with the Christian Democratic KVP sharing 
government with the Christian Democrats as the two strongest governing parties 
throughout the period. In the case of France, governmental instability was the norm 
in the French Fourth Republic. French politics throughout the period is a veritable 
case of ‘cycling’ in which the institutional structure fails to stabilize against voting 
cycles and to induce roughly predictable politics (Browne and Hamm 1996). 
Hence, there is a discrepancy in terms of political stability of governments and their 
composition between France and the remaining negotiating countries. Table 4.3 be-
low displays the composition of the Cabinets in the five European states negotiating 
the EDC between 1950 and 1954. In terms of the Cabinet leadership – not consider-
ing smaller coalition parties or parties on whose votes government majorities had to 
rely on – there are no additional notable changes beyond the ones just mentioned. 
Again, there are only two cases in which government leadership changed: the UK in 
late 1951 and Belgium in early 1954. In the British case, new government leadership 
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did not produce reappraisals of the ‘national interest’, as the first section of this chap-
ter already indicated: the UK government did not begin to contemplate joining the 
EDC or committing troops to the EDC in 1951. In the Belgian case, the Belgian gov-
ernment had negotiated and signed the treaty by 1952, lobbied for the inclusion of 
Common Market provisions in the EPC in 1953 and ratified the EDC Treaty before 
the new government was sworn in early 1954. 
Table 4.3 Cabinet Composition of European Governments, 1949 - 1954 
BEL Cabinet Name Parties 
  
GER Cabinet Name Parties 
   
1949 Eyskens I PSC-CVP LP-PL 
 
1949 Adenauer I CDU CSU DP FDP 
 
1950 Duvieusart I PSC-CVP 
  
1950 Adenauer I CDU CSU DP FDP 
 
 
Pholien I PSC-CVP 
  
1951 Adenauer I CDU CSU DP FDP 
 
1951 Pholien I PSC-CVP 
  
1952 Adenauer I CDU CSU DP FDP 
 
1952 Houtte I PSC-CVP 
  
1953 Adenauer I CDU CSU DP FDP 
 
1953 Houtte I PSC-CVP 
   
Adenauer II CDU CSU DP FDP GB/BHE 
1954 Houtte I PSC-CVP 
  
1954 Adenauer II CDU CSU DP FDP GB/BHE 
1954 Acker IV BSP-PSB LP-PL 
        LUX   
  
ITA   
   
1949 Dupong IV CSV DP 
 
1949 De Gasperi V DC PLI PRI PSDI 
 
1950 Dupong IV CSV DP 
 
1950 De Gasperi VI DC PRI PSDI 
  
1951 Dupong IV CSV DP 
 
1951 De Gasperi VI DC PRI PSDI 
  
 
Dupong V CSV LSAP 
  
De Gasperi VII DC PRI 
   
1952 Dupong V CSV LSAP 
 
1952 De Gasperi VII DC PRI 
   
1953 Dupong V CSV LSAP 
 
1953 De Gasperi VII DC PRI 
   
 
Bech I CSV LSAP 
  
De Gasperi VIII DC 
    
1954 Bech I CSV LSAP 
  
Pella DC MIS 
   
 
Bech II CSV LSAP 
 
1954 Fanfani I DC MIS 
   
      
Scelba DC PLI PSDI 
  UK   
  
NDL    
  
1949 Attlee I Labour 
  
1949 Drees I KVP PvdA* CHU VVD 
 
1950 Attlee II Labour 
  
1950 Drees I KVP PvdA* CHU VVD 
 
1951 Attlee II Labour 
  
1951 Drees I KVP PvdA* CHU VVD 
 
 
Churchill III Conservatives 
  
Drees II KVP PvdA* CHU VVD 
 
1952 Churchill III Conservatives 
 
1952 Drees II KVP PvdA* CHU VVD 
 
1953 Churchill III Conservatives 
  
Drees III PvdA KVP CHU ARP 
 
1954 Churchill III Conservatives 
 
1953 Drees III PvdA KVP CHU ARP 
 
     
1954 Drees III PvdA KVP CHU ARP 
       
Note: The table displays Party Composition of  governmental coalitions.  Parties are 
displayed according their share of the vote. In a ll cases except the Netherlands, the 
largest share would imply governmental leadership.  In the case of  the Netherlands, 
leadership was retained by the PvdA by agreement.  Thus,  formal Cabinet leadership 
in the Dutch case is marked by an * (Source: Döring and Manow 2011). 
Chapter 4 The EDC Bargain: Explanandum and Intergovernmentalist first cut 
151 
 
There are more subtle shifts in the composition of these governments. The two most 
important to be noted concern the Netherlands and Italy. It was mentioned above in 
section 4.1.3 that the Dutch government initiated the call for the inclusion of the 
Beyen Plan in 1952: this development coincides with a new composition of the 
Dutch government in 1952: as the KVP switched its coalition partner, (the VVD for 
the ARP,) a new Foreign Minister (Beyen) was appointed who was, however, not 
affiliated to any party. In Italy, there are two noteworthy shifts. In 1951, there was a 
coalitional realignment by which the moderate Socialist PSDI left government. In 
1953, long-term Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi left office in 1953 and was re-
placed first by Giuseppe Pella, followed by Amintore Fanfani, followed by Mario 
Scelba. Moreover, these cabinets, as already argued, relied on votes from the proto-
fascist party MSI for their majority in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. 
In comparison, the leadership of French governments changed frequently and more 
drastically, as Table 4.4 below illustrates. 
Table 4.4 Cabinet Composition in France, 1949 - 1954 
FRA Cabinet Name Parties 
    
1949 Bidault II MRP* SFIO PRL 
  1950 Bidault II MRP* SFIO PRL PRR/RS UDSR 
 
Queuille III MRP* PRL PRR/RS* UDSR 
 
 
Pleven I MRP* SFIO PRL UDSR* 
 1951 Pleven I MRP* SFIO PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP 
 
Queuille IV MRP* SFIO PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP 
 
Pleven II MRP PRR/RS UDSR* CNIP 
 1952 Faure I MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP 
 1952 Pinay MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP* 
 1953 Mayer MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP 
 
 
Laniel MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP* 
 1954 Laniel MRP PRR/RS UDSR CNIP* 
 
 
Mendès France MRP PRR/RS* UDSR CNIP RPF 
      
Note: The table displays the party composition of French governmental coalitions 
between 1949 and 1954. Parties are displayed according their share of  the vote.  Due 
to frequently shifting bargains between different factions of  French parties,  gover n-
mental leadership rarely coincided with the strength of  the respective party.  Thus,  
governmental leadership is marked by an * as well (Source: Döring and Manow 
2011). 
Throughout the years under consideration, French cabinets switched leadership about 
two times per year, although the party composition of the governing coalitions was 
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more stable. Additionally, there is a basic shift in the composition of French govern-
ments: the last Cabinet supported by the Socialist SFIO went out of office in 1951. 
The break- up of the so-called ‘third force’ coalition of Christian Democrats (MRP), 
Socialists (SFIO), and Liberals (PRR/RS) has been argued to have constituted a ma-
jor domestic realignment that proved fatal for the fate of the EDC as the attitudes of 
subsequent governments were increasingly ‘anti-EDC’ (Parsons 2003, 74). As al-
ready mentioned, the leadership of subsequent governments changed with similar 
frequency, but their composition was largely stable, comprising the Christian Demo-
cratic MRP, the largely liberal Radicals, the centrist UDSR, and the conservative 
CNIP with government leadership changing intermittently between the latter three 
parties. The last government, ‘responsible’ for the rejection of the EDC Treaty under 
Mendès, then included, for the first time, Gaullist ministers from the RPF. 
In short, there are a number of domestic shifts that give rise to the possibility of pref-
erence changes due to domestic realignments. There is a clear-cut shift in the UK in 
1951 from left to right. There is a clear-cut left right shift in Belgium in early 1954, 
as well as minor shifts in the composition of the domestic government in the Nether-
lands in 1952, and in Italy in 1951 and Italy 1953. However, none of these shifts co-
incide, in terms of their timing, with the major changes in the conflict constellation 
of the EDC bargain in 1951.  
In the case of France, the picture is obviously rather complex. The asymmetry of 
governmental instability in France versus relative stability in the remaining negotiat-
ing countries makes it clear that the main source of strategic uncertainty in terms of 
the ratification constraint were clearly the vagaries of available French majorities. 
Additionally, it provides a possible ‘liberal explanation’ of French influence over the 
negotiations by recourse to the ‘Schelling conjecture’. 
 
Domestic Sources of Preference Shifts: Interest Group Influence or Party Ideolo-
gy? 
There are three potential sources by which changing compositions of governing coa-
litions can result in shifting state preferences. First, party ideology, as argued in 
chapter two, may affect the subjective assessments of the causal implications of spe-
cific institutions and preferred foreign policy objectives between parties; second, 
different susceptibility of parties to interest group influence may affect their stance 
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towards international institutions; third, as Hoffman has emphasized, there may have 
been differences in the degrees to which nationalist values dominated the preference 
formation processes in the countries under consideration. 
Take the question of interest group influence first. Assessing the degree of interest 
group influence in the context of the EDC implies, at a first approximation, to assess 
the incentives for domestic producers of weaponry and equipment of national armies 
resulting from the EDC Treaty. Just as interest group pressure may induce govern-
ments to seek or block arrangements for the liberalization of trade and the construc-
tion and regulation of common markets, industries producing arms and weapons may 
have pushed or sought to prevent the EDC for fear of losing potential contracts with 
their own national ministries. In principle, national producers of arms and weapons 
compete domestically for governmental contracts. The EDC Treaty would have 
changed that environment as the treaty stipulated that contracts for procurement of 
weapons, standardization, supplies, and infrastructures, and programs for research 
and development for the European Army were issued by the Council with a two-
thirds majority prepared under a two-thirds approval of the Commission (Art. 102 
and 106, EDC Treaty). As a result, European producers of arms and weaponry were 
potentially affected by the EDC. 
However, the incentives for interest group lobbying from the armament industry in 
post-war Europe, especially for the continental countries, are much more ambiguous 
than in the case of treaty negotiations involving economic liberalization, the creation 
of a common market for coal and steel, or the liberalization of agriculture (Green 
Pool), cases in which strong lobbying efforts with varying success are well docu-
mented (Gillingham 1991; Thiemeyer 1999). The first reason stems from the peculi-
arity of the situation in post-war Europe: defense spending was highly dependent on 
flows of US aid (Wall 1991; Killick 1997). There was a clear distributional conflict 
within the Alliance that showed itself in the simultaneous negotiations over the 
amount of defense spending in the European countries involved. As the continental 
countries in particular were still involved in expansive reconstruction efforts, defense 
spending was increased only slightly and caused constant irritation for American 
officials who perceived European states to be overtly relying on US deterrence. The 
first years of NATO – and indeed the EDC – were marked by recurrent conflicts that 
the European Allies were not nearly spending enough of their budgets on defense 
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although European Defense spending peaked in the early 1950’s (Kaplan 1994, 22; 
Judt 2005, 151, 152). 
Moreover, the only countries in Europe that still contained globally significant arms 
production independent from the US immediately after the Second World War were 
the UK and Sweden (Moravcsik 1991, 33). Traditionally powerful industries produc-
ing arms and weapons were in France, Germany, and to a much lesser extend Italy 
and the Benelux – but these countries had been ravaged by the war. Combined with 
their dependence on US aid, they were utterly dependent on American resources in 
order even to begin domestic production: for example, the US purchased the entire 
first post-war production series of French Dassault airplanes for the French army 
(Kolodziej 1987, 40 - 49). In other cases, US or British models were obtained by 
European countries (Buzan and Herring 1998, 40, 41). In short, European producers 
were more dependent on US decisions than on the availability of procurement con-
tracts given out by their national governments. 
Moreover, the incentives resulting from a possible EDC Treaty were not uniform for 
national industries, to the extent that they existed. For the German industry - given 
that Germany had lost the war, was formally under occupation and subject to tight 
production constraints for the basic materials for weapons construction – any agree-
ment that promised US aid and the permission to begin production anew had to be 
first priority, rather than lobbying for specific institutional solutions (Schwengler 
1997). The support of industrial representatives for the ‘Wiederbewaffnung’ was of 
higher significance for the domestic debate, than for the question of whether a na-
tional or European Army would exist (Ibid.). 
In the French case, the EDC procurement system was hotly debated. Especially the 
French aircraft industry actively lobbied for a common procurement system: with the 
EDC offering strong restrictions on German production, those producers specializing 
in weaponry Germany would not be allowed to produce actively lobbied for the 
EDC. The eventual problem was that the EDC Treaty included a rule according to 
which each country was to receive arms orders of no less than 85 % and no more 
than 115 % of its contribution to the EDC (Ibid., 58). The result, coupled with the 
restraint on German rearmament, was the agreement that the German contribution 
was to focus on light equipment. Thus heavy French industry was generally support-
ive of the Plan whereas the staunchest and most outspoken critics were French light 
producers who expected to lose in competition with German or other counterparts 
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(Elgey 1993b, 361; Parsons 2003, 76; Pitman 2000, 85). Opponents of the EDC 
largely came from those sectors (i.e. clothing, logistics) which the Germans were 
allowed to have. Thus, the French industry was divided (Pitman 2000). For the dura-
tion of the negotiations, there is little evidence that any significant influence was 
exerted as Étienne Hirsch, member of the French delegation and presiding over the 
commission of armaments negotiating the issues most sensitive to industry attested 
to.
54
 
In sum, a decisive role of interest groups, or shifting interest group influence con-
nected to shifting conflict constellations, is implausible. 
The alternative factor influencing party preferences is party ideology. As pointed out 
in chapter 2, the factors that cause different party positions on institutions may stem 
from ideological differences related to subjective views of the world. Hypothetically, 
the most pertinent issues for the present purposes are differences related to Hoff-
man’s argument about nationalist values and nationalism as well as differences on 
the left-right spectrum (chapter 3, section 3.1.1). The data available from the Com-
parative Manifesto Project provide the basis for a first approximation of the issue 
across the countries negotiating the EDC Treaty (Budge, et al. 2001). The CMP cod-
ing scheme contains two additional items that are relevant in this context: besides the 
left-right score and positive versus negative positions about the national way of life, 
the dataset contains two items: international peace, and Europe (see previous chapter, 
section 3.3.1). 
In order to gain a first approximation, Figure 4.5 draws on electoral commitments in 
party programs between 1950 and 1954 to evaluate the relationship between party 
positions on the left-right scale and the ‘International Peace’ score in the Compara-
tive Manifesto project, introduced in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
54
 Excerpt from an interview with François Duchêne in 1987, “François Duchêne: J'ai lu dans les 
archives américaines un rapport de l'ambassade de Paris je crois que c'était signe Bruce - ça ne veut 
pas dire que c'était lui, c'était peut-être Tomlinson - ou il est dit que les industries des armements fran-
çaises ont eu une influence très importante dans l'échec de la CED. Est-ce que vous en avez eu des 
échos vous-même? Étienne Hirsch: Moi, je n'en ai eu aucun écho. François Duchêne: Vous avez 
fait la négociation sans eux? Étienne Hirsch: […] Non, mais il s'agissait qu’i1 y ait un Etat, et qu'il y 
ait une libre concurrence entre les fabricants d'armements dans l'ensemble de la Communauté. Donc, 
il fallait trouver des règles analogues à celles du marché commun, pour que la concurrence soit à 
armes égales. C'est ça qu'on a du construire. François Duchêne: Il n'y a pas eu un lobby formidable 
contre cette construction? Étienne Hirsch: Absolument pas.” (Hirsch 1987). 
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Figure 4.5 Aggregate Relationship between Party Commitments for International Peace and 
Left-Right Dimension, Western Europe 1949-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the positions of  party manifestos towards international 
peace and their position on a lift -right dimension as published in West European ele c-
tions between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categ o-
ries in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter,  section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 
2001) 
It displays that there may have been a systematic link between party positions on the 
left-right scale and their ideological beliefs that are relevant for foreign policy choic-
es. According to this figure, the more a party was positioned on the left side of the 
spectrum, the stronger it expressed sentiments for international cooperation, interna-
tional institutions, and peaceful cooperation as opposed to an emphasis on national 
foreign policy (𝑟(𝜏𝐵):  0,39, 𝑝(𝑧): 0,001). The extreme cases with very high val-
ues for International Peace on the left are uniformly composed of Communist parties 
from Italy, Luxembourg, and France. Moreover, this relationship holds, to varying 
degrees across the states negotiating the EDC Treaty.  
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Figure 4.6 Relationship between Party Commitments for International Peace and Left-Right  
Dimension in Individual Countries, 1949-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the positions of  party manifestos towards international 
peace and their position of  a lef t -right scale as published in West European elections 
between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in 
the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001 ) 
In this sense, it appears that conflicts on Foreign policy issues and international co-
operation should have been structured in particular between parties on the left and 
parties on the right. Thus, government changes across the left-right spectrum may 
have contributed to shifting government preferences. In particular the fact that com-
munist parties seem to express the most extreme preferences for international coop-
eration suggests that the issue of international cooperation was heavily influenced by 
Cold-War related ideological conflicts.  
However, Figure 4.7 below contrasts this finding by drawing on a ‘Europe’ score 
composed of positive mentions of European institutions minus negative mentions the 
CMP data set. Europe Score’ reconstructed from the two ‘Europe items’ in the Com-
parative Manifesto project as described in the previous chapter.  
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Figure 4.7 Aggregate Relationship between Party Commitments for Europe and Left-Right  
Dimension, Western Europe, 1949-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the positions of  party manifestos towards European integra-
tion and their positions on a lef t -right dimension as published in West European ele c-
tions between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categ o-
ries in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter,  section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 
2001) 
A simple glance at the scatter-plot below reveals that there is no relationship between 
party positions on the left-right scale and their expressed sentiments for ‘Europe’ in 
their respective party manifestos (𝑟(𝜏𝐵) :  0,01, 𝑝(𝑧): 0,89). Parties that do express 
positive attitudes about European integration can be found on both sides of the left-
right spectrum. Negative mentions of European issues are virtually absent. Moreover, 
there is a relatively high number of parties, on both sides of the political spectrum, 
who express no position whatsoever on Europe. This may be due to problems with 
the data set itself: the varying lengths of party manifestos implies a high variance of 
existent or absent sentences about low salience issues and thus a large number of 
values of zero when in fact there was a position (Hans and Hönnige 2008). Alterna-
tively, research on party position taking suggests that the absence of positions about 
an issue may suggest either irrelevance (lack of salience) or the existence of internal 
conflicts (Parsons and Weber 2011). 
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This relationship, however, is not consistent across countries (see Figure 4.8). Alt-
hough there are too few data points to draw definitive conclusions per country, it is 
clear that the tendency is highly disparate. Parties left of the political spectrum tend 
to express more positive sentiments towards Europe in Belgium and to a lesser ex-
tend in France, while in the UK the relationship is the opposite. In Italy and Germany 
there does not seem to be any relationship whatsoever, while in the Netherlands, the 
tendency is somewhat similar as in the UK. Given this inconsistence, it seems that 
the issue of Europe was highly country-specific, requiring a more detailed examina-
tion of domestic politics as well as intra-party conflict.  
Figure 4.8 Relationship between Party Commitments for Europe and Left-Right Dimension in  
Individual Countries, 1949-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the positions of  party manifestos towards Europe and their 
positions on a left-right dimension as published in West European elections between 
1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP 
Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al.  2001 ) 
What is the relationship between expressed positions for or against Europe and ex-
pressed nationalist values? According to Hoffman’s analysis as described above, 
there are two possible observable implications. First, more positive expressions to-
wards the ‘national way of life’ should imply more negative sentiments towards Eu-
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rope. Second, there should be discernible differences between countries. As Figure 
4.9 indicates, this was certainly not the case either (𝑟(𝜏𝐵):  0,04, 𝑝(𝑧): 0,66). 
Figure 4.9 Aggregate Relationship between Party Commitments for the Nation and Party  
Commitments for Europe, Western Europe, 1949-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards nationalism and 
European integration as published in West European elections between 1949 and 
1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding 
scheme (See previous chapter, sec tion 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001) 
The remarkable feature of Figure 4.9 is that, in the upper right quadrant, there are a 
number of parties who express positive attitudes towards Europe, and, at the same 
time, positive attitudes towards the ‘national way of life’. The relative lack of a de-
finitively identifiable relationship between nationalist position and positions about 
Europe largely holds across the negotiating countries, with the exception of Italy. 
Thus, in the case of Italy, the relationship is as expected, but, again, largely diluted 
by the absence of positions on Europe for a number of parties. In the Netherlands, 
there is an obvious extreme case, namely the Christian Democratic KVP, displaying 
very high values on the nationalist item (2,3) and scoring among the highest on the 
European issue as well (3,5). In Italy, the Liberal PRI and the PLI are the only parties 
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mentioning Europe positively, the communists negatively, and the remaining parties 
(including the Christian Democratic DC) do not voice any position.  
Figure 4.10 Relationship between Party Commitments for the Nation and Party Commitments 
for Europe in Individual Countries, 1949-1954 
 
Note: the graph displays the positions of party manifestos towards nationalism and 
European integration as published in West European elections between 1949 and 
1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP Coding 
scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al. 2001 ) 
The argument put forth by Hoffman entails another observation, namely that the two 
countries that lost the war display low nationalist values and associated high prefer-
ences for European integration. Consequently, the winners of the war should display 
higher nationalist values and consequently lower preferences for European integra-
tion. In order to ascertain whether this argument leads in the right direction, Figure 
4.11 below presents boxplots of the party scores on nationalism and on Europe per 
country. According to these data, Hoffman’s thesis of a direct connection between 
geopolitical position, war experience, and the significance of nationalist values in the 
political space of a particular country appears dubious.  
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Figure 4.11 Cross-National Comparison of Nationalist and European Party Commitments as  
Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots) 
Note: the graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards natio n-
alism and European integration as published in West European elections between 
1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP 
Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al.  20 01) 
In the case of Germany, the reasoning seems correct. Sharing the lowest median val-
ue of party scores on nationalism, Germany has the highest median value on Europe 
as well as the highest scores in the upper quartile of the distribution. For Italy, how-
ever, this reasoning is suspect. Sharing a low median and a low upper quartile for 
nationalist values, Italian parties are virtually silent on the European issue, indicating 
either low salience of the European issue or internal party divisions leading to party 
leadership ‘muffling’ the issue. The values of French parties seem in line with Hoff-
man’s argument, displaying the highest median for nationalist values and sharing the 
lowest median for pro-European party positions. It is odd however, that the median 
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value for positive mentions of Europe is lower than in Great Britain. Again, a possi-
ble explanation may be found in intra party conflicts.  
Thus, a comparison of national party position only partially confirms Hoffman’s ar-
gument about the association of national values and ‘state-preferences’ about Euro-
pean integration. 
One possibility to make sense of these data is to consider the negotiating countries, 
along with the intergovernmental framework, as enclosed states where the peculiarity 
of the national political context and its ideological space produce disparate results as 
just presented. The other possibility is that internal party conflicts conflate these data 
by inflating the number of absent positions. Categorizing party family differences 
equally points to these two possible conclusions. Comparing expressed sentiments 
toward Europe by party family shows little differences with the exception of liberal 
parties having overall more positive expressed positions. 
Figure 4.12 Comparison of Party Commitments toward Europe According to Party Families as 
Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots) 
Note: The graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards Europe 
grouped according to party families as published in West European elections between 
1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categories in the CMP 
Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al.  2001 ) 
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Comparing expressed positions towards the nation equally identifies a single party 
family – conservative parties – as scoring higher than the remaining parties, while 
there appear to be no systematic differences between Social Democrats, Christian 
Democrats, and Liberal parties. 
Figure 4.13 Comparison of Party Commitments toward Europe according to Party Families as  
Expressed in Party Manifestos in European Countries, 1949-1954 (Boxplots) 
Note: The graph displays boxplots of the positions of party manifestos towards Na-
tionalism grouped according to party families as published in West European elec-
tions between 1949 and 1954. Both categories are computed from individual categ o-
ries in the CMP Coding scheme (See previous chapter, section 3.3.1 and Budge, et al.  
2001) 
The conclusion is thus the following: interest group influence as decisive factor 
switching government preferences on the EDC is unlikely; expressed party positions 
about Europe in the early 1950’s are not reducible to party positions on the left-right 
spectrum. Nor is there a discernible relationship with expressed positions about na-
tional way of life. Finally, the argument put forth by Hoffman, implying that the war 
experience of a country and its geopolitical position and capabilities after the war had 
a discernible effect on nationalist values as expressed in the party political space and, 
as a result, on party preferences for or against European integration cannot readily be 
corroborated for the party political space of post-war Europe as there is a clear lack 
of an identifiable and consistent relationship between nationalist values and ex-
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pressed party positions on Europe. Two alternative explanations seem equally likely, 
pointing either to irreducible national peculiarities of political discourse or, alterna-
tively, transnational ideological influences cutting across states and parties. 
 
Summary 
This section has provided an intergovernmentalist first cut to explain the shifting 
lines of conflict that characterized the EDC bargain. As a first approximation, it was 
argued that there were meaningful shifts in the distribution of material power that 
would provide an explanation for shifting preferences. Thus, if geopolitical concerns 
mattered, they should be related to subjective assessments of geopolitical threats. 
In terms of explanations focusing on domestic shifts, there are a number of govern-
mental changes throughout the period: some of them could conceivably have been 
associated with changes in the conflict constellation in 1952 and 1953, none of them 
capture the 1951 shift towards the EDC track. In addition, there is little indication of 
plausible interest group influence. Moreover, an examination of party ideologies 
finds no discernible relationship between party left-right ideologies and the issue of 
European integration in the early 1950’s nor is there a discernible relationship be-
tween party positions on Europe and party positions on the preservation of a national 
way of life. Thus, the analysis of the party positions leaves only two possible inter-
pretations: either domestic shifts were associated with intricate domestic differences 
not captured by party ideology or national consciousness –pointing to a possibly in-
tergovernmental explanation – or intra-party conflicts, due to a transnational conflict 
over Europe cutting across states and party families that preempted consistent posi-
tions of parties from the left and the right on European issues. The last finding thus 
sets the stage for evaluating the transnational networks in the subsequent chapters. 
4.3 Conclusion: Implications of an Intergovernmental Explanation 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, it has identified the explanandum of 
this dissertation by reconstructing the EDC bargain in terms of a ‘negotiation dance’ 
with a particular focus on the institutional positions taken by the negotiating gov-
ernments. This reconstruction yielded a characterization of the bargaining process as 
consisting of four stages. In the first period between 1950 and 1951, all countries 
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except France accepted the idea in principle that Germany was to enter NATO, under 
restrictions to be negotiated. The French government objected and instead insisted on 
a supranational army, i.e. a level of hierarchical centralization resembling a ‘national 
army’. In order to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations, a temporary compro-
mise was reached, lasting until mid-1951. Until that time, all governments except the 
French cabinet, pushed for a solution of relatively low centralization – envisioning 
only low and limited degrees of pooling and delegation – whereas the French pro-
posal, although asymmetrical in nature, advocated the opposite: a high level of cen-
tralization in the form of a European Minister of Defense, whereas the remaining 
dimensions of institutional design where still left vague. 
In the second period between 1951 up to the signing of the treaty in 1952, Germany, 
Italy, and the US adopted the French point of view of preferring a supranational – 
centralized – army in response to two concessions by the French government that 
accepted the principal of institutional equality and raised the level of nationally ho-
mogenous units above thresholds deemed necessary to ensure the military functional-
ity of the army by some military experts. As a result, negotiations concentrated on a 
supranational alternative and a new conflict constellation emerged: the three larger 
continental governments, backed by the US, sought much higher levels of centraliza-
tion and particularly representation than Belgium and the Netherlands whereas the 
UK refused to consider even limited direct involvement in the organization. The ne-
gotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty were thus characterized by a pro-
longed conflict over institutional design issues. The eventual compromise, produced 
under significant US pressure, resulted in the EDC Treaty. Upon requests by the 
three bigger states it contained the controversial Article 38 that required the signing 
states to task the parliament with proposing a complete political ‘superstructure’ that 
would review and complete the ‘final’ design of the organization. In sum, the period 
leading up to the EDC Treaty had been characterized by differences between the 
smaller and the larger countries on virtually all institutional dimensions.  
Once the treaty had been signed, views of governments that were closely aligned 
during the negotiation phase drifted apart over the main issues debated during the 
ratification period, except one aspect, namely the British troop commitment. In fact, 
the only issue on which the signing states agreed was the demand for British or 
American troops to be credibly and permanently stationed on the continent. Neither 
the UK nor the US were to grant this wish. Instead, the ratification conflicts among 
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the signatories were associated with a shift in the positions of their governments. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany ratified the treaty, whereas Italy and France, 
amid mounting domestic resistance, did not. Not being able to secure a ‘balancing’ 
troop commitment to the EDC by the UK or the US, efforts to secure ratification and 
appease domestic resistance focused on the federalist Article 38, leading to the con-
vocation of an Ad Hoc Assembly that produced a Draft Treaty for a European Politi-
cal Community which, in terms of its level of centralization and representation, went 
far beyond the initial EDC Treaty. The Belgian and the Dutch governments insisted 
on the inclusion of provisions of a Common Market, a proposition that was utterly 
rejected by the French government(s). The latter delayed ratification of the treaty, 
seeking to renegotiate its terms by securing, inter alia, additional unilateral rights to 
withdraw its troops from the EDC. The coalition of the big three continental gov-
ernments had dissolved.  
The final period in which the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Assemblée Na-
tionale resolved the seemingly intricate problem of German rearmament relatively 
quickly. Remarkably, the terms of the WEU Treaty, negotiated within a couple of 
months at a conference in London, resembled the initial package deal in so far as the 
main substantial provision of the US offer of 1950 – German entry into NATO under 
terms of limited sovereignty, restrictions of available weaponry and operational au-
tonomy – were taken up. The French government accepted the terms it had vehe-
mently opposed in 1950: instead of German soldiers in European uniforms, there was 
to be a German Army under a German Defense Ministry. Institutionally, the WEU 
provided two mechanisms that sealed the deal. First, it added to the NATO inspec-
tion prerogatives an agency that was to oversee German compliance with the terms 
of the treaty. Second, although decisions were on the whole made by unanimity, the 
WEU Council provided a means for the UK to credibly commit a limited amount of 
troops on the continent. Both solutions solved the bargaining gridlock. Simple as 
they were, these solutions seem to have eluded the negotiators for about four years. 
On the other hand, the dismay over the WEU solutions voiced by figures such as 
Adenauer, Spaak indicates that a number of key individuals would, nevertheless, 
have preferred even a weak EDC solution to the one which actually transpired. 
In order to grasp this course of the bargain, this chapter then turned to intergovern-
mentalist explanations to provide an explanatory first cut by examining the geopoliti-
cal incentives, domestic shifts and party positions in the negotiating countries over 
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time. As a first approximation, it was argued that there were not meaningful shifts in 
the distribution of material power that would provide an explanation for shifting 
preferences. Thus, if geopolitical concerns mattered, they should be related to subjec-
tive assessments of geopolitical threats. 
In terms of explanations focusing on domestic shifts, there are a number of govern-
mental changes throughout the period: some of them could conceivably have been 
associated with changes in the conflict constellation in 1952 and 1953, none of them 
capture the 1951 shift towards the EDC track. In addition, there is little indication of 
plausible interest group influence. Moreover, an examination of party ideologies 
finds no discernible relationship between party left-right ideologies and the issue of 
European integration in the early 1950’s nor is there a discernible, consistent rela-
tionship between party positions on Europe and party positions on the preservation of 
a national way of life. Thus, the analysis of the party positions leaves only two possi-
ble interpretations: either domestic shifts were associated with intricate domestic 
differences not captured by party ideology or national consciousness – pointing to a 
possibly intergovernmental explanation, or intra-party conflicts, due to a transnation-
al conflict over Europe cutting across states and party families that preempted con-
sistent positions of parties from the left and the right on European issues. The last 
finding thus sets the stage for evaluating the transnational networks in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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5. Transnational Networks in Post-War Europe I:  
A Structural Assessment 
The task of this chapter is to present, describe, and analyze the affiliation data behind 
the organized transnational networks in post-war Europe up until 1950. Hence, this 
chapter primarily informs the preconditions for the ‘transnational hypotheses’ pre-
sented in chapter 2. The information thus gained will be important for the subsequent 
steps of the argument. 
The purpose of the first section (5.1) is to evaluate the composition of the sampled 
network and to identify influential actors within the network to establish its ‘transna-
tional character’. According to the reasoning put forth in chapter 2, the most central 
individuals presumably had a high standing or reputation and thus significant poten-
tial ‘political capital’ from contacts in the transnational network and served as key 
brokers of influence of transnational ideas. Moreover, this section shows that there 
are little differences between individuals’ centrality values when grouped according 
to their party family or country, the main exception being Italian actors. Finally, it is 
demonstrated there are very little differences in the centrality values of actors 
grouped by their party families, with the exception of conservative actors, who ap-
pear to be less well integrated into the transnational network. Both observations 
demonstrate the genuine ‘transnational’ character of the network, spanning across 
states and party families. 
In addition, the argument advanced throughout the thesis presupposes a degree of 
transnational ideological conflict that is a suitable basis for transnational coalition 
building. As already mentioned, ideological conflict and polarization have been as-
sociated in a wide body of literature with identifiable network structures. Utilizing 
the network data, the second section of this chapter (5.2) thus identifies five clusters 
of ‘actor communities’ constituted by their patterns of overlapping membership in 
eight transnational organizations. Combined with a visual analysis of the graphs of 
these clusters, this section produces three results. First, the clusters exhibit, to vary-
ing degrees, signs of internal differentiation. The indications are the most robust for 
Social Democratic actors who fall into two distinct groups. Visual analysis suggests 
that one group, through overlapping affiliations with the federalist organizations, 
contained more radically federalist actors, whereas the second group, assembling 
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party representatives to the Socialist International, comprises two types: actors with 
cross affiliations with the European Movement and actors with affiliations to the 
Socialist International only. Subsequent analyses (chapter 6) will confirm that these 
structural divisions reflect a deep ideological conflict within Social Democracy over 
post-war European institutions across European states. Second, Christian Democracy 
– clustering heavily around genuine Christian Democratic organizations – seems 
more unified, visible through the relatively higher degree of overlapping affiliations 
of Christian Democratic actors with federalist organizations and the European 
Movement. The remaining clusters are composed of actors who have no affiliation 
with party related organizations: a group of actors engaged in the European Move-
ment only, primarily consisting of Conservative and British actors, a group of actors 
with predominant affiliations with the federalist organizations and the European 
Movement, predominantly consisting of Italian actors, and a small group of actors 
engaged in the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), primarily con-
sisting of Dutch, Belgian, and British actors. Although the sampling procedure does 
not allow drawing concrete generalizations, these results may suggest self-selection 
and, as a result, a different strengths dominant ideologies in the countries under con-
sideration. 
The third section (5.3) of this chapter draws on the sampled network data to recon-
struct transgovernmental networks among the European states negotiating the EDC 
between 1950 and 1954. Assuming that the communities so identified contain dis-
tinct dominant ideologies, the results indicate a potential alternative explanation for 
the shifting conflict constellation in the EDC bargain. The embeddedness of the 
French and Italian governments in particular undergoes a significant shift: between 
1950 and 1952, both governments were linked to the transnational Christian Demo-
crats, the Federalists, and the European Movement whereas, from 1953 onwards, 
these attachments vanished, most significantly for the French government in 1954 
that had no longer a single affiliation with any transnational community whatsoever. 
Section 5.4 summarizes the results and concludes by briefly summarizing the impli-
cations for the subsequent chapters. 
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5.1 The Structure of the Transnational Network: Individuals and Centralities 
The purpose of this section is to present the basic properties of the sampled transna-
tional network and to conduct a first analysis of the centrality values of the individu-
als in the network. The first part of this section (5.1.1) establishes that there is an 
‘elite’ of individuals within the transnational network. Both a visual inspection of the 
overall network as well as a comparison with random network of similar size and 
density reveal that there is a notable presence of individuals with disproportionately 
high centrality values. Additionally, this section evaluates two broad patterns within 
the overall network that are of particular interest. First, it is investigated whether 
there are overall differences between actors’ centrality values when grouped accord-
ing to their party family or according to their nationality. Second, it is investigated 
whether there is a tendency for actors sharing a similar party affiliation or nationality 
to connect with similar types of actors, i.e. whether the network exhibits a tendency 
towards homophily among actors from a similar party family or country. The latter 
examination establishes that the network is truly ‘transnational’ across states and, 
indeed, party families. 
The second section (5.1.2) presents the individuals with the highest centrality values, 
adding some information on their biographical backgrounds. The purpose of this 
section is twofold. First, presenting information on the domestic positions and ca-
reers of these actors allows evaluating whether the transnational elite was, at the 
same time, part of the domestic political elite and thus influential in their countries, 
be it by having a seat in their respective domestic parliaments or by leading a minis-
try in the respective governments. Second, information on these individuals’ biog-
raphies may provide additional clues as to the intellectual and biographical factors 
that propelled them towards their activities in the transnational sphere. A conclusion 
(5.1.3) summarizes the findings of this section briefly. 
5.1.1 A First Look at the Overall Network 
As explained in the previous chapter, the sampling procedure followed several steps. 
The basic dataset comprising individuals from all institutions data consisted of a bi-
partite network of the sampled 1209 individuals and their affiliations with the eight 
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sampled transnational organizations.
55
 Due to the sampling approach, this dataset 
contains a large number of ‘isolates’, that is, individuals having no affiliation with 
one of the eight transnational organizations, only with one or more of the interna-
tional institutions and organizations. Removing these individuals yields a bipartite 
network of 222 individuals with a possible membership in eight organizations, realiz-
ing 355 edges overall. Figure 5.1 presents the composition of the dataset by party 
families and country of origin.  
Figure 5.1 Composition of the Transnational Network 
 
Note: The graph shows the composition of  the network dataset.  The upper row di s-
plays the number of actors assigned to each party family; the lower row the number of 
actors for each country included in the sample.  
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 These organizations, introduced in the previous chapter, are: the Committee of the International 
Socialist Conferences (COMISCO), refounded as Socialist International (SI) in 1951; the Christian 
Democratic Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI); the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle; the 
Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE); the European Parliamentary Union 
(EPU); the European Union of Federalists (UEF); the European League for Economic Cooperation 
(ELEC); and the European Movement. 
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In terms of membership of party families, the two dominant party families in post-
war Europe – Christian Democracy and Social Democracy – are the most prevalent 
within the transnational sphere, whereas, in terms of nationalities, French actors 
dominate. 
In order to gain a first understanding of its structure, Figure 5.2 below displays two 
bipartite graphs of the network. In both cases, the unlabeled nodes represent individ-
uals whereas the eight white labeled nodes represent the eight organizations. A grey 
edge represents an individuals’ membership in the respective organization. If an in-
dividual is a member of a domestic party, the respective colors and shapes indicate 
the respective party family. In the upper figure each node is displayed similar in size. 
The lower figure illustrates individuals ‘centralities’, that is, the measure of how well 
connected an individual is by drawing individuals’ node sizes proportionate to their 
Eigenvector centrality as computed from the projected unipartite network (as dis-
cussed in chapter 3, section 3.2.1). By comparing the two figures, one can see that 
some actors are attached to only one group whereas there are a number of individuals 
– roughly visible as a half-circle in the middle of the graph – possessing multiple 
memberships and thus higher centrality values, thus comprising the transnational 
‘elite’ this section is interested in. 
Figure 5.2 Cross Membership and Centrality in the Transnational Groups 
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Note: The graph displays two bipartite visualizations of  the complete transnational 
network comprising 222 individuals (represented by the shaded nodes with their r e-
spective colors representing actors’ party families) and the eight sampled transn a-
tional organizations (white nodes).  The grey lines represent an individual’s membe r-
ship in the respective organization. The upper f igure displays all nodes with equal 
size.  In the lower f igure,  individuals’ node sizes are proportional to their Eigenvector 
Centrality computed from the projected weighted network.  
Visual inspection of the above figure demonstrates the implications of overlapping 
memberships. There is a ‘half-moon’ shaped group of individuals in the center of the 
graph comprising the most ‘central’ individuals with a disproportionately high num-
ber of ties to the various organizations. 
A projection of the bipartite network to a unipartite network is useful for analysis. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this projection is achieved by using the procedure 
introduced by Newman to obtain a weighted network among the individuals only, 
taking individual memberships in similar organizations as an indicator of the strength 
of a tie between individuals (Newman 2001; Opsahl, et al. 2010). The projection 
results in a very dense network of 222 nodes and 11352 edges, with a mean degree 
(mean number of adjacent edges of each node ) of 102,27 and a graph density of 
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0,46, implying that about half of all possible edges are present in the network 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, 143). 
The first step to identify central individuals is to compute the three centrality indices 
introduced in the previous chapter, namely Degree Centrality, Eigenvector Centrali-
ty, and Betweenness Centrality. As explained in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), the differ-
ent indicators focus on aspects of the notion of network centrality and therefore im-
ply somewhat different interpretations. Figure 5.3 below displays the bivariate corre-
lation of the three indicators. 
Figure 5.3 Relationships between the Centrality Measures 
 
Note: The graph displays pairwise linear correlations between the three cen trality 
measures to illustrate the differences between the three centrality indicators.  
The differences in the correlation between Betweenness Centrality and the remaining 
two centrality indicators are due to the different emphases of the centrality indicators. 
Whereas Degree Centrality is a ‘brute measure’ based on the number of connections 
a node has, Eigenvector centrality takes into account both the number of nodes any 
particular node is connected to as well as their centrality. Betweenness Centrality on 
the other hand emphasizes the ‘bridging position’ of a specific node between differ-
ent sparsely connected clusters of a network thus heavily focuses on the structural 
position of a specific node in the network. Thus, both Degree and Eigenvector Cen-
trality focus more on the number of ties whereas a node with only a few but ‘unusu-
al’ ties will score a high in terms of its Betweenness Centrality but low in terms of its 
Degree Centrality or Eigenvector Centrality. 
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In order to gauge the structure of the network, Figure 5.4 below compares the histo-
grams of the three centrality distributions of the actual one-mode network – shown in 
the second row – with the equivalent centrality distributions of a simulated random 
network of the same size and density as shown in the first row of Figure 5.4 (Erdős 
and Rényi 1959; for more detailed information see Newman 2010, ch. 12). Since 
about half of all possible edges are present in the actual network, the simulation of a 
random network based on this structure amounts to tossing a coin for every possible 
connection between the actors to decide whether an edge exists or not. The centrality 
distributions exhibited by such a random network are markedly different from those 
in the actual network. 
Figure 5.4 Histograms of the Centrality Distributions: Comparison with a Random Network 
 
Note: The graph above compares the distributions of the centrality indicators of 
the sampled network (lower row) with that of  a simulated random ne twork (upper 
row) of  the same size (222 nodes) and density  (0,46).  The comparison shows that, 
whereas the distributions of  all three centrality indicators of  the random network 
in the upper row ref lect an approximately equal shape, the histograms of the sa m-
pled network in the lower row display ‘long - tailed’ distributions that are charac-
teristic of networking processes according to the preferential attachment model, 
thereby giving rise to a small group of  disproportionally well connected actors 
that form the end of the ‘tail’ at the left-hand side of the histogram.  
A comparison to the actual network in the second row shows that the centrality dis-
tributions of the actual network are heavily skewed to the right, depending on the 
respective centrality indicator. In comparison to the random network, the transna-
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tional network clearly exhibits a ‘long’ tail of the distribution – a tendency most 
strongly pronounced for betweenness centrality – that assembles individuals with 
much higher centralities, a fact that is markedly absent in the random network. In 
sum, these individuals thus can be considered disproportionately ‘well connected’ 
and thus presumably making up the influential transnational elite.
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Before the subsequent section takes a closer look at the individual composition of 
these elite, the remainder of this section briefly focuses on its composition in terms 
of individuals’ party family and their nationality in order to assess whether actors of 
a certain nationality or party ideology are disproportionately well connected in the 
overall network. Finding that members of a particular party family have dispropor-
tionately high centrality values would be a first indication that a particular party ide-
ology drives participation in transnational networks more than others. A similar con-
clusion would apply to actors’ nationality: finding that individuals from a particular 
country possess disproportionately higher centrality values than other actors would 
lead to the conclusion that it is the nationality of actors - including the possibility of 
nationally specific ideational circumstances – that drive network activities. Finding 
neither would suggest that the degree of overlapping membership – and thus network 
activity - is driven by factors different from nationality or party family, warranting to 
further investigate the finer structure of the network, the biographies of highly central 
individuals and their particular ideological affiliations that go beyond ideational par-
ty discourses. 
As a first visual approximation, Figure 5.5 below presents boxplots of two centrality 
measures - Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality - ordered by party family 
and nationality. A similar visual display of the values of the Betweenness Centrality 
measure is difficult because of its extremely skewed distribution that was already 
demonstrated in Figure 5.4 above. Beyond a purely visual inspection, it is imperative 
to take into account the probability that merely ‘visible’ differences are produced by 
chance. This is somewhat difficult because of the highly skewed character of the 
distributions: normal parametric comparisons are infeasible and standard non-
parametric alternatives such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are infeasible as well 
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 Note that the histograms show considerable ‘gaps’ that are largely explained by the fact that the 
network was projected from a bipartite network based on only eight organizations; every additional 
membership in an organization in the bipartite network will thus result in a great number of additional 
edges, depending on the number of members. 
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since there are too many equal centrality values between the respective actor groups 
(‘ties’), producing imprecise p-values (Dalgaard 2008, 100). A feasible alternative 
used below is a Bayesian equivalent of the t-test that does not presume any specific 
sampling distribution and seems to be more robust to outliers and many ties 
(Kruschke 2011, ch. 18; 2013). 
Figure 5.5 Centrality Measures by Country and Party Families (Boxplots) 
 
Note: The graph displays boxplots of  the centrality distributions (Degree Centrality 
and Eigenvectors) grouped according to actor’s party family (upper row) and na tion-
ality (lower row).  
The two boxplots in the first row of the above figure compare the composition of 
actors’ centrality values (Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality) according to 
their party affiliations. It appears that differences between the two largest party fami-
lies – Christian Democracy and Social Democracy – are visible but relatively small. 
In fact, the only significant difference between party families – excluding the numer-
ically irrelevant radical Socialist/ Communist actors – is the discrepancy between 
members of Conservative parties on the one hand and members of Liberal, Christian 
Democratic and Social Democratic parties on the other hand. Comparing the latter 
party families in terms of the Degree Centrality measure on the left hand side of Fig-
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ure 5.5, both the median values as well as the interquartile ranges are relatively simi-
lar. In terms of the Eigenvector Centrality measure, the only credible mean differ-
ence between the party groups within the 95% posterior highest density intervals 
(HDI) – and thus unlikely to be produced by chance – is between the Social Demo-
cratic and the Conservative party groups both with regard to Degree Centrality and 
Eigenvector Centrality. The remaining pair-wise comparisons do not return credible 
differences according to this criterion. In sum, there are little differences between 
party families. Conservative actors appear to be less well integrated into the transna-
tional network, whereas the embeddedness of Liberal, Social Democratic, and Chris-
tian Democratic actors is remarkably similar. 
The differences in terms of actors’ nationalities – displayed in the second row - are 
more pronounced. While the median Degree Centrality values – shown on the left 
hand side - are relatively similar, Italian individuals have a much larger interquartile 
range, indicating that individuals from Italy tend to score consistently higher than 
individuals from other countries. This tendency is more pronounced when comparing 
the Eigenvector centrality values, where both the median value as well as the number 
of Italian individuals possessing higher values is much higher than the values of in-
dividuals from the remaining countries.  
Using the same test for credible differences between the centrality values of national 
groups as above reveals a similar picture. Disregarding the numerically irrelevant 
French and German actors from the Saar, a pairwise comparison reveals that Italian 
actors’ Eigenvector Centrality scores are credibly higher than those of any other ac-
tors grouped by their country of origin. Thus, Italian actors are disproportionately 
more ‘central’ and thus, presumably, in a more influential position within the trans-
national network than actors from other countries. Finally, there appears to be a very 
small credible difference between British and French actors, in terms of their Eigen-
vector centrality values. It is remarkable, however, that no other pair wise compari-
sons return credible differences. In sum, the sampled network is largely ‘transnation-
al’. 
Beyond the composition of the network, chapter 2 implied that the formation of 
transnational networks might follow the principle of homophily, that is, actors of 
similar ideological dispositions or interests will be more likely to form connections 
among each other than actors with differing interests or ideological predispositions. 
With regard to actors’ party families or nationalities, such a tendency might be ex-
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pected in our case, especially since the sampled organizations include explicitly party 
family related organizations, such as the Socialist International and the Christian 
Democratic transnational organizations, the NEI and the Geneva Circle. Thus, an 
interesting question is whether there is a tendency in the overall network for individ-
uals of a similar party family or a similar country to be more connected to each other 
than to individuals having a differing party family or nationality. A tendency for ho-
mophily along predominantly national lines would indicate that actors link up with 
actors of a similar nationality because of national similarities in the ideational or oth-
er preference related variables, which would go against the idea that transnational 
networks contribute to cross-national formation of ideologies and trust. In the same 
vein, a tendency for homophily along party families would be a first indication – 
barring the qualitative examination in the subsequent chapter – against a possible 
contention, first advocated by Craig Parsons (Parsons 2002, 2003), that similar ‘ideas 
of Europe’ cut across party lines. 
Answering this question structurally is difficult due to the density of both the bipar-
tite network and its unipartite projection. An additional complication is the fact that 
the latter consists of valued ties.
57
 Several considerations at least indirectly support 
the conclusion that the present network does not exhibit a tendency towards homoph-
ily along party family or nationality lines. A standard measure for homophily is the 
assortativity coefficient (Newman 2010, 223, 224). It can be interpreted similar to 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient: a value of 1 indicates perfect homophily, a negative 
value of 1 indicates that no ties between similar types of actors exist. However, the 
assortativity coefficient is not defined for valued networks. Nevertheless, it can be 
computed by dichotomizing the valued ties between individuals. Computing the co-
efficient for actors’ nationalities in this way returns a negative value of -0,006, sug-
gesting there is little to no tendency for actors enter into relationships with actors 
from the same country. Computing the similar value for party families returns a val-
ue of 0,153, reflecting the fact that there are several genuine transnational party or-
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 An effort was made to use extant methods for simulating bipartite networks to assess the role of 
party family and country of origins for explaining tie formation and deviation from a random realiza-
tion of the network (Admiraal and Handcock 2008). However, due to density of the graph, these esti-
mation techniques become computationally ‘expensive’ to the degree that they are unfeasible: the 
density of the network implies that many ‘possible’ random networks conforming to the size and den-
sity of the actual network. Hence, even simple model specifications did not converge even after long 
computing times, a well-known problem, especially for bipartite graphs to which solutions only for 
small graphs are feasible (Ibid., 2). 
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ganizations in the network. The value is still relatively small, perhaps reflecting the 
fact that dichotomizing valued ties between individuals result in a significant loss of 
information.  
To summarize this section, three observations are noteworthy, some of which suggest 
first and still tentative conclusions with regard to the presence of the preconditions 
for the ‘transnational hypotheses’ advanced in chapter 2. First, the structure of the 
sampled network reveals that there is a well-connected ‘elite’ of actors with dispro-
portionally more cross-affiliations that than most actors in the networks, suggesting 
that there is a clearly identifiable group that, presumably, had disproportional influ-
ence within the transnational sphere. A second observation is that there are some 
small differences between actor groups when comparing their centrality values: 
members of conservative parties seem, overall, less well integrated into the transna-
tional network than their peers from the remaining party families whereas Italians 
are, overall, more central than their peers. The comparison via boxplots of actors’ 
centrality values suggests that there are little other differences between either party 
groups or nationalities. The fact that there are relatively small differences between 
the remaining groups of actors suggest a need to focus on finer substructures within 
the network in order to draw conclusions of possibly different channels of influences 
on processes of domestic demand formation. The structural aspect of that task that 
will be tackled in section 5.2, its qualitative dimension, that is, an analysis of the dif-
fering ideologies of clusters of actors identified in the transnational network, will be 
undertaken in the subsequent chapter.  
A third and final observation is that there does not appear to be tendency of ho-
mophily, that is, assortative tie formation among actors from either a similar party 
family or similar nationality. Connections between actors, at least in the overall net-
work, display a tendency to cut across nationalities and party family lines. In order 
examine the factors that may explain high activities within the transnational sphere, 
the following part of the present section will focus on this issue by taking a closer 
look at the individual biographies of those actors with the highest centrality values, 
i.e. the ‘transnational elite’ of post-war Europe. 
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5.1.2 Central Individuals in the Transnational Network 
The present subsection presents the individuals of the transnational elite identified 
within the complete transnational network, i.e. those individuals comprising the right 
hand ‘tails’ in the histograms of the centrality value distributions shown above (Fig-
ure 5.4 above). A second goal is to examine, by way of comparing information about 
the most central individuals’ biographies, the degree to which there are biographical 
commonalities that may have played a role in their transnational activities. 
This section demonstrates that the most central individuals in the dataset are not only 
well-known figures from the historical literature on the transnational movements but 
also that a large proportion was, at the same time, part and parcel of the political and 
governmental leadership of their respective countries between 1950 and 1954. Sec-
ond, examining these individuals’ biographies, it appears that a majority of these 
actors share similar experiences during the war in the resistance organizations in 
their respective countries. Hence, this section provides independent evidence for 
claims in the historical literature concerning the influential role that the resistance 
movements played in the formation of the post-war European Movements (Lipgens 
1968, 1984a). 
Beginning this examination, Table 5.1 assembles the highest scoring individuals in 
terms of the valued Degree Centrality measure. Recall that, as explained in the previ-
ous chapter, this measure merely adds up the number of valued ties an actor has in 
the network and therefore does not take into account the position of the actor within 
the network. 
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Table 5.1 Degree Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals 
Name Country Party Party Family Degree Output 
von Brentano, Heinrich Germany CDU Christian Democracy 728 
Brugmans, Henri NL PvdA Social Democracy 656 
Spinelli, Altiero Italy DC Christian Democracy 656 
La Malfa, Ugo Italy PRI Liberal 652 
Courtin, René France none None 522 
Adenauer, Konrad Germany CDU Christian Democracy 519 
Bichet, Robert France MRP Christian Democracy 519 
Cingolani, Mario Italy DC Christian Democracy 519 
Sassen, Emmanuel M. J. A. NL KVP Christian Democracy 519 
Serrarens, Petrus J.S. NL KVP Christian Democracy 519 
Teitgen, Pierre-Henri France MRP Christian Democracy 519 
Van Zeeland, Paul Belgium PSC-CVP Christian Democracy 519 
Zijlstra, Jelle NL ARP Christian Democracy 519 
Note: The table displays individuals with the highest valued Degree centrality values 
in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for b iographical infor-
mation.
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 Von Brentano, Heinrich: A practicing Catholic and strong proponent of the ‘Abendländische’ 
conception of Europe (Kroll 2004; see also the next chapter). After the war, he became a Hessian 
delegate to the Bundestag and, from 1949 onwards, became the Fraktionsvorsitzender of the 
CDU/CSU Fraktion in the German Bundestag. A Cofounder of the ‘Parlamentarische Gruppe des 
deutschen Rates der Europabewegung’ in 1949, he would succeed Adenauer as the German Foreign 
Minister in 1955. He participated in the meetings of the Geneva Circle and was a speaker at several 
NEI Congresses. A founding member of the federalist UEF and its German section (“Europa-
Union”), he was a delegate to the ECSC Common Assembly and would chair the influential constitu-
tional committee of the Ad Hoc Assembly that was tasked with the institutional design of the EPC 
Draft Treaty (Griffiths 2000, 73). As an aspiring Foreign Minister, he was an important and trusted 
conduit between Adenauer and the Bundestagsfraktion especially when there was opposition to Aden-
auers’ policies, both foreign and domestic (Kroll 2004). Brugmans, Henri: Imprisoned by the Gesta-
po in 1942 and a member of the Dutch resistance, Brugmans became a founding member of both EPU 
and the UEF and leader of its Dutch section. Brugmans was an active publishing voice for a ‘United 
States of Europe’ for both social and geopolitical reasons (Brugmans 1966). A participant of the Con-
gress at The Hague in 1947, he also became a key founding member of the European Movement, 
participating in its Executive Committee during its foundation (Hick 1990a, 11). In 1950, he became 
the founding rector of the College of Europe in Bruges (See Munzinger Archiv 2015h). Spinelli, Al-
tiero: Leading member of the Italian Resistance, he coauthored with Ernesto Rossi the Ventotene 
Manifesto, the foundational programmatic document of the Italian and European Federalist Move-
ments. A key organizer of the European conference of the European Resistance Movements in Geneva 
1944, he was one of the leading initiators of the federalist UEF, leading its ‘constitutionalist’ wing. A 
Communist in his youth, he broke allegiance with the party during the war and did not become a 
member of another party although he retained close ties to the Socialists. Due to his prominent posi-
tion in the resistance and his radical federalist positions, he developed a strong reputation in the trans-
national scene after the war, spearheaded the European organization of the UEF at meetings in France 
shortly after the war, lead the Italian section of the UEF, and took part in meetings of the MSEUE, 
and European Movement. His close connection to De Gasperi and his reputation led to him playing a 
key role in influencing Italian positions, especially the inclusion of the federalist Art. 38 in the EDC 
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Treaty (Palayret 2008). La Malfa, Ugo: Founding member of the resistance organization “Partito 
d'Azione” in 1941, he returned to Italy from Swiss exile after the end of the war, joined the Italian 
Republican Party (PRI) and entered the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He participated immediately in 
Alcide De Gasperi’s cabinets, first as Minister of Transport, then as Minister for Foreign Trade until 
1953. A high profile figure in Italy, he would, after a short tenure as Italian Foreign Minister, head on 
to become long-term Minister of Industry and Commerce and played a leading role in the negotiation 
of the Treaties of Rome. He participated in the meetings of the federalist UEF, the Italian section of 
the EUP as well as the ELEC. He was a member of the Italian Council of the European Movement 
(CIME) and a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1949 to 1953 
(Munzinger Archiv 2015i). Courtin, René: Member of the French resistance who joined ‘Combat’ in 
1942 (Belot 2003, 250). He became a Professor of Law in Paris and the founding editor of Le Monde. 
Courtin was an early advocate of a small European Union on geopolitical grounds (Courtin 1949). He 
participated in congresses of both the NEI and UEF, where he would be in the midst of the emerging 
conflicts between British Unionists and Federalists in the European Movement (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 420). An influential figure in France with close contacts to French conservatives and Christian 
Democrats (such as Teitgen and Menthon), he was the long term president of the French section of the 
European Movement (Courtin 1964). Adenauer, Konrad: The German chancellor was a regular at the 
annual NEI meetings in the early 1950’s and participated in the first clandestine meetings of the Ge-
neva Circle until October 1948 (Kaiser 2007, 211). Having taken part at the Congress at The Hague, 
he was a founding member of the “Deutscher Rat der Europäischen Bewegung”, the German section 
of the European Movement (Schwarz 1982, 558, 560).  Bichet, Robert: Secretary General of the 
French Christian Democrats (MRP) from 1949 onwards and long-term member of the Assemblée 
Nationale. He was a founding member and long-term head of the executive of the NEI (Kaiser 2007, 
202). A regular participant at the Geneva Circle meetings, he was a founding member of the Executive 
Bureau of the European Movement and, additionally, a member of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (Hick 1990b). Cingolani, Mario: A prominent Italian Christian Democrat, a close 
associate of De Gasperi, and long standing member of the Italian Senate. He had a short stint as Italian 
Minister of Defense in 1947 under De Gasperi and as Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce (Minister Guiseppe Spataro) from 1951 to 1953 during De Gasperi’s tenure. He was a 
regular at meetings of the Geneva Circle and the NEI, a founding member of the Italian Section of the 
European Movement, a member of the Italian Delegation to the ECSC assembly and EPC Ad Hoc 
Assembly (Christian Democratic Group) as well as a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (See < http://www.degasperi.net/scheda_fonti.php?id_obj=4070 > (Last accessed 
02-03-2014) as well as < http://www.senato.it/leg/01/BGT/Schede/Attsen/00009245.htm > (Last ac-
cessed 02-03-2014). Sassen, Emmanuel M. J. A.: Member of the catholic precursor of the post-war 
KVP– the Roman-Catholic State Party – before the war, during the war he had contacts with and 
wrote for the Nederlandse Uni, an organization forbidden by the Nazis in 1941, that continued ‘ille-
gal’ publishing and organizational activities (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 132). He became the vice presi-
dent of the Dutch Christian Democrats from 1946 to 1948, and was a member of the Dutch Second 
chamber from 1946 to 1948 and member of the first chamber – the senate – from 1952 to 1958. A 
regular participant of the Geneva Circle, member of the executive committee of the NEI (Kaiser 2007, 
202), and member of the Dutch section of the European Movement, he was a member of ECSC 
Common Assembly and EPC Ad Hoc Assembly, becoming the first head of the Christian Democratic 
Party Group in the ECSC Common Assembly. He went on to succeed Hans van der Groeben as 
Commissioner for Competition in 1967 (Munzinger Archiv 2015b). Serrarens, Petrus J.S.: A promi-
nent Dutch catholic politician before the war, he became the first general secretary of the International 
Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) in 1920. He joined the second Dutch chamber in 1937, 
leading the parliamentary group of the Roman-Catholic State Party – the precursor of the post-war 
Christian Democratic KVP (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 99-116). He rejoined the Dutch Second Chamber 
in 1948 until 1952. Having joined the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, he 
participated in meetings of the Christian Democrat Geneva Circle, Congresses of the NEI, and in 
congresses of the European Movement. He was a strong advocate of the ‘abendländische’ conception 
of Western Europe as well as promoting European federation within the Dutch second chamber. He 
would never join a cabinet and would go on to become one of two Dutch judges at the European Court 
of Justice from 1953 -1958 (Rasmussen 2010, 647). Teitgen, Pierre-Henri: A prominent figure of the 
French ‘Résistance intérieure française’ and associated with the French resistance organization Liber-
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The individuals in Table 5.1 above comprise a relatively prominent group of actors 
well known from the historical literature. Note that the listing of the last five actors is 
arbitrary, as the subsequent three actors – all Christian Democrats – possess similar 
Degree Centrality values of 519. Some of these actors, such as Altiero Spinelli or 
Henri Brugmans, are highly prominent federalist figures who, however, did not play 
a formally significant role in the domestic politics of their respective countries. Oth-
ers had – apart from their role in the transnational network – important governmental 
or parliamentary roles: among the most prominent overall are Konrad Adenauer, 
Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, and Dutch Minister of Economics Jelle 
Zijlstra. Others, such as Heinrich von Brentano, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Ugo La Malfa, 
and Emmanuel Sassen fulfilled important roles within their parties or parliamentary 
groups: apart from René Courtin, Henri Brugmans, and Altiero Spinelli, all of the 
actors listed above where members of the parliaments of their respective countries. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the highest ranking actor is the CDU/CSU Fraktionsvor-
sitzende Heinrich von Brentano, due to his participation in the transnational Christian 
Democratic groups as well as the German section of the UEF (“Europa-Union”). In 
sum, all of these actors belonged to the political elite of their countries and were 
clearly in a position to be influential in the domestic political process, both in terms 
of the demand conditions – due to their influential presence within their parties and 
parliament – as well as in terms of the supply conditions due to their presence within 
the domestic governments of their respective countries. Finally, it is notable that 
most of the actors above are associated with Christian Democracy. 
                                                                                                                                          
té and later joined Combat (Teitgen 1988; Belot 2003, 250). A long term member of the Assemblée 
Nationale, president of the MRP from 1952 to 1956, and a frequent member of French cabinets, he 
participated at the Hague Congress in 1947 and was a member of the French Section of the European 
Movement. A frequent participant at meetings of the Geneva Circle and the NEI, a member Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Common Assembly of the ECSC and the Ad Hoc As-
sembly for the EPC (Munzinger Archiv 2015g). Van Zeeland, Paul: A prominent Belgian politician 
and member of the Belgian Christian Democratic CVP. Before the war he became Belgian Prime 
Minister for the first time from 1935 until 1938. He spent the war in exile in London, becoming head 
of the Belgian Committee on Refugees and Belgian Commission on post-war issues. Being well con-
nected in international financial circles, he was a leading founding member of the ELEC. After the 
war, he became Belgian Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1954. In addition to his involvement in the 
ELEC, he occasionally participated in the NEI congresses and, as leading member of the ELEC, in 
meetings of the Executive Bureau of the European Movement congresses (Munzinger Archiv 2015f). 
Zijlstra, Jelle: A student during the war, he became a lecturer and professor in economics in Rotter-
dam and Amsterdam shortly after the war. He joined the smaller Dutch protestant Christian Democrat-
ic ARP, and became Dutch Minister of Economics in 1952 which he remained until 1963. During and 
after the war, he became active in federalist youth organizations and, subsequently, he became in-
volved in the ELEC and through the ELEC, in the Dutch section of the European Movement (Zijlstra 
1998; Munzinger Archiv 2015a). 
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Examining these individuals’ biographies, it appears that five had links to resistance 
organizations within their respective countries (Altiero Spinelli, Henri Brugmans, 
Ugo la Malfa, René Courtin, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen). Spinelli played a key role in 
the foundation of the Italian MFE (Movimenta federalista europeo) – the nucleus of 
the Italian section of the federalist UEF - together with several members of the Ital-
ian resistance organization ‘Partito d'Azione’ and spent much of the war in forced 
exile (e.g. Palayret 2008, 331). Henri Brugmans was editing a well-known under-
ground paper from 1941 onwards (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 52). Pierre-Henri Teitgen 
and René Courtin joined the French resistance organization Combat, led by eventual 
federalist leader Henri Frenay, in 1942 (Belot 2003, 250). Ugo La Malfa joined the 
Partito d'Azione and had to flee to Swiss exile in 1943 to avoid being captured by the 
Gestapo (Der Spiegel 1963; Munzinger Archiv 2015i). 
The prevalence of actors with reported ties to resistance organizations is equally 
found among the actors possessing the highest Eigenvector Centrality Values, as 
shown in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 Eigenvector Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals 
Name Country Party Party Family Evcentrality 
Spinelli, Altiero Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1728 
Brugmans, Henri NL PvdA Social Democracy 0,1728 
Tosi, Enrico  Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1639 
La Malfa, Ugo  Italy PRI Liberal 0,1580 
von Brentano, Heinrich GER CDU Christian Democracy 0,1507 
Benvenuti, Lodovico Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1325 
Asquini, Giuseppe Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1325 
Bastianetto, Celeste  Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1325 
Camposarcuno, Michele Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1325 
Giacchero, Enzo Italy DC Christian Democracy 0,1325 
Lang, Gordon UK Labour Social Democracy 0,1325 
Parri, Ferruccio Italy PRI Liberal 0,1325 
Note: The table displays the individuals with the highest valued Eigenvector central i-
ty values in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for biograp h-
ical information.
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 Tosi, Enrico: Prominent Italian Christian Democrat. During the war, he became associated with the 
Italian resistance organization CLN (Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale). A member of the post-war 
Italian constitutional assembly as well as a long term member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies for 
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the Christian Democratic DC (1948-1958), head of the foreign policy department of the DC (Gehler 
2001, 686). He was a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, a member of 
the Italian parliamentary group for European Union (EPU) and occasional delegate to meetings of the 
Christian Democrat Geneva Circle and NEI conferences, as well as a member of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and a member of the committee in the Italian Chamber of Depu-
ties that was formed to treat the EDC ratification question (See < 
http://storia.camera.it/deputato/enrico-tosi-19061229/gruppi > Last accessed 03-05 2015). Benvenuti, 
Lodovico: Long-term member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and member of the Executive 
Committee of the Italian DC. Active in the Italian resistance movements during the war, he was elect-
ed to the Italian constitutional assembly in 1948 and remained in the Italian Chamber of Deputies until 
1953. From 1951-1953, he was undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Trade under Ugo La Malfa. 
In 1953, he became undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry after De Gasperi left office as Italian Prime 
Minister. Having taken part in the Congress at The Hague, he was a member of the Italian section of 
the federalist movement, the Italian parliamentary group for European Union and the Italian section of 
the European Movement. A delegate to the ECSC Common Assembly and the Ad Hoc Assembly 
(Christian Democratic Group), he was also a member of Spaak’s Action Committee for a European 
Constituent (see the subsequent chapter). He went on to be a member of the Italian Delegation in 
Messina (Munzinger Archiv 2015k). Asquini, Giuseppe: Member of the Italian Senate from 1948 to 
1953, originally a member of Ugo la Malfa’s illegal Partito d'Azione but later joined the Socialist 
Party Group. A member of the Italian Section of the European Movement, the Italian parliamentary 
group for European Union (EPU), and the Italian Council of the European Movement. A member of 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (See http://www.senato.it/leg/ 
01/BGT/Schede/Attsen/00006542.htm > Last accessed 03-05 2015). Bastianetto, Celeste: A member 
of the Italian Senate from 1949 until 1953, he had close connections to the Italian resistance move-
ment during the war. He was a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, the 
Italian parliamentary group for European Union, and the Italian section of the European Movement. 
Additionally, he was a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (see Forlenza 
2009). Camposarcuno, Michele: A Christian Democratic member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
from 1948 until 1958, he was a founding member of the Italian parliamentary group for European 
Union and a founding member of the Italian section of the federalist movement, the Italian parliamen-
tary group for European Union (EPU), and the Italian section of the European Movement (Lipgens 
and Loth 1990, 202, 226). See also < http://storia.camera.it/deputato/michele-camposarcuno-
18920212/gruppi > Last accessed 03-05 2015}. Giacchero, Enzo: Giacchero enlisted with the Allied 
Air Forces during the war, and returned to Italy in 1943, joining the Comitato di Liberazione Na-
zionale (CLN). After the war, he was elected to the Italian Constitutional Assembly for the DC, re-
maining in the Italian Chamber of Deputies until 1952 (See < http://storia.camera.it/deputato/enzo-
giacchero-19120225/atti#nav > Last accessed 03-05 2015). In contact with Coudenhouve-Kalergi 
during the formation of the EPU, he was a founding member of the Italian Parliamentary Group for 
European Union, that was founded upon initiative of the Italian section of the UEF 1947 (Lipgens and 
Loth 1990, 202; D’Urso 2005, 225, 226). A strong federalist and Christian Democrat by conviction, 
he was a frequent member of Italian delegations send to Congresses of the European Movement and 
the UEF (D’Urso 2005, 229). After the foundation of the ECSC, he joined the ECSC High Authority 
under Monnet, leaving the ECSC in 1959 (D’Urso 2005, 238). Lang, Gordon: A member of Parlia-
ment for Labour, he was a member of the federalist ‘Europe Group’ of the somewhat influential La-
bour Party in Parliament and, heading the equally small ‘federalist group’ (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 
683; Pistone 2008, 39). He was a member of the British parliament’s cross-party group for European 
Union (EPU section) and a member of the British section of the European Movement (Wurm 1988, 
638). Parri, Ferruccio: A very prominent leader of the Italian resistance organization CLN during the 
war, as well as leading a member of the illegal Partito d'Azione during the war, he was Italy’s first 
post-war Prime Minister before the convocation of the post-war constitutional assembly. After being 
selected to the constitutional assembly, he became a member of the Italian Senate in 1948 – having 
joined the Italian Republican party (PRI) – and remained in the Senate until 1983. A founding mem-
ber of the Italian section of the federalist movement (MFE), he was a member of the federalist group 
in the Italian Senate (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 225). He joined the Italian parliamentary group for Eu-
ropean Union (EPU) – taking part at its first congress at Interlaken – and the Italian section of the 
European Movement. He was a member of the ECSC Common Assembly, the EPC Ad Hoc Assem-
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In the listing above, three actors - Altiero Spinelli, Henri Brugmans, and Ugo la Mal-
fa – reappear, suggesting that their prominent standing in the network is robust to 
choice of centrality indicators. Another remarkable feature is that eight of the ten 
highest scoring individuals are Italian, reflecting the observation made previously 
that Italian actors have disproportionally higher Eigenvector centrality than actors 
from other countries. While the high Eigenvector centrality values these actors pos-
sess suggest a relatively prominent standing in the transnational sphere, their domes-
tic standing seems less prominent compared to the previous group of actors. 
Only two of the actors displayed in Table 5.2 above had governmental functions be-
tween 1950 and 1954; Ugo la Malfa as Italian Minister of Industry and Commerce 
and Lodovico Benvenuti as undersecretary in La Malfa’s Ministry until he switched 
to the Foreign Ministry as undersecretary in 1953. Apart from Brugmans and Spi-
nelli, however, all of these actors are elected members of the legislative branch of 
their respective countries. In sum, while individuals with the highest Eigenvector 
centrality scores are not in a position to exert strong influences on the governments 
of their respective countries, they are nevertheless present in their domestic parlia-
ments and thus, presumably, have been able to influence processes of demand for-
mation, especially in the case of Italy. Additionally, most of the actors with high Ei-
genvector Centrality scores are Christian Democrats as well.The biographies of these 
actors reveal their shared experiences in the resistance organizations of their respec-
tive countries. This tendency is particularly obvious in the case of Italian actors for 
who a tendency to develop a sort of militant ideological federalism in Swiss exile is 
well documented, both ideologically as well as organizationally (e.g. Vayssière 2002, 
43 ff.). Thus, Enrico Tosi, Ugo La Malfa, Celeste Bastianetto, Enzo Giacchero and 
most prominently Enrico Parri – were leading figures in the Partito d’Azione (PdA) 
that formed the nucleus of the Italian Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN) after 
the armistice in Italy in 1943 (Corni 2000). 
Table 5.3 below provides a list of the highest scoring individuals in terms of the Be-
tweenness Centrality indicator. Recall from section 3.2.2 in chapter 3 that Between-
ness Centrality primarily takes into account the structural position of the individuals, 
particularly how important their position in connecting otherwise sparsely connected 
                                                                                                                                          
bly, and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Munzinger Archiv 2015d and < 
http://storia.camera.it/deputato/ferruccio-parri-18900119?reloaded#nav > Last accessed 03-05 2015). 
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components is. Recall further that the distribution of Betweenness Centrality was 
highly skewed and had the ‘longest tail’, that is, exhibited an extreme difference in 
centrality values between the highest values and the remaining actors. 
There are three ‘new’ individuals: Paul-Henri Spaak, inter alia the Belgian Prime 
Minister from 1947 to 1949 and Foreign Minister from 1954 to 1958; André Philip, 
an influential French Socialist (SFIO); and Michel Rasquin, the leader of the Luxem-
bourgish Social Democrats and Minister of Economics between 1951 and 1958. The 
relative international and domestic prominence of these individuals reinforces the 
observation that the members of the transnational political ‘elite’ were, by and large, 
influential figures in the domestic political scene of their respective countries, cer-
tainly in the position to affect the course of domestic conflicts over the ‘national in-
terest’.  
Table 5.3 Betweenness Centrality: Highest Scoring Individuals 
Name Country Party PartyFamily betw 
Tosi, Enrico  Italy DC Christian Democracy 3517,5238 
Brugmans, Henri NL PvdA Social Democracy 2247,4419 
Spinelli, Altiero Italy DC Christian Democracy 2211,4419 
La Malfa, Ugo  Italy PRI Liberal 2037,4792 
von Brentano, Heinrich GER CDU Christian Democracy 1591,3664 
Spaak, Paul-Henri Belgium BSP-PSB Social Democracy 977,7 
Raquin, Michel  Lux LSAP Social Democracy 977,7 
Philip, André France SFIO Social Democracy 977,7000 
Courtin, René France none None 431,8664 
Zijlstra, Jelle NL ARP Christian Democracy 403,6524 
Van Zeeland, Paul Belgium PSC-CVP Christian Democracy 403,6524 
Note: The table displays the individuals wi th the highest valued Betweenness central i-
ty values in the overall transnational network. See the footnotes below for biograp h-
ical information.
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 Spaak, Paul-Henri: Belgian Prime Minister from 1947 to 1949, and Belgian Foreign Minister from 
1954 to 1958. First president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; first president of 
the ECSC Common Assembly, president of the EPC Ad Hoc Assembly, president of the European 
Movement between 1950 and 1954, president of the Belgian section of the MSEUE, and delegate to 
the Socialist International. Inaugurated the first Spaak committee setting up a study group for the EPC 
Treaty and, obviously, co-author of the Spaak report in the run up to the Messina conferences 1957 
(See also Munzinger Archiv 2015e). Rasquin, Michel: A Luxembourgish Socialist before the war, he 
became the president of the Social Democrat LSAP after the war in 1945. Elected to the Luxembour-
gish Chamber of Deputies in 1948 until 1951, he joined Luxembourgish governments under Dupong 
and Bech as Minister of Economics between 1951 and 1958. He joined the MSEUE at its inaugural 
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5.1.3 Summary 
To sum up, this section has presented a first overview of the transnational network. It 
was shown that the structure of the network different from a random network in that 
there is a marked tendency towards the formation of a few highly connected individ-
uals, a ‘transnational elite’. It was shown that, in the transnational sphere, there is no 
marked difference between the centrality values of the different Party Families, with 
the exception of a relative lack of strength of Conservative actors. Comparing actors’ 
centralities according to their nationalities revealed that Italian individuals seem sys-
tematically better connected than their peers from other countries, particularly with 
regard to their Eigenvector Centrality Score. In general, the structure of the cross-
affiliations seems indeed ‘transnational’: there is no observable tendency for individ-
uals from similar countries to enter similar organizations. A further issue worth ob-
serving is the prevalence of individuals with ties to resistance organization during the 
second world war, reflecting potential research on influence of federalist tendencies 
in resistance movements on post-war efforts for European unification (Lipgens 1968; 
Brugmans 1970). 
In order to contextualize the information on individuals’ centrality values, a better 
understanding of the overall structure of the network is needed. In order to make 
some headway in this direction and put the information regarding individuals’ cen-
trality values into context, the next section looks more closely at the community 
structure of the network to identify clusters and groups of more densely connected 
individuals Section (4.2) will focus on this issue after the subsequent conclusion 
briefly summarizes the main results of this section. 
                                                                                                                                          
congress at Montrouge, becoming its president in 1948 and, in that function, joined the International 
Council of the European Movement (European Movement 1949, 3). After leaving the Luxembourgish 
government in 1958, he joined the EEC Commission under Hallstein as Commissioner of Transport in 
1958 (Munzinger Archiv 2015c). Philip, André: A professor of Political Economy at the University 
of Lyon before the war, he joined the French Social Democrat SFIO in 1920. Participating in the 
French resistance organization Comité d'action socialiste, he joined De Gaulle’s government in exile 
in 1942. He was elected to the Assemblée Nationale in 1945 until 1951. He was a founding member of 
the MSEUE, becoming its president in 1949 (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 88). He was a MSEUE delegate 
to meetings of the European Movement (Munzinger Archiv 2015j).  
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5.2 The Structure of the Transnational Network pt. II: Group Detection, 
Group Membership, and Group Composition 
Having described the central individuals within the overall structure of the network, 
this section analyzes the ‘community structure’ in the network. Are there more 
densely interconnected subgroups – i.e. ‘clusters’ – in the network? If so, what is 
their composition? The question is significant because it was hypothesized in chapter 
2 that diverging patterns of transnational networking may be indicative of ideological 
divergence. Actors with similar ideological convictions should join similar organiza-
tions, thus constituting ‘subgroups’. As a result, groups of actors with different ideo-
logical convictions should be, roughly, identifiable. The degree to which these 
groups in fact do reflect ideological differences will then be described and analyzed 
in the subsequent chapter 6. Under the assumption that more densely connected 
communities share similar ideologies, the composition of these groups in terms of 
actors’ nationalities is interesting, since the tendency of a particular country to be 
overrepresented in a particular group indicates that individuals from that particular 
concentrated their transnational activities on a specific group. Thus, once such sub-
groups as well as their ideological dispositions are identified, possible differences in 
the composition of these groups in terms of their members’ nationalities and party 
families give first indications about differences and similarities between countries 
that should translate, observably, into similarities in the domestic conflict over pref-
erable institutions in post-war Europe, the analysis of which is undertaken in chapter 
6. Finally, having assigned individuals to such groups allows establishing the degree 
to which the governments under considerations were embedded within the transna-
tional network in post-war Europe; section 5.3 of this chapter will address this issue. 
Thus, in order to inform the subsequent analysis this section proceeds by presenting 
the best partition of the network in five distinct groups and gives summary descrip-
tive statistics with regard to their composition in terms of members’ nationalities and 
party families. In addition, each identified group will be presented visually, which 
allows to the information regarding individuals’ centralities into context of their posi-
tion within the network. 
As described in chapter 3, all community detection methods seek to identify groups 
or clusters in networks. Such clusters or ‘communities’ share the property that the 
individuals within them are more densely connected to each other than to all other 
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individuals in the network (Newman 2010, 371 ff.). Table 5.4 below displays the 
modularity scores for the different algorithms used, indicating that the ‘Springglass’ 
Community Detection algorithm performs best. 
Table 5.4 Modularity of Community Detection Methods 
Algorithm Modularity 
Springglass 0,395 
Fast greedy 0,382 
Walktrap 0,374 
Infomap 0,365 
Note: The table presents the Modularity Scores of  the used Community-Detection Al-
gorithms. Higher scores indicate better separation of the network (see chapter 3,  se c-
tion 3.2.2). 
In comparison to other empirical networks – such as friendship networks in multi-
ethnic high schools – these modularity scores are sufficiently high in order to suggest 
that there is a real separation between individuals (Newman 2010, 224). 
The resulting division reduces the eight organizations into six clusters or ‘communi-
ties’ of actors. Three clusters gravitate around the European pressures groups, the 
first group being composed of actors with only a single affiliation in the European 
Movement (57 members), a second group centered around the European League for 
Economic Cooperation (18 members), and a third cluster of actors with cross-
affiliations in the two federalist organizations (44 members). The three remaining 
clusters are composed of actors with strong ties to the transnational party organiza-
tions. The transnational Christian Democrats form a unified cluster of 55 members 
whereas the transnational Social Democrats are split into two clusters, one gravitat-
ing around the proto-federalist MSEUE (24 members), the other composed of dele-
gates of the Socialist International (aka COMISCO), comprising 21 members.  
The next subsection presents and analyzes the composition of the identified groups 
more closely. 
5.2.1 The Transnational Community Structure 
In order to present these groups and describe their composition, this section presents 
each group in a similar manner. First, it presents a bipartite network visualization of 
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the cluster under consideration; second it compares the proportions of actors from 
different nationalities and party families within the five communities with their re-
spective proportion in the whole sample. As indicated in the third chapter, (section 
3.2.2), the visual presentation is necessary because the projection from the bipartite 
network to a unipartite network implies a certain loss of information, particular with 
regard to the sources of the ties and the exact patterns of actors’ cross-affiliations. 
Hence, the visual inspection of the bipartite network makes the basis for calculating 
centrality values transparent and provides a better understanding of the internal struc-
ture of the identified clusters as well as their overlap with the remaining clusters. The 
visual layout is composed utilizing a widely used algorithm that situates nodes with 
similar membership structures in vicinity to each other (Fruchterman and Reingold 
1991). The graphs were adjusted manually for better visualization. Individuals’ node 
sizes are always displayed proportionately to their Eigenvector centrality: actors with 
the highest centrality values can be easily identified visually. 
Comparing the composition of the identified groups faces a similar difficulty as 
above, namely taking into account the fact that observed differences in proportions 
may be the result of chance, or a result of the sampling procedure. For example, one 
identified community comprises only 18 actors as opposed to the 222 actors in the 
total network. Naturally, the uncertainty with the proportions of the smaller commu-
nities will, by default, generally be much larger than the associated uncertainty with 
the respective proportions in the whole transnational network. In order to gauge the 
associated uncertainty in such cases, I compare the actor proportions in the complete 
network with actor proportions in the identified subgroups according to their nation-
ality and party family. In particular, I consider the proportions as a result of a bino-
mial experiment – for example a coin toss – with a number of N trials (the popula-
tion) and associated successes giving rise to the binomial distribution and its associ-
ated confidence intervals (e.g. Walpole 2011, 144 ff.). The used bounds of confi-
dence are, for similar reasons as described above, Bayesian Highest Density Inter-
vals, following the recommendations to use the equal tailed Jeffrey's prior for smaller 
sample sizes in binomial proportion tests (Brown, et al. 2001). 
Having discussed the preliminaries, this section proceeds to describe the community 
structure resulting from overlapping memberships in the eight organizations, focus-
ing on the five communities identified by the ‘Springglass’ algorithm, beginning 
with the two party family related clusters.  
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Transnational Christian Democrats 
Several members of the transnational Christian Democratic community, as section 
(5.1.2) has shown, were among the best ‘connected’ actors in European transnational 
space as well as in highly influential domestic positions, both in terms of their par-
liamentary and governmental access at the time. A visual bipartite graph of this 
group is shown in Figure 5.6 below. 
Figure 5.6 Community Detection I: Transnational Christian Democrats 
 
Note: The figure above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of Christian Dem o-
cratic actors as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed 
proportional to their Eigenvector cent rality. 
Apart from two genuine Christian Democratic organizations – the Geneva Circle and 
the NEI – several members of the Christian Democratic community possess cross-
affiliations with notable transnational and, in particular, federalist organizations. In-
specting the internal structure of this community reveals, however, some differentia-
tion. There is a visually noticeable pattern of clustering around the genuine Christian 
Democratic organizations, the Geneva Circle and the transnational NEI. Of the 55 
actors, 47 share an affiliation within the NEI, whereas 23 actors are participating in 
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the informal Christian Democratic Geneva Circle. Thirty of the 55 actors are affiliat-
ed only with either the NEI or the Geneva Circle, whereas the remaining 25 actors 
are active within at least one of the transnational European pressure groups. The dif-
ferentiation between actors engaged only in party related activities versus actors en-
gaged in both party organizations as well as the European pressure groups suggests 
the possibility of internal differentiation. It is quite possible that those actors who are 
only active in the two party organizations may not share similar European ideology 
of their otherwise engaged peers. 
The actors that were identified above (section 5.1.2) as having very high Degree cen-
trality scores are in the latter group that connects the Geneva Circle, the NEI, and the 
European Movement, whereas Heinrich von Brentano and Enrico Rosi are members 
of both federalist organizations (the EPU and the UEF). Note the relatively low score 
of Robert Schuman that is due to a missing affiliation with the Geneva Circle, an 
affiliation that has been frequently but erroneously assumed, although Schuman re-
portedly received verbal protocols of the proceedings (Gehler 2001, 659). His suc-
cessor in the Quai d’Orsay, Georges Bidault is contained within this cluster as well, 
affiliated with the NEI and the Geneva Circle. What can be said about the composi-
tion of this community? Figure 5.7 below presents the composition of this group. 
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Figure 5.7 Composition of the Christian Democratic Community 
 
Note: The figure evaluates the composition of  the Christian Democratic community 
according to actors’ nationality and party family.  The grey b ars represent the respec-
tive proportion of  actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respe c-
tive proportion of  actors in the Christian Democratic Community.  The proportions 
within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Inter-
vals at the 0.95 level.  
Evaluating this group by party family is not meaningful: it is an almost exclusive 
Christian Democratic group, with one individual without affiliation – René Courtin – 
having attended NEI congresses. British actors are absent since Christian Democracy 
as a political tradition does not exist in the UK. Some of the remaining differences 
present slight but not ‘credible’ cases of overrepresentations: French and Luxem-
bourgish actors represent a share in the Christian Democratic Community that is 
slightly higher than the upper bound of the HDI of their share in the overall network. 
Italian actors seem relatively absent from the Christian Democratic Community as 
compared to their presence in the overall network. These differences may be due to 
chance, however. Overall, it is apparent that this group indeed connects the sampled 
actors relatively widely across the continental European states. 
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Transnational Social Democracy 
The next community to be examined is Transnational Social Democracy. Contrary to 
the Christian Democratic Community, transnational Social Democrats are partitioned 
into two clusters, suggesting considerable internal polarization based on different 
patterns of cross-affiliations of its members. 
Figure 5.8 below displays the first cluster that might be labeled ‘Federalist’ because 
of the strong overlapping membership patterns with the federalist UEF and then 
MSEUE. Several members of the cluster below belong to the most central Social 
Democrats in the whole network. This group of actors on the lower right of the graph 
exhibits overlapping memberships with the federalist UEF, the European Movement, 
as well as the MSEUE. Its members, such as the French Henry Frenay and Marc Al-
exandre in particular, were in formally important and influential positions in the 
UEF, being involved in its foundational congresses. Overall, although some of the 
individuals assembled here are well known from the historical literature, none of 
these individuals were in influential governmental positions.  
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Figure 5.8 Community Detection II: Federalist Social Democrats 
 
Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of  the cluster of  Federalist Social 
Democratic actors as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are di s-
played proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.  
This is drastically different for the second cluster of transnational Social Democrats, 
displayed in Figure 5.9 below. This group assembles figures such as long-term Ger-
man SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, the long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem 
Drees, the French Minister of Defense Jules Moch, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Dutch 
Minister of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt and the head of the French SFIO Guy Mol-
let. 
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Figure 5.9 Community Detection III: Internationalist Social Democrats 
Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of  the second cluster of  Social 
Democratic actors as identified by the Sp ringglass algorithm. Node si zes are dis-
played proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.  
A closer look reveals why this is the case. The second group largely assembles na-
tional delegation leaders to meetings of the Socialist International, whereas the first 
group assembles affiliates of the MSEUE that were active in the European Move-
ment, and the federalist organizations. Additionally, a visual inspection of the com-
munity displayed above reveals a similar pattern as observed for the Christian Dem-
ocrats: a number of the most prominent Social Democrats representing their coun-
tries at the Socialist international have no cross-affiliations with the European pres-
sure groups whatsoever. In addition to the fact that Social Democrats in general form 
two distinct clusters, this observation suggests that transnational Social Democracy 
was far more polarized, across Europe, than Christian Democracy. 
What about the composition of these groups? Figure 5.10 below examines the feder-
alist cluster of Social Democrats. Due to the small number of actors in both clusters, 
these comparisons need to be treated cautiously. 
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Figure 5.10 Composition of the Federalist Social Democrats 
 
Note: The graph evaluates the composition of  the ‘Federalist Socialist’ commun ity 
according to actors’ nationality and party family.  The grey bars represent the respe c-
tive proportion of  actors in the whole network. The white bars represent the respe c-
tive proportion of actors in the ‘Federalist Socialist’ community. The proportions 
within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest Density Inter-
vals at the 0.95 level.  
Figure 5.10 above demonstrates that no particular nationality is credibly overrepre-
sented in this cluster. As was the case for the Christian Democrats, there are some 
cases of weak differences: Dutch and to a lesser degree Belgian actors are less pre-
sent in this group than in the overall network. In contrast, German and, surprisingly, 
British actors are more present. The remaining nationalities are equally present as in 
the overall network.  
The composition of the second Socialist group displays a similar picture, although 
containing a historical artifact with the absence of Italian actors. As noted in chapter 
3, the sampling method focused on formal membership patterns in the organizations 
until and including 1950 – Italian Social Democracy was, by that time, experiencing 
a number of internal conflicts largely revolving around their allegiance to the Com-
munist cause. Thus, thus no Italian members for the International were recorded.  
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Figure 5.11 Composition of Internationalist Social Democrats 
 
Note: The graph evaluates the composition of  the ‘Internationalist Socialist’ 
community according to actors’ nationality and party family.  The grey bars 
represent the respective proportion of  actors in the whole network. The white 
bars represent the respective proportion of  actors in the ‘Internationalist S o-
cialist’ community.  The proportions within the respective pop ulations are pre-
sented with Bayesian Highest Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.  
The remaining differences in composition are equally minor and, to the degree that 
they exist, they mirror the differences to the first group of Social Democrats. Hence, 
Belgian and Dutch actors seem slightly overrepresented in the group of International-
ist Social Democrats, mirroring their relative absence in the Federalist Social Demo-
crats. None of these observed differences, however, are credibly different from dif-
ferences created by chance. 
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The Federalists 
The remaining three clusters of actors, as already mentioned, gravitate around the 
transnational pressure groups. The first cluster, displayed in Figure 5.12 below, pre-
sents the ‘federalist’ community whose actors are affiliated with the two federalist 
organizations (UEF, EPU) and the European Movement. 
Figure 5.12 Community Detection IV: Federalists 
 
Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of  the cluster of  Fed eralist actors 
as identif ied by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are displayed proportional to 
their Eigenvector centrality.  
The first pronounced feature of this group is the relatively balanced pattern of mem-
bership across the three main organizations. Of the 44 actors within this group, 30 
share an affiliation with the European Movement, 30 share an affiliation with the 
UEF, and 29 are affiliated with the EPU. Accordingly, this community is the most 
densely connected of all five communities, having the highest clustering coefficient 
of 0,327. Moreover, this group includes most of the actors with the highest Eigenvec-
tor Centrality scores: of the ten highest scoring individuals presented above (section 
4.1.2), eight are assigned to this group. These actors (such as Spinelli, Brugmans, La 
Malfa, Parri, Giacchero) share an affiliation with all three of the core organizations in 
this community.  
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Since those actors are the most influential, there are some cases of organizational 
overlap with other communities. Thus, Ugo La Malfa is the only individual in the 
federalist group with an affiliation in the ELEC, an organization that assembles its 
own transnational community that will be presented below. Additionally, both Al-
tiero Spinelli and Henri Brugmans took part in Congresses of the MSEUE, indicating 
an organizational overlap with the transnational Social Democrats.  
Taking a look at the composition of this group (Figure 5.13) below, there is strong 
evidence of an overrepresentation of Italian actors, withstanding the scrutiny of a 
two-sided comparison. This is not a surprising result indicating that the transnational 
activities of Italian actors focused heavily on federalist organizations, a conclusion 
that concurs with much of the historical literature on post-war Europe. 
There are other differences, but these are weaker and not credibly different from a 
chance result. It is notable that the proportions of actors from the smaller Benelux 
countries within the federalist group are lower than the lower bound of the confi-
dence margin in the overall network, German actors seem somewhat underrepresent-
ed, but not credibly so. Contrary to what might have been expected, British actors are 
not clearly underrepresented either. 
In terms of party families, there is no clear cut difference either. There are cases of 
weak indications of differences in proportions for the Social Democrats and the 
Christian Democrats but this must be qualified heavily since the proportions of both 
party families in the overall network are ‘inflated’ due to the fact that there are Chris-
tian Democratic and Social Democratic organization with exclusive membership. 
Liberals are relatively strongly present within this group as well as Conservatives. In 
sum, federalist dispositions should have been present in all party families across Eu-
rope across the left-right divide.  
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Figure 5.13 Composition of the Federalist Community 
 
Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the ‘Federalist’ community a c-
cording to actors’ nationality and party family.  The grey bars represent the 
respective proportion of  actors in the whole network. The white bars represent 
the respective proportion of  actors in the ‘Federalist’ community.  The propo r-
tions within the respective populations are presented with Bayesian Highest 
Density Intervals at the 0.95 level.  
 
The ELEC Group 
The second transnational pressure group is organized around the ELEC and the Eu-
ropean Movement. It is displayed in Figure 5.14 below.  
Relatively speaking the smallest group in the network with eighteen actors, it com-
prises all individuals associated with the European League for Economic Coopera-
tion, with the exception of Ugo La Malfa who is assigned to the Federalist communi-
ty. This group is by far the smallest community in the network, comprising only 18 
actors. 
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Figure 5.14 Community Detection VI: ELEC Group 
 
Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of the cluster of actors connected 
to the ELEC group as identified by the Springglass algorithm. Node sizes are dis-
played proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.  
Hence, any conclusion drawn here needs to be treated with caution. As can be seen 
below, this group shows a similar tendency of internal differentiation as the party 
family communities. Of the 18 actors within this community, eight possess only a 
single affiliation with the ELEC and do not exhibit any further transnational activi-
ties, whereas ten actors are active within the European Movement. 
In the graph above, there are two highly prominent figures with a relatively high Ei-
genvector Centrality, namely Paul van Zeeland, the former the Belgian Foreign Min-
ister between 1949 and 1954, and Jelle Zijlstra, the Dutch Minister of Economic Af-
fairs between 1952 and 1959. Both were sporadic participants in the congresses of 
the Christian Democratic NEI. Both share membership in the European Movement 
with a number of actors – among Etiénne de la Vallée Poussin, a prominent Belgian 
senator. At the left hand side of the graph, there is the only individual in this group 
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possessing a cross-affiliation with the UEF. In sum, the ELEC community displays 
similar signs of potential internal differentiation as did the two party family commu-
nities. 
Focusing on the composition of this group (Figure 5.15 below) presents a particular 
difficulty due to the fact that this group is relatively underrepresented in the sample. 
Thus, while there are several stark differences in the proportions of actors, the asso-
ciated uncertainty for such a small N is correspondingly large. 
Figure 5.15 Composition of the Transnational ELEC Group 
 
Note: The graph evaluates the composition of the transnational ‘ELEC group’ 
according to actors’ na tionality and party family.  The grey bars represent the 
respective proportion of  actors in the whole network. The white bars represent 
the respective proportion of  actors in the ‘ELEC group’.  The proportions within 
the respective populations are presented with a Bayesian Highest Density Inte r-
vals at the 0.95 level.  
Starting with the comparison by countries, the proportion of Belgian, Dutch, and 
British actors in the ELEC group is about twice as high as their share in the whole 
network, but the small sample size makes drawing definitive conclusions difficult. A 
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similar conclusion applies to the relative absence of Italian actors. German actors 
joined the ELEC only in 1950.  
Looking at the respective differences in terms of actors’ party families, there is a 
similar problem: it appears that Conservatives and actors without any party affiliation 
are relatively overrepresented but not credibly so, whereas, Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats are underrepresented, the latter by a sufficient margin so that a 
two-sided comparison supports a conclusion of underrepresentation. 
 
The European Movement 
The last community to be examined is centered on the European Movement. As men-
tioned in the first section, the European Movement did have a structurally prominent 
role within the post-war transnational network in Europe. Virtually all of the actors 
that accumulated the most cross-affiliations were active within this organization as 
well. However, there are a few actors within the sampled network who did not be-
come active in any organization beyond the European Movement. Figure 5.16 below 
assembles these individuals for whom an active membership is only recorded for the 
European Movement.  
Accordingly, these individuals’ centrality values are all similar and at the lower end 
of spectrum with a Degree Centrality of 135, a Eigenvector Centrality of 0,033, their 
Betweenness Centrality being zero. Thus, this ‘European Movement’ community is 
largely a residual category: it assembles actors with a only a single membership in 
the European Movement, whereas most of the influential actors in the remaining 
groups, as demonstrated below, are affiliated with the European Movement as well. 
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Figure 5.16 Community Detection VI: European Movement 
 
Note: The graph above displays the bipartite graph of  the cluster of  actors only co n-
nected to the European Movement as identified by the Sp ringglass algorithm. Node 
sizes are displayed proportional to their Eigenvector centrality.  
Nevertheless, as can be seen from the graph above, this group includes several prom-
inent actors, including two Prime Ministers of the period, namely Winston Churchill 
(UK) and Alcide De Gasperi (Italy), and René Mayer (France). Other notable figures 
include Carlo Sforza, a long-terms Italian Foreign Minister; Harold Macmillan, 
member of the British cabinet from 1951 onwards (UK); Édouard Herriot (France), 
president of the Assemblée Nationale between 1947 and 1953; Maurice Faure 
(France), General secretary of the French Radical Party (PRR/RS).  
The fact that this ‘community’ is largely a residual category creates a difficulty for 
interpretation. Indeed, the fact that key individuals in all communities analyzed be-
low share an affiliation with the European suggests the conclusion that the European 
Movement – as an organization – was ideological among the most divided in the 
transnational sphere. 
In order to gauge the composition of the residual community of its members by ac-
tors’ nationalities and party family affiliations, Figure 5.17 below compares the pro-
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portions of actors’ nationalities (upper row) and party families (lower row) between 
the European Movement Community and the whole network.  
Figure 5.17 European Movement Community Composition 
 
Note: The graph compares the proportion of  actors (in percent) with differing natio n-
alities and party affiliations in the ‘European Movement’ community with their pr o-
portion in the whole network. It displays the actual proportion of each a ctor group in 
the European Movement Community (white bars) and its respective proportion in 
whole network (gray bars) in percent.  The error bars delimit the respective 95 % 
Highest Density Interval.  
In terms of actors’ nationalities, no other differences appear to be credible, British 
actors seem relatively overrepresented in this group: while representing an overall 
share of 0,13 percent in the whole network, 13 of the 57 actors in the Movement 
Community are from the UK (0,23 percent). 
In terms of actors’ party families, there is a small discrepancy visible for members of 
Conservative parties, another case in which the share in the community is twice as 
high as the respective share in the transnational network. In the same vein, Liberals 
appear to be slightly overrepresented whereas both Christian Democrats as well as 
Social Democrats are relatively underrepresented. 
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Centralities of the Identified Groups in the Transnational Network 
Before a brief conclusion summarizes the composition of these clusters, a brief com-
parison of their centrality values is useful. Figure 5.18 below compares boxplots of 
the centrality values of all transnational clusters. 
Figure 5.18 Boxplots of Centrality Distributions by Transnational Groups 
Note: The graph displays boxplots of  the distributions of two centrality indicators –  
Degree Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality –  of  actors grouped according to the 
identif ied clusters in the transnational network.  
Starting with the Degree Centrality measure, there is a single exception, namely the 
European Movement community whose residual status implies similarly low cen-
trality values for all its members. For the remaining actors, there are visible distribu-
tions between the centrality values, but a similar test for credible differences as used 
above does not return any credible discrepancies. The picture is clearer when turning 
the Eigenvector Centrality indicator, in which both the Federalist Socialists as well as 
the Federalist communities have credible higher centrality values than the remaining 
clusters of actors. Thus, at the transnational level, both the Federalist Community as 
well as the Socialist Federalist Community are by far the most active and connected 
individuals, which would lead to the expectation that Federalist individuals should by 
and large influence ideological conflicts in a disproportionate manner at the transna-
tional level.  
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5.2.2 Conclusion 
This section has identified clusters of individuals within the transnational networks. 
Assuming that similar patterns of cross-affiliations suggest similar ideological con-
victions, the analysis suggests a certain measure of ideological differentiation within 
the transnational network. 
More specifically, transnational Social Democracy seems relatively strongly frag-
mented as the membership of actors engaged in two genuine Social Democratic or-
ganizations – the MSEUE and the Socialist International – clusters into two distinct 
groups. As the composition of both groups covers every country in an approximately 
similar manner, this result indicates significant that there may be significant ideolog-
ical conflict within Social Democratic Parties in every country under consideration. 
Transnational Christian Democracy appears to be more uniform structurally, as ac-
tors committed to genuine Christian Democratic organizations cluster into a single 
group. Although the visual inspection suggests a certain level of internal differentia-
tion between actors only committed to Christian Democratic organizations and actors 
with cross-affiliations in the Europeanist organizations, these results indicate less of 
an internal divide and more similar ideological convictions within Christian Demo-
cratic parties than in Social Democratic ones. 
Third, there appears to be a distinct ‘Federalists’ group within relatively homogenous 
membership patterns, whose actors span the party spectrum assembling Social Dem-
ocratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative actors in an approximately 
similar manner. Thus, federalist ideas should be observable within every party in 
every country across the left-right cleavage. Moreover, as the single credible result, 
Italian actors seem to concentrate their transnational activities on this group. 
Finally, there were two clusters of individuals that are more difficult to interpret. One 
group of actors centers around the ELEC. Although the results indicate that British, 
Dutch, and Belgian actors focused their transnational activities disproportionally on 
this community, the small number of actors contained within that group prohibits 
more substantive conclusions. 
Finally, there is residual group of actors with a single affiliation in the European 
Movement. As cross-affiliations with the European Movement are present in every 
community, the overall results strongly suggest that the overarching transnational 
organization should have been characterized by substantive ideological differences 
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spanning across states and parties. The subsequent chapter will then approach this 
result from a qualitative angle. 
5.3 The Embeddedness of Governments in Transnational Communities: 
Transgovernmental Networks 
This section reconstructs the embeddedness of governments in the transnational 
communities identified in the previous section between 1950 and 1954. Under the 
assumption that the transnational communities identified in the previous chapter 
share distinct ideological assumptions, values, and normative commitments for con-
structing common international institutions in post-war Europe, identifying the pat-
terns of embeddedness of governments within these communities allows informing 
the supply side of the transnational hypotheses. Similar patterns of embeddedness of 
governments within these transnational clusters should translate into a similarity of 
institutional preferences, irrespective of the material context. Changing affiliations of 
governments should, similarly, imply observable shifts in government preferences. In 
the sequence of the argument of this dissertation, the subsequent qualitative chapters 
will then link the transnational communities with specific ideological content, 
whereas the final chapter will trace whether the influence as hypothesized was 
voiced and what its success was within the domestic politics of the negotiation states. 
Finally, this section provides information about the structure of transgovernmental 
networks between 1950 and 1954. As chapter 2 has argued that structural imbalances 
are related to the dominant influences on learning outcomes exerted by ‘central’ 
groups, this section identifies whether, to what degree, and during which periods 
such an imbalance can be observed in the transgovernmental networks of post-war 
Europe. The subsequent qualitative chapters will trace the impact of this imbalance 
on the course of the negotiations. 
To reiterate the discussion of the sampling strategy from the previous chapter, there 
are two caveats to the evidence presented in this section. Since the affiliation net-
works used are based on formal membership within the ‘European organizations’ 
that formed until 1950, both the actual strength of interactions as well as informal 
contacts between individuals, in particular informal transatlantic networks are ex-
cluded from the present considerations. As the network sample was restricted to con-
tacts made before 1950, the present reconstruction does not take into account dynam-
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ics of possibly changing contacts and the formation of new groups and coalitions 
within the transnational and transgovernmental sphere. Rather, the present section is 
based on the assumption that the identified communities largely present groups of 
individuals that collaborated closely before 1950 and therefore know each other. Fur-
thermore, it is assumed that the period of collaboration before 1950 was sufficient for 
actors with similar ideologies to develop mutual trust or mistrust. These assumptions 
are neither implausible nor impossible to verify. Both of these issues can be ad-
dressed in the subsequent qualitative chapter that will draw on a variety of documen-
tary evidence to study both the main ideas of Europe advocated within the transna-
tional clusters identified above as well as the changing forms of interaction and con-
crete evidence of the presence (or absence) of close interaction and collaboration, 
including informal patterns of interaction such as transatlantic elite networks. Thus, 
the information presented in this section will be ‘triangulated’ by drawing on alterna-
tive archival sources. 
The next section will proceed (5.3.1) by briefly explaining how the transgovernmen-
tal networks were reconstructed from the dataset. Section 5.3.2 will then present an 
overview of the centralities of the transnational communities within the transgov-
ernmental networks in order to assess which communities had the most ties to the 
negotiating governments between 1950 and 1954, showing that the period between 
1950 and 1952 displays a marked ‘imbalance’ in favor of the Christian Democratic 
Community. The subsequent section (5.3.3) will then present each identified trans-
governmental network between 1950 and 1954 in order to describe the affiliations 
for each individual cabinet in order to differentiate the possible sources of ideologi-
cal influence on the negotiating governments. 
5.3.1 Constructing the Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954 
In order to reconstruct transgovernmental networks from the dataset, individuals’ 
membership in the eight organizations in the complete dataset were replaced with 
their recorded membership in the six communities’ transnational clusters. Based on 
this information, the second step consisted of recording individuals’ memberships in 
any of all governmental cabinets of the Six and the UK between 1950 and 1954. Re-
cording individuals’ membership in the respective cabinets introduces a diachronic 
dimension that is impractical to deal with: since governmental changes among the 
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seven countries do not occur in ‘regular’ and synchronized intervals, the division of 
these five years into similar periods is difficult, particularly because Italian and 
French cabinets had a tendency to be very short-lived. At the same time, reconstruct-
ing a distinct network for every French and Italian cabinet is not particularly useful. 
A useful division into discrete time intervals turns out to be a division into six 
months separating each year into two and utilizing the respective Cabinet for each 
period that was the most days in office. The resulting division leaves out two French 
and one Italian Cabinets, totaling about three months in office in the French and the 
Italian case.  
Table 5.6 displays the names of the used Cabinets between 1950 and 1954, labeling 
them according to the respective head of the government. All government members 
at the ministerial level were included among the actors of the network, leaving out 
lower ranking political appointments (i.e. ‘Undersecretaries’ or ‘Staatssekretäre’) 
because their number and roles in the political systems of the various countries vary 
too widely. 
The third step was to create, for each half year period, a respective bipartite network 
of all actors, recording their cabinet membership and their affiliation with one partic-
ular transnational cluster. The final step consisted of creating a unimodal network for 
every period: the vertices within these networks are the seven cabinets and the re-
spective five communities. The edges are valued and represent the proportional share 
of the members of each Cabinet in any of the five communities: the higher the pro-
portion of transnationally connected actors within a cabinet, the stronger the link of 
the cabinet to a particular cluster (Adapted from Messing 2012). The resulting ten 
networks – two for each year – allow tracking both the embeddedness of the seven 
Cabinets within these communities as well as the centrality of the six communities in 
terms of the strength of their linkages to cabinets. 
In order to analyze the results, the next section (5.3.2) presents the computed central-
ity values of the transnational communities in the transgovernmental networks be-
tween 1950 and 1954. The subsequent section (5.3.3) presents the transgovernmental 
networks visually to trace the changing ‘embeddedness’ of respective Cabinets over 
time.  
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Table 5.5 West European Cabinets Used to Reconstruct Transgovernmental Networks, 1950 to 1954 
 
Belgium Germany France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands UK 
1950a Eyskens I Adenauer I Bidault II De Gasperi VI Dupong IV Drees I Attlee II 
1950b Pholien I Adenauer I Pleven I De Gasperi VI Dupong IV Drees I Attlee II 
1951a Pholien I Adenauer I Queuille IV De Gasperi VI Dupong IV Drees II Attlee II 
1951b Pholien I Adenauer I Pleven II De Gasperi VII Dupong V Drees II Churchill 
1952a Houtte I Adenauer I Pinay De Gasperi VII Dupong V Drees II Churchill 
1952b Houtte I Adenauer I Pinay De Gasperi VII Dupong V Drees III Churchill 
1953a Houtte I Adenauer I Mayer De Gasperi VII Dupong V Drees III Churchill 
1953b Houtte I Adenauer II Laniel Pella Dupong V Drees III Churchill 
1954a Acker IV Adenauer II Laniel Scelba Bech I Drees III Churchill 
1954b Acker IV Adenauer II Mendès France Scelba Bech II Drees III Churchill 
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5.3.2 Group Centralities in the Transgovernmental Network, 1950-1954 
Computing the centrality values in the transgovernmental networks relies on the 
three centrality values used so far: Degree Centrality, Eigenvector Centrality, and 
Betweenness Centrality. Recall that the three indicators focus on different aspects of 
the concept of centrality: Degree Centrality captures only the number of ties a partic-
ular node possesses; Eigenvector Centrality incorporates the positions of the nodes to 
which a particular node is tied, so that a tie to a more central node is valued higher 
than a tie to a less central node; Betweenness Centrality captures the degree to which 
a particular node connects groups of nodes that are otherwise unconnected. 
Figure 5.19 below displays the Degree Centrality of the six transnational communi-
ties within the transgovernmental networks between 1950 and 1954. Since the edge 
weights are proportions that, inter alia, depend heavily on the different sizes of Cab-
inets, the computation of the simple Degree Centrality measure disregards the infor-
mation contained in the edge values, effectively showing the number of Cabinets a 
particular transnational Community had access to throughout those four years.  
Figure 5.19 Degree Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmental  
Networks, 1950-1954 
Note: The graph displays the binary Degree Centrality of  the f ive transnational 
communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstru cted transgov-
ernmental network.  
As Figure 5.19 shows, between 1950 and 1952, the transnational Christian Demo-
cratic Community has by far the most number of ties to governments. Thus, through-
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out the years of the negotiations of the ‘Paris Treaties’ – the ECSC and the EDC – all 
the Six cabinets, excluding the UK, had ties to the Christian Democratic community, 
twice the number of ties as the next highest community has. By 1952 – when the 
EDC Treaty was signed – this figure drops to four governments. By the end of 1954, 
differences effectively disappear: the Christian Democratic Community has the same 
number of ties as the International Social Democrats. Throughout those four years, 
there are little differences between the remaining clusters, certainly none that are 
comparable to early Christian Democratic dominance. 
This picture of early Christian Democratic dominance is equally reflected by the two 
alternative centrality indicators. Figure 5.20 below displays the Eigenvector Centrali-
ty scores computed by including edge values. 
Figure 5.20 Eigenvector Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmen-
tal Networks, 1950-1954 
 
Note: The graph displays the binary Eigenvector Centrality of  the f ive transnationa l 
communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstructed transgover n-
mental network.  
As Figure 5.20 shows, the Christian Democratic Community has the highest Eigen-
vector Centrality scores throughout 1950 and 1951 until the first half of 1952 when 
the EDC Treaty was signed. Although the discrepancy is not quite as high, the gen-
eral picture of early Christian Democratic dominance is clear enough. A second in-
teresting feature is that between late 1951 and early 1953, the Federalist Community 
and the ‘residual’ group of actors form the European Movement acquire a relatively 
prominent standing as the values for the Christian Democratic Community decline. 
Subsequent cabinet changes in early 1954 show a strong decline of the values for the 
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Christian Democratic Community and a steep rise of the values for the international 
Social Democrats suggesting that, by late 1953 governmental changes drastically 
altered the pattern of embeddedness of the European governments.  
Comparing the Betweenness Centrality scores over time gives essentially the same 
picture, although the discrepancies are more extreme (Figure 5.21 below). Recall that 
Betweenness Centrality measures the structural position of a node rather than the 
number of ties. 
Figure 5.21 Betweenness Centrality of Transnational Communities in Transgovernmental Net-
works, 1950-1954 
Note: The graph displays the binary Eigenvector Centrality of  the f ive transnational 
communities between 1950 and 1954 calculated from the reconstructed transgovern-
mental network.  
Figure 5.21 demonstrates a similar predominance of the Christian Democratic Com-
munity between 1950 and 1952 as the previous two centrality measures indicated. 
The early discrepancy is much more pronounced, the subsequent decline as well. 
There is a more pronounced increase in the values of the European Movement and 
the cluster centered around the ELEC group, but their interpretation requires more 
information on specific governments, information that is given in the next section. 
Overall, there are a few conclusions that can be drawn at this point without knowing 
the affiliations of particular governments. Between 1950 and 1952, all three centrali-
ty scores indicate a possible imbalance in the transgovernmental networks privileg-
ing the Christian Democratic Community. The early imbalance suggests that the pat-
terns of influence that were described in chapter 2 (section 2.3.4) are likely: to the 
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extent that the negotiations over the EDC were conducted in an uncertain strategic 
and causal environment, the beliefs shared by those individuals should have a domi-
nating influence on the governments conducting negotiations that produced the EDC 
Treaty in 1952. Hence, the centrality indicators potentially provide a clear, albeit 
qualified support to the claims by Kaiser and colleagues (Gehler 2001; Gehler and 
Kaiser 2001; Kaiser 2007). It appears that the influence of the transnational Christian 
Democratic community was, at least in terms of its structural conditions within the 
transnational sphere, much higher than that of any other transnational group. After 
1952, however, this privileged position of the Christian Democratic Community 
wanes, so that by the end of 1954, cabinet changes lead to the Social Democratic 
Community – or parts thereof – having more overlap with the European govern-
ments. 
The subsequent section examines these changes in more detail, focusing on the em-
beddedness of individual governments over time. 
5.3.3 Transgovernmental Networks, 1950-1954: A Second Look 
After the previous section has focused on the transnational communities and their 
centralities, in effect studying the overall preeminence of the communities within the 
transgovernmental networks, the present section focuses more on the individual gov-
ernments and cabinets between 1950 and 1954 in order evaluate to what degree there 
were differences in the overlap between specific cabinets and the respective transna-
tional communities. This information is presented through visualizations of the ten 
respective transgovernmental networks. The individual network graphs were con-
structed so that the respective edges are valued and directed from Cabinets to Com-
munities, their values representing share of members of each Cabinet being affiliated 
with any one of the six communities. Visual inspection of these graphs then allows 
drawing conclusions as to possible transnational influence on specific cabinets over 
time. In the visual representations below, the thicker the visualization of an edge 
from a respective government to a transnational community is, the higher the share 
of the respective cabinet member participating in meetings of the respective commu-
nity. 
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Figure 5.22 Transgovernmental Networks 1950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph above presents the embeddedness of  the Cabinets of  the Six and the 
UK within the transnational networks throughout 1950. The governments appear in 
nodes colored and shaped according to the dominant party family.  The transnational 
communities appear as white circles. The edges are directed, their width representing 
the proportion of  members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a pa r-
ticular transnational community.  
 
Early 1950 
Late 1950 
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Beginning this evaluation in chronological order, Figure 5.22 represents the trans-
governmental network for 1950, the year both the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan 
were proposed by the French government. The dominance of the Christian Demo-
cratic Community that was mentioned before can be seen in the graph above. By late 
1950, all governments of the Six were, to varying degrees, associated with the Chris-
tian Democratic cluster of the transnational network. A second notable feature is the 
association of the Italian and French governments with the Federalist Community 
and the European Movement cluster.
61
 Irrespective of individual shifts and the high 
turnover rate of cabinets in both countries, these ties remain in place until late 1953. 
Finally, the single affiliation of the German government to the Christian Democratic 
community remains in place throughout the whole period.  
The main change in mid-1950 is due to a cabinet change due an internal political 
change in Belgium brought two new members into the Belgian government: Paul 
Van Zeeland from the Christian Democratic PSC-CVP took over the Foreign Minis-
try and Albert Coppé (PSC-CVP) took over the Ministry of Economics. The former 
is affiliated with the ELEC group, the latter with the transnational Christian Demo-
crats. Finally, a new French cabinet under René Pleven (UDSR) took over. Jules 
Moch (SFIO) entered the Cabinet as a Minister of Defense and Guy Mollet (SFIO) as 
special Minister for the Council of Europe. This move connected the Pleven Cabinet 
to both the transnational Christian Democrats and to the transnational Social Demo-
crats. 
The next graph displays the transgovernmental networks in 1951. In the early period 
of 1951, the structure of the network is similar to late 1950. The only shift that af-
fects the embeddedness of governments in 1951 is, due to the British election that 
brings in a new conservative government under Churchill in 1951 that has some affil-
iations with the ELEC group and the European Movement. 
  
                                                 
61
 For the Italian government of De Gasperi, the overlap consists of Ugo La Malfa (Minister without 
Portfolio, PRI) and Ivan Matteo Lombardo (Minister of Industry, PSDI). For the French Cabinet of 
Bidault, the overlap consists only in Yvon Delbos (Minister of National Education, PRR/RS). 
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Figure 5.23 Transgovernmental Networks 1951 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of  the Cabinets of the Six and the UK 
within the transnational networks throughout 1951. The governments appear in nodes 
colored and shaped according to the dominant party family.  The transnational co m-
munities appear as white circles.  The edges are direc ted, their width representing the 
proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular 
transnational community.  
The new British cabinet changes picture slightly, but the general structure remains in 
place despite the fact that an election in France in mid-1951 substantially altered the 
composition of the Assemblée Nationale. Its new composition is not reflected in the 
Early 1951 
Late 1951 
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transgovernmental networks. The embeddedness of the French and Italian cabinets in 
the federalist community and the European Movement remains untouched; the domi-
nant position of the Christian Democratic community persists throughout 1951. 
Figure 5.24 Transgovernmental Networks 1952 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of  the Cabinets of the Six and the UK 
within the transnational network throughout 1952. The governments appear in nodes 
colored and shaped according to the dominant party family.  The transnational co m-
munities appear as white circles.  The edges are directed, their width representing the 
proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular 
transnational community.  
Early 1952 
Late 1952 
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Throughout 1952, the year the EDC was signed, additional shifts occur (see Figure 
5.24) above. Compared to the embeddedness of other transnational communities, the 
Christian Democratic Community loses some access, most notably to the Belgian 
government. Additionally, by late 1952, British, Belgian, and Dutch cabinets share 
an affiliation with the ELEC group.  
By early 1952, the new Belgian government under Jean van Houtte (PSC-CVP) no 
longer shares an affiliation with the Christian Democratic Community as Albert 
Coppé (PSC-CVP) is replaced by Jean Duvieusart (PSC-CVP) as a Minister of Eco-
nomics. As a result, Belgian transnational affiliations are reduced to a membership in 
the ELEC community, represented by Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland (PSC-
CVP), who, as shown above, took part in yearly congresses of the Christian Demo-
cratic NEI. An additional shift affected the Netherlands. By late 1952, an internal 
shift excluded Theo Rutten (KVP) who was replaced by Jo Cals (KVP) as a Minister 
for Science and Education, leaving the Dutch government without a member affiliat-
ed with the Christian Democratic Network. Thus, by late 1952, as already indicated 
by the centrality indicators, the privileged position of the Christian Democratic Net-
work wanes, as it now connects only the ‘big’ three of the Six (Italy, France, Germa-
ny) and Luxemburg. Moreover, Dutch prime Minister Willem Drees in mid-1952 
included a new Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beijen
62
, originator of the so-called 
Beyen Plans for a common European Market of 1953 and 1955, as well as the was 
the new Dutch Minister for Economics and ELEC affiliate Jelle Zijlstra (ARP). The 
affiliations of the Belgian and Dutch governments now converge on the ELEC 
Community – consistent with the relative overrepresentation of both countries in that 
community observed in section 5.2.1 above. The embeddedness of the three large 
countries remained unaffected. Both France and Italy remain the only two countries 
affiliated with both the European Movement and the transnational federalists. 
This structure remains unaffected by cabinet changes in the first half of 1953 (Figure 
5.25 below), when difficulties regarding the ratification of the EDC came to the fore-
front and the EPC Draft Treaty was presented to the Six. 
  
                                                 
62
 Beijen is sometimes also referred to as Johan Willem Beyen. 
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Figure 5.25 Transgovernmental Networks 1953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of  the Cabinets of the Six and the UK 
within the transnational networks throughout 1953. The governments appear in nodes 
colored and shaped according to the dominant party family.  The transnational co m-
munities appear as white circles.  The edges are directed, their width representing the 
proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular 
transnational community.  
As the ratification difficulties for the EDC intensified in the second half of 1953, 
domestic changes in France and Italy lead to significant changes in their ties to the 
transnational communities (see Figure 5.26 above). Although the Christian Demo-
cratic DC remained the governing party in Italy, domestic changes due to the 1953 
Early 1953 
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election produced a new government under Giuseppe Pella (DC) that consisted of a 
coalition with two right of center parties (the monarchist Partito Nazionale Monar-
chico and the nationalist MSI) and decoupled the Italian government from the Feder-
alist Community, in spite of the fact that Italy was particularly overrepresented in the 
Federalist community. Since Alcide De Gasperi was no longer Italian Prime Minis-
ter, the new composition of the Cabinet equally implied that the hitherto strong ties 
to the European Movement had been reduced as well. In France, the shift from the 
Mayer Cabinet to the cabinet under Laniel severed the ties to the European Move-
ment that every French government had until this point. Georges Bidault replaced 
Robert Schuman as Foreign Minister. The linkage with the Federalist community, 
constituted by Edgar Faure (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, PRR/RS) 
and André Mutter (Ministry of Veterans and War Victims, CNIP) remained. Both 
shifts alter the embeddedness of the Italian and French governments that persisted 
during the foundational years of the ECSC and the negotiation of the EDC Treaty. As 
will be shown in the subsequent chapters, they were directly tied to the EDC ratifica-
tion debate.  
Towards the beginning of 1954, more drastic changes occurred. As Figure 5.26 be-
low demonstrates, the new Italian cabinet under Mario Scelba (DC), consisting of a 
similar coalition as the previous government under Giuseppe Pella, severed its ties 
with the European Movement as well. Moreover, an election in Belgium brought in 
an entirely new Social Democratic government under Achille Van Acker (BSP-PSB), 
including Paul-Henri Spaak as new Belgian Foreign Minister, implying that the Bel-
gian government now had overlapping memberships with the European Movement 
and the transnational Social Democrats. All of these changes in late 1953 and early 
1954 reflect the relative decline in dominance of the Christian Democratic communi-
ty as well as that of the Federalists and the relative rise in centrality of the transna-
tional Social Democrats, during a time when the ratification debate – particularly in 
France – intensified. 
The most drastic change that is introduced by late 1954 is the final eradication of any 
semblance of Christian Democratic dominance. As the overview of the centrality 
indicators in the previous section implied, by late 1954, there is little difference be-
tween the access available to the Social Democratic and the Christian Democratic 
Community.   
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Figure 5.26 Transgovernmental Networks 1954 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The graph presents the embeddedness of  the Cabinets of the Six and the UK 
within the transnational networks throughout 1954. The governments appear in nodes 
colored and shaped according to the dominant party family.  The transnational co m-
munities appear as white circles.  The edges are directed, their width representing the 
proportion of members of a particular cabinet sharing an affiliation with a particular 
transnational community. 
An entirely surprising aspect of the second half of 1954 is the relative isolation of the 
French government under Mendès France. For the first time, the link between the 
French government and the Christian Democratic Community is severed. Second, the 
French government had no longer any minister from the federalist community. Both 
Early 1954 
Late 1954 
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facts may suggest a profoundly different set of preferences of the French govern-
ment. In conjunction, the changing nature of embeddedness of the Italian and French 
governments may provide an indication of an alternative explanation for the shifting 
preferences and conflict constellations throughout the EDC bargain. 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
This section has utilized the results of the cluster analysis to investigate the transna-
tional embeddedness of the governments negotiating the EDC Treaty. On the as-
sumption that these different clusters subscribed to different ideological analysis and 
institutional prescriptions, two results are worth mentioning.  
The most important result established is somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Dem-
ocratic cluster presents the transgovernmentally best connect group of actors between 
1950 and 1952 by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used 
to establish the result. Connecting most of the governments of the Six most of the 
time between 1950 and 1952, it is argued that transgovernmental networks recon-
structed in this dissertation were ‘imbalanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the domi-
nance of the Christian Democratic cluster was sufficiently high to expect their influ-
ence over the basic beliefs and arguments structuring the bargain in during this time 
to be predominant. Due to a number of domestic changes, this dominance declines 
rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to 
have had a similar sort of influence. In addition, more subtle differences exist: based 
on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect clear 
differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the 
Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the lat-
ter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC commu-
nity. Most importantly, these results point to an alternative explanation for why 
French and Italian governments were ardent supporters of a European supranational 
army in the early stages of the bargain whereas the ratification of the EDC stalled 
subsequently. 
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5.4 Conclusion and Implications for the Subsequent Chapters 
The present section has provided an analysis of the network data of the transnational 
networks constituted by actors’ activities in eight transnational organizations in Eu-
rope until 1950. Three results are significant. 
First, it was shown that there is no marked difference between actors’ centrality val-
ues between different Party Families, with the exception of a relative lack of strength 
of Conservative actors. Comparing actors’ centralities according to their nationalities 
revealed that Italian individuals seem systematically better connected than their peers 
from other countries, particularly with regard to their Eigenvector Centrality Score. 
In general, the structure of the cross-affiliations seems indeed ‘transnational’. In this 
sense, the overall network connected European states and parties and provided a po-
tential ‘transmission belt’ for transnational conflict among the European elite into all 
European states under consideration. 
Second, this chapter has identified clusters of individuals within the transnational 
networks. Assuming that similar patterns of cross-affiliations suggest similar ideo-
logical convictions, the analysis suggests a certain measure of ideological differentia-
tion within the transnational network. Transnational Social Democracy seems rela-
tively strongly fragmented as the membership of actors engaged in two genuine So-
cial Democratic organizations – the MSEUE and the Socialist International – clusters 
into two distinct groups. As the composition of both groups covers every country in 
an approximately similar manner, this result indicates that there may be significant 
ideological conflict within Social Democratic Parties in every country under consid-
eration. Transnational Christian Democracy appears to be more uniform structurally, 
as actors committed to genuine Christian Democratic organizations cluster into a 
single group, indicating less of an internal divide and more similar ideological con-
victions within Christian Democratic parties than in Social Democratic ones. Addi-
tionally, there is a distinct ‘Federalist’ group with relatively homogenous member-
ship patterns, whose actors span the party spectrum assembling Social Democratic, 
Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative actors in an approximately similar 
manner. Thus, federalist ideas should be observable within every party in every 
country across the left-right cleavage. Italian actors seem to concentrate their trans-
national activities on this group. Finally, one group of actors centers around the 
ELEC. Although the results indicate that British, Dutch, and Belgian actors focused 
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their transnational activities disproportionally on this community, the small number 
of actors contained within that group prohibits more substantive conclusions. In addi-
tion, there is a residual group of actors with a single affiliation in the European 
Movement. As cross-affiliations with the European Movement are present in every 
community, the overall results strongly suggest that the overarching transnational 
organization should have been characterized by substantive ideological differences 
spanning across states and parties. 
Third, analyzing the embeddedness of the European governments negotiating the 
EDC Treaty points to two conclusions. First, the Christian Democratic cluster pre-
sents the transgovernmentally best connect group of actors between 1950 and 1952 
by a rather wide margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the 
result. Connecting most of the governments of the Six most of the time between 1950 
and 1952, transgovernmental networks reconstructed in this dissertation were ‘im-
balanced’ between 1950 until 1952: the dominance of the Christian Democratic clus-
ter was sufficiently high to expect their influence over the basic beliefs and argu-
ments structuring the bargain in during this time to be predominant. Due to a number 
of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. Thus, in 
1953 and 1954, no distinct group can be said to have had a similar sort of influence. 
In addition, more subtle differences exist: based on their governments’ embed-
dedness within these clusters, one would expect clear differences between France 
and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other 
hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation with the Federalist community 
and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, the latter exhibit a primary 
attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC community. Most importantly, 
these results point to an alternative explanation for why French and Italian govern-
ments were ardent supporters of a European supranational army in the early stages of 
the bargain whereas the ratification of the EDC stalled subsequently as Italian and 
French governments were increasingly disconnected from the transnational commu-
nities. 
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6. Transnational Networks in Post-war Europe II: A Qualitative  
Assessment 
The present chapter builds upon the analysis of the previous chapter. Taking political 
speeches and rhetoric as its primary qualitative source of evidence, this chapter will 
provide the outlines of a transnational conflict of ‘ideas of Europe’ between that was 
already implicit in the clustering of the transnational networks presented in the pre-
vious chapter. Behind a vague consensus on the need for ‘European unity’, there 
were multiple causal narratives and different institutional prescriptions that this con-
flict entailed. The implications of these narratives can, roughly, be reduced to three 
different types of rhetorical commitments that actors subscribed to across the trans-
national communities: an intergovernmental model, a supranational model, and a 
federalist model, circulating in both the transnational organizations as well as in 
transatlantic relationships between the European and a distinct American political 
elite. 
The first section (6.1) of this chapter thus focuses on the transnational groups intro-
duced in the previous chapter and, in addition, includes the transatlantic linkage. At a 
superficial consensual level, the basic terms through which the notion of ‘Europe’ 
was understood had shifted and ‘European unity’ and peaceful cooperation had be-
come a universally accepted goal. The concrete ‘causal stories’ behind that consen-
sus and their implied institutional prescriptions differed widely. 
Until 1950, early superficial commitments to ‘European unity’ as well as loyalties to 
transnational party families held together a loose consensus among the European 
transnational political elite at the lowest common ideological denominator resulting 
in the creation of the Council of Europe. Subsequently, the wide differences between 
actors regarding the actual institutional implications of ‘European unity’ contributed 
to a decisive break and the emergence of a temporary transnational coalition of su-
pranationalists and federalists in the early 1950’s. The second section of this chapter 
analyzes the emergence this coalition in the early 1950’s. The transnational organiza-
tions themselves, however, were relatively fragile, constituting only loose associa-
tions. Moreover, the similarity of goals within the transnational coalition varied 
providing for a temporary alignment that seemingly evaporated with the failure of 
the EDC in 1954. It was constituted by key individuals from the transnational Chris-
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tian Democrats, Socialists, federalists as well as individuals within the ‘Foreign poli-
cy apparatus’ of the US. Grounded partially in similar deeper level causal and nor-
mative beliefs as well similar strategic assessments, their common ground was a sim-
ilar political goal: a European Army with supranational institutions. Through its priv-
ileged access to governments in the US, France, Germany, and Italy, it was able to 
insert its reasoning into the processes of preference and strategy formation of key 
bargaining governments. Tracing the rhetorical content of these beliefs and the ex-
changes of strategic information on the transnational and transgovernmental level is 
the task of the second section of this chapter (section 6.2). 
 
“All the States represented here have,  
I think, now accepted the principle that  
some form of European integration  
must be achieved. Opinions differ only  
on the question of how this is to be done.” 
Alcide De Gasperi 
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
December 10
th
, 1951
63
 
6.1 Transnational Networks and Post-War ‘Ideas of Europe’ 
The most remarkable feature of the political world in post-war Europe was undoubt-
edly the extent to which major political voices in all of Western Europe seemed unit-
ed and committed to the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’, as Winston Church-
ill put it in Zurich in September 1946 (Churchill 1946). Old political forces like the 
Social Democrats just as well as the recently founded Christian Democrats equally 
denounced the European past of national competition; new transnational organiza-
tions, some of them founded by former resistance members in the rubbles of the post-
war world, dedicated themselves programmatically to a European federation 
(Lipgens 1968; Lipgens and Loth 1977). The continued advocacy of ‘European eco-
nomic federation’ (Healey 2011, 233) by high level US officials during the negotia-
tions of the Marshall Plan suggest a virtual unanimity among European and Ameri-
can political elites on the future institutional shape of post-war Europe. European 
‘unity’ was ubiquitous. 
                                                 
63
 (Quoted in De Gasperi 1951) 
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As a result, claims about the ‘idea’ of a united Europe having influenced the post-war 
integration project abound in the literature. Asserting that Europe was a distinct re-
gion whose societies shared a set of similarities that gave rise to the ‘West’ and thus 
possessed a distinct sense of unity was certainly nothing new. From Rousseau to 
Tocqueville to lesser figures such as Coudenhove-Kalergi, such abstract reasoning 
has perhaps a longer ideological history than the idea of the nation-state itself (e.g. 
Voyenne 1964). At the same time, much of the historical work on the long-term his-
tory of the European idea suffers from a generality that tends to take any historic 
utterance of ‘European unity’ out of its specific context and leaves ‘European unity’ 
as concept without any specific meaning (Swedberg 1994, 383).  
The post-war discourse on European unity suffered from a similar problem. The 
mere fact of post-war unanimity about the necessity of an abstract form of European 
‘unity’, however superficial, is not puzzling at all since the European countries were 
faced with a similar daunting problem: the West European socio-economic recon-
struction and political reorganization in the emerging Cold War (i.e. Loth 2014). As 
an answer, a vague notion of closer European unity made sense structurally because 
it implied solving economic problems such as the ‘dollar gap’ (e.g. Eichengreen 
1995) as well as the geopolitical problem of how to integrate Germany in the western 
alliance. Thus, materially - economically as well as geopolitically – some form of 
‘unity’ implemented through a new and effective institutional environment became 
ever more urgent, the more the tensions with the Soviet Union grew. 
Thus, the meaning of ‘European unity’ had acquired a novel quality, at least when 
compared to the ‘classical’ notion of Europe. In the classical sense, the very meaning 
of the European ‘concert of states’ connoted both unity and discord. It implied that 
war was one of the many ordinary ways in which states conducted their business and 
resolved conflicts (Deudney 2007, 136 ff.). War was part and parcel of any particular 
European national identity, even a desirable component. Thus, violent conflict and 
European unity, in the old image, were hardly perceived as contradictions. As Ed-
ward Gibbon put it in his classical comparison between Europe and ancient Rome,  
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“It is the duty of the patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his 
native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider 
Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level 
of politeness and cultivation. The Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate, and the 
prosperity of our own or the neighboring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or de-
pressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, 
the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above 
the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies” (Quoted in Deudney 2007, 141). 
Global material superiority, ‘cultural superiority’, empire, and recurrent but benign 
wars among its nations to whom ‘European citizens’ owed their primary allegiance: 
these were elements of a notion of Europe that had dominated the ‘age of Empire’ 
(Hobsbawm 2007). The idea of nationalism, in this sense, was intricately wound up 
with a ‘certain idea of Europe’. The First World War had already shattered that im-
age; the Second World War, the emerging conflict between the two non-European 
global superpowers, an unprecedented vulnerability, and the apparent dependence of 
all Western Europeans on the United States for their own survival: these hallmarks of 
the post-war era had rendered the old notion of Europe useless as a guide for political 
action for good. In an era of unprecedented interdependence in terms of basic securi-
ty needs for European peoples, the established means for dealing with interstate-
conflicts were no longer suitable and ‘reinventing’ Europe became a practical neces-
sity. 
In addition, a new image of Europe was strategically convenient. In Italy and Ger-
many, reconstruction implied reconstructing democracy on the ruins of a fascist and 
genocidal state; in the formerly occupied countries of Western Europe, reconstruc-
tion implied dealing with the experiences of occupation, collaboration, and re-
sistance. Reconstruction thus required the legitimation of cooperating with former 
enemies or collaborators, both internationally and domestically. In this sense, ‘Eu-
rope’ would come to represent a rhetorical commitment to cooperation based on a 
certain set of values, defined both in opposition to the fascist past as well as in oppo-
sition to the emerging communist bloc (see Judt 2002). A part of this construction 
was thus entirely intentional and strategic, to mobilize and engage those that were 
needed, that is, to “[…] show the rising generation that there was a job to be done 
worthy of their ambitions and to give them their place in a really great community, 
no longer attainable by one nation, but only by a free association of peoples” 
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(Courtin 1949, 9). ‘European Unity’ was thus, from the beginning, conceived from a 
strategic point of view as well.
64
 
However, the concrete implications of the new ‘European unity’ were highly con-
tested among the Western political elite. Differences were related to different narra-
tives concerning the causes of the previous two wars and the current situation that 
European states found themselves in. There were vast differences as well as an in-
herent vagueness, both in terms of the geographical meaning of ‘Europe’ as well as 
what the institutional implications of European ‘unity’ actually were, leaving ample 
space for mutual misunderstandings and deep conflict over post-war European insti-
tutions as well as the policy areas that required such novel solutions. The first trans-
national conferences – for example in The Hague in 1948 – already revealed that the 
unanimity was as superficial as the ideological sources of the post-war ‘Eurocant’ 
were disparate (Judt 2002, 167). To be sure, there were the obvious culprits. The 
political resolution of the congress at The Hague denounced the “progressive evils of 
nationalism” and recognized that “in the present emergency the organizations created 
are by [European states] themselves [are] insufficient to provide any lasting remedy” 
to the “unprecedented menace to the well-being and the security of the peoples of 
Europe”.65 While this concern was similar to most, actors were steeped in different 
political traditions, national contexts, possessed different biographies and had made 
different experiences during the war. As a result, concrete institutional goals differed 
as well. 
To order those inherent differences across multiple narratives circulating in the exist-
ent political traditions, David Mitrany had, already in 1948, proposed to distinguish 
between three different types of ‘remedies’ that were discussed in post-war Europe, 
namely “(i) a general and fairly loose association, like the League of Nations and the 
United Nations, (ii) a federal system and (iii) functional arrangements.” (Mitrany 
1948, 351). This distinction is implicit in much of the existing literature on ‘ideas of 
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 As De Gasperi put it while defending ‘European federalism’ in the Italian Senate “[…] some said 
that the European federation is a myth. It’s true, it is a myth in the Sorelian sense. And if you want to 
there to be a myth, then please tell us what myth we need to give to our youth concerning relations 
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conflict that inevitably leads to war. I tell you that this myth is a myth of peace” (quoted in Müller 
2012, 19). 
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 Political Resolution, The Hague Congress, 7-10
th
 May 1948 (Congress of Europe 1948). 
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Europe’ (e.g. Jachtenfuchs, et al. 1998; Thiemeyer 1998; Jachtenfuchs 2002; Parsons 
2003`). As already described in chapter 3, ideal-types, by themselves, are not causal-
ly relevant social facts: instead they are reconstructions that, by ordering different 
observations or facts allow the meaningful explanation of purposeful behavior 
(Weber 1988a, 193). The literature thus distinguishes several different ‘ways of talk-
ing and thinking about Europe’, the most useful of which is found in Craig Parsons’ 
work (Parsons 2002, 2003). According to this argument, there were three distin-
guishable French models for post-war Europe that crystallized after the initial set-
backs of French policy seeking to contain the German reconstruction. A traditional 
model that “appealed to legitimacy rooted in the nation-state as an inseparable 
whole” associated with prescriptions for a policy of balancing (Parsons 2003, 43). A 
confederal model sharing similarities with the traditional model but “qualified this 
with Anglophilic ‘pragmatism’ and a liberal view of international politics” and hence 
prescribing “a strategy of cooperation in broad, multilateral, intergovernmental or-
ganizations” (Parsons 2003, 43, 44). Finally, a ‘community model’ that “rested on 
‘functionalist’ notions of political legitimacy” and prescribed “supranational institu-
tions” and “real integration” that would lead “perhaps to a United States of Europe as 
powerful and rich as America.” (Parsons 2003, 44). 
A differentiation into three broad ideal typical categories is useful but their logic can 
be refined. Building upon the literature, a useful distinction relates central values 
contained in the various causal stories to two central political values or “conception 
of the desirable” in post-war Europe: (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 28): the na-
tion and democracy.  
The first model, following Parsons, is a ‘traditional’ model, since its main corollary 
is the preservation of the nation-state; the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation is 
seen as a value that takes literally the “principle which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). Hence, those attached to the 
values and political norms implied by nationalism, when confronted with the prob-
lem of post-war reconstruction, had to find ways to preserve the nation state and its 
sovereignty, the result of which, in Mitrany’s words quoted above, was a preference 
for a ‘loose association’ of nation-states. A persistent commitment to national sover-
eignty does not imply a skeptical attitude towards international institutions per se. As 
argued above, essentially all actors participating in the transnational exchanges over 
the design of post-war Europe shared the basic concern that some novel form of dis-
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pute resolution had to be found in Europe. The distinguishing feature of this model is 
a preference for as little centralization – i.e. pooling and delegation – as possible. 
Thus, international institutions are the means to preserve the viability of national 
sovereignty which, at the same time, is the guarantee of democratic sovereignty. Alt-
hough actors following a traditional model share the concern of finding suitable in-
ternational institutional arrangements for post-war Europe, the departure from the 
assumptions contained in the classic European notion of interstate conduct is rela-
tively small. Recognizing the need for institutions and close intergovernmental coop-
eration, actors prefer unanimous decisions to voluntarily submitting sovereign deci-
sion-making rights to a supranational body deciding by majority. The reasons for this 
skepticism may be numerous: a principled attachment to the nation, concerns for the 
normative implications of delegating democratically legitimated sovereign rights, 
and a skepticism towards the necessity thereof. This is not to say that traditionalist 
actors reject the delegation of sovereignty in principle, but rather tend to prefer min-
imalist solutions to given cooperation problems. Thus, they may seek assurances of 
the credibility of commitments, they may advocate the institutionalization of agen-
cies for monitoring purposes, but, in general, they prefer the institutionalization of 
‘Councils of States’ that decide unanimously. In general, this tendency applies both 
to ‘low’ as well as ‘high politics’. 
The natural opposite of this model – a ‘federalist model’ – leads to a different set of 
principles. The ideological point of departure, here, is little or only weak attachment 
to the nation-state and the normative principles of nationalism. Confronted with post-
war Europe, the source of that detachment was the declaration that the nation-state 
had “[…] become a divine entity, an organism that has to consider only its own ex-
istence […]” and that the “[…] absolute sovereignty of national states has given each 
the desire to dominate […]” without showing “[…] the least regard for the damage 
this might cause to others.” (Spinelli and Rossi 1941).  
It is probably no coincidence that the main advocates of this model came from vari-
ous resistance organizations: the practical requirement of organizing trust and coop-
eration between actors with different nationalities and political convictions under 
extreme political repression during the war may have turned the notion of a united 
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Europe into an attractive ideological device (Florath 2005).
66
 Thus, federalists drew 
the most radical conclusion: since it was precisely national sovereignty that had led 
Europe into the post-war quagmire, national sovereignty had to be abolished. Due to 
democratic commitments, federalism thus transplants national sovereignty: as a logi-
cal conclusion, it reinstates democratic institutions at the supranational level. Hence, 
there is no systematic distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. The concrete 
institutional implications of ‘federalism’ however are less clear. Since the ideological 
history of ‘ideas of democracy’ is not uncontested, even the term federalism does not 
necessarily imply unanimity about the concrete design of federalist institutions. As 
Michael Burgess has put it, federalism “has many faces: political idea, strategy, in-
fluence, process and goal. Federalism is all of these things.” (Burgess 2000, 28). 
Provided that actors embrace norms of constitutional democratic government, a fed-
eralist conviction leads to direct applications of (liberal) democratic and federalist 
principles of constitutional design for a wider political community, including the “the 
proper checks and balances between the different departments” as James Madison 
put it (Hamilton, et al. 2014, 253). Federalist thinking along these lines thus harks 
back to the mainstays of modern democratic constitutional design. A different line-
age growing from this tradition, however, stems from a more radical skepticism to-
wards the state and leads to the rejection of any centralized form of government and 
instead turns towards particular federalist versions of anarchist-syndicalist thought, 
the modern day origins of which can be found in Pierre Joseph Proudhon (Voyenne 
1981). Concrete institutional prescriptions within this tradition are difficult to formu-
late. As will be seen below, this tradition, whose supporters described themselves as 
‘Personalists’ in the federalist community, nevertheless played a certain role within 
the federalist movement. 
A third model called for a novel institutional hybrid form – ‘supranationalism’ – that 
emerged in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s (Thiemeyer 1998; Rittberger 2009). 
While refraining from federalist radicalism, this model entails the call for ‘function-
al’ cooperation that implied some transfer of sovereignty, a view that is perhaps best 
exemplified by David Mitrany’s work on ‘functionalism’ (Mitrany 1944). Mitrany is 
a representative of a wider debate in Anglo-Saxon academic and economic elites at 
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the time (Anderson 1998). The view that some check on national sovereignty – cred-
ible commitments in modern parlance – was required for a lasting peace was wide-
spread, shared, for example by the alleged ‘realist’ E.H. Carr, who, reacting to the 
demise of Imperial Europe, equally advocated international functional agencies to 
regulate economic affairs (Carr 1942; Deudney 2007, 76). Though borne out of skep-
ticism towards the nation-state, these actors did not share the radical detachment of 
the federalists: they did not seek the foundation of a new political community. On the 
other hand, they equally rejected the view that ‘Councils of States’ are effective in 
providing the institutional means to restructure international cooperation in post-war 
Europe in a permanently peaceful manner. Sharing part of the federalist diagnosis – 
that absolute national sovereignty tends to systematically produce violent conflicts in 
Europe – these actors seek a containment of national sovereignty. This goal results in 
a conscious effort at designing an institutional lock-in that is supposed to remain in 
place to constrain the choices of leaders’ political choices in the future. The immedi-
ate institutional implication is a rejection of unanimous forms of decision-making: at 
least some durable form of substantial delegation and pooling of national sovereignty 
was seen as essential. The institutional reasoning is thus susceptible to concerns for 
transaction costs, the distribution of power, as well as normative concerns. As a dis-
tinct institutional form, it was supported by a variety of centrist actors, for a variety 
of motivations, be it economic and geopolitical concerns as well as concerns for 
democratic norms of appropriate representation (Thiemeyer 1998; Rittberger 2009). 
In this sense, supranational institutions are a hybrid design which, though in certain 
respects ‘sui generis’, emerges from systematic arguments that combine the goals of 
efficiency, effective control of power asymmetries, and ‘sufficient’ democratic legit-
imation. Its hybrid nature therefore invites difficulties of classification. There may be 
some ambiguity regarding the status of the judiciary and the ‘Community law’ as 
either being subject to the principles of International Law or a fundamentally new 
type of supranational law (Boerger-De Smedt 2012). In this sense, the distinction of a 
supranationalist view from the federal and the intergovernmental view is a matter of 
degree, not of kind. It involves different attitudes as to the extent to which sovereign 
transfers are viewed as desirable, whether delegation of sovereignty to international 
agencies should be accompanied by the pooling of decision-making, and whether its 
suitable scope entails both security and economics, or merely the latter. Genuine 
functionalist reasoning largely restricted supranational cooperation to the economic 
sphere. As Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker put it in 1951 “[it] should be borne 
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in mind that Europe is not a building which can be pulled down and rebuilt. It is a 
living organism which can be altered only gradually. Let us proceed step by step, 
then, always with a practical end in view.” (Stikker 1951, 444). Before 1950, there 
were few voices – besides the radical federalists – that would advocate the immediate 
extension of radical pooling to defense issues: that dynamic would change. 
Figure 6.1 Attachment to the Nation-State and Institutional Preferences for Security Coopera-
tion in Post-War Europe: an Idealized Picture 
Figure 6.1 above summarizes these differences in terms of their relationship to na-
tionalism, its ideological underpinnings, and associated preferred institutional blue-
prints. 
These institutional models allow a broad orientation and classification of the degrees 
to which transnational groups were characterized by ideological homogeneity or het-
erogeneity. Behind these institutional prescriptions were – and still are – multiple 
causal stories and ideas result in diverging goals, place different salience on the at-
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tachment to the value of national sovereignty and grew out of diverging beliefs re-
garding the causes of European conflicts. In essence, the causal stories constructed 
on the basis of an analysis of the two wars in the preceding decades predisposed ac-
tors towards a distinct ideological outlook. This pattern can be traced across the vari-
ety of transnational groups steeped in different political traditions across Europe as 
well as across the Atlantic. 
6.1.1 Transnational Pressure Groups 
As argued above, post-war Europe was characterized by surge of transnational 
groups that emerged in order to find political responses to the challenges of econom-
ic and social reconstruction after the Second World War. In many cases, they contin-
ued developments from the inter-war period that had emerged in reaction to the First 
World War. During the Second World War, the common experience of exile – usual-
ly in London – or close collaboration between individuals in various resistance 
movements helps explaining the relatively quick establishment of a number of Euro-
pean transnational organizations after the end of the war (Lipgens 1968, 1984a). Al-
most exclusively founded during 1947, they differed in character. The European Un-
ion of Federalists (UEF) and the European Parliamentary Union (EPU) were transna-
tional assemblages of clear cut federalists. The European League for Economic Co-
operation (ELEC) was a collection of political and economic elites, spanning British 
and continental actors advocating the creation of a European market and the liberali-
zation of trade without predominant programmatic commitment to particular institu-
tions. Finally, the European Movement would become the most inclusive organiza-
tion of all Europeanist pressure groups, recruiting its members from all programmat-
ic groups (UEF, EPU, ELEC) as well as representatives from the transnational Chris-
tian Democrats and the Social Democrats Christian Democrat NEI and the Social 
Democrats. 
The foundation of these organizations in post-war Europe naturally required re-
sources. Voluntary organizations are classically beridden by problems of collective 
action: whereas the availability of transnational contacts – and thus political capital – 
constitutes a public good within the organization, they needed financial resources for 
setting up the required organizational structure, staff, as well as the organization of 
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European congresses activities (Pernet 2011). Such resources were, in the post-war 
context, hard to acquire. One primary reason for the heightened activity of Euro-
peanist transnational groups was that essentially all of these organizations – the Eu-
ropean Movement, the UEF, the EPU, and the ELEC – received funds via the Ameri-
can Committee on United Europe (ACUE) (Aldrich 1995, 1997). Founded in 1948, it 
became a key organization in the transatlantic networks to be discussed in the subse-
quent pages. Leading figures of the ACUE included, among others, actors such as 
Allan Welsh Dulles
67
 and Walter Bedell Smith,
68
 i.e. actors that were well integrated 
into the US foreign policy establishment and directly involved in the operations of 
the OSS during the war and the setting up the CIA after the war and thus had access 
to the necessary funds. In sum, transatlantic contacts, made either while European 
leaders were in exile during the war or had had contacts to OSS operatives while in 
the resistances of their respective countries, were the inaugural ‘hard currency’ of 
post-war transatlantic networks (Aldrich 1997, 193). Thus, leading figures of the 
European transnational organizations repeatedly sought US help in Washington on 
various trips between the late 1940s and early 1950s, often under the condition that 
these contributions do not become public. These included, initially, Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and subsequently Winston Churchill, Henri Frenay, or Paul-
Henri Spaak (e.g. Aldrich 1995, 1997). These funds were significant and provided 
the backbone for much of the activities of the European Movement and the Federal-
ists in the early 1950’s. As a French delegate from the UEF reportedly stated to the 
ACEU, “it is simply impossible for us to carry out the enterprise without your help.” 
(quoted in Aldrich 1997, 214). Aldrich contends that ACEU funds accounted for half 
of the expenses of the European Movement (Ibid.). 
As the previous chapter has indicated, these organizations attracted distinct individu-
als. Members of the EPU and the UEF clustered together, indicating the largely simi-
lar federalist predispositions its members had. ELEC affiliates clustered separately, 
indicating their distinct ideas that exclusively focused on economic integration and 
advocated a limited supranationalism. Finally, the membership patterns of the Euro-
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 Alan Welsh Dulles: Head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern, Switzerland during the 
war and from 1953 onwards head of the organizational heir of the OSS, the CIA, as well as the brother 
of eventual US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles (Munzinger Archiv 2015l). 
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 Walter Bedell Smith: Member of the Allied Supreme Command during the war under Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, he became the head of the CIA in 1950 and Undersecretary in the State Department un-
der President Eisenhower in 1953 (Munzinger Archiv 2015m). 
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pean Movement reflected its status as an ‘umbrella’ organization of the existent 
transnational organizations, indicating its ideological heterogeneity. Analyzing avail-
able documents, the subsequent pages assess the primary motivations and dominant 
post-war concerns as expressed publicly, as well as describe the degree of internal 
consistency of these transnational groups regarding their expressed ideal institutional 
blueprints. To what degree did the transnational organizations express consistent 
concerns, political goals, and institutional demands? Does the picture of structural 
fragmentation presented in the previous chapter correspond to ideological fragmenta-
tion on the institutional level? 
 
The Federalists 
The federalist group identified in the previous chapter consisted of strong cross-
membership patterns of two decidedly federalist organizations, namely the UEF and 
the EPU. The strong cross-membership is reflected in the fact that their main pro-
grammatic contents are largely similar, as both organizations were heavily influenced 
by the federalist ideology described above. The origin of both organizations is very 
dissimilar however: whereas the EPU focused its activities mainly on parliamentari-
ans, the UEF was an ‘umbrella organization’ of federalist organizations all over Eu-
rope, organized by leading figures of war-time resistance organizations. 
The European Parliamentary Union (EPU) was more short-lived and less successful. 
Its initiating founder, Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the 
Pan-Europa movement of the inter-war period, had started lobbying parliamentarians 
in Western European parliaments in 1946 to organize parliamentary groups. In July 
1947, the founding congress of the EPU could mobilize 114 MP’s across the conti-
nent (Gisch 1990a, 114). During these years, Coudenhouve-Kalergi drew on contacts 
in the US academic circles and the Foreign Policy establishment – he was acquainted 
with then US Foreign Secretary Marshall – to secure the funding for his organization 
(Gisch 1990a, 118). 
Comprising prominent members such as Henri Brugmans and Ludovico Benvenuti, 
its programmatic goals, set up in the Interlaken Plan of 1948, subscribed to the defin-
ing feature of the early federalist movement: the call for a European Constituent to 
establish a European federation (Gisch 1990a, 135). Initially, the idea was that such a 
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constituent would not have the status of a constitutional assembly but rather to “rec-
ommend to the European Governments practical steps to be taken to promote the 
political and economic union of Europe.”69 The recommendations contained in the 
Interlaken Plan, however, were radical. Explicitly calling for broad membership of 
the ‘European federation’ for those European countries “who accept the principles 
contained in the Declaration of Human Rights prepared by the United Nations Or-
ganization, which will form part of the Constitution of the Federation.” (Lipgens and 
Loth 1990, 142). The plan in effect called for membership by Austria, Switzerland, 
Scandinavia, the UK, Greece, and Turkey. Offering a blueprint for the constitution of 
the European constitution, the plan called for a two-chamber system – a ‘Senate’ and 
a ‘Chamber of Deputies’ – wielding the legislative powers of the federation; an Ex-
ecutive – a ‘Federal Council’ – to “be elected by both Houses of Parliament”, which 
“should be collectively and personally responsible to them”; finally, a Court filling 
the judicial branch that would deal with “all questions of the interpretation of the 
Constitution.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 142). The plan enumerated the ‘powers of 
parliament’ according to two ‘schedules’: the first schedule – exclusive powers of 
both chambers – included all ‘core state powers’: external Affairs and Defense, that 
is, the control of all “military, naval, and air defense of the Federation”, “the preser-
vation of law and order”, “immigration and emigration”, “duties of customs”, “bor-
rowing money on the public credit of the federation”, and “the issue of paper or other 
forms of money and or credit” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 145). These extensive pow-
ers of the federal government were matched with ‘concurrent powers’ of the federal 
government and the states, including taxation and economic regulation of commer-
cial activities (Ibid.). In short, the Interlaken Plan called for a new highly centralized 
European federal state. 
The diagnosis underlying this institutional blueprint referred to a common federalist 
narrative: peaceful cooperation in Europe was held to be unattainable “[…] so long 
as the world tries to rebuild Europe on the same obsolete foundations which have 
twice ruined our generation: those of unrestricted national sovereignty, national tar-
iffs and currencies, nationalistic hatred and the arms race.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
123). The conclusion was the abolishment of nationalist sovereignty within a ‘United 
States of Europe’. In the discussion of the result of Interlaken, as Ludovico Benvenu-
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ti put it, the delegates “pledge[d] solemnly […] to defend federalist policy in our 
respective parliaments.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 163). Thus, parliamentarians 
committed to the EPU transnationally committed to a radical federalist cause. Alt-
hough some of the members of the EPU, such as British Ronald Mackay were des-
tined for political obscurity in their respective parliaments, the efforts of the parlia-
mentary groups seemed initially successful: in 1948, EPU parliamentary groups in 
cooperation with similarly disposed MP’s from other transnational groups were suc-
cessful in mustering the support of majorities in the parliaments of the UK, France, 
the Netherlands, and even Greece for motions which, however, had to be significant-
ly adapted to gather support. In the Netherlands, for example, the motion adopted by 
the Lower House on March 19
th
 1948 ‘invited the government’ to consider  
“[…] a permanent association of states […] by means of various functional institutions, 
wherein, so far as may be possible and desirable, authority should be conferred on supra-
national bodies, especially in monetary, economic, and social fields and that of defense 
[…] and thus contribute to the creation of a true community governed by the rule of law” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1990, 390).  
It turned out quickly that federalists were rarely in the majority in their own states. 
Political expedience sat ill with the radicalism of the EPU leadership, especially 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and Georges Bohy. As the negotiations for the Council of Eu-
rope drew to a close in 1949 – and its Consultative Assembly, by agreement of the 
negotiating states turned out to be no more than that, a Consulting body – 
Coudenhove-Kalergi sought to prevent EPU members to coordinate with UEF feder-
alists in an emerging campaign to advance federalist projects (Gisch 1990a, 120). 
This decision delegitimized EPU leadership and its mobilizing capacities declined: 
the third yearly congress of the EPU in Venice in 1949 already drew a much smaller 
attendance than the previous congresses and prominent members such as Giacchero 
Enzo had decided to stay away altogether (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 160). Its resolu-
tions reflected the merely reactive role the EPU congresses could play: in absentia, 
EPU delegates criticized the Council of Europe and the lack of direct elections for its 
Consultative Assembly (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 164, 165). In September 1950, the 
last conference organized by the EPU noted similar points in reference to the Schu-
man Plan (Ibid., 169). Subsequently, Coudenhove-Kalergi unsuccessfully sought to 
resurrect the Pan-Europa Movement of the inter-war years. Since the EPU had a 
large amount of overlap in terms of individuals’ activities with the UEF, leadership 
of the federalist community would largely fall to the UEF.  
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The latter organization would, throughout the late 1940’s and early 1950’s be the 
center of distinct federalist campaigning for European governments to follow broadly 
federalist blueprints for institutional change in Europe. Although ideologically simi-
lar in outlook to the EPU, the sociological origins of the UEF were somewhat differ-
ent as its leadership had been active in various resistance movements during the war 
(Lipgens 1968; Brugmans 1970). The UEF was founded as an international umbrella 
organization from these federalist resistance contacts that, early on, converged on the 
central federalist narrative of the main causes of the European wars. As early as 
1942, the French resistance outlet ‘Combat’ contained an article by eventual promi-
nent French federalist leader Henri Frenay arguing that ‘the minimal result of the war 
has to be the creation of a Europe that is politically, economically, and spiritually 
united.
70
 The well-known Ventotene Manifesto, a pamphlet written by Altiero Spi-
nelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colorni while being imprisoned on a small volcan-
ic island of Ventotene contained similar reasoning and was distributed along clandes-
tine channels throughout the continent (Vayssière 2005, 70). It called for a ‘free and 
United Europe’ and echoed similar sentiments expressed in all leading resistance 
organizations (Spinelli and Rossi 1941). Hence, these writers shared a basic diagno-
sis: the problem was the nation-state having “the power to decide matters of war and 
peace, the power to control national armies, the power to divide the world into sepa-
rate economic areas, the power to create despotism in a state, without outside inter-
ference,”71 As Frenay put it in 1943 after a visiting London, he was ‘astounded […] 
by the surprising agreement of our thinking.
72
 Indeed, it seems that across the various 
countries, there was a general agreement on the necessity of organizing post-war 
Europe along federal lines.
73
 A number of preparatory meetings culminated in the 
Geneva declaration of European Resistance Movements from May 1944 that argued 
for a European federal union.
74
 After the war ended, the first transnational confer-
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quement, et spirituellement unie, étape vers l’unité mondiale” (quoted in Belot 2003, 468). 
71
 Foundational Convention of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Milan, Aug. 28, 1943 (quoted in 
Lipgens 1968, 10) 
72
 “frappé, comme eux, par l’étonnante concordance de nos pensées” (quoted in Belot 2003, 469). 
73
 For Germany, a leaflet from the Kreisau group from 1941 stated, “Europe is a federal state with 
uniform sovereignty […] responsible for foreign policy, defense, and economy” (Quoted in Lipgens 
1968, 13).  
74
 The second section of the declaration, “European peace is the keystone in the arch of world peace. 
During the life time of one generation Europe has been twice the centre of a world conflict whose 
chief cause was the existence of thirty sovereign States in Europe. It is a most urgent task to end this 
international anarchy by creating a European Federal Union. Only a Federal Union will enable the 
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ence by federalist resistance members was organized by the German Europa-Union 
and the Dutch Europeesche Actie (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 13). Subsequently, na-
tional section of the European federalist movement were founded in most states Eu-
ropean states (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 99; Vayssière 2007, 388 ff.). 
The subsequent year then revealed internal ideological differences at the first annual 
UEF congress in Montreux in 1947. The rejection of the nation-state was shared in 
all quarters, both economically as well as geopolitically. As Henri Brugmans put it at 
Montreux, “We believe the German problem is insoluble except by federalist meth-
ods and by fighting nationalism in all its forms.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 33). This 
radicalism separated the federalists from the remaining groups and traces back to the 
influence of resistance movements (Lipgens 1984a, 19). 
Although the rejection of the nation-state was shared in all quarters, there were two 
sources of federalist ideology that separated two distinct factions with the federalist 
movement, the so-called integralists on the one hand, the so-called constitutionalists 
on the other (Greilsammer 1975, 42; Vayssière 2007, 33 ff.; Pistone 2008, 38) The 
integralist or so-called personalist federalists drew on work of Socialist-anarchist 
writer Proudhon (especially Proudhon 1959 [1863]; see also Voyenne 1981). Its cen-
tral philosophy relied on the ‘politique de la personne’: an ‘organic’ image of a rela-
tionship between society and individual that was, for example, highly suspicious of 
the division of labor between a political class and its citizens leading to a quasi-
anarchist rejection of centralized government in the form of the state (Vernon 1981, 
782).
75
 The implication for institutional demands was, accordingly, a rejection of 
centralized forms of power, be it in the form of the nation-state or at a higher federal 
level. As Denis de Rougement put it at Montreux, “[…] federalism entails the renun-
ciation of any particular kind of political system. […] a federation is formed little by 
                                                                                                                                          
German people to join the European community without becoming a danger to other peoples. Only a 
Federal Union will make it possible to solve the problem of drawing frontiers in districts with a mixed 
population. The minorities will thus cease to be the object of nationalistic jealousies and frontiers will 
be nothing but demarcation lines between administrative districts. Only a Federal Union will be in a 
position to protect democratic institutions and so to prevent politically less developed countries be-
coming a danger to the international order. Only a Federal Union will make possible the economic 
reconstruction of the Continent and the liquidation of monopolies and national self-sufficiency.” 
(Militant Socialist International 1944). 
75
 “[…] notre force est personnelle, non collective. Elle réside dans les petits groupes, non dans l'Etat 
totalitaire. Elle a pour formule réelle [...] la fédération, non la masse; et non la tyrannie d'un seul, et 
non le gigantisme national. La société doit être un corps, non pas une construction mécanisée. Et la 
santé et la force d'un corps supposent l'harmonie de fonctions diversifiées saines et fortes. C'est une 
harmonie ‘fédérale’.” (Denis de Rougement quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 46). 
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little, by combinations of persons and groups, not from a single centre or by the 
agency of governments.” (Lipgens and Loth 1985, 24-26). Its most prominent propo-
nents being Denis de Rougement, Alexandre Marc, Henri Brugmans, and André 
Voisin who headed the French UEF member organization ‘La Fédération’ (Hick 
1990a; Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 46).
76
 
On the other side of the spectrum, there were the so-called ‘constitutionalists’: fol-
lowing the classic reasoning as laid out, for example, in the Federalist papers, these 
figures, including Henry Frenay and Altiero Spinelli, their positions closely resem-
bled the demands voiced by the EPU, its core being the idea of a European constitu-
ent assembly as the nucleus of a European federation.  
The conflicts between both camps culminated for the first time in November 1948. 
Hitherto, discussions about concrete institutions had been left vague within the offi-
cial resolutions of the UEF. As competing transnationalist organizations were draw-
ing up their recommendations for governments and sought to influence the negotia-
tions over the Council of Europe, constitutionalists within the UEF sought to imple-
ment a ‘campaign for a European constituent’, which explicitly called for the crea-
tion of a ‘federal state’, against the wishes of the integralists (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
61). This constituent, explicitly, was not an intergovernmental exercise: it would 
constitute “an Assembly of peoples and not of states” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 63). 
As contents of the negotiations for the Council of Europe were becoming more ap-
parent, it turned out that the constitutionalists were more influential within the UEF: 
in September 1949 the central committee passed a resolution that members of the 
UEF should campaign for a federal pact within the institutions of the Council of Eu-
rope (For members of the UEF central committee at the time see Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 100-102). An extraordinary session of representatives of UEF member organi-
zations from all over Europe passed a resolution arguing that “the defence of Europe 
is impossible so long as each state remains sovereign, and is prepared to consider 
such defence only from a national standpoint” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 85). The fed-
eral pact resolution thus echoed the Interlaken Declaration of the EPU from 1948. 
Although suggesting a gradual approach it demanded a European authority with a 
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 As Henri Brugmans pronounced at Montreux in 1947, “Let us end by quoting our master Proudhon, 
who wrote in 1866: ‘To end the irreparable abuse of sovereignty, I demand once and for all the dis-
memberment of sovereignty’. In this ‘dismemberment of sovereignty’ lies the real politique de la 
personne.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 33). 
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two-chamber legislative branch, an executive of ‘civil servants’ controlled by both 
Assemblies, and a “European Supreme Court” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 89). As im-
plied above, the responsibility of the European Authority, according to these views, 
extended from economic matters to defense: “The European Authority must take 
over full responsibility in this sphere [defense] as in others.” (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 87). 
Thus, both the ‘constitutional campaign’ launched by the UEF as well as the core 
elements of the Interlaken Declaration adopted by the EPU reveal a certain con-
sistency and cohesiveness in the federalist ideology after the Second World War. 
Both declarations contain the ideal-typical logic. The renunciation of the nation-state 
– its normative implications of an overlap between national territory, its people, and 
its political authority – were complete. The new European institutions had to be built 
across the either dangerous or obsolete national borders. The dominant institutional 
demand thus called for a political authority to be implemented through a European 
constituent. To be sure, internal ideological differences persisted. As the previous 
chapter had demonstrated, the federalist community contained individuals from 
across the European political traditions. Thus, conflicts within the federalist camp 
existed as well: the conservatism of a figure such as Coudenhouve-Kalergi turned out 
to be incompatible with the more left-leaning leading figures of the UEF. Even with-
in the UEF, radical ‘personalists’ differed in the most basic understanding of institu-
tional goals from the constitutionalists. In the years following the initial programmat-
ic declarations, these conflicts would repeatedly ignite in particular over questions of 
political strategy to achieve federalist goals. Moreover, the dispute between the con-
stitutionalists and the personalists overshadowed any potential conflict between the 
former enemies during the war. Perhaps the resistance background of major German 
federalist figures such as Eugen Kogon – founding member of the German section of 
UEF, the Europa Union – implied that Nazi Germany was the common enemy. 
 
The ELEC Group 
The European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) was predominantly an 
organization comprising members of the European political and economic elite that 
had its sources in exile contacts made during the war in London. Its basic considera-
tion, namely that European welfare would benefit from the abolishment of the nu-
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merous intra-European trade barriers, had been prevalent among certain circles of the 
European economic elite before the war. ‘Economic order’ presupposed liberaliza-
tion. The initiative for its foundation was, inter alia, largely due to Paul van Zeeland, 
Belgian Prime Minister before the war and Foreign Minister in the early 1950’s, 
Daniel Serruys, French Minister for Economics before the war, and Joseph Retinger, 
a Polish exile in London (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 13). Shortly after the war, 
van Zeeland sought out several contacts he had made during the war with figures 
such as such as Ugo La Malfa, Peter Adrian Kersten, Roger Motz, and Edward Bed-
dington-Behrens. These were usually members of the financial community, including 
future French president Giscard d’Estaing (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 43). Dedi-
cated to the liberalization of the post-war European economy, a provisional commit-
tee was founded in 1947, and national sections were founded in the UK, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg within the same year (Gisch 1990b, 188; Dumoulin 
and Dutrieue 1993, 18, 23). In van Zealand’s words, the goal of the ELEC was “[…] 
to bring order and a cohesive economic fabric to the Continent, where even one of 
them tries […] to disrupt the Continent by dividing [it] into two zones, both antago-
nistic to each other” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 23). Its impetus being focused on 
economic reconstruction and not grand institutional schemes, its members, were ini-
tially wary to be associated with the European Movement, which, in Van Zeeland’s 
word ‘ought to be and remain distinct’. Their long-term goal is similar. But their 
immediate preoccupations and the means they employ are different. As Van Zeeland 
put it, “Our organization proposes a more modest but also more immediate goal, 
namely reconciliation [rapprochement] on the economic front.”77 The differences 
concerned both the radicalism of the federalists as well as the presence of federalist 
socialist ideas (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 55). An indication of this tendency was 
already given in terms of the party composition – largely from the liberal and con-
servative party family of this group relative to the other transnational organizations. 
An elite group in character, its purposes was to provide policy suggestions for the 
solution of economic problems of the reconstruction of post-war Europe. Not pro-
jecting a public appearance directed at organizing mass support, it focused on organ-
                                                 
77
 “L’organisation présidée par M. Churchill et celle dont nous occupons sont et doivent […] rester 
distinctes. […] Leur but très éloigné est le même. Mais leurs préoccupations immédiates et les moyens 
qu’elles emploient sont différents. La première travaille sur le plan politique et vise d’emblée a la 
Fédération de l’Europe. Notre organisation se propose un but plus modeste mais plus immédiat, à 
savoir rapprochement sur le plan économique.”  (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 29). 
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izing conferences and exchanges that sought to bring together officials from across 
Europe to debate possibilities for closer economic collaboration, primarily through 
liberalization of trade in the whole continent. Even in reactions to the Schuman Plan, 
there were few public declarations (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 268 ff.). Thus, the raison 
d’être of the ELEC was not to push publicly for grand institutional designs that 
would revolutionize international politics. Its purpose, as Dutch Minister of Econom-
ic Affairs Jelle Zijlstra recounted, was to focus on concrete policy instruments and to 
provide an opportunity for elite exchange, 
“I attended all kinds of international conferences, in which we explicitly dealt with ques-
tions like: what kind Economic Union, what kind of monetary union should come? And 
with the question of which policy instruments would be required. I traveled from one 
conference to another. It was always interesting. And I built many international contacts, 
networking, we would say today. So when I took up on [the ministry of] Economic Af-
fairs, I was in a sense there already prepared.” 78 
Institutionally, few recommendations were made that went further than ‘closer col-
laboration on the economic front’ (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 29). In this sense, 
the advocacy of the ELEC focused on questions of functionalist cooperation, i.e. 
concrete economic measures such as programs for trade liberalization within the 
OEEC and the European Payments Union, examinations of currency convertibility, 
etc. In the same way as federalist convictions and resistance experiences shaped the 
predispositions of the federalists, actors engaged in the ELEC shared the same con-
cern and conviction, namely that nationalist competition had led to protectionism and 
thus the absence of international regulation of trade and financial flows: their recon-
struction in the post-war era was the primary concern and goal of ELEC actors. In 
this sense, the Europe that the ELEC sought to produce was almost exclusively based 
on economic cooperation. Thus, the thrust of the policy ideas of the ELEC was en-
tirely different from the ideas put forth by the federalists. As Van Zeeland out it in 
1946, “I believe that a regional grouping, in order to achieve all its economic aims, 
must go straight for radical solutions, namely a customs and a monetary union.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1990, 193). Hence, the outlook of the ELEC, i.e. its self-professed 
radicalism, largely covered ‘economic rapprochement’ (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
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 Own translation from “Ik nam dee1aan allerlei intemationale conferenties, waarop we ons 
uitdrukkelijk bezighielden met vragen als: welk soort Ecorromische Unie, welke soort Monetaire Unie 
moet er komen? En met de vraag welke politieke instrumenten daarvoor nodig zouden zijn. Soms 
reisde ik van de ene conferentie naar de andere. Het was altijd interessant. En ik heb er veel 
intemationale contacten opgebouwd, netwerken, zouden we tegenwoordig zeggen. Dus toen ik op 
Economische Zaken aanspoelde, was ik in zekere zin daar weI op voorbereid.” (Zijlstra 1998, 2). 
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199). As Paul van Zeeland expressed it at the 1949 ELEC conference in Westmin-
ster, London, 
“We want to remake Europe, want to give it peace and prosperity and restore it to what it 
was. We want to create a huge market in which goods can be exchanged freely, or almost 
so. We want a large area in which capital can be used wherever it is of most benefit to the 
masses. We want to see men freed from the present hindrances so that they can move 
wherever they like, wherever they will be happiest and most useful. Finally, we want the 
free interchange of ideas of all kinds, provided they are sincere.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
253) 
The concrete institutional implications, however, remained vague. Early suggestions 
for institutional designs suggested ‘intermediary institutions’ that assured the ‘equi-
librium and stability’ of the nation-state: in Paul van Zeeland’s words, the goal was 
not to abolish the nation-state but to assure its survival by liberalizing trade in Eu-
rope and to construct the necessary institutions for international cooperation.
79
 These 
institutions would constitute “a compromise between national and international aspi-
rations” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 200). They would be designed to administer com-
mon policies for technical areas such as “electricity, transport, and European ports” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1990, 251). Daniel Serruys, in a speech in 1949, pointed to 
“agreement that an organization must be planned not on the basis of associations and 
agreements among the states of Europe, but as a single European economic union. 
That is the first of our desiderata.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 255). As a fellow Bel-
gian ELEC delegate put it, the efforts to “create a mystique or stir up consciences in 
favor of a crusade […]” were simply not in the Belgian ‘national interest’, at least 
from this particular point of view. What mattered in his view was “to make men feel 
the hard necessity […] of creating an economy […] requiring […] the most vigorous 
action to prepare plans for production, organization and equipment in the new Euro-
pean economy” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 316).  
Thus, the institution of a single European market was seen as an ‘indispensable ne-
cessity’ (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 50). In this sense, the ELEC delegates une-
quivocally welcomed the Schuman plan from the economic point of view, particular-
ly welcoming an institution that would inaugurate a competitive European market for 
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 In Van Zeelands conception, which he had published as early as 1946 it looked like this “A la base, 
l’Etat nationale. Au sommet une Ligue universelle. Entre les deux, les organes intermédiaires, qui 
doivent assurer l’équilibre et la stabilité du grand corps politique national.” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 
1993, 22). 
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coal and steel, tackle current regimes of ‘protection’ and ‘subsidization’ and, for that 
matter, create a European political authority with ‘precise supranational powers’.80  
Noticeable is the absence of suggestions for democratic institutions: different from 
the demands for a European constituent, ELEC exchanges spoke of ‘vertical’ institu-
tions such as courts, committees, and international banks that were supposed to enact 
the ‘economic rapprochement’ without specifying precisely what those institutions 
might be.
81
 Instead, the early speeches preeminently focus on policy areas and debat-
ed in which policy area liberalization was advisable, invariably returning to their 
“agreement for the need of a real economic union” in Europe (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 254). Hence, the ELEC can be properly associated with functionalist ideas 
leading to a supranational model of Europe, advocating limited transfers of sover-
eignty in economic policy fields.  
An important corollary was the emphasis on British participation, the absence of So-
cialist actors as well as a notable absence of German actors. Political reconciliation 
as a topic was equally absent. Thus, French, English, Luxembourgish, Dutch and 
Belgian national committees had been established by 1950. Italian and German 
committees – the latter under the leadership of Herman Abs – were only established 
by 1951 (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 41). The absence of transnational socialists 
was politically motivated as the group was composed primarily of actors from the 
conservative and liberal party families. Van Zeeland, for example, initially contacted 
Belgian Socialists such as Henri Brugmans and Victor Larock who refused to partic-
ipate in the organization (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 32). 
The proximity to British actors, the relative agnosticism towards grand institutional 
schemes, and the liberal emphasis on free trade help explain the subsequent reaction 
of the ELEC group towards the proposal of the ECSC: once details of the Schuman 
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 An ELEC publication from July 11
th
 1950 stated that the ELEC “[…] approuve sans réserve la pro-
position faite par le Gouvernement français d’instituer au plus tôt un marché unique concurrentiel 
Européen pour le charbon et pour l’acier dont le développement soit recherché par l’expansion de la 
production et la réduction des prix.” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 49). At the same time, it demand-
ed that principles of market competition would be adhered to so that factories “[…] inaptes à vivre 
autrement que sous le régime de protection et de subvention”  were closed down (Dumoulin and 
Dutrieue 1993, 49). Institutionally, it welcomed “[…] l’institution d’une autorité politique européenne 
dote de pouvoirs précis et supranationaux” (Ibid.). 
81
 A note from August 14
th
 1950 proposed, for the Schuman Plan, the creation of three political com-
mittees, specialized in distinct policy fields, with powers of oversight and a high authority to coordi-
nate the work of the committees. The composition of the committees was to be chosen by member 
states (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 273). 
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plan emerged, the institutional issue was secondary as the ECSC was seen as a 
“menace of a directed economy”.82 ELEC publications thus insisted on British partic-
ipation as an ‘essential condition for success’. The proposed ECSC institutions were 
judged from the point of view of achieving the goal of realizing the European market 
and economic efficiency goals hence demanding that ‘the attributes and the powers 
of the High Authority should be limited to what is strictly necessary for the coordina-
tion of industrial and commercial policies as well as the concerned companies. It 
should be avoided to surround the High Authority with institutions that have a politi-
cal character’.83 
In sum, the ELEC, contrary to the far-reaching designs of the federalist movements, 
was from the beginning characterized by a relatively narrow and technical focus on 
the economic reorganization of European trade. Contrary to the federalist position, 
the focus in the ELEC conferences is entirely on economic issues. The absence of 
leading German figures equally implied that the security relevant issue of reconcilia-
tion after the war was relatively absent from the concerns of the ELEC conferences. 
Additionally, the liberalization of trade in Europe was supposed to aid and serve the 
stability and integrity of the nation-state. In this sense, the main concern correspond-
ed to what Milward has termed ‘the rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward 2000). Insti-
tutions are evaluated from a technical and functional point of view, seeking to design 
effective administrative procedures to maximize European welfare. In the vague pre-
1950 language, these concerns and goals translated into demands for rudimentary 
supranationality: so-called ‘intermediate bodies’, staffed by politicians and experts. 
There is little indication that these issues were contested within the ELEC. 
 
The European Movement 
The European Movement was the initial nucleus of early efforts to put the terms of 
European interstate cooperation on novel terms after the Second World War had 
ended. Organizationally, it was the starting point emerging as the organization unit-
ing all of the heretofore mentioned organizations was based upon an initiative by 
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 “[…] une menace d’économie dirigée […] ” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 59). 
83
 “[…] les attributions et pouvoirs de la Haute Autorité devraient être limité á ce qui est strictement 
nécessaire au fonctionnement d’une coordination des politiques industrielle et commercial des entre-
prises en cause. Il faut éviter également d’entourer la Haute Autorité d’autres institutions qui auraient 
un caractère politique […].” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 53). 
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Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys. After Churchill’s speech in 
Zurich in 1946 in which he called for the ‘United States of Europe’, Sandys had 
founded the British United Europe Movement, a collection of British Tories and 
‘honorary figures’ that seemed to feel some enthusiasm for the idea. Initially, the 
European Movement was the primary recipient of US funds from the ACUE, initially 
channeled primarily through Sandys (Vayssière 2007, 233). 
In early 1947, a meeting between the leading figures of all emerging Europeanist 
transnational organizations took place to seek to coordinate their activities.
 84
 By De-
cember 1947, the decision was taken to establish a joint transnational organization, 
the core of which would be an executive secretariat with Sandys becoming the first 
executive secretary (Hick 1990b). Its members being in leading roles in their respec-
tive organizations, the Movement’s first action was to send out letters to selected 
political, cultural, and economic elites calling for a congress at The Hague in 1948 in 
which to discuss the institutional reorganization of post-war Europe. The first honor-
ary presidents of the newly founded European Movement were leading political fig-
ures comprising the widely respected Léon Blum (SFIO) – the first French Prime 
Minister of the post-war period – Paul-Henri Spaak as well as Alcide De Gasperi 
(Hick 1990b, 322). Thus, the European Movement had the potential of becoming the 
key hub to connect the European political elite under a common program across na-
tions and parties. Schuman and Adenauer met for the first time at The Hague in 1948 
(Kaiser 2007, 212). Against the wishes of several of their transnational fellow party 
members, Social Democratic representatives, such as Gérard Jaquet, joined the Euro-
pean movement.
85
 Hence, the European Movement became the most widely connect-
ed pressure group committed to European ‘Unity’. 
Moreover, the presence of a German delegation at The Hague was a significant 
event. In this sense, the commitment to ‘European Unity’ fostered reconciliation: as 
Winston Churchill put it at The Hague,  
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 UEF (Marc, Brugmans), EPU (Maccas), Retinger, Serruys (ELEC), Sandys (United Europe 
Movement), Courtin (Hick 1990b, 321). 
85
 As Gérard Jaquet recounts, “René Courtin avait été en rapport avec Duncan Sandys, et m'a dit: 
“Duncan Sandys et son beau-père Churchill désirent organiser un grand congres á La Haye et il vou-
drait en parler a quelques Franyais, est-ce que tu veux venir avec moi ? J'ai répondu d'accord, et nous 
avons été invites par Duncan Sandys, chez lui pendant huit jours à Londres.” (Jaquet 1997). 
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“Europe requires all that Frenchman, all that Germans, and all that every one of us can 
give. I welcome therefore here the German delegation, whom we have invited in our 
midst. For us the German problem is to restore the economic life of Germany and revive 
the ancient fame of the German race without thereby exposing their neighbors and our-
selves to any rebuilding or reassertion of their military power. United Europe provides the 
only solution to this two-sided problem and it is also a solution which can be implement-
ed without delay”. (Churchill 1948). 
Applause ensued. European reconciliation required, such was the consensus view, 
more than national reconstruction efforts. As the political declaration at The Hague 
expressed it, 
“The ravages wrought by six years of war and by the occupation, the diminution of world 
food production, the destruction of industrial capacity, the creation of huge debts, the 
maintenance of military expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the people, 
the shifting of economic power, the rancours left by war, the progressive evils of nation-
alism and the absence, despite the work of U.N.O., of an international authority suffi-
ciently strong to provide law and order, constitute an unprecedented menace to the well-
being and the security of the peoples of Europe and threaten them with ruin.” (Congress 
of Europe 1948). 
Reconstruction required thus overcoming nationalism as well as an ‘international 
authority’ that would ensure that the conduct of states in Europe would be governed 
by law. In this sense, there was certainly unanimity. Beyond this agreement, howev-
er, the discussions at The Hague revealed that there were widespread and, to a de-
gree, irreconcilable differences between the delegates and groups engaged in the Eu-
ropean Movement. To the degree that the European Movement had the potential to 
connect the political elite in a central organizational hub, conflicts that would later 
plague the Council of Europe emerged already here. 
Most British actors, already at this stage, never went beyond vague calls for ‘unity’ 
while, at the same time, expressing a reluctance to engage in far-reaching institution-
al discussions. Winston Churchill declared, 
“The movement for European Unity must be a positive force […] deriving its strength 
from our common spiritual values. It is a dynamic expression of democratic faith based 
upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. […] Mutual aid in the eco-
nomic field and joint military defense must be accompanied step by step with a parallel 
policy of closer political unity.” (Churchill 1948).  
The repeated insistence on European ‘unity’ thus earned this position the label ‘un-
ionist’. Although sharing the general concern for the need of an international authori-
ty, the advocated goal of ‘European unity’, for these actors, did not translate into 
anything that perturbed national sovereignty. Duncan Sandys summarized this posi-
tion in 1948, by explaining that the “[…] first stage in the process is to foster the 
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habit of regular consultation. […]. When a firm basis of confidence and joint experi-
ence has been laid, it would be reasonable to ask the nations of Europe to abrogate at 
any rate some part of their separate sovereignties.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 333). 
‘Regular consultation’, in this view, sufficed for the time being. A consultative ma-
chinery should foster a common understanding and trust: in the future, delegating 
sovereignty was possible. This is the intergovernmentalist interpretation of function-
alism (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 333). Thus, the British Unionists’ interpretation of 
‘European unity’ definitely entailed a concern about the divisive force of nationalist 
competition, but did not seek to abolish or even decisively constrain the nation- state: 
“the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural group-
ings.” 86 Notions of the old European notion, for example as Georges Le Brun Keris 
insisted on the fact that it remains a national prerogative to ‘develop’ and administer 
European colonies.
87
 
It is thus no surprise that there were vast differences in proposed strategies and insti-
tutional schemes with the federalists in the organization. Recognizing that “to estab-
lish a Federal Statute at once would [create] difficulties in Great Britain.” (Lipgens 
and Loth 1990, 422), the federalists found themselves at odds with the British Union-
ists on a number of occasions already at The Hague (Gisch 1990a, 118). Hence, the 
political resolution passed at The Hague was a political compromise, a negotiated 
settlement between the different ideological currents within the movement. Although 
calling for the abrogation of ‘certain’ sovereign rights to be exercised in common, 
the declaration remained ambiguous as to the definition of the proposed community, 
whether it would be a ‘union’ or a ‘federation’.88 Additionally, the resolution called 
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 As Winston Churchill put it in his Zurich speech in 1946, “The first step in the re-creation of the 
European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France 
recover the moral leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great 
France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly 
built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will 
count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.” 
(quoted in Larres 1996, 28). 
87
 As Le Brun Kéris put it at The Hague “je voudrais simplement insister pour demander que si nous 
nous prononçons très fermement sur la nécessité au point vue économique de cette collaboration, dans 
le domaine du progrès social, du progrès culturel, du progrès politique des territoires d'outre-mer que 
ce soit entièrement dans la ligne propre à chacune de nos nationalités.” (Le Brun Kéris 1948). 
88
 As the Political Resolution at The Hague declared “l’heure est venue pour les nations de l'Europe de 
transférer certains de leurs droits souverains pour les exercer désormais en commun, en vue de coor-
donner et de développer leurs ressources. […] l'Union ou la Fédération, dont le but sera d’assurer la 
sécurité des peuples qui la composeront, devra être indépendante à l’égard de toute puissance et ne 
constituer une menace contre aucune nation” (Congress of Europe 1948). 
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for the convocation of a European assembly, composed of national parliamentarians, 
which should study the form of the proposed ‘Union or Federation’.89 Finally, it 
called for the drafting of a Charter of Human Rights and the creation of an Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 
This compromise formula left many disappointed. Especially the fact that the confer-
ence proposed that the Assembly should consist of representatives sent by national 
parliaments, instead of resulting from general European elections, seemed to rattle 
cages. As Paul Reynaud expressed it, direct elections were almost a ‘pedagogical 
means’ to disengage the European electorates from their nationalist sentiments and to 
create “a superior domain of thoughts and opinions”.90 The conflict however, went 
straight across nationalities: a French compatriot of Paul Reynaud, Paul Ramadier 
had apparently forcefully argued against the idea of direct elections, denouncing di-
rect elections as progressing to early and too quickly (Reynaud 1948). 
The compromise solution at The Hague was thus a distinction between immediate 
and long term goals, immediate goals including the creation of an ‘emergency coun-
cil’ of governments, the creation of an international court of justice, as well as a ‘Eu-
ropean Deliberative Assembly’ for the ‘exchange of views’, but without any real 
powers. Long-term goals, with a nod to the federalists, included the creation of a 
‘complete federation’ with a ‘European Defense Force’ and ‘European Citizenship’ 
(Hick 1990a). How to get from the first step to the second was left open. Although 
federalists participants at The Hague such as Frenay, Brugmans and Gironella urged 
the Executive Bureau of the Movement to embrace the idea of a federal pact, subse-
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 As the Political Resolution at The Hague declared “une Assemblée Européenne qui, élue – dans leur 
sein ou au dehors – par les Parlements des nations participantes. a) contribuera à créer et exprimera 
l'opinion publique européenne; b) recommandera les mesures immédiates propres à établir progressi-
vement, tant sur le plan économique que sur le plan politique, l'unité nécessaire de l'Europe; c) exami-
nera les problèmes juridiques et constitutionnels posés par la création d'une Union ou d'une Fédéra-
tion, ainsi que leurs conséquences économiques et sociales.” (Congress of Europe 1948). 
90
 Own translation from “un domaine supérieur de pensées et de sentiments”. Paul Reynaud declared 
«Dès lors, notre seul moyen d'agir, c'est d'obtenir le consentement des peuples. C'est notre doctrine, 
c'est notre foi, mais c'est une tâche immense. Ce sont les peuples qu'il faut convaincre. C'est à eux 
qu'il faut insuffler l'esprit européen et, vous le savez tous, leur jugement est encore trop souvent faussé 
par un nationalisme étroit. Lorsque nos ministres des Affaires étrangères se réunissent autour d'un 
tapis vert et lorsqu'ils ne tombent pas d'accord, cela n’est pas de leur faute, c'est parce que chacun 
d'eux songe à son Parlement auquel il aura des comptes à rendre. Or, il sait que celui-ci est l'image du 
pays qui l'a élu. C'est là que gît la difficulté. Le problème est donc de convaincre le pays ; c'est le 
peuple qui doit changer d'esprit. Pour faire une Europe, il faut élever au-dessus de lui-même chacun 
des peuples qui la composent. Il faut le faire accéder à un domaine supérieur de pensées et de senti-
ments” (Reynaud 1948). 
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quent public resolutions on the question of a European Assembly continued to em-
brace vague wording such as “shall exercise in common certain rights” and “to in-
crease the influence and extend the functions” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 424). 
The European Movement, due to its central position assembling key representatives 
from European countries and governments, did inspire the creation of the council of 
Europe who would, nevertheless, be plagued by ongoing disputes. Within the Execu-
tive Bureau as well as in subsequent congresses, disagreements quickly arose over 
the question whether countries willing to engage in an immediate federal pact should 
go ahead or not (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 420). 
 
Summary 
In sum, the differences and conflicts between minimalist British Unionists and radi-
cal federalists were the foundational flaw within the European Movement that would 
unravel soon enough. Many embraced the middle and wavered strategically between 
the maximalist and the minimalist position. Apart from the federalists, disagreements 
arose equally with actors espousing the supranational models engaged in the party 
related member groups of the European Movement such as the Christian Democratic 
NEI and the Social Democratic MSEUE and thus were equally influenced by party 
ideology and question of strategic expedience. The next section will review those. 
6.1.2 Transnational Party Families 
As mentioned, apart from the genuine Europeanist transnational groups, several 
transnational organizations with distinct ties to European party families were en-
gaged in the European Movement. Transnational contacts had always played an im-
portant part in the history of the dominant European party families. Christian Democ-
racy’s precursor, political Catholicism, was organized on a transnational scale from 
the beginning through its affiliation to the Catholic Church in the 19
th
 century 
(Kaiser 2007, 15 ff.). After the war, Christian Democracy emerged as an initiative for 
the foundation of interconfessional Christian parties and to mirror the international-
ism of Social Democracy. Social Democracy – or Socialism – had been originally 
founded as a transnational movement, the various ‘Internationals’ being the site of 
ideological conflict and coordination throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
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(Braunthal 1974). Electorally speaking, during the post-war years, particularly at the 
time of the negotiations of the treaties on the ECSC and EDC, Christian Democratic 
governments dominated in the democratic continental members of the Council of 
Europe, whereas Social Democratic governments dominated ‘non-continental’ Eu-
rope, i.e. Scandinavia and the UK. 
Figure 6.2 Political Map of Post-War Europe late 1950 
 
Note: Map of  Post-war Europe in the second half  of  1950 including all democratic 
European OEEC Members.  Countries are shaded  according to the party composition 
of  governing cabinets according to their party family in late 1950. Mixed cabinets are 
those in which the governing coalition in which Social Democratic, Christian Dem o-
cratic and other party families share government res ponsibilities.  The continental 
prevalence of Christian Democracy extends to the mixed Cabinets.  On the continent, 
the Netherlands were governed by a coalition of  Social Democratic,  Christian Dem o-
cratic,  and Liberal parties; France by a coalition of  Liberal ,  Christian Democratic, 
and Social Democratic parties; Switzerland by a coalition of Christian Democratic, 
Social Democratic,  Liberal and Conservative parties.  The government in Finland was 
based on a coalition of Agrarian, Liberal and Social Democratic Pa rties. 
Other political families did not match the degree of transnational organization in Eu-
rope outside of supranational parliaments, i.e. the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the ECSC parliament. Members of conservative parties did 
not develop a distinct transnational organization, their transnational activities being 
largely confined to the European Movement. Liberal parties on the other hand, initi-
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ated a process for the foundation of a Liberal international, the so-called ‘Liberal 
World Union’. Upon the foundation of the European Parliament, an independent 
group called ‘Mouvement Liberal pour l’Europe unie’ (MLEUE) was founded 
(Hrbek 1988, 455). Publications of the ‘Liberal World Union’ suggest only highly 
sporadic and unevenly attended meetings that did not concern themselves to a signif-
icant degree with questions of European integration (Jacobson 1962, 585 ff.). Liberal 
thought, however, played a distinct and highly important role, partially in the form of 
actors engaged in the ELEC, partially in the form of actors distributed across the re-
maining transnational groups – as the previous chapter has already indicated – and 
partially by influencing the political thought that was relevant in the transatlantic 
context. Christian Democracy as well as Social Democrats, on the other hand, were 
engaged under the banner of distinct groups within the European Movement and en-
gaged the question of Europe, inter alia, explicitly as a question of transnational par-
ty strategy. Their different traditions, geographical spread and distinct ideologies, 
however, implied that the views about the best organizations of post-war Europe dif-
fered. 
 
Transnational Social Democracy 
Social Democracy as a political tradition was founded in the 19
th
 century with an 
explicit commitment to internationalism. In this sense, the history of Social Democ-
racy can be narrated in terms of the histories of the various ‘Internationals’. Begin-
ning with the foundation of the Second International in 1889 in Paris, internationalist 
commitments in Socialist ideology were reflected in frequent attempts at coordina-
tion of Socialist party strategies against their respective domestic governments. Much 
to the bewilderment of left radicals, these efforts failed spectacularly as Socialist 
parties did not adhere to a widely accepted transnational pledge to oppose national 
mobilization for the First World War (e.g. Trotsky 2012, 233 ff.). The inter-war peri-
od then put international Social Democracy in the middle of the ideological conflict 
of the 20
th
 century, which was reflected in a sometimes violent struggle with Com-
munist parties organized in the so-called ‘third international’, the COMINTERN, 
whereas Social Democratic parties entered governmental responsibilities and found-
ed the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) to continue efforts of transnational 
coordination. This effort, however, was comparatively feeble and failed to achieve 
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similar successes as before the First World War (Sassoon 1996, 27). The concomi-
tant rise of fascism never allowed transnational socialism to regain its prewar pres-
tige (Hobsbawm 1995, 105). However, internationalism as an ideology retained a 
prominent place in Social Democratic party programs. For example, an inter-war 
party program of the SPD, the so called ‘Heidelberger Program’ of 1925, called for 
‘the creation of European economic unity in order to create the United States of Eu-
rope and thereby accomplish a solidarity of interests of the peoples of all conti-
nents.’91  
Efforts to take up the internationalist tradition were continued immediately after the 
Second World War. Because several continental Social Democrats had spent the war 
in exile in the UK, the first conferences were organized in London by Labour leaders 
under the label COMISCO in 1946 (Loth 1977, 67). The Socialist International (SI) 
was formed in 1951, with global membership of Social Democratic parties, at a high-
ly publicized congress in Frankfurt (Braunthal 1971, 237). It comprised delegates 
from the continent, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, and initially Eastern Europe, 
instead of the continentally limited Christian Democrats (Braunthal 1971, 177). Del-
egates were usually prominent party representatives from the participating countries, 
usually comprising respective country party leaders and their deputies. The universal 
and broader appeal, however, produced a heterogeneity of views, especially on the 
question of Europe. 
Initially, the debate among Social Democrats centered on the possibility of establish-
ing a distinct ‘Socialist Foreign Policy’ along a so-called ‘third way’ in Europe be-
tween the capitalist West and the Communists East, both in terms of its socio-
economic order as well as its foreign policy (e.g. Sassoon 1996, 167 ff.). Early prin-
cipled debates did not center on the European questions but were more concerned 
with differentiating themselves from communism by establishing that Marx was no 
longer the single basis of socialism and that Democracy was the prerequisite of So-
cialism (Braunthal 1971, 245). As the future bipolar world order became increasingly 
obvious by the late 1940s, it became clear very quickly that transnational Social De-
mocracy was highly divided on the question of the question of Europe, ranging from 
seeing in a united Europe the only answer to current geopolitical challenges on the 
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 The German program demanded “die aus wirtschaftlichen Ursachen zwingend gewordene Schaf-
fung der europäischen Wirtschaftseinheit, für die Bildung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, um 
damit zur Interessensolidarität der Völker aller Kontinente zu gelangen.“ (SPD 1925). 
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one hand, to considering these efforts as ‘capitalist traps’ on the other hand (Griffiths 
1993a). Although the founding congress of the Socialist International in 1951 in 
Frankfurt explicitly stated that the principle of undivided sovereignty in International 
relations had to be overcome, the concrete implications would cause deep divisions 
among European Social Democrats.
92
 Consistent with the divided pattern of group 
membership that the transnational Social Democratic group exhibited in the analysis 
of the previous chapter, transnational Social Democracy was strongly influenced by 
all three models of Europe described above.  
An additional factor contributed to the lack of a cohesive transnational Social Demo-
cratic strategy. The inclusion of delegates from Italy and then Germany into the In-
ternational was a hotly contested issue from the beginning. In Italy, coexistence with 
the relatively strong presence of the Communist Party resulted in a Socialist Party 
that was divided over its allegiance in the emerging Cold War, with some of its 
members attending the COMINTERN. As a result, the Italian radical Socialists from 
the PSI were excluded from the International (Braunthal 1971, 231). In the case of 
Germany, the positions taken by SPD leader Schumacher – in particular on the ques-
tion of German unity – did not sit well with several Social Democrats, particularly 
those, such as Jules Moch, who had lost family to the Gestapo. German delegates 
were only admitted in late 1947 (Loth 1990, 438). Ideological differences com-
pounded personal animosities: rumors indicate that French SFIO leader Guy Mollet 
had privately reported that if the SPD under Schumacher came to power, it would be 
the “supreme catastrophe” whereas Schumacher referred to Mollet as “Oberlehrer” 
(Orlow 2000, 144). Mutual accusations of egoistic nationalism accompanied the dif-
ficult relationship (Ibid.). 
Thus, ideological heterogeneity went hand in hand with strained trust. On one side of 
the ideological split of transnational Social Democracy were those leaning towards 
federalist models identified in the previous chapter as the Federalist Social Demo-
crats. Apart from their activities in federalist organizations, these individuals founded 
a separate Social Democratic federalist organization, the Mouvement Socialiste pour 
les États-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE) in 1947 (Loth 1977, 165). The MSEUE remained 
a formally autonomous organization, allowing members of other parties to participate 
in its congresses (Jacobson 1962, 545). Part of the original motivation was the fact 
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 “Das System uneingeschränkter nationaler Souveränität muß überwunden werden.” (SPD 1951, 4). 
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that the Socialist International had refused to send official delegates to the Hague 
conference in 1947 (Griffiths 1993a, 12). Thus the final resolution of the inaugural 
MSEUE congress in Montrouge in June 1947 called for a complete “ transfer of na-
tional sovereignties to a federal organism” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 293). The reso-
lution included an explicit link of the federal project to the German question by for-
mulating an “Appeal to the German people” claiming that avoidance of future wars 
could only be achieved “by integrating [Germany] in a wider community with other 
peoples, into which she will merge the lager part of her sovereignty.”(Lipgens and 
Loth 1990, 295). Moreover, the resolution further stated, 
“That a socialist, therefore peaceful Europe, which will have no hostility towards any 
country, will not serve as the instrument of any policy of hegemony, no matter from 
whence it comes. In face of the growing dangers it makes an appeal to the peoples of Eu-
rope to realize their community of interest and destiny, of their essential unity in order to 
bring to the actual problems the imperative solutions which present themselves and which 
may be summed up in two words: Socialism and Federalism.” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
291) 
Institutionally, the professed goal was the creation of a European political authority 
and election for a European constituent assembly (Jacobson 1962, 546; Loth 1977, 
201).
93
 The thinking was both geopolitical – seeking Franco-German reconciliation 
and European independence – as well as striving toward the creation of a socialist 
Europe.
94
 Thus, the MSEUE fused socialist ideology with federalist ideology, a fact 
that is reflected in multiple cross-memberships of key individuals in the MSEUE 
with the transnational the federalist group identified in the previous chapter, and their 
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 Gérard Jaquet about the aims of the MSEUE and the European left in his interview, “Nous avons 
combattu. dès le début de mouvement européen et donc la Gauche européenne qui en faisait partie, ont 
combattu pour une Europe de caractère fédéral. Une véritable fédération européenne dans les do-
maines les plus essentiels de la vie de nos nations. Nous avons demandé l'élection d'un Parlement 
européen élu au suffrage universel.” (Jaquet 1997). 
94
 As Gerard Jaquet explained it later “J'étais partisan de l'Europe pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, je 
crois que c'était la possibilité d'une réconciliation franco-allemande. On sortait de la guerre, la France 
et l'Allemagne s'étaient battues a plusieurs reprises, et cruellement, et je pensais qu'il fallait arriver à 
une réconciliation véritable, et qu'on ne pourra' aboutir à cette réconciliation véritable que si la France 
et l'Allemagne se retrouvaient dans une même communauté. Une communauté assez forte pour s'im-
poser dans le monde. Et que Ile jour ou les intérêts français seraient lies aux intérêts allemands, toutes 
les vieilles querelles disparaitraient. Deuxième raison: je pensais également que dans le monde mo-
derne qui naissait de la guerre, l'avenir allait appartenir aux grands ensembles économiques, et qu'une 
Europe unie serait probablement plus facilement orientée vers le progrès économique et la prospérité. 
Une troisième raison, c'est que devant les deux superpuissances, l'Amérique d'un cote, et la Russie de 
l'autre, je pensais que l'Europe unie aurait plus d'influence dans le monde pour s'imposer, et avoir une 
diplomatie commune réelle. Et puis j'étais Socialiste, et je pensais que cette Europe qui devait être une 
Europe de caractère fédéral devrait s'orienter dans la voie du socialisme, et qu'il fallait créer un mou-
vement qui représente cette politique. C'est ainsi que la Gauche européenne a été créé et est devenue 
membre du mouvement européen.” (Jaquet 1997). 
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documented activities in resistance movements, such as Henri Frenay, Claude 
Baurdet, Gerard Jaquet, and Henry Marc (Loth 1977, 199; Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
282). 
Nowhere, however, did the federal view dominate in any Socialist party in Western 
Europe. In the Netherlands, leading Social Democrats such as Marinus van der Goes 
van Naters and Henri Brugmans constituted prominent voices because of their posi-
tions within the party but did not attract overwhelming rank and file support and their 
proposals were criticized on grounds of lack of realism in official party memoranda 
in the late 1940’s (Asbek Brusse 1993, 108). Moreover, these attitudes found strong 
resistance within the larger transnational Social Democratic Community. Prominent 
national Social Democratic leaders such as Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer in 
Germany, most of the British Labour party under Prime Minister Ernest Bevin, key 
French figures such as Salomon Grumbach and Jules Moch, Victor Larock, and the 
long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem Drees were largely opposed (Sassoon 1996, 
168, 212). Kurt Schumacher’s denunciation of the ECSC institutions as ‘conserva-
tive, capitalist, clerical’ is emblematic of this attitude (Ibid.). Due to this opposition, 
the Socialist International did not participate in the European Movement whereas the 
MSEUE officially send delegates in November 1948 to the Liaison committee (Loth 
1977, 201). German SPD members Fritz Erler and Carlo Schmid had received per-
sonal invitations to attend the congress at The Hague, but did not do so at the behest 
of the SPD Präsidium (Orlow 2000, 142). Paul-Henri Spaak, despite being invited as 
then Foreign Minister of Belgium, did not participate at The Hague Congress since 
the Bureau of the Belgian BSP-PSB recommended to its members to abstain 
(Mommens and Minten 1993, 141). 25 members of the British Labour Party partici-
pated unofficially against the official decision of the party (Dumoulin 1999, 417). 
Paul Ramadier of the French SFIO participated in the first congress of the European 
Movement in 1948, which was ill-received by SFIO leadership under Mollet (Orlow 
2000, 142). In reaction to the first initiatives for the Council of Europe, the 1949 So-
cialist International rejected an initiative introduced by proponents of supranational 
institutions welcoming the Council of Europe initiative (Steininger 1979b, 152). So-
cialist French Minister of the Interior Jules Moch rejected the participation of a Ger-
man delegation in the Council of Europe which in turn contributed the rejection of 
the very idea of the Council of Europe by the German SPD (Steininger 1979, 147). 
These quarrels within transnational Social Democracy largely prevented the Socialist 
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International from playing a critical role in the early integration process. According-
ly, initial meetings of the COMISCO were largely characterized by efforts to contain 
the internal conflict (Bossuat 2003, 418). When the Socialist International was re-
founded in Frankfurt in 1951, the debate about its core principles virtually ignored 
the European question for lack of agreement among the participants (Braunthal 1971, 
245). 
Thus, while the concern for reconstruction and workers’ welfare remained the com-
mon denominator, the heterogeneity of Socialist views on Europe differed widely. In 
the UK, opposition to early European initiatives dominated partly because these orig-
inated from Churchill and the conservative Tories (Wurm 1988, 632). The perception 
was that a united Europe would be a ‘bourgeois’ undertaking detrimental to Europe-
an workers’ interests (Morgan 1984, 392; Ceadel 1992 32). As Labour’s promise had 
been based programmatically on the founding of an economically just welfare socie-
ty, a ‘new Jerusalem’ after the hardships of the war, workers’ welfare was valued 
higher than lofty European ambitions (Judt 2005, 161). As Labour had governmental 
power, European supranational institutions would only be a potential obstacle. For 
example, Denis Healey, then head of the international department of the Labour Par-
ty, wrote in 1951 in an official party document that  
“[…] the nation is by far the most important entity in world affairs. […] To the extent that 
the internal structure of a given state satisfies the need of the workers within it, to that ex-
tent its socialist party will tend to put the national interest before international solidarity. 
It is no accident that in their approach to European Unity since 1945 the socialist parties 
of Britain and Scandinavia have been most conservative – for they have the most to con-
serve.” (quoted in Wurm 1988, 633, 634).  
In this sentence, Healey had characterized a position that tended to take prevail 
among British and Scandinavian Social Democrats, a conception that is radically 
different from the resolution of the MSEUE quoted above. The main reasoning in-
fers, from the goal of securing workers’ welfare, that national sovereignty is valued 
higher than international, and by extension, European solidarity. This view was dom-
inant within the Labour party. While the previous chapter has indicated that a notable 
proportion of elite members of the Federalist Socialist Community was British, these 
figures were in a minority in the UK and more of a nuisance to Labour party leader-
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ship and never attained influential positions (Morgan 1984, 390).
95
 Nor did it ever 
gain influence in the Scandinavian countries, who, to the contrary, grew ever more 
suspicious of the Socialist merits of the European rhetoric of their continental coun-
terparts (Sassoon 1996, 197). Hence, Hugh Dalton, who presided over the Labour 
delegation to the Council of Europe, understood his role as actively working against 
deeper erosion of sovereignty. In fact, Dalton and Healey published a pamphlet in 
1950 arguing for socialist opposition to the Schuman Plan (Newman 1993, 166). 
On the continent, the German SPD was, in terms of the pronouncements of its lead-
ership, more in tune with the intergovernmental rhetoric put forth by Labour. Thus, 
although its rhetoric internationalist, the position of the SPD within the Socialist In-
ternational was largely tenuous because Schumacher insisted on unification as one 
condition of German participation in international institutions (Steininger 1979, 
171).
96
 Moreover, Schumacher’s rhetoric was acerbic at times. For example, he pub-
licly rejected the widespread ‘European enthusiasm’ which, according to Schumach-
er, was deliberately created so that Germany could be “dragged by the tail of the 
French nag through the gates of Strasbourg”.97 Needless to say, the nationalist innu-
endo in the SPD leadership’s public rhetoric was not lost on their French, Dutch, and 
Belgian counterparts; certainly not five years after the Second World War had ended. 
Some even questioned the value of the Socialist International for these reasons 
(Steininger 1979b, 177). 
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 The MSUE was founded with active participation of British Socialists such as Bob Edwards (Inde-
pendent Labour Party) and F.A. Ridley largely in opposition the Foreign Policy of the Labour Party 
(Loth 1977, 165). 
96
 In a speech at the Bundesparteitag of the SPD in May 1950, Kurt Schumacher stated “Die heutige 
Zerreißung Deutschlands ist nicht nur eine nationale Schwächung der Deutschen. Die Illusion, daß ein 
geteiltes Deutschland ein leicht beherrschbares und ungefährliches Deutschland sei, geht allmählich 
auch bei den Opportunitätspolitikern und bei den Alliierten zurück. Ein geteiltes Deutschland ist doch 
ein geteiltes Europa und eine geteilte Welt, mit all den wunden Stellen und Krankheitsherden, die eine 
solche Zerreißung mit sich bringt. Die Teilung Deutschlands ist ein Unglück für Europa und die Welt, 
und die Einheit Deutschlands ist die Aufgabe der Demokratie in Europa und der Welt.”  He stated 
further “Wir Deutschen bekennen uns offen zu dem guten Willen der Aufgabe von Souveränitätsrech-
ten zugunsten einer übernationalen staatlichen Ordnung in demselben Umfang, in dem die anderen 
Beteiligten ihre Souveränitätsrechte auch reduzieren.” He qualified this commitment, however, by 
naming German reunification a condition for any assent to further European Institutions “Ja, wir beja-
hen diesen Staat, in dem wir jetzt leben, als Ausgangspunkt einer höheren nationalen Einheit, und wir 
bejahen diese höhere nationale Einheit als Ausgangspunkt für eine noch höhere internationale Verbin-
dung.” (Schumacher 1950). 
97
 Kurt Schumacher in the same speech at the Bundesparteitag of the SPD in May 1950 “Es ist dieser 
Hurra-Enthusiasmus, der jetzt in Deutschland zu dem Zwecke erzeugt wird, um sich am Schwanz des 
französischen Gauls durch das Portal des Europarates in Straßburg schleifen zu lassen.” (Schumacher 
1950). 
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The relatively dominant position of the Präsidium under Schumacher, Ollenhauer 
and Wehner – representing Germany at the Socialist International - ensured that 
these staunchly intergovernmental commitments remained the core party line in the 
Bundestag. However, there was substantial opposition to this course, particularly 
around the mayors of the city states of Bremen (Wilhelm Kaisen), Hamburg (Max 
Brauer) and Berlin (Ernst Reuter) who had an independent power base (Hrbek 1993, 
68; Orlow 2000, 165). Kaisen and Schmid were leading members of the German 
Federalist section of the Europa Union (see previous chapter, section 5.2.1). While 
the mayors of the city states could afford to be more vocal critics of the SPD’s offi-
cial course of rejecting European developments such as the Council of Europe , Car-
lo Schmid, as a member of the Präsidium and the Bundestag was in a more difficult 
position, sometimes leading to rhetorical ‘embarrassments’ in the German Europa 
Union that were usually instigated by CDU member Heinrich von Brentano because 
of an official SPD position on Europe Schmid had to defend in the meetings of the 
Europa Union (Weber 1996; 434). Public opposition to Schumacher’s course never 
went ‘unpunished’.98 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, similar internal divisions were visible. Differences 
in assessments of the Council of Europe in the Dutch PvdA, for example, prevented 
an official resolution on the party’s position on the Council of Europe throughout its 
first years. When MSEUE member Marinus van der Goes van Naters lobbied in early 
1950 that this issue should finally be decided, the party’s leadership declined out of 
fear that this would “expose party differences to the public and might result in a 
binding resolution” (quoted in Asbek Brusse 1993, 112). The Dutch PvdA leader-
ship, most notably Willem Drees, was absent from all transnational organizations, 
and thus largely followed the intergovernmentalist lines of their British counterparts 
(Asbek Brusse and Griffiths 1993, 137). In Belgium, a similar pattern was visible, 
pitting intergovernmentalist ‘unionists’ such as Henri Rolin, Edouard Anseele of 
Ghent, and Achille van Acker Belgian Unionists, against the BSP-PSB leadership 
such as Paul-Henri Spaak and Max Buset, and Raymond Rifflet (UEF, MSEUE) 
(Mommens and Minten 1993, 142). 
                                                 
98
 For example, Wilhelm Kaisen’s advocacy for the SPD sending delegates to the Consultative As-
sembly of the Council of Europe resulted in Schumacher preventing Kaisen to be reelected to the SPD 
Präsidium (Orlow 2000, 166) 
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In between the extremes of federalism and intergovernmentalism, a number of Social 
Democrats went along a more pragmatic route. Social Democratic leaders such as 
Guy Mollet or Paul-Henri Spaak remained committed into the early 1950’s to the 
creation of a wider Europe, including the UK and were willing, due to a wider social-
ist solidarity, to compromise on the institutional plane, a move that socialist federal-
ist leaders, like Gérard Jaquet or André Philipp, were not willing to make (Steininger 
1979, 151). These differences led to confrontations within the Consultative Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe (Loth 1977, 271).
99
 Initially, the more pragmatic actors 
represented inter alia by Paul Henri Spaak, preferred the diplomatic venues in order 
to advance towards the goal of limiting sovereignty institutionally. Spaak thus ac-
quired an early decisive role within the European Movement.
100
 Even these positions 
were sufficient to generate conflict: far from subscribing to the broad federalist prin-
ciples espoused by the MSEUE, figures such as Spaak or Van der Goes van Naters 
sought to advance, step by step, the institutional ‘lock-in’ of cooperation and thus to 
convince their British and Scandinavian colleagues in the Socialist International to 
accept the limited application of majority decisions, without success (Steininger 
1979, 148). 
The fact that transnational Social Democracy was divided among all three ideal-
typical institutional dispositions was particularly felt in France. For the SFIO, the 
division was exacerbated by its internal structure into partially independent district 
organizations (‘fédérations’): districts in areas of heavy industry competed with 
communists whereas districts in central France largely relied on lower middle class 
and public service employees (Orlow 2000, 61). The party resembled the threefold 
                                                 
99
 As Gérard Jaquet explained in his interview “Nous avons eu des discussions sérieuses sur la ma-
nière de faire l'Europe qui m'ont notamment opposées à Guy Mollet. On parlait de ce qu'on appelait 
alors les ‘autorités spécialisées ’. On parlait du plan Schuman, notamment. Les anglais avaient dit 
‘Nous n'irons pas’ […]. Et moi je disais ‘C'est insuffisant, il faut faire une véritable communauté eu-
ropéenne de caractère fédéral, avec une véritable diplomatie commune, avec une défense commune, et 
avec une communauté sur le plan économique’. Mais on ne pourra le faire qu'a six parce que les an-
glais ne marcheront pas. Mais Guy Mollet nous a répondu ‘Pour une véritable communauté euro-
péenne, il faut les Anglais. Sans les Anglais on n'ira pas’. II y a eu de sérieuses controverses entre 
nous, notamment a l'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe, même en séance publique, des controverses 
avec Guy Mollet et quelques autres sur l'idée: Est-ce qu'on fait l'Europe sans les Anglais ou pas?” 
(Jaquet 1997). 
100
 Referring to the Congress at The Hague from which Spaak abstained out of loyalty to his party 
line, he pronounced “Lorsque le comité du congrès de La Haye aura étudié son projet et l’aura mis au 
point, il faudrait qu’il communique aux différents gouvernements. Je crois pouvoir m’engager, au 
nom de gouvernement belge, à soutenir ce projet et à aider à sa réalisation en le soumettant, au besoin, 
aux gouvernements des autres pays et en tâchant de soutenir le projet par la voie diplomatique.” 
(Dumoulin 1999, 418). 
Chapter 6 Transnational Networks II: A Qualitative Assessment 
 
270 
 
division into intergovernmentalists, such as Jules Moch, or Vincent Auriol that were 
from the beginning skeptical towards delegations of sovereignty in the context of the 
Council of Europe. Their reasoning was largely related to aftermath of the war. Dur-
ing the early reconstruction period, they had instigated the campaign “First us, then 
Germany”101, that drew heavy intra-party criticism from leading SFIO figures such 
as André Philipp and Léon Blum (Loth 1977, 197, 285). On the other end, the SFIO 
contained several prominent federalist such as Gerard Jaquet and André Philipp, who 
had played a key role in the foundation of the MSEUE , whereas the party leadership 
and specifically Guy Mollet was in the paradoxical position of emphasizing suprana-
tional organization, the need for majority decisions, democratic control, and British 
membership alike (Loth 1977, 250). 
In short, at both the national and the transnational level, transnational Social Democ-
racy was uniform in terms of its main concern – workers’ welfare and post-war re-
construction- but ideologically divided about the question of Europe, confirming the 
conclusion reached in the previous chapter based on the affiliation data for transna-
tional Social Democrats. Partially as a result of these differences, Socialist parties as 
well as the Socialist International became the most vocal critics of the democratic 
credentials of the European institutions, much more vocal than the Christian Demo-
crats, for example. It was the least common denominator that the clashing factions 
were able to find, proponents of integration because they subscribed partially to the 
ideal of a federal democracy whereas for opponents it was a convenient rhetorical 
device by which to discredit a political development they opposed (see Jacobson 
1962, 559, 581; Bossuat 2003, 425). 
 
Transnational Christian Democracy 
A novelty in the political landscape in post-war Europe, transnational Christian De-
mocracy emerged from a programmatic recast of European confessional parties seek-
ing to appeal to all Christian voters, Catholics and Protestants alike (Papini 1996; 
Kaiser 2007; Kaiser and Leucht 2008). Its origin lay in inter-war considerations with-
in Political Catholicism and the Vatican contending that the unity of Christian parties 
was a necessary counterforce to Communist parties. Thus, domestic initiatives to 
                                                 
101
 Own translation from “Nous d’abord, l’Allemagne après.” 
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found genuinely Christian Democratic parties had a transnational dimension from the 
beginning: Christian Democratic actors explicitly perceived themselves in direct 
competition with transnational Social Democracy (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 
2001). 
As the map displayed in Figure 6.2 had shown, Christian Democracy was largely a 
continental phenomenon, including Christian Democrats from Austria and Switzer-
land. Organizationally, transnational Christian Democracy had two main pillars. The 
main organization was the ‘Nouvelles Équipes Internationales’ (NEI). The NEI were 
intended as public ‘device’ to influence public opinion and key decision-makers as 
well as to coordinate national party strategies by releasing programmatic statements 
intended as summarizing the positions of all participating parties as well as preparing 
annual congresses to which the leadership of all Christian Democratic parties was 
invited and appeared regularly (Gehler 2001; Gehler and Kaiser 2001). Intended to 
become the direct competitor to the Socialist International, official membership of 
European Christian Democratic parties was, however, inconsistent as there were dif-
ferences regarding the necessary degree of institutionalization at the foundational 
congress of the NEI in Lucerne, Switzerland (Papini 1996, 51; Kaiser 2007, 196). 
Differences largely concerned the degree of its formalization and purpose: the French 
MRP and Belgian PSC-CVP were opposed to the NEI being a formal party organiza-
tion to which the national parties had to establish a formal link which was exactly the 
project the more conservative Austrian ÖVP – represented by Felix Hurdes – and the 
Swiss SKVP – Martin Rosenberg – had sought to build (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
47). The latter sought concrete a formalization of the structure with official party 
membership, the former sought loose informal contacts in order to meet and ex-
change information “between fellow Christian Democrats who enjoyed a certain in-
fluence in their respective countries”.102 French Christian Democrats in particular 
feared losing votes by being officially associated with religious catholic conserva-
tives with close to ties the Vatican, i.e. their Swiss and Austrian counterparts (Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004, 46). As Dutch representative August De Schryver put it, the NEI 
was supposed to become “a center of influence and a community of ideas” while 
                                                 
102
 As expressed by Beglian PSC-CVP General Secretary Désirée Lamalle “sous la forme d’échanges 
d’informations, de rencontres et d’amitié entre personnalités qui jouissent dans leur nation respective 
d’une influence sérieuse” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 46). 
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avoiding the perception of being “an organization under Roman authority”.103 As a 
result, it was left open to individual parties whether to name official representatives 
or allowing for individual attendance. As a result, all continental Christian Democrat-
ic parties with the exception of the Belgians (PSC-CVP) and the French (MRP) be-
came official members. 
In the late 1940’s until the early 1950’s, NEI meetings and congresses were well vis-
ited by delegates from NEI member parties as well as regularly accompanied by 
French and Belgian members, most notably the prospective head of the MRP Teitgen 
and, on rare occasions of annual conferences, by Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zee-
land. However, increasingly lackluster attendance led to complaints by the early 
1950’s about the lack of involvement of the national parties as the focus of their ac-
tivities shifted to the European parliament (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 47, 276).
104
 By 
the mid 1950’s, the status of the NEI declined as the Christian Democratic Group in 
the ECSC parliament gained importance and complaints about lack of attendance 
start to occur relatively often. 
While the NEI were founded to organize political party strategies and advocate 
common Christian Democratic policy, the second arm of the Christian Democrat was 
the so-called Geneva Circle. Initially constituted through personal contacts between 
Victor Koutzine and Johann Jakob Kindt-Kiefer, it developed into a clandestine 
meeting of representatives of Christian Democratic parties in Geneva. The meetings 
were so suspicious that they even caused speculations by the Swiss police about their 
nature (Gehler and Kaiser 2001; Kaiser 2007, 206). The purpose, declaratively, was 
to build “a non-public contact committee of relevant European party representatives 
[…], making an effort to discuss concrete political tasks and enforce the agreed 
measures”.105 Its existence being denied at the time, its first clandestine meetings 
were held on the initiatives of the head of the Swiss CVP (Altermatt 2000, 95). The 
participants initially included high profile figures such as Konrad Adenauer, George 
                                                 
103
 Own translations from “une centre de rayonnement et une communauté de pensées” and “une or-
ganisation sous l’obédience romaine” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 48). 
104
 Blankenhorn noted in his diary in September 1951 “Mit dem, was die zentrale Leitung der NEI 
sich unter dem Kampf um das Abendland vorstellt, ist es nicht getan; auch der Plan Bichets, das Ge-
neralsekretariat in Paris durch einige Vetreter der führenden christlichen Vertreter zu verstärken, er-
scheint mir nicht ausreichend.“ (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 284). 
105
 Own translation from “ein nicht an die Öffentlichkeit tretendes Kontakt-Komitee maßgeblicher 
europäischer Parteienvertreter […], welches bemüht ist, konkrete politische Aufgaben zu erörtern und 
die vereinbarten Maßnahmen durchzusetzen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 59). 
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Bidault, the Dutch Emmanuel Sassen, the French Robert Bichet, the Dutch August de 
Schyver, and the Italian Enrico Tosi. Reportedly, Adenauer attended the first meeting 
by entering Switzerland – in 1948 – with false papers (Ibid). Adenauer later regularly 
sent two of his closest associates, namely subsequent CDU/CSU and German For-
eign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and his first aide (‘Persönlicher Referent’) and 
later head of the ‘Grundsatzabteilung’ in the ‘Auswärtige Amt’, Herbert Blanken-
horn. Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi never attended the meetings (Gehler 
2001). They were, however, reportedly provided with protocols of the meetings regu-
larly as the exchanges were perceived to be important for the creation and mainte-
nance of trust between the leading European Christian Democrats (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 60).
106
 The purpose was to serve as an opportunity to meet secretly and build 
trust among key figures of Christian Democracy without exerting direct influence on 
the interstate bargains (Gehler and Kaiser 2001, 777). 
As suggested by the network analysis mentioned earlier, transnational Christian 
Democrats were, relatively speaking, far more ideologically cohesive than transna-
tional Social Democracy. Moreover, this relative ideological cohesion was accompa-
nied by a more concerted and much more successful effort to rebuild trust between 
the German side and the Western European Christian Democrats than was the case 
for Social Democracy. The first NEI Congress in Lucerne in 1948 was already large-
ly successful in this regard. As Adenauer expressed it in his speech at the Congress, 
 “[We are] deeply touched by the friendly reception […]. This reception gives us the im-
pression that this convention takes place among Christians and is carried by the Christian 
ideals of justice and love. I welcome it with great gratitude that neither in the presenta-
tions nor in the debate the question of a German collective guilt was raised. As a German, 
as a European, and first and foremost, as a Christian, I would have to refuse this accusa-
tion of a collective guilt since large parts of the German people, and particularly its Chris-
tian parts, put up bold and brave resistance against the Nazi regime.”107  
                                                 
106
 Protocol of the Geneva Circle, March 24
th
 1952 “Fontanet: Georges Bidault, Maurice Schumann et 
Robert Schuman, ainsi que le secrétaire général du MRP reçoivent chaque fois un compte rendu dé-
taillé de no travaux. Tosi : Chaque fois qu’il n’y a pas ici un représentant direct et qualifie de la partie, 
nous en faisons une relation complète au Secrétaire Général du parti, à De Gasperi et à Taviani […]. 
Nous pensons que des contacts permanent sont plus propices à créer la confiance et l’amitié que des 
contacts occasionnels.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 320). 
107
 Own translation from “[Wir sind] berührt von der freundlichen Aufnahme […]. Diese Aufnahme 
hat uns das Gefühl vermittelt, daß diese Zusammenkunft sich unter Christen vollzieht und von den 
Idealen der christlichen Gerechtigkeit und Liebe getragen ist. Ich begrüße es dankbar, daß weder in 
den Referaten noch in der Aussprache die Frage einer Kollektivschuld des deutschen Volkes ange-
schnitten wurde. Als Deutscher, als Europäer, und vor allem als Christ müsste ich den Vorwurf der 
Kollektivschuld ablehnen, da weite Teile des deutschen Volkes und vor allem seine christlichen Teile 
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As Adenauer indicated, three elements seemed to have been important. A key part 
was the construction of myth of ‘the good’ vs. ‘the bad’ German. The Dutch repre-
sentative P.J.S. Serrarens, for example, concurred with Adenauer, stipulating that 
there was not only Catholic opposition to the Hitler Regime but a veritable resistance 
movement in which Catholics played an important role.
108
 This distinction contribut-
ed to a relatively straightforward moral rehabilitation of German Christian Demo-
crats after the war (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 64). The second element can be found in 
the ideological roots of political Catholicism: contrary to Protestantism, Catholicism 
had never unabatedly embraced the main organizational form of industrialized politi-
cal life in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, namely the nation-state (Boyer 2001, 25). Third, 
the context of the Cold War lead to a strong reassertion of notions of Europe as the 
Christian ‘Abendland’ – thus a common identity and heritage – which required steps 
towards unification in defense from the ‘Soviet’ or ‘Bolshevik threat’ (Müller and 
Pflichta 1999; Gehler and Kaiser 2001). Thus, Adenauer could claim that the Ger-
man Christian Democrats constituted “the only reliable stronghold against com-
munism and materialism“.109 As he put it in 1951,  
 “I [believe] it necessary to present you in all detail the extent of danger that Christianity, 
the Christian culture, the entire Western Europe is facing. Because only if one really un-
derstands the extent of this threat, one can deal with it. […] [The] integration of Europe 
has to be accomplished, if we want to save the occidental culture and a Christian Europe. 
The European integration is the only salvation of the Christian Abendland.” 110 
The sense of impending threat is palpable, the connection to a felt cultural threat 
from the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War apparent. The integration of 
Germany into the West was thus essential to ensure the survival of European civiliza-
tion and European integration became the solution to the main ‘pedagogical’ problem 
                                                                                                                                          
mutig und energisch Widerstand gegen das Nazi-Regime geleistet haben.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
118) 
108
 He expressed it an NEI in Luxemburg in 1948 “[…]il faut dire, il y a eu une opposition catholique 
contre le national-socialisme; il y a même eu, plus tard, une résistance allemande dans laquelle les 
catholiques on joue un rôle.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 116). 
109
 Own translation from “das einzige zuverlässige Bollwerk gegen den Kommunismus und den Mate-
rialismus” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 118). 
110
 Own translatioan from “Ich [halte] es für nötig, Ihnen die Größe der Gefahren, die dem Christen-
tum, der christlichen Kultur, die Gesamt-West-Europa drohen, in aller Ausführlichkeit darzulegen, 
denn nur dann, wenn man die Größe der Gefahren wirklich erkennt, überlegt man sich auch, wie man 
dieser Gefahr begegnen kann […]. [Die] Integration Europas muss erreicht werden, wenn wir die 
abendländische Kultur und das christliche Europa retten wollen. Die Integration Europas ist die einzig 
mögliche Rettung des christlichen Abendlandes.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 294, 295). 
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of post-war Europe.
111
 As the Belgian Christian Democrat Désirée Lamalle put it in 
Lucerne, 
“Without a true and peaceful recovery of Germany, Europe is open to the barbaric Orient. 
Without the European hope, Germany can only hope for revenge. In brief, a European re-
surgence is not possible without a German resurgence, which in turn is not desirable if it 
is not in line with a new European order.” 112 
As a result, the first NEI Congress called for a ‘federated Germany in a federated 
Europe’.113 The institutional implications, moreover, seemed clear and different from 
those of the British unionists as well as the radical federalist blueprints. As Bidault 
put it in the Geneva Circle in December 1948 at a time when the term ‘supranational’ 
had not yet acquired significance in distinction to federalism, 
 “Concerning the political base of a European Union, the French theory proposes an 
elected Parliament whereas the British theory postulates a simple consultative council. 
We have to provide for an embryonic Parliament and an executive organ. Above all, the 
idea of abandoning national sovereignty in favor of international power has to be put in 
practice.” 114 
Adenauer agreed. In his terms “[…] the European Federation is the only means to 
solve the German problem […].” 115 
The relative ease by which the German Christian Democrats were welcomed was 
thus partially a matter of ideological disposition and common views regarding a cer-
tain ‘spiritual unity’ of the Western European ‘Abendland’ and its ‘natural enemy’ in 
the Communist East. Common appeals to the Christian and Catholic common ground 
as well as to Europe formed a key aspect in the rhetorical mutual affirmation of 
                                                 
111
 As Pierre Frieden put it at an NEI Congress in 1948 “Au fond, le problème est la: faire retacher le 
peuple allemande dans le courant chrétien […].” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 112). 
112
 Own translatioan from “Sans un relèvement plausible et harmonieux de l’Allemagne, l’Europe est 
ouverte a la barbarie orientale. Sans l’espoir européen, l’Allemagne ne peut songer qu’a une revanche 
[…] En bref, la renaissance européenne n’est pas possible sans renaissance allemande, mais celle-ci 
n’est pas souhaitable si elle ne se fait dans la ligne d’un nouvel ordre européen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 113) 
113
 “Ein föderativ strukturiertes Deutschland soll die Schaffung eines föderativen Europa begünstigen” 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 122). 
114
 Own translation from “A propos de la base politique de l’Union européenne, la thèse française 
propose un parlement élu et la thèse britannique un conseil simplement consultatif […]. Il faut prévoir 
un embryon de parlement et un organe exécutif. Il faut surtout faire entrer dans la pratique l’idée de 
l’abandon de souveraineté nationale au profit d’un pouvoir international.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
149). 
115
 Own translation from “ […] la Fédération européenne est le seul moyen de résoudre le problème 
allemand […]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 149). 
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common political goals.
116
 Moreover, in personal exchanges, the commitment to Eu-
rope was constructed in distinction to nationalistic sentiments, in all countries, 
against which, according to their self-perception, Christian Democratic political 
strategies were directed.
117
 In addition, these commonalities within the NEI and the 
Geneva Circle were partially a matter of self-selection: more nationalistically in-
clined actors – which existed in all Christian Democratic parties – were unlikely to 
participate neither in the NEI or in the Geneva Circle (Van Kemseke 2006, 29). In 
the German case in particular, it was also a result of straightforward politics: those 
who happened to disagree in any way with Adenauer’s foreign policy course were 
excluded from the illustrious circle at the behest of the Chancellor himself. This was 
the case for Josef Müller, the founding chairman of the CSU: once he publicly con-
sidered neutralist conceptions of Foreign Policy during the early 1950’s, Adenauer 
excluded him from further attending the Geneva Circle and explicitly tasked Brenta-
no with communicating with Müller’s contacts to Italian Christian Democrats such as 
Taviani and Piccioni (Guiotto 2006, 184, 185). 
The general concern for ‘unity’ of the Abendland and thus the ‘German question’ 
among Christian Democrats implied distinct institutional positions that differed from 
the intergovernmentalist positions of the British Unionists and the radicalism of the 
federalists. As the main thrust of the political goals of transnational Christian De-
mocracy was never to completely ‘overcome’ the nation-state, the terms federation 
and confederation were frequently used interchangeably. Christian Democratic no-
tions thus differed from the radical federalist conceptions. Although Teitgen rejected 
                                                 
116
 As Adenauer wrote in a letter to Schuman in August 1951 “Ich brauche kaum zu betonen, dass in 
den nächsten Wochen und Monaten Aufgaben und Probleme zu lösen sind, die für die Zukunft unse-
res europäischen Kontinents im Ganzen und das Schicksal unserer Völker im Einzelnen von außeror-
dentlicher, vielleicht entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Ich werte es hierbei als ein besonders günstiges, 
ja glückliches Zeichen, dass die ganze Last der gestellten Aufgaben auf den Schultern von Männern 
ruht, die wie Sie, unser gemeinsamer Freund Ministerpräsident De Gasperi und ich von dem Willen 
erfüllt sind, den Neuaufbau der europäischen Welt auf christlichen Grundlagen zu entwickeln und zu 
verwirklichen. Ich glaube, es hat wenige Kombinationen in der europäischen Geschichte gegeben, die 
so günstige Voraussetzungen für das Gelingen eines solchen Werkes bieten, als der gegenwärtige 
Augenblick; nie aber hat die Zeit so gedrängt wie heute und nie waren gegnerische Kräfte, die über-
wunden werden müssen, so stark wie heute.” (Schuman 1951a). 
117
 As Adenauer wrote in a letter to Schuman on August 21
st
 1951 “Seit zwei Jahren bemüht sich die 
Bundesregierung mit großer Beharrlichkeit, eine wahrhaft europäische Politik zu verfolgen. Sie hat 
sich hierin trotz einer heftigen Opposition nicht beirren lassen. […] Wenn die Europäer einmal begin-
nen, in europäischen Organisationen zusammenzuarbeiten, dann werden sie zwangsläufig zu Men-
schen werden, für die der nationalistische Egoismus zu einem Begriff wird, den man in die Vergan-
genheit verbannt. Die Fortschritte, die in den Verhandlungen in Paris erzielt worden sind und die ihren 
Niederschlag in dem Zwischenbericht der Pariser Konferenz über die europäische Verteidigungsge-
meinschaft gefunden haben, berechtigen zu den besten Hoffnungen” (Adenauer 1987, 115). 
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the ‘federal pact’ approach pursued by the federalists in front of the French Assem-
blée Nationale, he argued for an “an organized Europe with a structure similar to that 
of a state with mandatory powers, leading eventually to a confederation or, better, 
federation of Europe.” They “must possess the power to apply and execute deci-
sions” but not constitute a fully-fledged federation. “We cannot immediately set up 
the federal Europe which is our ideal. We must be content to advance more slowly 
[…]” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 103). Teitgen’s rhetoric was faithful to a resolution 
accepted at an NEI congress in The Hague the year earlier, which had proposed,  
“[…] the convocation of a European assembly […] that exclusively had a consultative 
character and no executive or legislative powers. Its role should consist of proposing 
practical measures that were to be put in place as soon as possible to establish an econom-
ic and political Union in a free and democratic Europe. […] Concerning mutual relation-
ships, states should overcome their nationalisms and build a federation or confederation 
that achieves unity but preserves diversity.”118 
The Christian Democratic position thus embraced the idea of democratically over-
coming European nationalist competition by forming a European Assembly in order 
to constitute a political union without wholeheartedly supporting the federalists in the 
quest for a federal pact.
119
 In sum, the consensus view called for the containment of 
national sovereignty that concurred with the design of the Council of Europe and 
rejected radical federalist notions.
120
 Hence, words of caution and opposition to the 
extreme federalist proposals were repeatedly uttered in the Geneva Circle.
121
 
                                                 
118
 Own translation from “die Einberufung einer europäischen Versammlung […], die ausschließlich 
beratenden Charakter und keinerlei ausführende oder gesetzgebende Befugnisse haben soll. Ihre Rolle 
soll darin bestehen, praktische Maßnahmen vorzuschlagen, die möglichst bald durchzuführen wären, 
um eine wirtschaftliche und politische Union des freien und demokratischen Europas zu verwirkli-
chen. […]Auf dem Gebiete ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen müssen die Staaten den Nationalismus 
überwinden und eine Föderation oder Konföderation bilden, die Einheit verwirklicht, ohne jedoch die 
Verschiedenheit zu beseitigen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 138, 140). 
119
 As the NEI New Year’s message (Neujahrsbotschaft) of 1949 said “Eine beratende europäische 
Versammlung muß noch in diesem Jahr zustande kommen. Europe darf nicht allein eine wirtschaftli-
che Einheit werden, es muß auch Schritt für Schritt einer politischen Einheit [..] zustreben.” (Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004, 156, 157). 
120
 Bidault stipulated in the Geneva Circle in March 1949 “L’union, c’est la simple affirmation d’une 
bonne volonté réciproque. La fédération ou la confédération suppose au contraire des institutions 
politiques stables devant lesquelles les Etats abandonneront une part de leur souveraineté nationale. Il 
va y avoir un Conseil de Gouvernement de l’Europe et une Assemblée Consultative dont les membres 
sont seront désignés par les parlements nationaux. Il est fâcheux que le Mouvement Européen à 
Bruxelles ait demandée que n’importe qui puisse être membre de l’Assemblée Consultative: il faut des 
hommes qualifiés, responsables et résolus à faire l’Europe.” Adenauer agreed (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 167). 
121
 In October 1948, Bidault said to Adenauer, “Bei der europäischen Zusammenarbeit soll man vor 
allem auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet sehr fortschrittlich, auf politischem Gebiet sehr vorsichtig sein. Mit 
einem europäischem Parlament soll man nicht zu weit gehen, man muss vor allem auch die Schwie-
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Although Christian Democracy was much more unified ideologically about the ques-
tion of Europe, there were differences as well. In the same vein as Social Democrats 
differed on the question of how to achieve workers’ welfare in their specific national 
contexts, there were differences within Christian Democracy as well. Clear-cut cases 
in point are the Swiss and Austrian Christian Democrats who participated in the 
meetings of the NEI and the Geneva Circle but never seriously considered joining the 
European project through their respective countries. Thus, the Swiss representatives 
within the Geneva Circle such as Rosenberg were wholly uninfluential minority with 
regard to the foreign policy considerations of the Swiss Catholic SKVP, whose 
members were simply uninterested in abrogating Swiss sovereignty (Salzmann 2006, 
64 ff.). Austrian Christian Democrats did not officially send delegates until the mid-
1950’s and, despite professions to the common Christian Democratic heritage, did 
not seriously contemplate membership in the European institutions to be created (e.g. 
Judt 2005, 260 ff.).  
Additionally, there were differences in emphasis between the German, Italian, and 
French representatives on the one hand, and those from the Netherlands and Belgium 
on the other, both with regard to the concrete political matters which should be de-
cided upon as well as over institutional questions. For example, in December 1948, 
Bidault and Adenauer agreed in the Geneva Circle on the necessity of abandoning 
the principle of national sovereignty. Belgian CVP member Robert Houben replied 
that the CVP had not yet formed a position on the subject and was curious about 
concrete institutional provisions and the possibility of British participation.
122
 Bidault 
and Adenauer proceeded to speculate on the possibility of a German defense contri-
bution in a European Army, which Houben rejected.
123
 Thus, the Geneva Circle al-
                                                                                                                                          
rigkeiten sehen, die einer europäischen Zusammenarbeit entgegenstehen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
146, 147). 
122
 As Bidault expressed it to Adenauer in December 1948 in the Geneva Circle “Il faut prévoir un 
embryon de parlement et un organe exécutif. Il faut surtout faire entrer dans la pratique l’idée de 
l’abandon de souveraineté nationale au profit d’un pouvoir international.” Adenauer: “La CDU est 
totalement d’accord sur la nécessité de l’Union européenne quelle qu’en soit la forme.” Houben: “Le 
PSC n’a pas pris officiellement position. […] quelles serait les moyens de réalisations? […] Quelle est 
la politique anglaise? Adenauer: Bidault à raison de dire qu’il faut d’abord commencer à agir. […] A 
souligner que la Fédération européenne est le seul moyen de résoudre le problème allemand en englo-
bant l’Allemagne dans un tout qui l’associe pacifiquement à une coopération internationale et en 
même temps l’immunise contre ses tentations traditionnelles” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 148, 152). 
123
 In December 1948, Adenauer rejected German rearmament as dangerous but speculated that the 
Russian danger might make it necessary and that the only viable path was to create a European Army. 
“Cette armée allemande devrait être intégrée dans une armée européenne pour éviter les risques due 
militarisme allemande. L’idée de l’Europe est accueillie en Allemagne avec chaleur non seulement 
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lowed German representatives such as Adenauer and Blank to speculate very early 
speculate a German contribution to defense within a European without repercussion 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 69). Other examples reveal that - during the height of the 
EDC negotiations - Dutch representative Sassen complained that 
“[…] we were offended by the attitude of the great powers vis-à-vis the small ones […]. 
Those, especially France, gave the impression to think of the small states as satellites. It 
was a disappointment for the Dutch, but also for the Belgians. This attitude of the big 
powers stands in stark contrast to a European federalism […].”124  
 
Summary 
In sum, there was a significant difference in the ideological cohesiveness between 
Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, as already indicated by the structural 
analysis of the previous chapter. For Christian Democrats, the common concern for 
the ‘unity’ of the Abendland seemed to ease reconciliation with German Christian 
Democrats. Whereas the institutional blueprints advocated in transnational Social 
Democracy were spread across the three models introduced early, the scope for con-
flict within Christian Democracy was narrower. Unity of the Abendland implied a 
containment of the nation-state and nationalist competition, not is abandonment: 
thus, Christian Democrats, by and large, thought that only some degree of sovereign-
ty had to be abandoned; at the same time, Christian Democrats supported, very early, 
that the delegation of sovereignty had to be matched by some form of representation 
at the supranational level as well. Social Democrats, on the other hand, could be 
found among radical federalists – in particular around the MSEUE – as well as 
among ‘traditional intergovernmentalists’, in every state, that sought the preservation 
of sovereignty as a safeguard for the preservation – or indeed the creation – of the 
welfare state, in particular in Britain. Concerns for the unity of Social Democracy 
had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while supporting the 
delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, or Van der 
                                                                                                                                          
comme possibilité d’un redressement national mais aussi en elle-même.” As the Belgian representa-
tive Houben reacted highly sceptical, Bidault recounted that in the long term “L’Europe organisée 
abolira peu a peu les distinctions entre ex-belligerant. Mais auhourd’hui il faut voir les realités ac-
tuelles”. The issue was deferred (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 150, 151). 
124
 Own translation from “[…] on a été froisse par l’attitude des grandes puissance vis-à-vis des petites 
[…]. Celles-ci, et notamment la France, on eut l’air de considérer les petites puissances comme des 
satellites. Cela a été une déception pour les Hollandais mais aussi pour les Belges. Cette attitude des 
grandes puissances est contraire au fédéralisme européen […].” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 305 ff.). 
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Goes van Naters stuck to the gradualist approach in preference for the creation of a 
wider Europe including Great Britain. Within Christian Democracy, ‘supranational-
ism’ became a consensus view albeit not uncontested in terms of its breadth and 
scope, application to policy fields or the precise degree of envisioned pooling and 
delegation. Moreover, this view still left sufficient room for disagreement between 
representatives from the smaller and the larger states. Figures such as Van Van Zee-
land were more closely linked, ideologically, to the ELEC and advocated a limited 
supranationalism in the economic sphere only. 
6.1.3 The Transatlantic Context: Ideas and Transgovernmental Networks 
Whereas the previous sections have focused on ‘communities’ of actors constituted 
by contacts established through transnational organizations in post-war Europe, the 
present section considers the ideational background and the personal informal con-
tacts that have been analyzed as ‘transatlantic networks’ (Kaiser and Leucht 2008; 
Leucht 2010; Chira-Pascanut 2014). The importance of these contacts is crucial inso-
far as US policy – due to US hegemony – naturally carried weight. These contacts, in 
so far as they influenced US policy through transgovernmental networks – thus have 
significance for the institutional design of post-war Europe. Additionally, as men-
tioned already, historical research has revealed that these organizations channeled 
significant funds – private or via the CIA – to the Europeanist ‘pressure groups’ 
(Aldrich 1997; Vayssière 2007, 233 ff.). Although the overall sums cannot be pin-
pointed precisely, they were of a magnitude to ensure competition for such funds 
between the European Movement and the UEF that can be traced back to visits to 
Washington inter alia by Spaak for the European Movement and Henri Frenay for 
the UEF (Vayssière 2007, 237). According to one estimate, the Ford Foundation, 
between 1949 and 1952, transferred approximately three million dollars to support 
the activities of the European Movement and its associates, roughly “two-thirds of its 
post-1952 budget” (Grosbois 2009, 471). 
In a certain sense, then, the transnational organizations constituting the ‘transnational 
network’ were indeed predicated on US ‘hegemony’ (Cox 1987). From a sociologi-
cal perspective, speaking of a post-war US Foreign Policy Establishment is to speak 
of a distinct type of individuals who “were upper-class Ivy League graduates with 
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law degrees and came from white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant backgrounds. They and 
some of their close friends frequently moved from one position to another in educa-
tion, private enterprise, and government, thereby weaving an intricate network of 
connections between American government, the private sector, and academia.” 
(Winand 1993, 2). At the same time, these individuals, within the American admin-
istration, would possess sufficiently distinct views on post-war Europe, and thus to 
conform to the definition of transgovernmental networks put forth in chapter 2, sec-
tion 2.3.3 (Keohane and Nye 1974, 44). 
The ideological make-up of an influential segment of this generation has to be seen 
in the context of the development of US Foreign policy before the war. The original 
foundation of isolationism, as famously expressed by George Washington in his 
Farewell Address in 1796, rested on a view of Europe that formed part and parcel of 
the original argument for US federalism. The isolationist conception of US foreign 
policy, a long-standing principle, had always relied on the denunciation of European 
national conflicts, 
“Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation. 
Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially 
foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise to implicate ourselves, by arti-
ficial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and 
collisions of her friendships or enmities.” (Washington 2000 [1796], 26).  
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 7, 
“[..] America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offen-
sive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entan-
gled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive 
contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to 
the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et im-
pera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.” (Hamilton, et al. 
2014, 31). 
Thus, the founding myth of US federalism was, from the beginning, conceived of as 
a new solution to old European problems (Deudney 1995). One foreign Policy impli-
cation, dominant in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, was to remain isolated from the 
alliances and power politics of European states. A different set of prescriptions was 
already implicit in the Progressive movement of the late 19
th
 century out of which 
grew Wilsonian internationalism grew eventually (Smith 2012, 84 ff.). Contrary to 
the isolationist retreat of the US Public and Congress after the Treaty of Versailles, a 
number of both American as well as British liberal thinkers remained influential pro-
ponents of international institutions and began to consider larger forms of political 
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unification (Deudney 2007, 216 ff.). Students of International Relations refer to this 
tradition as ‘idealism’ during the so-called first great debate (e.g. Schmidt 2013). A 
particular case in the 20
th
 century was H.G. Wells, an unusual but by no means ex-
ceptionally radical proponent of that view, who speculated about a European confed-
eration based on the Swiss model in 1902.
125
 Thus, in the US and the UK, the 
“League of Free Nations Associations” was founded by respective centrist republi-
can, liberal, or social democratic sections of the political establishment in 1918 to 
support the global institutionalization of international politics: the US section was 
founded by Paul Kellogg and subsequently included Herbert D. Croly (founding edi-
tor of The New Republic), Columbia Political Scientist Henry Raymond Mussey, and 
Columbia Historian Charles A. Beard, with Congresses being attended by, inter alia, 
John Foster Dulles, and Franklin D. and Eleanor Roosevelt (Dennis 2002). The Brit-
ish section included H.G. Wells, and, among others, Norman Angell among its mem-
bers (Wells and Grey of Fallodon 1919; Dennis 2002). The project, from the start, 
was to interfere “with national aggression and competition” contributing to war and 
preventing institutional agreements to abolish war (Wells and Grey of Fallodon 
1919, 36). As Henry R. Mussey saw it, it was predominantly “nationalistic ideas of 
commerce” which had been responsible for the outbreak of the First World War.126 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, these considerations regained influence 
once preparations of plans for the post-war period were made. Within the US foreign 
policy establishment, a number of voices maintained very early on that for European 
construction to be successful, some form of European Unity had to be fostered. This 
view was shared by influential figures such as George Kennan (Mayers 1988, 149). 
Kennan, among others, explicitly shared the view that the basic root of the problem 
                                                 
125
 Wells wrote in 1902, “I imagine that the German Empire – that is, the organized expression of 
German aggression to-day – will be either shattered or weakened to the pitch of great compromises by 
a series of wars by land and sea; it will be forced to develop the autonomy of its rational middle class 
in the struggles that will render these compromises possible, and it will be finally not Imperial Ger-
man ideas, but central European ideas possibly more akin to Swiss conceptions, a civilized republican-
ism finding its clearest expression in the French language, that will be established upon a bilingual 
basis throughout Western Europe, and increasingly predominant over the whole European mainland 
and the Mediterranean basin, as the twentieth century closes. The splendid dream of a Federal Europe, 
which opened the nineteenth century for France, may perhaps, after all, come to something like reali-
zation at the opening of the twenty-first.” (Wells 1902, 259). 
126
 “Nationalistic ideas of commerce, of which we have had our full share, have contributed to those 
conceptions of national rivalry and hostility that are now bearing such bitter fruit. Possibly we may yet 
forsake these ideas, and in time come to stand with that small number of nations that believe interna-
tional commerce to be not economic warfare but actual international cooperation.” (Mussey 1914, 
625). 
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lay in national sovereignty being the organizing principle of European politics and 
that European unity was the appropriate ‘pedagogical’ answer to the German prob-
lem.
127
 As future US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it in September 1942, 
“Germany ought to be integrated into a unified Europe.” (Winand 1993, 7). In Wash-
ington, such ideas were advocated by think tanks such as the Ford foundation and the 
American Committee on a United Europe (ACUE). As already pointed out, the latter 
organization in particular – headed by Senator J. William Fulbright – was one of the 
prime channels of funds to the Europeanist transnational organizations, due to its 
members having close connections to the US intelligence community and the US 
economic elite (Vayssière 2007, 233). These actors combined progressive republican 
and liberal ideas with the US federalist tradition and applied it to problems of US 
foreign policy with regard to European reconstruction. Their reasoning, conforming 
to basic US interest in the emerging global confrontation, would become highly in-
fluential. Thus, in devising the resolution inaugurating the funds and institutions of 
the Marshall Plan, the 80th US Congress declared, 
“Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of 
a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar ad-
vantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the peo-
ple of the United States to encourage these countries through a joint organization to exert 
sustained common efforts […] which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in 
Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.” (1948) 
In sum, there was an influential segment in the US administration as well as in Con-
gress that saw suggestions ‘European unity’ – no matter how vague –in a positive 
light (Wall 1991, 192; Schwabe 1993, 43). 
Organizations such as the Ford Foundation or the ACUE were key carriers of the 
most radical interpretation of his line of thinking. Key individuals associated with the 
ACUE included Paul G. Hoffman, former OSS operative and first Head of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Administration (ECA) administering Marshall Plan aid; John J. 
McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1953; Robert R. Bowie, 
Harvard Professor of Government, later affiliated member of the Spaak committee 
                                                 
127
 In a paper prepared for the Policy Planning Staff Paper of the US State Department, Kennan wrote 
in 1949 “We see no answer to German problem within a sovereign national framework. Continuation 
of historical process within this framework will almost inevitably lead to repetition of post-Versailles 
sequence of developments [...]. Only answer is some form of European union which would give 
young Germans wider horizon and remove introverted, explosive, neurotic quality of German political 
thought [...].” (quoted in Pruessen 1996, 60). 
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for a European Constitution and member of the Policy Planning Staff in the Eisen-
hower administration from 1953-1957; Allen Welch Dulles, former OSS operative 
and later Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as his brother, John 
Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under the Eisenhower administration; Lucius D. 
Clay, Military Governor of the US Zone in Germany; Walter Bedell Smith, Secretary 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the US military during the war and Director of the 
CIA from 1950 to 1953; David K. E. Bruce, US ambassador to France 1949-1952 
and US special representative to the ECSC 1952-1957, William H. Donovan, a for-
mer OSS operative who succeeded Senator Fulbright as president of the ACUE (see 
Aldrich 1995; Aubourg 2003; Vayssière 2007, 233 ff.; Grosbois 2009, 471). As a 
result, a number of mid-level US representatives in Europe had a clear policy agenda 
and repeatedly urged European leaders to take steps towards ‘European unity’ (Au-
bourg 2003). Thus, McCloy had pronounced the Schuman Plan as “a test of whether 
the European countries are yet prepared to work together in creating a progressive 
European community which will advance the interests of all and overcome the cleav-
ages of the conflicts of the past.”(quoted in Pruessen 1996, 64). 
The failure of the Versailles settlement was an important background as well, not 
merely in terms of the political reasoning. Thus, Jean Monnet had met John Foster 
Dulles as well as Alan Welsh Dulles for the first time during the Versailles negotia-
tions in 1919, at which both participated (Duchêne 1994, 40).
128
 All three would 
henceforth look for solutions to the “world’s worst firetrap” (Dulles quoted in 
Pruessen 1982, 12-13; 1996, 67). Additionally, the relationship between John Foster 
Dulles and Jean Monnet was apparently marked by significant trust. A former aide to 
Dulles stated in an interview in 1966, 
 “I think Dulles had the greatest respect for Monnet and valued his advice. What became 
of the advice, I can’t tell you. They dealt only privately, because they were close personal 
friends. And then they came out and I never knew what the result was. But I’m sure that 
Dulles listened to him with great care“(Dwan 2000, 71) 
In their first contact made after Dulles’ nomination as Secretary of State in 1953, 
both reassured each other of their common goal.
 129
 Even official exchanges between 
                                                 
128
 In the inter-war period, John Foster Dulles and Monnet worked at the accounting firm Sullivan & 
Company (Duchêne 1994, 40). 
129
 Upon appointment of Dulles as Secretary of State, Monnet wrote to Dulles, “My dear Foster, the 
news of your nomination has moved me deeply […] The burden is heavy but the task ahead is great 
and the reward full of promise of peace can not only be kept but developed. […] To attain this goal, I 
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Dulles and Monnet would at times violate protocol dramatically with both individu-
als using each other’s’ first names. In the same vein, McCloy, Adenauer, and Dulles 
apparently developed a similar relationship over time.
130
 
A key member of this structure is obviously Jean Monnet. The consensus is that 
Monnet was clearly an individual with an exceptional quality of informal contacts, 
both within the French government as well as to the governments of the Six and the 
US administration (e.g. Duchêne 1994; Roussel 1996).
131
 According to Étienne 
Hirsch, one of Monnet’s assistants in France and at the ECSC, the success and the 
influence that Monnet supposedly wielded in behind the scenes of the European ne-
gotiations in the early 1950’s was “due to his American friends.”132 Apart from al-
leged individual qualities, Monnet thus occupied an strategically important position 
connecting the US, the French and henceforth the European elite at the lower – eche-
lon transgovernmental level (Bossuat 1996a; Chira-Pascanut 2014). These contacts 
were partially due to his biography: as a banker in the inter-war period and through 
his position in the administration of the Allied Victory arms program he established 
durable contacts with figures such as George W. Ball, Robert R. Bowie, Shepher 
Stone from the Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, Eisenhower, Robert Nathan, 
John McCloy, Harry Hopkins, Eugene Rostow, and many others (Bossuat 1996a, 
75). Already before the war he became a close friend with William Tomlinson, an 
assistant to the US ambassador in France, David Bruce (Winand 1993, 40).
133
 There 
                                                                                                                                          
believe that a prompt creation of a United States of Europe is essential and I know how much you 
share these convictions.” To which Dulles responded “Greatly appreciate your cable and look forward 
to our continuing association. I share your conviction that it is of the utmost importance promptly to 
create greater unity politically, economically, and militarily in Europe. This, as you know, has been 
my conviction for years.” (Winand 1993, 41) 
130
 Blankenhorn on the relationship between Adenauer and Dulles “[…] es hat Jahre gebraucht, bis 
dies einem ständig wachsenden Vertrauen und schließlich einer offenherzigen Freundschaft Platz 
machte.“ (Blankenhorn 1980, 133). He explained it thus, “Adenauer und Dulles haben viel Gemein-
sames, Gemeinsames der Charaktere, der weltanschaulichen und religiösen Vorstellungen.” 
(Blankenhorn 1980, 197). 
131
 A close collaborator, Georges Berthoin, for example, points out that Monnet always knew “the one 
who is preparing the paper or sometimes the man who is going to speak on the basis of the paper”, 
and, by thus ensuring that his point of view would be presented to the actors in power – for example 
by ensuring that his ‘”letter would be on top of the pile” of a minister’s desk - he would be able to 
spread his ideas through the political hierarchy without necessarily speaking to the actors and convinc-
ing them himself. Interview in the documentary”. “Jean Monnet, The Father of Europe” by Don C. 
Smith available at < http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/jean-monnet-father-of-europe/documentary > 
Last accessed 10-05 2015. 
132
 “[…] grâce à ses connaissances, ses amis américaines […]” (Hirsch 1987). 
133
 De Maiziere, German delegation in Paris about Bruce “David Bruce was a friend of France, a good 
friend of France, his heart was with the French. His feeling was that the European unity, the European 
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are documented repeated and close contacts with Robert Murphy, William Draper, as 
well as Walter Bedell Smith (Winand 1993, 41). Additional acquaintances already 
made in the inter-war period in the financial section included Henry Stimson, Felix 
Frankfurter, Dean Acheson, and W. Averell Harriman (Duchêne 1994, 88). 
In how far is it justified to speak of a sufficient similarity of ideas among within the 
US Foreign Policy apparatus and of Monnet? Is it at all proper to speak of transgov-
ernmental networks? 
On the US side, it is possible to broadly distinguish three viewpoints. Individuals 
around the ACUE “[…] were either themselves determined federalists […] or else 
viewed American federalism as an ideal political model which could be deployed 
elsewhere.” (Aldrich 1997, 186). Their basic reasoning directly builds upon the same 
reasoning as described in the Federalist papers and applies it to characterize basic 
American post-war security interests along these lines. This scheme, along the eco-
nomic dimension as expressed in the most basic ways by the Senate resolution for 
the Economic Cooperation Act quoted above, was generally shared by Democrats 
and played a significant role in garnering support for Marshall Plan aid (Hogan 1987, 
455).
 134
 Thus, the initial line of conflict in 1947 in setting up the OEEC was the US 
insistence on the creation of a European organization with the power to decide on the 
distribution of the funds whereas the European governments sought to safeguard na-
tional forms of distribution (Milward 1984, 61 ff.). Once that failed US officials 
heavily but unsuccessfully lobbied for Spaak to assume the chairman of the ministe-
rial council in the hope of endowing the institution with a more supranational charac-
ter (Milward 1984, 173). 
For geopolitical issues, there was much more reluctance. The general consideration 
was obvious enough: if the West European countries were to integrate and pool their 
resources, the United States could safely withdraw its troops as a sufficient balance 
in Europe would be achieved (Trachtenberg 1991, 164). This consideration became 
ever more salient, especially among Republicans, as the amounts of military spend-
                                                                                                                                          
cooperation and common defence must be done with the French and with the Germans and he played 
a big influence in Washington to avoid that some Americans circuits cooperated directly with the 
Germans, without the French.” (De Maizière 1990, 42). 
134
 Accordingly, a State Department paper reacted to the Schuman Plan thus “The political advantages 
of the plan are potentially tremendous, if it’s essential principles […] are retained in the final treaty 
and are implemented in practice” (FRUS 1950 III, 722). 
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ing called for in the context, escalated into a ‘second phase of state-building’ (Hogan 
1998, 1).  
Among officials in the State Department, however, a majority emphasized the need 
for British participation in any institutional structure to be constructed (McAllister 
2002, 176). Additionally, voices in Congress calling for the necessity to integrate 
Europe were met by initial reluctance in the State Department. While Kennan in the 
Policy Planning staff advocated European Unity without the British, these proposals 
were received sceptically by Acheson and other officials (Schwabe 1995, 123). In 
addition, the application of ‘supranational’ measures in security matters was still 
seen by some as unrealistic, dysfunctional or even dangerous; a ‘third force’ in Eu-
rope was generally seen as clashing with basic American interests (Mai 1993, 98; 
Trachtenberg 1999, 119).
135
 
Thus, the scope of the applicability of ‘European unification’ over different policy 
fields was disputed. This is best illustrated by the different reactions in the State De-
partment and the Pentagon to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In the State 
Department, members of the Policy Planning Staff devised their own conception of 
how to rearm German - in consultation with US High Commissioner in Germany 
McCloy – and developed the ‘Byorade Plan’ that proposed not just operational but 
organizational supranational integration by pooling controls over the German army 
and European troop contingents (FRUS 1950 III, 167-168, 180, 211-219). It called 
for an integrated and “really effective European Defense Force” (FRUS 1950 III, 
213). The plan was met enormous resistance from the Pentagon fearing delay and 
military impracticability. The State Department did not press the matter further but 
accepted the Pentagon proposal on President Truman’s insistence since the proposals 
seemed impractical, would not be accepted by the Pentagon, neither by the Allies and 
certainly not meet the timing demands imposed by Congress (Acheson 1969, 438). 
In summary, there was an influential segment in the US Foreign policy elite whose 
thinking about the basic US security interests in the emerging Cold War naturally led 
                                                 
135
 In the same paper, the State Department warned of ‘third force tendencies’ that might be implicit in 
the Schuman Plan “The greatest safeguard we have against the perversion of the plan in a "third force" 
direction rests in the existence of NAT[O] itself, and in fact that the stronger Western Europe becomes 
economically the more capable it will be of handling its own fifth columns and of withstanding Soviet 
pressures.” (FRUS 1950 III, 722). 
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to seeing in supranational institutional proposals the solution of the German problem 
and economic reconstruction. There is little evidence of radical federalist thinking 
along the same lines as the European radical federalist groups on the continent es-
poused it. Calls for ‘European unity’ resonated with the basic cultural toolkit for un-
derstanding Europe that US officials were equipped with. Although this line of rea-
soning was by no means in the majority, it would prove to remain a highly influential 
current. 
Regarding Monnet, it is equally difficult to connect his personality to a distinct insti-
tutional blueprint. Before the negotiations on the ECSC in Paris, it seems that there 
was no hard-wired institutional plan in his mind. What is clear, however, that he con-
curred wholeheartedly with the concern for greater European Unity very early on. 
Already in 1941, Spaak recalls a meeting with Monnet in which Monnet expounded 
in his thinking about the necessity of integrating the European Market for Coal and 
Steel (Duchêne 1994, 182). In an interview with Fortune magazine in 1944 he spoke 
of the necessity of a “true yielding of sovereignty” and “some kind of central union” 
(Duchêne 1994, 183). However, the build-up to the ECSC Paris conference amply 
suggests that Monnet was never a full-fledged federalist nor that he was wedded 
dogmatically to a particular blueprint. His main concern was to build durable institu-
tions that allowed durable and peaceful cooperation between European states 
(Monnet 1976, 460).
 
Concerns for democratic legitimacy only entered the picture 
afterwards.
136
 In this sense, his main concern as well as the institutional flexibility 
concurrent with this concern fit nicely into the basic considerations that the Euro-
peanist segment within the US administration shared: to find a solution to the Euro-
pean and the German problem via the containment of the nation-state through com-
mon institutions that implied the abrogation of at least part of their sovereignty. 
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 Étienne Hirsch recalls “Monnet avait une idée fondamentale, c'était qu'il fallait tenir compte de 
l'existence de l'Allemagne, qu'on ne pouvait pas la laisser en dehors comme ça, et le problème consis-
tait à savoir par quel mécanisme on pouvait aboutir à ce résultat. un objectif : l'introduction de l'Alle-
magne dans le circuit d'Europe de l'Ouest, et il faut chercher comment le faire. […] Donc, la notion de 
Monnet d'institutions lui vient en réalité plus tard. On ne peut pas dire qu'il y a une pensée institution-
nelle là-dedans. […] Il y avait l'institution fondamentale, c'était la Cour de Justice. […] En ce qui 
concerne l'Assemblée, c'est sur une suggestion d'André Philip. J’en ai parlé a Monnet qui a commencé 
par me renvoyer, en me disant, ‘Vous n'y connaissez rien, vous ne comprenez rien, ça n'a rien à voir’. 
Et trois jours après, il m'a rappelé, en disant, ‘Ecoutez, vous m'avez parlé d'une Assemblée ... Si on en 
reparlait?’ […] Au bout de trois jours, il m’a rappelé […]. ‘Ecoutez, voyez vos collègues et préparez 
un statut d’une Assemblée Européenne’” (Hirsch 1987). 
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 “Nothing is created without men, 
nothing lasts without institutions” 
Jean Monnet
137
  
6.1.4 Conclusion 
This section has characterized the ideas circulating within the transnational groups in 
post-war Europe. The challenges that the European post-war environment posed had 
been anticipated through different traditions of political thought available in the var-
ied cultural and social milieus described above. Thus, ideological ‘toolkits’ utilized 
to meet the post-war challenge consisted of different values and concerns and, ac-
cordingly, different solution for the basic geopolitical structural challenge had been 
foreseeable for several decades. ‘Ideas of Europe’ came from political traditions and 
‘world views’ as diverse as the conservative Pan-Europa’ movement, the quasi anar-
chist federalism of Proudhon, the constitutionalist federalism of the Federalist Pa-
pers, academic economic theory, as well as internationalist Socialist thought. Their 
commonality consists in the reflection on a similar challenge, namely the profound 
change in the global geopolitical status of Europe (Loth 2014). The end of the Sec-
ond World War seemingly required a novel invention of the basic notion of Europe. 
The concern was survival. Thus, ‘European unity’, perhaps for the first time went 
deeper than the abstract sense of a common European identity that had prevailed for 
centuries. A new sense of interdependence – both economically as well as in terms of 
Europe’s survival – was emerging and began to impact the thinking about the future 
prospects of Europe and its institutional implication. 
As this section has made clear, however, even in the late 1940’s already, there were 
clear differences in the ways in which the common political problem was perceived 
as well as in the concrete institutional goals put forth. The differentiation into distinct 
overlapping communities across the network of organizational cross-affiliations in 
the transnational organizations considered here – described in the previous chapter – 
reflected that heterogeneity. The differences in basic concerns as organized into the 
distinct transnational groups were reflected in their distinct ideological heritage. 
Thus, the federalist community – the most radical – had identified the nation-state as 
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 Own translation from “Rien ne se crée sans les hommes, rien ne dure sans les institutions.” 
(Monnet 1976, 460). 
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the root of the European problem and sought its abolishment in the foundation of a 
new federal political community. For the ELEC, the problem of nationalism lay pre-
dominantly in its force to hinder liberalization of trade and prevent taking advantage 
of welfare gains that a liberalized European market would provide for the economic 
recovery of Europe. The goal was not to abolish the nation-state but rather to find 
efficient institutional ways to construct a European Market that would stabilize the 
nation-state and ensure its survival, resulting in a focus on economic fields of coop-
eration alone. For the ELEC actors, supranational institutions implied merely the 
control of ‘committees of experts’ that were to oversee the gradual liberalization of 
trade. No significant centralization was envisioned, no forms of ‘democratic repre-
sentation’ of European citizens were sought. 
Apart from the federalists and the ELEC, the remaining transnational actors within 
the European Movement come from transnational party related organizations repre-
senting transnational Social Democracy and transnational Christian Democracy. Both 
had distinct views and concerns largely growing out of the history of their ideologi-
cal precursors. For Social Democrats, the only common concern after the war was 
the reconstruction of the welfare state in their respective countries. Apart from that, 
views differed widely. A significant portion of transnational Social Democrats 
thought that these goals required the radicalism of the federalists, added, by a con-
cern to rebuild Europe as a ‘third force’ in the emerging confrontation between the 
blocks. At the same time, there were Social Democrats in virtually every country 
under consideration who opposed substantial delegation and pooling, denounced the 
European project as conservative and sought national sovereignty to maintain or cre-
ate a welfare state and reconstruct European economies. Concerns for the unity of 
Social Democracy had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while 
supporting the delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, 
or Van der Goes van Naters stuck to a gradualist approach in preference for the crea-
tion of a wider Europe including Great Britain. In addition, these internal divisions 
made the reconciliation made French-German reconciliation difficult.  
Comparatively speaking, Christian Democracy was much more uniform A shared 
concern for the unity of the Abendland, the most intense sense of imminent threat 
from the Bolshewik East led to similar views on the necessity of a containment of the 
nation-state and nationalist competition, but not its abandonment: thus, Christian 
Democrats, by and large, thought that some degree of sovereignty had to be aban-
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doned. As that concern grew out of a sense of threatened security, the envisioned 
future scope of European institutions would be quite broad, encompassing security as 
well. As a result, Christian Democrats held that the delegation of sovereignty had to 
be matched by some form of representation at the supranational level as well. 
Finally, there was an influential transatlantic network connecting US actors that sub-
scribed to a classic causal story of the American political tradition on the vicissitudes 
of the old continent. While there was an overwhelming cross-party consensus on the 
need for closer cooperation between European states, in particular on the economic 
plane, federalist and supranationalist ideas were subscribed to by a distinct set of 
actors that organized in the ACUE and, having ties to the Foreign Policy establish-
ment and the Intelligence community, accordingly effected a significant flow of 
funding for the Europeanist organization that provided a significant boost to their 
organizational capabilities. 
Table 6.1 below illustrates the core concerns shared by these distinct groups, the im-
plied institutional prescriptions and the degree of ideological divisions. 
As the table shows, the ideological divisions, in particular in the transnational Euro-
pean space are considerable. In line with the results of the previous chapter, the Eu-
ropean Movement, as the overarching organization assembling the most influential 
transnational pressure groups and individuals, was characterized by an extreme di-
vide. As a result, although it may have disposed of the most significant resources, no 
uniform political pressure in a single direction would emanate from this organization. 
Thus, the dominant conclusion is one of a complex overarching transnational conflict 
that cannot be reduced to party ideologies and provided ample room for conflict dy-
namics. Moreover, even the federalist community – largely seen as ideologically 
homogenous in the previous chapter – was based on a political compromise between 
rather diverse factions. Combined with the relative organizational weakness of these 
organizations, any transnational coalition formed on the basis of the transnational 
networks would be temporary, formed to achieve a specific political goal and dis-
solve afterwards rather quickly. The next section traces these dynamics between 
1950 and 1954. 
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Table 6.1 Ideologies, Institutions and Cohesiveness in Transnational Networks 
 Main concern Goal Main institutional prescriptions Internal divisions 
Federalists 
Destructive force of nationalism 
and the nation state. European 
survival. 
Abolishment of national  
sovereignty. 
Federal pact: abolishment of na-
tional democracy, replacement by 
European democratic federation. 
Some divisions between personal-
ists and constitutionalists over the 
nature of the European political 
system and its institutions. 
ELEC 
Economic welfare and economic 
reconstruction: nationalism as a 
potential impediment to eco-
nomic efficiency and a European 
Market. 
Establishment of a liberalized Eu-
ropean Market and a European 
Monetary System. 
Form follows function. Intermedi-
ary expert committees for eco-
nomic regulation, i.e. limited 
supranational model in the eco-
nomic sphere 
No discernible divisions on basic 
institutional prescriptions. 
European 
Movement 
Destructive force of nationalism 
and nationalist competition. 
European survival. 
Vague: ‘European unity’ through 
institutionalized intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
Tenuous compromise on the 
Council of Europe model: Institu-
tionalized consultations and unan-
imous decisions among govern-
ment representatives. 
Major internal divisions between 
British unionists, supranationalists 
and federalists. 
Transnational 
Social De-
mocracy 
Worker welfare, economic re-
construction, establishment of a 
Social Democratic Welfare 
State. 
Disparate: from reconstructing and 
protecting the national welfare 
state, to Europe as a third force in 
the Cold War and the construction 
of a European Socialist federation. 
Disparate: from advocating a 
European federation to major 
concerns for national sovereignty 
to protect the national welfare 
state. 
Major internal divisions; value of 
the nation state for worker welfare 
and international peace. 
Transnational 
Christian 
Democracy 
Destructive force of nationalism, 
unity and survival of the Euro-
pean Christian ‘Abendland’ in 
face of the ‘Bolshevist threat’. 
European solution of the ‘German 
question. 
Supranationalism – constraining 
the nation-state through majority 
decisions and appropriate demo-
cratic representation. 
Some disagreement between rep-
resentatives from smaller and 
larger European countries (of the 
Six) over policy fields to be cov-
ered the degree of pooling/ dele-
gation. 
Transatlantic 
networks 
Destructive force of nationalism 
and national competition. Euro-
pean security and economic 
welfare. 
Creation of a European institutional 
order for welfare and conflict man-
agement in emerging cold war. 
Supranationalism – constraining 
the nation-state through pooling 
of sovereignty through majority 
decisions or delegation of deci-
sion-making to independent agen-
cies 
Some differences within the US 
administration on the scope and 
breadth of integration over policy 
fields. 
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6.2 Changing Allegiances: the Politics of Transnational Influence and the 
EDC 
The previous section has described the ways in which actors within the post-war 
transnational and transgovernmental networks had developed typical institutional 
solutions to the question of international cooperation in post-war (Western) Europe. 
The main concerns were abstractly similar, the derived political goals differed widely 
across and within the transnational organizations, ranging from preservation of the 
nation-state, its containment within supranational arrangements, to its complete abol-
ishment. 
In sum, there was ample room for conflict: the tenuous commitments voiced by the 
leadership of the European Movement under Duncan Sandys in the late 1940’s sug-
gested that the institutional compromise of the Council of Europe would be tempo-
rary. Moreover, the rhetoric about European unity and the pathos that Churchill had 
employed in his 1946 speech in Zurich contributed to certain expectations: by the 
late 1940’s, the perception that the British unionists failed to adhere to such solemn 
pledges grew consistently.  
Accordingly, this section will trace the emergence, persistence and decline of a 
transnational coalition of supranationalists and federalists in the early 1950’s. 
Formed against in the aftermath of disappointments over the inconsistency between 
rhetorical commitments and political actions of the British unionists, Christian Dem-
ocratic and Social democratic supranationalists, federalists, and, significantly, a 
number of US actors with similar convictions formed a loose transnational and trans-
governmental coalition in the early 1950’s. Sharing similar values and ideas as well 
as exchanging information, this coalition sought to lobby and convince the negotiat-
ing governments of its approach to European integration in general and German re-
armament in particular. The convergence of national viewpoints that Hoffman and 
Haas had noted for the mid 1950s (chapter 3, section 3.1.1), correlated, at the trans-
national level, with an increased activity and documented access to key European 
governments. 
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6.2.1 Formation, 1947 - 1951: the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and 
the Pleven Plan 
Seeing that the differences between the various transnational groups were substantial, 
it is no surprise that the first signs of the limits of an institutional compromise be-
tween the different groups within the European Movement already emerged at the 
congress of The Hague in 1948. On the one end of the spectrum, British Unionists 
insisted that the first step to European Unity was continuous intergovernmental con-
sultation; on the opposite end of the spectrum, federalists sought the foundation of a 
European constituent and thus a new European quasi-state. Thus, the resolutions at 
the Hague were a political compromise, that was particularly painful for the radical 
federalists. The federalists in particular agreed to the compromise because they 
shared  
“[…] the same fears and contradictory desires, however unequally divided: breaking with 
the party of leading personalities, which held the purse strings and the press, meant, on 
one hand, to run the risk of courting rapid destruction or of becoming a sect […] and […] 
to condemn the Hague to be simply a trompe l’oeil congress, without any European fu-
ture.” (De Rougemont 1967, 337, 338).  
Initially, these compromises seemed well founded insofar the arguments set forth by 
the unionists seemed to merely imply a different time scale. The rhetorical commit-
ments voiced in the European Movement still suggested that the political goals for a 
‘united Europe’ were similar: the unionists simply preferred an initial period of mere 
intergovernmental consultation. As Duncan Sandys had expressed it in the Executive 
Committee of the European movement, “the first stage […] is to foster the habit of 
regular consultation between Governments on inter-European and international af-
fairs.” (Lipgens and Loth 1991, 333). Since the European Movement assembled key 
delegates from all major transnational organizations sharing that commitment, this 
line became the least common denominator for it was recognized that the leadership 
of the European Movement afforded significant influence.
138
 
The political compromise at The Hague and the work of the European Movement 
initially seemed to pay off. The conference in The Hague assembled key figures who 
met for the first time, including Adenauer and Schuman (Kaiser 2007, 212). The po-
                                                 
138
 As the Executive Committe of the NEI stated in 1948, “dass in diesem Koordinationskommittee 
von unserer Seite die aktivste Mitarbeit von unserer Seite erforderlich ist” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
131). 
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litical resolution of the Congress stipulated that “the European nations must transfer 
and merge some portion of their sovereign rights”, demanded “the convening, as a 
matter of real urgency, of a European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the 
participating nations […] to advise upon immediate practical measures” and suggest-
ed that “the Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of a Court of 
Justice with adequate sanctions.” (Congress of Europe 1948). A delegation led by 
Churchill presented the resolution to the British government; in France, a delegation 
led by Paul Reynaud presented it to the French government (Vayssière 2007, 225, 
226). As a result, the governments of the European Brussels Treaty signatories set up 
a study committee that comprised key actors from the transnational sphere, includ-
ing, inter alia, Paul Reynaud, Guy Mollet, Francois de Menthon, Hugh Dalton, 
Gladwyn Jebb, Pieter Kersten, J. Bruyns Slot, Max Buset, August de Schryven, Fer-
nand Dehousse. (Vayssière 2007, 227). Robert Schuman passed the results directly 
on to the French Cabinet for consideration (Poidevin 1986, 231). Paul-Henri Spaak, 
still being Belgian Foreign Minister, passed it directly to the Belgian Cabinet (Spaak 
1969, 226). As other governments equally took up the resolutions, the resolution of 
the Political Committee of the conference instituted a Council of States as well as a 
Consultative Assembly, a fact only grudgingly accepted by the British Labour gov-
ernment under Ernest Bevin (Hick 1990b, 336, 337). A process started by the diverse 
transnational coalition of the European Movement had provided the blueprint for a 
European organization that looked like a promising starting point for European inte-
gration (Spaak 1969, 266). Rhetoric, it seemed, was followed by action. 
However, the internal conflicts within the European Movement were reproduced in 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as between govern-
ments. Key members of the transnational European pressure groups were among the 
delegates, Spaak became the first president of the Assembly. As a result, a major line 
of conflict emerged between radical federalists, intergovernmentalists, and more ten-
tative proponents of supranationality that sought to advance the European project 
step by step and keep the Unionists on board (Loth 1977, 245; Dumoulin 1999, 26 
ff.).
139
 Rhetorical efforts to maintain unity persisted but the divisions became appar-
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 Gérard Jaquet on French German contacts in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
Assembly “A propos des rapports entre Français et Allemands? Oui, les rapports entre Français et 
Allemands dès la deuxième session du Conseil de l'Europe ont été excellents. On s'est trouvé devant 
des amis, avec qui on a pu discuter très librement, très franchement. Il n'y a pas eu de véritables dé-
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ent.
140
 In the rhetorical engagements, the exchanges were already cast in the form of 
normative arguments that centered on the ‘democratic deficit’. As Winston Churchill 
put it in the Consultative Assembly,  
“We do not possess executive power and, at this stage in our development, we could not 
possibly claim it. […] We must feel our way forward and, by our good sense, build up an 
increasing strength and reputation. But we must not attempt on our present electoral basis 
to change the powers which belong to the duly constituted national Parliaments founded 
directly upon universal suffrage.” (Churchill 1949a, 282).  
The tentativeness of the unionists was accordingly denounced by federalist leader 
Henri Frenay as a ‘Europeanism out of fear’ (Vayssière 2007, 228). The discontent 
of the federalists was exacerbated by envy: plagued by continuing financial prob-
lems, the leaders of the UEF started to realize that the European Movement was well-
financed through its US contacts. Complaints were followed by active competition 
for US funds between the organizations (Vayssière 2007, 228). 
The conflicts mainly between the British Unionists and the continental federalists 
saw their first culmination in the campaign for a ‘federal pact’, undertaken by radi-
cals from the UEF in 1949 who sought to transform the Consultative Assembly into 
the ‘constituent’ envisioned in their programs to form the nucleus of a European fed-
eration. It was launched by the steering committee of the UEF – at the time including 
Ugo La Malfa, René Coty, André Philip, Paul Ramadier, and Eugen Kogon – that 
drew up a resolution calling for assembly and federal pact to reform the Council of 
Europe (Vayssière 2007, 252). A straightforward application of the federalist blue-
print, it called for a two-chamber legislative branch representing European voters and 
states, an executive Political Authority controlled by the legislative branch and wide-
ly responsible for economic matters as well as defense, and an independent judiciary. 
                                                                                                                                          
saccords entre nous. Et quand tu dis “des amis”, tu ne penses pas uniquement aux Socialistes et au 
SPD? Je pense d'abord aux Socialistes, mais je pense aussi aux Chrétiens démocrates. Des gens 
comme Von Brentano étaient vraiment très proches de nous.” (Jaquet 1997). 
140
 For example, in one of first speeches as a delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Winston Chur-
chill warned “Les dangers qui nous menacent sont grands, mais grande aussi est notre force, et il n’y a 
aucune raison de ne pas réussir à réaliser le but et à établir la structure de cette Europe unie.” 
(Churchill 1949b). Spaak’s characterization of the situation within the Consultative Assembly “Eine 
föderalistische Minderheit verlangte, man solle unverzüglich das Statut eines europäischen Staaten-
bundes aufstellen. Die Vorsichtigen hingegen behaupteten – als anderes Extrem – man müsse Europa 
Schritt für Schritt, Etappe um Etappe, und ohne übertriebene Eile aufbauen. In der Mitte stand eine 
Mehrheit, der auch ich angehörte, prinzipiell mit den Föderalisten einer Meinung, jedoch darum be-
sorgt, sich nicht von den Engländern abzusondern.” (Spaak 1969, 273). 
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It was adopted by an extraordinary assembly of the UEF in October 1949 (UEF 
1949). 
The result of this campaign was disappointing in two dimensions: first, the efforts to 
organize mass-demonstrations in Europe were a failure, with the exception of Italy 
where over 500.000 signed the petition, with over 141 deputies and 105 senators 
(Vayssière 2007, 252). Elsewhere, it became obvious that the federalist efforts to 
organize a European constituent ‘bottom up’ style would fail and the notion of a fed-
eral Europe was the affair of a faction of the political and cultural elite, because the 
resonance in the remaining countries was negligible (Greilsammer 1975, 63; 
Vayssière 2007, 253). Within the Consultative Assembly, its members put forth a 
successful resolution that demanded that the Committee of Ministers to renounce 
their veto rights and create an executive political authority (Brunn 2009, 65). The 
resolution was vetoed in the Committee of Ministers and the federalist members of 
the Consultative Assembly abstained from its session scheduled for November 1949 
and organized a parallel ‘protest’ meeting in Strasbourg, seeking to voice their objec-
tion against the supposed rejection of the will of ‘European peoples’ (Vayssière 
2011).
141
 It remained an empty gesture. Hugh Dalton decried the external pressure 
within the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
142
 
However, not only radical federalists such as Spinelli but also more pragmatic actors 
who nevertheless sought to institutionalize the limitation of national sovereignty 
grew increasingly frustrated with the Council of Europe (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 
94). The main frustration within the Council of Europe grew partially from the gulf 
that separated the Social Democrats. Thus, in January 1950, the British Foreign Min-
ister Bevin contemplated an appropriate timing for “standing up frontally to the pre-
tensions of the Strasbourg Assembly” (DBPO II: I, 381). The failure of more limited 
reform initiatives – such as the assignment of the right to initiate decisions in the 
Committee of Ministers to the Consultative Assembly as sanctioned by the leader-
ship of the European Movement – caused “profound disappointment within the Ex-
                                                 
141
 A federalist pamphlet thus pronounced that the UEF “se réserve d’agir à Strasbourg selon les cir-
constances sans exclure des actions de caractère révolutionnaire.” The goal was to “mettre les parle-
mentaire face à leurs responsabilité” (Vayssière 2007, 270 ; 2011). 
142
 He complained about the campaign for a federal pact in the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe “Des personnes étrangères à cette maison essayent de nous influencer. C’est incompatible 
avec la dignité de élus” (Vayssière 2007, 240). 
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ecutive Committee of the European Movement (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 419). Reas-
surance came through rhetoric. As Spaak put it in a speech in the Consultative As-
sembly, “We must have faith in the Council of Europe and – you may think it is in-
terested advice – we must have faith in the European Assembly.” (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 331). So long as the main ‘obstruction’ came from a British Labour govern-
ment, leading Social Democrats, Spaak and Mollet in particular, were unwilling to 
contemplate a smaller union. 
The protocols of meetings in the Christian Democratic Geneva Circle, however, pay 
testimony to the growing impatience with the lack of progress in moving away from 
mere intergovernmental consultations. By early 1950, the protocols began to decry 
‘British obstruction’ in the Council of Europe (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 254). At the 
same time, the tensions within the European Movement itself grew. Thus, frustrated 
by the continuing tensions between the British Unionists and their continental coun-
terparts, Duncan Sandys resigned from his position as head of the European Move-
ment and Spaak, no longer the Belgian Foreign Minister, became head of the Euro-
pean Movement (Pistone 2008, 69). 
 
The Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan 
The announcement of both the Schuman and the Pleven Plan fell into this environ-
ment of increased tensions between the three ideologies in the transnational sphere. 
However, the Schuman Plan did not abolish the coalition built around the European 
Movement altogether. For a considerable time, there were continuing efforts to figure 
out some form under which the envisioned ECSC, a European Army, and the Coun-
cil of Europe could coexist in a meaningful and productive way. However, as it be-
came clear that a British government led by a formerly leading figure of the Europe-
an Movement – Winston Churchill – would pursue exactly the same line as it had 
under Bevin, the main proponents of the transnational federalists, Christian Demo-
crats, as well as the federalist Social Democrats broke with the Council of Europe 
and shifted their attention towards the nascent supranational institutions being nego-
tiated among the Six. 
Both the origins as well as the content of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan had 
a number of features in common. The timing of both proposals followed a similar 
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logic: the Schuman Plan was proposed in response to an expiring deadline at which 
point the quotas on German Coal and Steel production were to be renegotiated, with 
the American government pressing for higher quotas for the German industry. The 
proposal of the Pleven Plan was a response to the Korean War and American insist-
ence on German rearmament. Moreover, the main institutional elements that were 
combined in the Paris Treaties had been amply discussed or proposed in the preced-
ing years. Both the content of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan had been dis-
cussed explicitly or implicitly within the Christian Democratic Community, specifi-
cally the Geneva Circle, before the announcement of the respective treaties. (Kaiser 
2007, 225, 273). Thus, the Schuman Plan was a coordinated affair. Schumacher had 
sent a draft to Adenauer in a personal letter, assuring the consent of the German 
chancellor before the announcement (Adenauer 1976, 327). Owing to this situation, 
the French initiatives have been described by Lothar Herbst as ‘not particularly orig-
inal’.143 
With regard to the issue of rearmament, it was no secret that the German government 
would, if rearmament was necessary, prefer a European alternative. In December 
1948, Adenauer had already proposed in the Geneva Circle that if German rearma-
ment may become necessary, it would have to be integrated in a European Army.
144
 
Adenauer had expressed this view publicly in an interview with the American News-
paper Cleveland Plain Dealer in 1949. At that time, the fact that a German head of 
state was already contemplating rearmament publicly caused widespread irritation 
(Large 1996, 54, 78). Three weeks before the announcement of the Pleven Plan in 
1950, Adenauer’s personal ‘Referent’ in the Kanzleramt and later head of the 
‘Politische Abteilung’ at the Auswärtige Amt Herbert Blankenhorn (see Ramscheid 
2006), again recounted in the Geneva Circle the position of the German government: 
it “would refuse national rearmament” and it “hoped that a European Army would be 
created.” 145 Contrary to the hostile public reactions to Adenauer’s interview – placat-
                                                 
143
 Own translation from “[…] nicht besonders originell” (Herbst 1996, 75). 
144
 Geneva Circle, December 1948, Adenauer “Mais la création d’une force armée allemande pose de 
graves problèmes. J’ai moi-même beaucoup d’appréhension. […] Il vaudrait mieux trouver des élé-
ments nouveaux acquis à l’idée européenne démocratique. Cette armée allemande devrait être intégrée 
dans une armée européenne pour éviter les risques du militarisme allemand.” (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 150). 
145
 Blankenhorn in the Geneva Circle on October 2
nd
 1950, three weeks before the Pleven Plan was 
announced “Nous refusons le réarmement national. Nous espérons qu’une armée européenne sera 
créée […]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 252). 
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ing domestic fears of German rearmament – the proceedings within the Geneva Cir-
cle were open and frank. For example, the Dutch MVP representative Emmanuel 
Sassen – contrary to the strong rejection of the EDC by the Dutch government – re-
acted positively to Blankenhorn’s reasoning (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 253). Three 
weeks before the announcement of the Pleven Plan, Bichet noted that the representa-
tives in Geneva were ‘unanimous’ that a European Army German with participation 
would have to be created.
146
 It is notable that the Geneva Circle allowed very open 
expression of viewpoints, testimony to the trust between those present. As German 
delegate Schröter put it, “If I speak about this question, this is only because we are a 
restricted circle where one can speak openly.”147 The early discussions brought to the 
table essentially all problems that would plague the negotiators in Paris for the years 
to come: the question of equality of rights, the size of German units, the problem of 
democratic control, as well as the question of how realistic the French Plan was 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 261, 262). 
Reactions to the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan within the Council of Europe 
were mixed and reflected the early divisions within the European Movement. A 
study group set up by the Council of Europe concluded with the hope that  
“[…] the Conference of six will seek to set up a system of mutual exchange of infor-
mation and means of eventual association with countries not participating in the Schuman 
Plan with a view to extending as far as possible the field in which the essential economic 
aims of the Plan can be realized” (Council of Europe 1950a, 428; 1950b).  
There was still a considerable ambiguity regarding the Tories in the European 
Movement. Thus, during the debate on the Schuman plan in the Common Assembly 
– under the impression of beginning war in Korea –  Churchill called for “the imme-
diate creation of a unified European Army, under the authority of a European Minis-
ter of Defence, subject to proper democratic control and acting in full cooperation 
with the United States and Canada.” (Council of Europe 1950a). At the same time, 
ongoing conflicts within the European Movement lead to resolutions throughout 
1950 and 1951 that are full of contradictions: one the one hand, the Movement main-
tained that countries wishing to do so may associate with each other more closely 
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 Bichet at meeting of the Geneva Circle on October 2
nd
 1950 (the Pleven Plan was announced on 
October 24
th) “Je crois que nous aboutissons a une conclusion très satisfaisante. Nous sommes 
d’accord sue une participation de l’Allemagne dans le cadre d’une armée européenne.” (Gehler and 
Kaiser 2004, 254). 
147
 Own translation from “Si je parle cependant de cette question, c’est que nous sommes dans un 
cercle restreint, ou l’on peut s’exprimer avec franchise.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 259). 
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under a special political authority; on the other hand, no institutional changes to the 
Council of Europe are deemed necessary (Jacobson 1962, 539, 540). With an elec-
tion looming in the UK in 1951, many still seemed to expect a change in British poli-
cy provided that Labour would be replaced by the Tories in government and were 
thus unwilling to entirely bank their strategy on a small Europe, especially on the 
basis of ‘military integration’ (Spaak 1969, 213). 
In analogy to the conflicts within the Consultative Assembly and the European 
Movement, the reaction of transnational Social Democracy to the Pleven Plan was 
divided. Within the Socialist MSEUE, the Pleven Plan was seen positively. The main 
criticism of the proposal largely followed federalist principles by demanding a uni-
fied European High Command and a European Defense Minister, it insisted that all 
institutions should will be responsible to a European parliamentary Assembly 
(Jacobson 1962, 559).
148
 At the same time, the Socialist International was unable to 
agree on any substantive common reaction to either the Schuman Plan nor the Pleven 
Plan for months (Loth 1977, 268). The fact that the SPD explicitly rejected the Oder-
Neiße Line as final border between a potentially united Germany and Poland certain-
ly did not help (Steininger 1979b, 171). 
The reaction of the federalist community was enthusiastic. Spinelli thought that 
Pleven’s declaration had the same significance as the Marshall Plan speech 
(Vayssière 2007, 265). The UEF immediately convened a conference in November 
1950 in Strasbourg that was attended by leading members of the UEF and the 
MSEUE. The resolution of the conference reflected basic federalist reasoning: in 
order for the construction of a European Army to be valid, it would need to be 
founded through a constituent congress. Since the Strasbourg Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe was no longer suitable for these purposes, the UEF passed a resolution 
demanding the convocation of a new constituent on the continent (Pistone 2008, 62). 
As Henry Frenay put it, “The battle against national sovereignties has to be 
fought”149 More importantly, the UEF for the first time advocated a pragmatic 
                                                 
148
 The resolution further demanded representation of the working classes and requested that the gov-
ernments of both supranational efforts to pass a diplomatic agreement that a required European as-
sembly was to be elected until July 1951; that this assembly should produce a treaty for a European 
political authority; that this treaty is to be negotiated and signed by governments; and then to be sub-
mitted to participating electorates to approval via a referendum (Jacobson 1962, 561). 
149
 Own translation from “La bataille contre les souverainetés nationales doit donc être engagé.” 
(Belot 2003, 581). 
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course, accepting the diplomatic venue and seeking to influence the negotiations by 
lobbying governments to pass treaties, hitherto an anathema to the integralists within 
the UEF  
This radicalization meant that conflicts within the European Movement began to es-
calate quickly. Because the majority of members of the Executive Committee was 
still intent on keeping in line with a larger and more modest solution including the 
British Unionists, the Federalists (Henry Frenay, Frances L. Josephy, Altiero Spi-
nelli, and André Voisin) stormed out of a meeting of the Executive Committee late 
1950, largely because not even an an agreement on a supranational authority could 
be reached (Vayssière 2007, 278). Estranged from the European Movement, an 
MSEUE resolution from November 1950 explicitly expressed the realignment  
“[…] in the eye of the fundamental problem in the current stage of the uniting of Europe, 
the creation of a real international authority, the European Movement […] unfortunately 
had to face the total failure in taking a position […]. In consequence, the Forth Congress 
of MSEUE cannot consider the European Movement as any other than a center of rela-
tionships between the movements […]. However, the MSEUE declares itself willing to 
start common actions with all other organizations that are ready to fight for the creation of 
supranational European authorities […], especially with the UEF and NEI.”150  
The view was becoming widespread as irritation grew. As Schuman put it in March 
1951, the separation of Europe into nation-states, in the European post-war environ-
ment “had become an anachronism, nonsense, a heresy”.151 The common denomina-
tor of ‘supranationality’ on the continent thus began replacing the vague goal of ‘Eu-
ropean unity’. 152. In April 1951, a conference convened by the federalist UEF in 
Lugano, Italy, assembled delegates from the Socialist MSEUE and the Christian 
Democratic NEI send as well (Lipgens 1984b, 653). It passed a resolution laying 
down “principles for a pact on a federalist Union“ stipulating that “current or emerg-
ing European authorities should only be expanded and coordinated under the leader-
                                                 
150
 Own translation from “face au problème essentiel dans l’étape actuelle de l’unité européenne, la 
création d’une réelle autorité internationale, le Mouvement Européen […] a du malheureusement 
constater l’échec total d’une prise de position. […] En conséquence, la IVᵉ Congres du MSEUE con-
sidère que le Mouvement Européen ne peut plus être qu’un centre de relations entre les mouvement 
[…] La MSEUE se déclare par contre disposer à entreprendre une action commune avec toutes les 
organisations qui sont prêtes à lutter pour la création d’autorités européennes supranationales […] 
notamment avec l’UEF et les Nouvelles Equipes Internationales.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 279). 
151
 “[…] devenu un anachronisme, un non-sens, une hérésies” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 240). 
152
 As Schumann continued in his openening speech of the EDC negotiations in Paris “[…] coordon-
ner les activités des pays européen, accroitre leur efficacité en les libérant des égoïsmes à courte vue, 
les orienter vers un bien commun supranational, en un mot, grouper ces pays en vue d’une action 
positive, commune et concertée […]” (Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 241). 
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ship and control of the Federal government and the Federal parliament.”.153 It called 
on all European sections of the European Movement to immediately lobby their gov-
ernments to abandon any efforts to seek compromises in Paris that did not involve a 
European constituent (Pistone 2008, 63). As Fernand Dehousse put it, “It is indisput-
able that the Logano conference was a major success since the Federalists now final-
ly had a text worth fighting for.” 154 
Considerable lobbying was a result. On July 6
th 
1951 – at a time when the EDC nego-
tiations were in a critical stage – Schuman received Henri Frenay and Eugen Kogon 
in the Quai d’Orsay, the result of which was a public declaration by Schuman, re-
printed in Le Monde, calling for “the creation of a European political organization, 
having supranational authority, to lay the basis for a common foreign policy.”155 In 
Italy, federalist deputies issued a demand to the Italian government that 
“[it should] decisively overcome the domestic pressure of nationalistic sentiments that 
propose half-provisionary measures for supranational, autonomous armed forces under 
the coordination of an illusionary European commando, and that the government should 
support without reserve the thesis of a unified European Army and all implied sovereign-
ty constraints.”156  
The activities of the Christian Democrats equally suggested that the middle of 1951 
would be a crucial window of opportunity. French German exchanges between Fon-
tanet and Blankenhorn suggested that the conflict between Germany and France – 
still the major obstacle to the EDC – could be overcome.157 In September 1951, an 
                                                 
153
 Own translation from “Grundsätze für einen Pakt für eine föderalistische Union […] die bestehen-
den oder in Bildung begriffenen europäischen Fachbehörden nur unter der Leitung und Kontrolle 
einer Bundesregierung und eines Bundesparlaments ausgebaut und koordiniert werden” (Lipgens 
1984b, 653; Loth 1996, 97). 
154
 Own translation from “la conférence de Logano a été incontestablement un succès parce qu’enfin 
les Fédéralistes possèdent un texte pour lequel il vaut la peine de se battre.” (Vayssière 2007, 284). 
155
 Own translation from “la création d’une organisation politique européenne, ayant une autorité 
supranationale, pour la formation d’une politique étrangère commune.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 
287). 
156
 Own translation from “[…] die italienische Regierung entschlossen, den Druck nationalistischer 
Strömungen in ihrem Innern überwinde, die halbe, anscheinend provisorische Maßnahmen übernatio-
nal autonome Streitkräfte unter der Koordination eines illusorischen europäischen Kommandos vor-
schlagen, und daß die Regierung ohne Vorbehalte die These einer einheitlichen Europa-Armee und 
alle daraus entstehenden Begrenzungen der Souveränität unterstütze.” (Magagnoli 1998, 40). 
157
 In April 1951, Fontanet recounted in the Geneva Circle that “l’opinion française est beaucoup 
moins défaitiste. La bataille n’est pas encore gagnée, mais il y a de gros progrès depuis six mois.” 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 278). Blankenhorn responded, “Nous avons des divergences de vue avec la 
thèse française, surtout en ce qui concerne les groupes de combat. Mais nous espérons qu’une conclu-
sion commune aboutira. […] Nous croyons qu’une armée européenne est nécessaire. Nous sommes 
donc d’accord avec le plan Pleven sur ce point. […] Nous sommes convaincus que le Plan Pleven est 
une solution. […] L’idée de sortir des frontières, de défendre un bien commun, est très universelle-
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NEI congress debated the question of Western defense at which Adenauer stated, “In 
the creation of a European Defense Community, I see the only safe way to the crea-
tion of an integrated Europe, the only possibility to build a stronghold against the 
Soviet Russian pressure.”158 MRP president Teitgen approved and expressed his dis-
dain for British obstruction: „[…] certain British and Scandinavians want to turn 
Europe into a ‚Conversation Saloon‘.“159 
At the same time, the links between the US ambassadors in Paris and Bonn, Bruce 
and McCloy – members of the ACUE – and Monnet provided a key factor in pulling 
the EDC negotiations in Paris ahead. Coordinating with the French and German gov-
ernments, both Bruce and McCloy had to convince the State Department that a Euro-
pean Army was the only possible solution, against Acheson, for example, who ini-
tially seemed to prefer a German entry into NATO (FRUS 1951 III-b; Schwartz 
1991, 223, FRUS 1951 III, 801-803). Monnet was among those who supported both 
the threat tactics of the US government throughout and repeatedly stated to Bruce, 
Bowie, and McCloy that there was no alternative to the EDC (Dwan 2000, 76). Thus, 
Monnet had pointed out to Eisenhower that the issue was “more of a human problem 
than a military one”. To constitute a “solidarity of destiny”, “the French and the 
Germans should wear the same uniform” (Quoted in Winand 1993, 28). As a result, 
Eisenhower publicly endorsed the EDC on July 3
rd
 1951, Eisenhower speech, advo-
cating European economic and political integration, thus the EDC (Ibid.). 
Additionally, because of the trust Monnet enjoyed among US officials, several 
sources agree that a meeting set up with him and Eisenhower was crucial in over-
coming doubts regarding the military effectiveness of the EDC (e.g. Elgey 1993, 
288; Dûchene 1994, 231; Creswell 2006, 61; Bossuat 1996, 197; Hitchcock 1998, 
155).
160
 Bruce and McCloy took care that Adenauer would be made aware of those 
                                                                                                                                          
ment répandue. Aussi je crois que le plan Pleven pourra vivre s’il y a entre tous les pays égalité de 
droits, égalité d’honneur” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 279). 
158
 Own translation from “In der Schaffung der europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft erblicke ich 
den sicheren und einzigen Weg zur Schaffung eines integrierten Europas, erblicke ich die einzige 
Möglichkeit den starken Damm zu errichten, den wir gegenüber dem sowjetrussischen Druck brau-
chen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 296). 
159
 Own translation from “gewisse Engländer und Skandinavier, die gerne aus Europa einen Konversa-
tionssalon machen wollen[…]” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 297). 
160
 Dûchene (1994, 231) claims that this “encounter was a turning point in the short history of the 
European Defence Community.” Eisenhower had initially opposed the Pleven Plan rather vigorously 
(Sulzberger 1969, 615; Ambrose 1983, 508). The effect that Eisenhower – as Commander in Chief of 
US forces in Europe – endorsed the European Army project in the National Security Council on Au-
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developments, whereas the head of the French delegation, Hervé Alphand had al-
ready indicated to the American ambassadors that he would compile a report for the 
French government which would contain the necessary compromises to make suc-
cessful negotiations possible – on Schuman’s permission.161 Similarily, Spinelli had 
personally submitted a memorandum to De Gasperi in August 1951, in which he 
explained that the position adopted by the Italian government was ineffective, that 
the parliament envisioned in the Interim report of June 1951 was a “shadow without 
a body” that had “no possibility to make a successful contribution” to the new army, 
and that without submitting the European army to a European federal system it 
would be under the influence of the Atlantic community (Magagnoli 1998, 40). A 
few weeks later, De Gasperi replaced Count Sforza as Foreign Minister, appointed 
Lombardo (UEF) as a new member of the Italian delegation in Paris, and the insist-
ence on the creation of a federal system with extensive rights for the parliament be-
came the new doctrine of the Italian delegation.
162
 
 
Summary 
Thus, the shifting lines of conflict described as a key feature of the EDC bargain in 
mid-1951 coincided with considerable transnational activity. While one cannot speak 
of a centrally coordinated affair yet – and without any evaluation of the actual impact 
of those activities on the diplomatic stage – a considerable number of initiatives 
within transnational Christian Democracy, the Federalist, and the federalist socialist 
coincided, in terms of timing, with the governments of key countries in the EDC bar-
                                                                                                                                          
gust 1
st
 1951 was decisive in overcoming opposition from the Pentagon and the JSC (Duchêne 1994, 
231; Bossuat 1996b, 197; Creswell 2006, 61). 
161
 On June 19th 1951, David Bruce reportedly told Hallstein, “Er [Bruce] sei es selbst, der Herrn 
Alphand den Rat gegeben habe, durch Vorlegung eines solchen Berichtes einen Eindruck von den 
Fortschritten, die seit Beginn der Verhandlungen erzielt worden seien, zu vermitteln. Er habe das 
selbst getan, weil er den Eindruck habe, daß der Petersberg-Bericht namentlich in Washington eine 
starke Aktivität ausgelöst habe. Er habe geglaubt, im Einklang mit der französischen Regierung, aber 
auch mit der deutschen Regierung vermeiden zu müssen, daß dabei die Bemühungen um die europäi-
sche Armee völlig unter den Tisch fielen. Er, Bruce, sei in seinem Vorgehen in voller Übereinstim-
mung mit McCloy, der wohl auch dieselben Gesichtspunkte in Washington vertreten werde.” (AAPD 
1951, 340, 341). 
162
 Lombardo demanded the creation of an assembly as a condition for assent, since without it, neither 
the Italian government nor the Italian parliament would agree to the EDC “sans créer en contrepartie 
sur le plan fédéral un organisme auquel serait confiés les pouvoirs dont les Assemblées Nationales se 
dessaisiraient et qui auraient l’autorité de les exercer au même titre que les Parlement nationaux.” 
(Quoted in Magagnoli 1999, 101). 
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gain, notably France, Italy and the US, reevaluating their positions at the bargaining 
table. Moreover, actors from the transatlantic network – sharing similar basic con-
ceptions of post-war Europe – equally displayed considerable activity to lobby their 
governments to throw in their lot for the realization of the proposed EDC. In sum, 
substantial transnational pressures and demands coincided with the shifting of gov-
ernment positions on the EDC institutions and the resulting changing conflict con-
stellations. The radicalism that the course taken in Paris entailed was observed, inter 
alia, by Sassen in the Geneva Circle in October 1951, who maintained that the crea-
tion of a European Army as intended required the creation of a Federation, which, 
being done under the impression of a threat, ‘could be dangerous’.163 Such warnings 
went unheard, however. 
 
 “[…] the trouble is […] that in England 
 the statesmen are pro-European when 
 they belong to the Opposition, 
 and anti-European when 
 they are in power.” 
Paul Reynaud
164
  
 
6.2.2 Second period, 1951 - 1953: Towards a European Political Community? 
Although the contacts between the Europeanist transnational groups and the emerg-
ing supranationalist coalition were loose, there are plausible signs that it was politi-
cally influential. At the same time, the continuing insistence of the leadership of the 
European Movement on a compromise with the Unionists and to use the Council of 
Europe as the primary site for the advancement of European ‘unity’ had caused a 
seemingly permanent rift within the larger organization of the Movement. This, how-
ever, was about to change. Paul Reynaud’s words, quoted above, indicate the disap-
pointment – and in a nutshell – the betrayal of the rhetoric commitments made by 
                                                 
163
 Sassen pointed out in the Geneva Circle on October 16
th
 1951 “Je vous présenter une observation: 
c’est sous une menace que l’Europe est en train de se créer une défense commune. Il ne faudrait pas 
que les homes laissent les événements les conduire ; cela pourrait être fort dangereux. A mon avis, il 
est faux de traiter la question de l’armée européenne de la même façon que le plan Pleven. 
L’institution d’une armée européenne implique l’établissement d’une politique extérieur commune de 
l’Europe. Si on veut instituer l’armée européenne, il faut créer une fédération.” (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 308). 
164
 (quoted in Larres 1996, 15). 
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British unionists during the first years of the European Movement that was felt by 
many within the European Movement at the end of 1951. As a consequence, being ‘a 
good European’ would become a normative expression that was endowed with a 
commitment to European institutions that, at a minimum, went beyond intergovern-
mental exchanges.  
The source of the felt betrayal were the solemn pledges, made by unionists and par-
ticularly Winston Churchill, that seemed to suggest that, once the Conservative party 
was in power, UK positions towards the institutional developments on the continent 
would change. Until the end of 1951, the British Labour party had been among the 
most vocal sources of skepticism towards integration and the Council of Europe. 
When the UK elections in October 1951 produced a new conservative majority in 
Parliament, the hopes were that a government led by a main foundational figure of 
the European Movement, would effect a change in the British stance towards the 
negotiations in Paris and the Council of Europe. The disappointment in the lack of 
any change in the UK stance towards the negotiations was exacerbated by a coordi-
native embarrassment within the new British government. After receiving Cabinet 
instructions, a member of the Tory group in the Consultative Assembly in Stras-
bourg, Maxwell-Fyfe delivered a speech in Strasbourg on November 29
th
 1951, and 
indicated a personal ‘opinion’ that the Kingdom might participate in the EDC. In 
response, the new Foreign Secretary Anthony, at a Press conference in Rome, an-
nounced that the British government ruled out any form of British units participating 
in the EDC but that “there might be some other form of association.” (quoted in 
Dockrill 1991, 86). This produced quite a stir, as members of the Conservative party 
complained to Churchill about the negative attitude on the EDC and its effect on 
their reputation in Strasbourg (DBPO II: I, 769-772, Eden 1960, 33). Not that the 
‘pro-European’ Tories had a clear program. Nevertheless, Eden was widely criticized 
as ‘anti-European’ (FRUS 1951 III-b, 843-6, 856-865). 
These events were accompanied by a vote, initialized in the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe in December 1951 by Spaak and a number of deputies from 
the European Movement, that called for the institutionalization of a “a federal Euro-
pean political authority” (Vayssière 2007, 293). It was overwhelmingly rejected in 
the Assembly and finally demonstrated how little support there was among the dele-
gates for such far-reaching designs, despite the fact that figures like Adenauer and 
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De Gasperi had spoken for it with heavy ‘European’ pathos.165 In reaction, Spaak 
resigned in a much publicized event from his position as president of the Consulta-
tive Assembly. ‚British obstructionism‘, in Spaak’s view, had led to a disaster, “The 
Europe we are speaking of is a Europe we have heavily mutilated.”166 He added in 
the Consultative Assembly, “Today, the cause for a United Europe is not present in 
this assembly.”167 
Once Spaak had resigned, he initiated a shift in the strategy of the European Move-
ment and a realignment with its federalist members. Whereas the Federalists had so 
far been unable to influence the official decisions of the Executive Bureau of the 
European Movement, in February 24
th
 1952 the Executive Bureau passed a resolu-
tion recommending that, in order for the European Army and the European institu-
tions to be legitimate, the new institutions should be embedded in a ‘quasi- constitu-
tion’ to be worked out by a European constituent (Belot 2003, 599). The proposal 
took up the dispute between the EDC delegations in Paris over the eventual political 
structure in which the European Army would be embedded – eventually enshrined in 
Article 38 of the EDC Treaty – and interpreted it according to the federalist blue-
print. As Henry Frenay put it after the session, “[…] the propositions we have de-
fended over a year have just received a major recognition.”168 Spaak proposed that 
the European Movement should constitute a study group to explore the outlines of a 
European constituent (Dumoulin 1999, 446). The goal now was, as a resolution of 
the Executive Committee of the European Movement from May 23rd 1952 put it, to 
prevent the emergence of a “European military technocracy, insufficiently dominated 
                                                 
165
 “Which road are we to choose if we are to preserve all that is noble and humane within these na-
tional forces, while co-coordinating them to build a supranational civilization which can give them 
balance, absorb them, and harmonize them in one irresistible drive towards progress? This can only be 
done by infusing new life into the separate national forces, through the common ideals of our history, 
and offering them the field of action of the varied and magnificent experiences of our common Euro-
pean civilization. It can only be done by establishing a meeting-point where those experiences can 
assemble, unite by affinity, and thus engender new forms of solidarity based on increased freedom and 
greater social justice. It is within an association of national sovereignties based on democratic, consti-
tutional organizations that these new forms can flourish.” (De Gasperi 1951). 
166
 Own translation from “Das Europa, von dem wir hier sprechen, ist ein Europa, das wir schwer 
haben verstümmeln lassen” (quoted in Weber 1996, 433). 
167
 Own translation from “aujourd’hui […] l‘intérêt de la cause de l’Europe unie […] ne se trouve pas 
dans cette assemblée.” (Quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 444). 
168
 Own translation from “les thèses que nous avons défendues depuis un an viennent de recevoir une 
consécration éclatante.” (quoted in Belot 2003, 599). 
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by political organs established in a democratic way.”169 The federalist ‘constituent’, 
it seemed, was about to be inaugurated. 
 
The Formation of the ‘Action Committee for a European Constituent’ 
Thus, shortly before the EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952, the ‘Action Commit-
tee for a European Constituent’ was set up on March 7th 1952 under Spaak’s leader-
ship with funds from the European Movement. It met continuously to work out a 
recommendation for an institutional structure that would incorporate the – as its par-
ticipants saw it – essential democratic and constitutional principles to be respected 
for the creation of a European Political Community. Its members were selected from 
within the European Movement, appointed by a proportional rule from all member 
organizations. A number of its members would occupy key positions within the fu-
ture Ad Hoc Assembly that worked out the Draft Treaty for the European Political 
Community.
170
 Spaak would become its elected president and other key figures with-
in the broader transnational coalition, such as Brentano for the Christian Democrats 
and Van der Goes van Naters for the Social Democrats would become members of 
its constitutional committee charged with the core institutional design question. As a 
result, the Committee had sufficient means to feed its results into the Ad Hoc As-
sembly (Vayssière 2007, 306). 
In addition, the shift in the strategy of the European Movement meant that support 
from the US transatlantic connections was now firmly behind the federalist strategy. 
After the inauguration of the Committee, Spaak toured the US for six weeks after the 
foundation of the group to utilize his contacts to obtain funding from the ACUE 
(Palayret 1995, 50, 51; Dumoulin 1999, 448). It’s two American Members – Robert 
R. Bowie and Harvard Professor of Government Carl J. Friedrich – managed to se-
cure ACUE funds for the committee work and their assistants at Harvard (Winand 
1993, 32). Already on January 31
st
 1952, the US Senate passed a resolution – spon-
                                                 
169
 Own translation from “technocratie militaire européenne, insuffisamment dominée par des organes 
politiques établis de façon démocratique” (quoted in Belot 2003, 601). 
170
 Formal Members were Paul-Henri Spaak, Fernand Dehousse, Max Becker, Lodovico Benvenuti, 
Piero Calamandrei, Arthur Caltheux, Pierre de Félice, Henry Frenay, Hans Nawiasky, Herman 
Pünder, Altiero Spinelli, Cornelis van Rij, Robert R. Bowie, and Carl J. Friedrich. Spaak, Dehousse, 
Becker, Benvenuti, and Pünder would be members of the Ad Hoc Assembly (Europäische Bewegung 
1953, 6). 
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sored by Fulbright and supported by Eisenhower – encouraging the US government 
to cooperate with any organization pushing for a European federation and a Europe-
an political authority (Rebattet 1963, 303) In sum, the transatlantic contacts via the 
ACUE increasingly paid off. On March 2
nd
, Adenauer and the French High Commis-
sioner in Germany, André François-Poncet attended a UEF congress in Aix-la-
Chappelle on March 2
nd
 1952 that concluded that “only the creation of a genuine 
federal state will allow for the real organization of a European defense.”171 
The creation of the new political structure was supposed to build upon the EDC 
Treaty by working out recommendations for the institutions of the EPC, following 
Article 38 of the Treaty. Its purpose was deliberately framed in federalist vocabulary: 
under ‘the threat of enslavement’ a new foundation for a new Europe should come 
through a European constituent, whose results – a constitution – should be proposed 
for ratification to the national parliaments.
172
 The blueprint was, no doubt, the US 
experience. The radicalism of this procedure as well as the strategy to implement it 
was prepared, inter alia, in a further meeting in Lutetia on June 18
th
 that assembled 
key representatives from the transnational communities, namely Paul-Henri Spaak, 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Rene Courtin, Henri Frenay, and Altiero Spinelli (Belot 2003, 
612) As Spaak wrote to Frenay, “[…] we are going to do something really spectacu-
lar.”173 On May 1952, Eisenhower, then still SHAPE commander, publicly visited 
the headquarters of the Italian MFE section of the UEF. For Spinelli, this was the 
vindication and legitimation of UEF efforts as the visit “[…] underligned the im-
portance taken by our movement. On the other hand, it put Eisenhower’s authority 
behind our claim in favor of the constituent assembly.”174 In particular, Eisenhower 
                                                 
171
 Own translation from “la création d’un véritable État Fédéral est la condition qui seule peut per-
mettre l’organisation réelle de la défense de l’Europe” (Vayssière 2007, 296, 297). 
172
 “Um den jahrhundertelangen Streitigkeiten, die die Völker Europas zerrissen und ausgeblutet ha-
ben, ein Ende zu bereiten, um den Weg zu neuem Krieg und drohender Versklavung zu versperren, 
um unsere Sicherheit und unsere Freiheiten zu garantieren, um einen wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg zu 
ermöglichen, der [die] Hebung des Lebensstandards und soziale Gerechtigkeit sichert, um unsern 
Völkern ihr Selbstvertrauen wiederzugeben, fordern wir, daß die demokratischen Staaten Europas, die 
schon bereit sind, ihre Souveränität auf der Grundlage von gleichen Rechten und Pflichten zu be-
schränken, unverzüglich eine europäische verfassunggebende Versammlung einzuberufen, mit dem 
Auftrag, einen Plan zu einer europäischen Verfassung auszuarbeiten, der dann den nationalen Parla-
menten zu Billigung vorgelegt werden soll.” (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 9). 
173
 Own translation from “[…] nous allons faire quelque chose d’assez spectaculaire” (Quoted in Belot 
2003, 613). 
174
 Own translation from “soulignait l’importance prise par notre mouvement, d’autre part elle mettait 
l’autorité de Eisenhower derrière notre revendication en faveur d’une Constituante.” (Quoted in 
Vayssière 2007, 289). 
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publicly supported via a press conference at the MFE headquarters the federalist ap-
proach of convening a constituent assembly (Kim 2000, 90). On June 15
th
 1952, a 
conference of the European Movement in Rome, which De Gasperi and Reynaud 
(position) attended, made the same calls (Ibid. 92). 
The UEF issued a memorandum on June 23
rd
 that was passed to Jean Monnet and, as 
president of the newly inaugurated ECSC High Authority, urged him to propose the 
aforementioned procedure to the governments of the ECSC; Monnet who approved 
passed the note on to Schuman.
175
 The European Movement issued a declaration, 
calling on the ECSC Assembly to form the nucleus of a European Constituent and 
thus to draft a document for a treaty that can then be accepted by the governments 
(Vayssière 2007, 299). At the press conference were present, inter alia, members of 
the French EDC delegation (Hervé Alphand, and Étienne Hirsch) as well as the Ital-
ian Delegation (Ivan Matteo Lombardo and Ferrucio Parri) (Vayssière 2007, 301). 
These events are significant because the imitative from the European Movement had 
competition. In May 1952, the British government equally took up the provisions of 
Article 38 of the EDC Treaty and suggested to use the existing institutions of the 
Council of Europe in order to create a very political superstructure: for EDC matters 
and concerns, only delegates of the Six would accordingly meet (i.e. ministerial 
Council of the Council of Europe composed of the Six; and delegates from the Six to 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe). The proposition was put forth 
by UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and accordingly christened the Eden Plan. 
For Eden, the goal was to speed up negotiations from the ‘outside’ and to allow pro-
gress for a European Political Community (DBPO II: I, 839-841). The Cabinet en-
dorsed Eden’s perspective. A memorandum conveyed the idea on April 11th 1952.176 
Within the Council of Europe, the proposal was initially welcomed: Stikker (Nether-
                                                 
175
 He apparently passed it on to Schuman with the note “Je viens en discuter avec nos amis. Ils le 
trouvent rn tous points excellent. […] J’ai en effet pense qu’il pourrait vous être utile de le connaitre 
en vue des conversations que, les cas échéant, vous allez avoir sur ce sujet.” (Quoted inBelot 2003, 
613). 
176
 The memo said that “the Council of Europe should be remodelled so that its organs could serve as 
the ministerial and parliamentary institutions of the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community 
and any future organisations of the same structure. At the same time, the Council of Europe would 
continue to serve as a consultative body and as a forum for inter-governmental and parliamentary 
cooperation in Western Europe.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 61). Moreover, it proposes a ‘two-tier’ 
system so that during negotiations relating to supranational institutions, only the Six would be present, 
whereas on other issues, 15 members would continue to be present (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 60-65). 
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lands), Van Zeeland (Belgium), and even Schuman suggested to at least study the 
plan further within the Consultative Assembly (Kim 2000, 86).
177
  
By directly challenging the constituent approach it caused some concern for Monnet, 
Spaak, and their allies. To prevent the Eden Plan from acquiring significance in the 
transgovernmental plane, Monnet turned to the new US ambassador in Bonn, Tom-
linson as well as Bruce, who agreed with his assessment (Kim 2000, 94) The main 
fear was that the Eden Plan would involve actors from the Council of Europe whose 
attitudes towards supranationality would again ‘dilute’ the whole project. Within the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, however, some of the delegates 
received the proposal more positively. As Julian Amery put it, “Under such an asso-
ciative arrangement the continental Communities on the one hand and the UK and 
Scandinavia on the other could exchange and harmonize their plans, and the various 
countries could remain in contact with one another on an ongoing basis.” Moreover, 
he argued that, 
“[…] there is no guarantee that the French Parliament will be persuaded to accept a Euro-
pean Defence Community with which the UK is not effectively associated. The technical 
details of such an association are a matter for the General Staffs but it is up to the Consul-
tative Assembly to explore how it might develop at a political level. Let us hope that, by 
working along the lines proposed in the Eden Plan, the Assembly will turn the Council of 
Europe into a practical tool for reconciling the British point of view with that of the con-
tinental Communities, and that, in so doing, it will save the united Europe from the many 
perils that it faces.” (Amery 1952). 
Amery had made an important point: on February 2
nd
 1952, a debate in the French 
Assemblée Nationale had passed, by a slim margin in a vote of confidence, condi-
tions for approval of the EDC Treaty that contained a demand for democratically 
legitimated representatives to check the new central authority; a demand that unani-
mous decisions within that authority should be minimized; and a demand that, with-
out being conditional, the UK should participate in the EDC to address the most 
basic concerns for the ratification of the treaty.
 178
 The latter was a key element for 
                                                 
177
 Pleased with this result, Eden cabled back from Strasbourg that “Things have gone better than we 
could have expected.” (Kim 2000, 86). 
178
 Among the chief elements in the ordre de jour, obligating the French government “de prévoir dans 
les protocols annexes du traité la mise en place progressive des unites au fur et à mesure que pourra 
matériellement être établie ;’organisation commune.” Moreover, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit 
mis en œvre pour assurer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique suprana-
tional à compétence limitée mais réelle, responsable devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des 
peuples européens, et invite le gouvernement à prendre dans ce sens toutes initiatives nécessaires. (2) 
la stricte limitation et l’énumération précise des cas où des peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que 
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the SFIO, French Socialist leader Guy Mollet was still committed to the possibility 
of British participation, arguing that a small Europe of the Six was ‘unacceptable’ 
(Dumoulin 1999, 446). The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe debated 
this question accordingly in May 1952: there was a direct competition between one 
proposal by Spaak suggesting to use the existing ECSC Assembly, while a different 
proposal, backed by the French Socialist leader Mollet suggested the creation of a 
special assembly of ‘potential’ members of the EDC. Spaaks proposal was defeated, 
and Mollets proposal accepted and referred to the Council of Europe for approval 
(see Kim 2000, 109). 
However, instead of drawing on the Eden proposals to combine a democratically 
appropriate political structure for the EDC with possible British association, the reso-
lution of the Consultative Assembly was vetoed by Germany and Italy in the Council 
of Ministers. Instead, the governments of the Six took up the proposals emanating 
from the European Movement. Lobbied by Monnet to reject the Eden Plan and under 
the impression of an NEI congress in May 1952 at which Schuman and De Gasperi 
had participated, as well as hearing the demands voiced by the UEF and the Europe-
an Movement, Schuman and De Gasperi issued an Italian-French memorandum in 
August 1952 that urged the ECSC Council to follow the proposal made by the Euro-
pean movement (Griffiths 2000, 69; Kaiser 2007, 283). In terms of the Luxembourg 
declaration, they took up the suggestion of Spaak, Spinelli, and Frenay that the Ad 
Hoc Assembly should liaise with parliamentarians from the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (Greilsammer 1975, 75). On the other hand, federalist in-
sistence by Spinelli and Frenay for a direct parliamentary ratification of the results of 
the Ad Hoc conference failed the ECSC Council. After the US State Department had 
come out unequivocally against the Eden Plan (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 198), the 
Luxembourg Declaration stipulated that an IGC would review the draft treaty and 
have to sign it (ECSC 1952). Subsequently, the UK abstained from putting institu-
tional alternatives on the agenda since the UK government was worried that this 
                                                                                                                                          
l’établissement d’un budget commun vote par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle 
maintient son opposition à la reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. 
Elle invite le gouvernement à renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en voue 
d’obtenir la participation dans a Communauté européenne de Défense s’autres nations démocratique, 
et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement 
aux soucis exprimés par l’Assemblée national comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point 
des institutions et des modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (Fauvet 1956, 26, 27, 
original italics). 
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would make the United Kingdom a scapegoat for the failure of the European project 
(Dockrill 1991, 111; Jansen 1992, 70). 
In the meantime, the ‘Action Committee’ had started preparing for the proceedings 
of the Ad Hoc Assembly. Instead of seeking to produce a definite blueprint for the 
constituent, questions regarding the European institutions were separated according 
to issues. Once debated and agreed upon, a text was drafted that would be submitted 
to the members of the Ad Hoc Assembly. Within the committee, there was a quick 
agreement that the organization would have to be based on democratic principles of 
the separation of powers, executive control, and a two-chamber system representing 
European voters and European states respectively.
179
 One chamber would consist of 
deputies representing the European people to be directly elected by European voter; 
the other chamber would consist of Senators representing European States to be ap-
pointed by national parliaments according to a procedure of their own choosing 
(Europäische Bewegung 1953, 234). Although the radicalism seemed to instill doubt 
in some members about its political feasibility, there were no objections. The policy 
areas the new organization should assume responsibility for were extensive and en-
compassing, ranging from basic rights, defense and foreign policy, to issues of trans-
portation and postal affairs.
180
 The fact that a complete political union was envi-
sioned is demonstrated by the fact that there was a debate over the right of secession 
(Europäische Bewegung 1953, 29). The central power would be invested in a direc-
torate, whose members would be independent, whereas its leadership was to elected, 
by majority, by both houses of the two-chamber parliament (Europäische Bewegung 
1953, 123).
181
 
Thus, the institutional design that the Action Committee prepared clearly followed 
the federalist blueprint in order to address the basic ‘democratic deficit’ of the EDC 
Treaty. The origins of the Action Committee formed part of a coordinated attempt, 
                                                 
179
 “Konstituierung einer Versammlung der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, besonders auf 
demokratischer Grundlage gewählt; […] Die endgültige Organisation [ …] soll in dem Sinne gebildet 
werden, daß sie einer der beiden Formen, der bundestaatlichen oder der konföderativen, gerecht wer-
den kann. Hierbei hat sie auf dem Grundsatz der Gewaltenteilung aufzubauen und insbesondere ein 
parlamentarisches Zweikammersystem zu ermöglichen.” (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 11). 
180
 “1. Allgemeine Grundsätze, 2. Freiheit der Bürger (das Recht des einzelnen im Rahmen der Ge-
meinschaft), 3. Verteidigung, 4. Außenpolitik, 5. Post und Verkehr, 6. Finanzen, 7. Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialfragen, 8. Vereinheitlichung des Rechts.” (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 21). 
181
 “Das Parlament wählt den Präsidenten der Regierung und den Vizepräsidenten aus ihren Mitglie-
dern. Die Wahl erfolgt für eine wiederholbare Zeit von zwei Jahren.” (Europäische Bewegung 1953, 
232). 
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across the transnational and transatlantic connections, to preempt the advance, made 
by Eden, link the EDC and the Council of Europe. Instead, a Political Community 
was to be created among the Six. 
 
The Ad Hoc Assembly and the Draft Treaty for a European Political Community 
The core rationale of the Ad Hoc Assembly, as described above, was to provide the 
EDC with an appropriate and legitimate political ‘superstructure”, “federal or con-
federal in character” in a two-chamber system as stipulated by Article 38 of the EDC 
Treaty. The members of the Ad Hoc Assembly were largely recruited from the ECSC 
Common Assembly; others were members of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and selected by domestic parliaments to sit in the Ad Hoc Assem-
bly (Griffiths 2000, 71). Transnationally active actors and members of the Action 
Committee of the European Movement managed to occupy key positions, particular-
ly in the constitutional committee tasked with drawing up the basic institutions: 
Heinrich von Brentano would be its chairman, Bruins Slot (European Movement) 
and Ludovico Benvenuti (Federalist Community) would be its vice chairmen, and 
among the remaining 26 members of the Assembly were Teitgen, Dehousse, Becker, 
Van der Goes van Naters, and Delbos.
182
 Spaak himself was elected as the President 
of the Assembly (Griffiths 2000, 73). 
There were by no means only actors within the Assembly that looked favorably upon 
federalist ambitions: a vocal critic, for example, was French Gaullist delegate Michel 
Debre in the constitutional committee. Conflicts between actors with differing points 
of view on the transnational ideological conflict combined with different viewpoints 
between actors from larger and smaller nations to produce complex lines of conflict 
across the transnational party groups. For example, a motion supported by Hans Joa-
chim von Merkatz (Deutsche Partei) and the Belgian Christian Democrat Pierre 
Wigny argued that Senators should be delegated by governments and argued for 
equal representation of all states. This motion, however, was, inter alia, argued 
against by the Belgian Socialist Dehousse and Spaak as well as the Christian Demo-
                                                 
182
 For the members of the Assembly and the Constitutional Committee, see the documentation of the 
Draft Treaty (EPC Treaty  1953). 
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crats Brentano and Teitgen (Kim 2000, 106). In many instances, the proposals by 
members of the Action Committee were met with considerable opposition.
183
 
The most salient conflict arose over the question of the extension of competences 
over policy areas not covered by the EDC and ECSC Treaties, in particular economic 
issues. In line with the positions held by their government, the Dutch, led by Pieter 
Blaisse, sought to enshrine social and economic unification as a central purpose al-
ready in the preamble (Griffiths 2000, 86). The opposition, however, did not fall 
neatly into national categories either. Thus, Teitgen (French MRP) came out in favor 
of endowing the Community with monetary and investment powers, Guy Mollet 
(French SFIO) opposed it (Griffiths 2000, 86). The emerging compromise contained 
a preamble formula and stipulated that the EPC could adopt proposals and decisions 
to expand powers accepted unanimously by Council of Ministers (Griffiths 2000, 
97).
184
 However, every step would require approval by governments and parliaments 
as well. Motions by Bergman, Becker and Van der Goes van Naters to relax these 
hurdles failed. When this compromise reached the floor, a fierce debate followed. As 
a result, the articles remained as they stood which only added to the discontent that 
was to characterize the final voting procedure. Thus, the Dutch representatives voted 
on the final Draft Treaty with a caveat, 
  
                                                 
183
 The most direct intervention from the European Movement and the Study Committee came with 
regard to the appointment of the executive. The initial motion that found some support within the 
Assembly called for the Executive to be appointed by the representatives of the European States. This 
directly contradicted the proposal worked out by the Action Committee – appointment by approval of 
both chambers - was also hotly contested internally within a meeting of the Executive Council of the 
European Movement in January 1953 that split into a vote of 22 in favor and 21 against the proposi-
tion that the Senate should suggest its members and then by invested by majorities in both legislative 
chambers (Griffiths 2000, 78). Even that proposal did not go through. After the January meeting of the 
constitutional committee, the compromise solution – stipulated that the Senate would appoint the 
president but that he was susceptible being ousted if a vote of no confidence in either the Senate or the 
co-called ‘People’s Chamber’ failed (Art. 27 – 31 EPC Treaty  1953). With regard to the budget, 
Budget: initially Belgian Wigny proposed that budget decisions be made only by Council of Minis-
ters, Becker proposed that that after transition period, the community would decide on its own (in-
come and expenditure) with consent of the parliament (Griffiths 2000, 85). 
184
 Article 2 of the EPC Draft Treaty stipulated the goal “to promote, in harmony with the general 
economy of Member States, the economic expansion, the development of employment and the im-
provement of the standard of living in Member States, by means, in particular, of the progressive 
establishment of a common market, transitional or other measures being taken to ensure that no fun-
damental and persistent disturbance is thereby caused to the economy of Member States” (Art. 2 EPC 
Treaty  1953). 
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“[…] because we cannot agree to a European Community being set up without adequate 
guarantees that integration in the economic sphere will be effected within a period which, 
in our view, should be short. What is missing is an undertaking, firmly rooted in the Stat-
ute, clearly to link the creation of the European Community in such a way that the Statute 
will represent the first concrete step on the path to the desired economic unity. This is not 
yet the case.”(Griffiths 2000, 90). 
The final Draft Treaty conformed to the call in Art. 38 for a two-chamber system and 
its content was mostly in line with the general ideas set forth in Spaak’s Action 
committee envisaging a substantial amount of pooling and delegation elements, hith-
erto and since unseen in European Treaties (Rittberger 2006). A number of positions 
already elaborated in the Action Committee found their way into the treaty.
185
 In 
other cases, for example with regard to the rights of the People’s Chamber, the Draft 
Treaty stipulated only the ability to deny confidence to the Executive by a simple 
majority, effectively granting a veto over its composition. Community laws required 
a simple majority in both chambers (Art. 52 EPC Treaty  1953). Thus, it is unsurpris-
ing that the Ad Hoc Assembly proceedings proved controversial: more importantly, 
it sent ominous signs that one of the main objectives of setting up a democratically 
legitimate structure – namely to ease the ratification of the EDC Treaty – was not 
achieved. The French Socialist bloc in the Ad Hoc Assembly abstained in its entirety 
from the final vote on the Draft Constitution because parliamentary control was 
deemed still insufficient. The three French Gaullists deputies equally abstained for 
the opposite reason, thus signifying that the main purpose to ease ratification in 
France was not obtained (Kim 2000, 189) 
Nevertheless, after the final vote in the Assembly, Spaak employed his usual rhetori-
cal pathos, recounting “the mortal danger of our quarrels” and arguing that the EPC 
Draft Treaty will “allow us to save what we have in common that is most cherished 
and most beautiful” and that “We today have broached a new stage.” (Quoted in 
Griffiths 2000, 93). Quoting a passage from a speech by George Washington made 
when submitting the US constitution to Congress in 1787, Spaak thanked, in his 
function as president of the Ad Hoc Assembly, ‘the army of the good Europeans’ for 
                                                 
185
 Thus, the ‘Peoples’ Chamber’ would be appointed by direct election (Art. 13 EPC Treaty  1953), 
the Senate delegates elected by Parliaments, not governments (Art. 16 EPC Treaty  1953). Both the 
Parliament (i.e. the Peoples’ chamber and the Senate) and Executive Council had a right to initiative 
(Art. 23 EPC Treaty  1953). 
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the work done within the Assembly.
186
 Spaak’s Belgian compatriot Fernand 
Dehousse equally spoke of a breakthrough reached with the EPC Draft Treaty.
187
 
Adenauer congratulated with the “conviction that our common fatherland, the unified 
Europe, will come because it alone can ensure the future of the occident”.188 After 
the Draft Treaty had been submitted to the governments, the UEF held a conference 
in Venice in April 1953 under the impression of Stalin’s recent death, at which fig-
ures such as Hervé Alphand, Heinrich von Brentano, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen were 
present (Vayssière 2007, 213). Its resolution sought to take head-on the impression 
that Stalin’s death, providing for a potential détente, made a European Community 
less necessary.
189
 This event seemed increasingly worrying as it would incite princi-
pled opponents of German rearmament to oppose the Treaty. The more serious de-
fects of the Treaty, having failed to garner the full support of the Dutch delegates and 
the French Socialists in particular, seemed less worrying. Given both defects, the 
EPC would die a slow death. Throughout late 1953, several IGC’s were convened 
without result. The first IGC for 1954, scheduled to take place in March 1954, was 
cancelled. 
                                                 
186
 “Il serait peut-être présomptueux d'espérer la voir recueillir l'approbation sans réserve de tous les 
Etats, mais chacun d'eux considérera sans nul doute que, si l'on n'avait tenu compte que de son seul 
intérêt, les conséquences auraient pu être particulièrement désagréables ou préjudiciables à d'autres ; 
nous espérons et croyons que cette Constitution ne soulèvera que le minimum d'objections auquel on 
pouvait raisonnablement s'attendre ; notre plus ardent désir est qu'elle contribue à assurer la prospérité 
durable de ce continent qui nous est si cher à tous et qu'elle garantisse sa liberté et son bonheur. […] 
Je félicite et je remercie – oserai-je dire que je cite à l'ordre du jour de l'armée des bons Européens - 
M. von BRENTANO, Président de la Commission constitutionnelle, les Présidents et rapporteurs de 
ses sous-commissions, MM. BLAISSE et BENVENUTI, pour ce qui concerne les attributions, MM. 
TEITGEN, DEHOUSSE et AZARA, pour les institutions politiques, MM. PERSICO et VON MER-
KATZ, pour les institutions juridictionnelles, MM. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS, SEMLER et 
WIGNY, pour ce qui concerne les liaisons de la Communauté politique et ses rapports d'association 
avec les autres nations libres.” (Spaak 1953). 
187
 “Disons le mot : la Commission constitutionnelle et l'Assemblée ad hoc ont fait ce que l'on appelle-
ra peut-être un jour, sur le plan de la science politique, une trouvaille, une «découverte» scientifique. 
Elles ont donné le jour à un type nouveau d'association d'Etats qui ne rentre dans aucune des catégo-
ries connues, quoiqu'il emprunte des éléments tantôt à la Confédération d'Etats, tantôt à l'Etat fédéral, 
tantôt même à l'Etat unitaire. C'est pourquoi le mot Communauté devient particulièrement précieux 
pour désigner l'œuvre accomplie” (Dehousse 1953). 
188
 As Adenauer expressed it in a personal letter to Spaak in 1953 “[…] in der festen Überzeugung, 
daß unser gemeinsames Vaterland, das Vereinigte Europa (sic!), kommen wird, weil es allein die 
glückliche und gesicherte Zukunft des Abendlandes gewährleistet.” (Adenauer 1987, 57). 
189
 “En présence des évènements qui ont marqué la vie du monde soviétique et son attitude internatio-
nale, évènements qui risquent faire paraitre a l’opinion publique des différents pays d’Europe, moins 
nécessaire ou moins urgent les mesures d’intégration européenne prévue […] l’UEF déclare : Même 
en dehors de toute menace soviétique, la Fédération européenne est une nécessite politique, écono-
mique et social impérative” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 314). 
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Summary 
In sum, the years between 1951 and 1953 provided for a ‘federalist movement’: mo-
tivated by the fact that, in order to prevent ‘technocratic military experts’ to rule, the 
EDC project had brought together transnational Christian Democrats, Social Demo-
crats, Federalists, and, with prominent US support in Eisenhower, had produced a 
federalist moment that sought, in terms of the indentations of the group around 
Spaak, to mimic the US experience and create a European constitution through the 
constituent approach. These actors coming from a supranationalist or federalist back-
ground, chose to pursue what in their minds was the ‘appropriate’ avenue for imple-
menting an ‘appropriate’ institutional design and ratification procedure. As shown in 
the preceding pages, the coalition seemed to have significant access to both the Eu-
ropean governments as well as the US administration, indicating that its actors had a 
privileged position within the dynamically evolving transnational and transgovern-
mental relations. 
In addition, a concerted effort was made by that assembled transnational coalition to 
bypass the British Eden Plan, thus to avoid the Council of Europe and British associ-
ation with the EDC altogether. Apart from this motivation, a second key motive was 
to ensure, through the creation of the democratically acceptable political ‘superstruc-
ture’ that the Treaty would find sufficient support in the national parliaments, espe-
cially the Assemblée Nationale. However, the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Assembly, 
and particularly the reactions of French Socialists in that chamber – abstaining from 
a vote on the draft treaty – suggest that this objective was hardly achieved. In fact, it 
is feasible that the opposite occurred: by ruling out the possibility, as suggested in the 
Eden Plan, of a British association to the EDC through the Council of Europe and by 
opening up a substantial conflict over the question of economic integration, the path 
taken was risky and, as it turned out, led nowhere. 
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 “There will be problems.” 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 
Geneva Circle, June 16th 1952
190
 
6.2.3 Endgame, 1953-1954 
The enthusiasm generated by the submission of the EPC Draft Treaty to the govern-
ments of the Six quickly proved to be the federalist trompe-l'œil that Denis de 
Rougement had warned against in 1949. By the time the Ad Hoc Assembly submit-
ted the Treaty to the governments of the Six, it was already becoming apparent that 
the ratification of the EDC Treaty alone would pose a more complicated problem 
than anticipated. The governments of the Six, moreover, were no longer as enthusias-
tic about a Political Community as a year before. In 1953, a number of key actors, 
including Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi had to leave office. Moreover, 
events in 1953 and 1954 gave rhetorical ammunition to the opponents of the EDC. 
Whereas in the previous years, proponents of the EDC could always point to the So-
viet threat – in Spaak’s words ‘the mortal danger of our quarrels’ – the war ended in 
July 1953 without any accompanied Soviet provocation on the continent. When Sta-
lin died in March 1953, a number of principled opponents to German rearmaments 
even saw the possibility for a neutralized Germany reappear. Thus, to the surprise of 
many, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill advocated a renewed round of four-
power conferences with the Soviet Union to explore that solution. 
 
The Fate of the EPC, Ratification Problems and the Decline of the Transnational 
Coalition: No Alternative to the EDC? 
When the EPC Draft Treaty was submitted to the ECSC Council by Spaak on March 
9
th
 1953, the signs of an impending ratification crisis in France had become fairly. 
The Socialists, as Teitgen had related to the Geneva Circle, would play a pivotal 
role.
191
 Continuing its efforts to influence public opinion and governments, in Octo-
                                                 
190
 “Es wird Schwierigkeiten geben” (Quoted in Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 325). 
191
 In June 1952, Pierre-Henri Teitgen recounted in the Geneva Circle – at a session where Brentano 
was present – the events surrounding the break of the cross-partisan ‘third force coalition’ in France 
and its implications for the prospects of the ratification of the EDC Treaty. “Die neue Koalition ist seit 
dem 17. Juni 1951 eingekesselt zwischen Kommunisten und Gaullisten. Zwischen diesen Blöcken ist 
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ber 1953, the European Movement sought to organize a second congress at The 
Hague to push for the adoption of the EPC Draft Treaty. Individuals present were 
inter alia Brentano, Teitgen and Monnet Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi, 
both having been forced to vacate left official positions in mid-1953 as well (Pistone 
2008, 76). A core problem of the EPC draft Treaty itself continued as French Social-
ist leader Guy Mollet did not attend; instead, his radical federalist intra-party oppo-
nents Jacquet and Phillippe were present. Both Spaak and Brentano repeatedly de-
manded that the at least the Constitutional Committee should be able to partake in 
the IGC on the EDC Draft Treaty, to no avail.
192
 Moreover, even within the Europe-
an Movement, the clash between the French and Benelux delegations over the crea-
tion of a Common Market under the auspices of the EPC had to be glossed over 
(Kim 2000, 322). This dispute – effectively one of national economic interests – af-
fected the European Movement. Thus, a declaration of the ELEC executive pro-
nounced that the European Movement had become “an organization maneuvered by 
the Socialists issuing interventionist propaganda for a European unification. If we 
were giving them less money, this propaganda would be less efficient.”193 194 In view 
of the apparent loss of influence over the governments, Spinelli, true to his Marxist 
past, attributed these disappointing events to a ‘European reactionary’ development, 
“De Gaulle, Togliatti, Ollenhauer […] have become three typical representatives of 
                                                                                                                                          
eine Regierungsmehrheit notwendig; sie ohne Sozialisten zu bilden und zu halten, ist sehr schwer.” 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 322). He thus continued about EDC ratification “Es wird Schwierigkeiten 
geben.” Moreover, he put the blame on the perception oft he pronouncements of German Socialist 
leader Kurt Schumacher “Für Frankreich ist aber Schumacher Symbol des Hasses, des Nationalismus 
und des Argwohns, daher im gesamten ein großes Mißtrauen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 325). 
192
 Paul-Henri Spaak and Heinrich von Brentano wrote in a letter to De Gasperi on June 1
st
 1953 “La 
Commission constitutionnelle estime devoir souligner l'importance extraordinaire que revêt la ques-
tion de l'intégration européenne. Elle prie vivement le Conseil de ministres de poursuivre sans autre 
délai la voie qui a été ouverte par la résolution que, dans une claire vision de l'avenir, les six ministres 
des affaires étrangères ont prise le 10 septembre 1952” (Spaak and von Brentano 1953). 
193
 Own translation from “une organisation manœuvrée par les socialistes et qui fait la propagande 
d’une unification européenne selon les méthodes dirigistes. Si nous lui donnions moins d’argent, cette 
propagande serait moins efficace” (Dumoulin and Dutrieue 1993, 60). 
194
 By early 1954, ELEC conferences had become a mirror of national differences: thus, the Dutch 
delegate Max Kohnstamm declared that he had “aucun intérêt à ratifier un traite politique dont les 
dispositions économiques n’assurent pas la formation du marché commun” (Quoted in Dumoulin and 
Dutrieue 1993, 69). His Belgian counterpart, Olivier Wormser declared that “sans […] assurance 
quant au marché unique, l’entrée de la Belgique dans la Communauté politique serait un leurre” 
(Ibid.). The French delegate Giscard d’Estaing sought appeasement “A nos yeux, l’institution du pou-
voir politique, comme l’institution de la CED, comme d’ailleurs le marché commun, sont des biens en 
soi dont tous nos pays seront également bénéficiaires.” (Ibid.). 
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the European reaction recognized by all of their colleagues”195 As the emerging disa-
greements over the radical nature of the Treaty and the continuing disagreement be-
tween the French and the Dutch and Belgian delegations over its provisions for a 
common market stalled the recurring meetings between government delegates, the 
prospects for the EPC Treaty looked increasingly dim. Spinelli simply denounced the 
Six governments as traitors, “trahison concertée” as he put it (Vayssière 2007, 316). 
Moreover, the apparent failure of the ‘constitutionalist approach’ spurred tendencies 
toward disintegration within the federalists, particularly in France, as supporters of 
the ‘personalist’ tendency within the movement criticized the ‘etatisme supranation-
al’ of Spinelli and Frenay (Vayssière 2007, 311). Fearing for the prospects of a dem-
ocratically bolstered union, Fernand Dehousse wrote in April 1953, 
“Today, we have to hope that the ministers of the Six will have enough consistency and 
wisdom not to cancel each other out tomorrow. The precedent they established yesterday 
could open the door for serious improvement of democratic control in foreign policy, not 
only in the present case, but also in others, in the future.
196
  
Moreover, whereas the prospects for the EPC were one thing, the ratification of the 
reason for the elaborate structure – the EDC itself – became a matter of serious con-
cern. In order to ease ratification, the Christian Democrats continued to utilize the 
Geneva Circle for the exchange of information outside of official and institutional-
ized contacts between governments. On March 2
nd
 1953, a discussion took place dur-
ing which the French representative Fontanet explained the difficulties of the French 
Mayer government,  
“It is interesting to see that the Socialists, little by little, get closer to the government 
while the Gaullists are more and more hostile towards it. In the government, we notice a 
slow slide to the Left to continue their work with the support of the Socialists. Mayer is 
not all too popular. Until the debate on the ratification of the EDC Treaty, there will be 
some kind of truce in parliament. Additional protocols will allow for the ratification of 
the treaty with the support of the Socialists.”197 
                                                 
195
 Own translation from “De Gaulle, Togliatti, Ollenhauer […] ils sont devenus trois representants 
typiques de la reaction europenne dans lequels tous leurs collegues les reconaissent.” (Quoted in 
Vayssière 2007, 316). 
196
 Own translation from “Il faut espérer que les Six Ministres auront dès lors assez de constance et de 
sagesse pour ne pas annuler eux-mêmes, demain, le précédent qu'ils ont établi hier et qui pourrait 
ouvrir la porte à une sérieuse amélioration du contrôle démocratique de la politique extérieure non 
seulement dans le cas présent, mais dans d'autres, à l'avenir.” (Dehousse 1953). 
197
 Own translation from “Es ist jetzt interessant festzustellen, daß die Sozialisten sich nach und nach 
der Regierung annähern, während die Gaullisten sich mehr und mehr der Regierung [gegenüber] 
feindlich einstellen. Man bemerkt daher ein langsames Linksrutschen der Regierung, um mit der Un-
terstützung der Sozialisten weiterzubestehen. Mayer ist nicht allzu beliebt. Bis zur Debatte über die 
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Fontanet expressed the widely held theory that EDC ratification required the help of 
the French Socialists. Thus, he added in response to Blankenhorn, that one should try 
to avoid ‘difficult questions’.198 Such exchanges continued well into 1953. Christian 
Democrats decried the delay that the four-power conferences in late 1953 meant for 
the EDC ratification.
199
 In view of these developments, Teitgen lamented that French 
public opinion had become less positive towards the EDC because of “the propagan-
da on a ‘soviet peace’.”200 As a result, the talks reveal the similarity felt in terms of 
their common goal and the cooperative search for a suitable strategy against their 
common domestic enemies and the effort to coordinate the ratification processes in 
the smaller countries. As Teitgen put it, 
“This does not mean that the game is over, but it will be hard to play. We have lost the 
unabridged direction of our foreign policy. The Soviets maneuver us. […] How should 
we continue our politics of European integration?”201 
Teitgen already had the answer, “There are possibilities immediately. We should ask 
our Dutch friends to ratify. This would already be one step ahead.”202 Dutch repre-
sentative and PVP party group leader Margret Klompé, answered, “If the French and 
the Germans agree that this is politically important, I will push in this direction to the 
best of my abilities.”203 The focus on the French Socialists was, in this analysis, intri-
cately wound up with the ratification procedure in the remaining countries. Thus, 
Teitgen argued, 
                                                                                                                                          
Ratifizierung des EVG-Vertrages wird im Parlament eine Art Waffenstillstand bestehen. Die zusätzli-
chen Protokolle werden es erlauben, die Ratifikation durchzuführen mit der Unterstützung der Sozia-
listen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 357). 
198
 “Die Partei [SFIO] ist gehemmt durch akute Gegensätze. […] Blankenhorn: Die Zukunft der Re-
gierung hängt also von den Sozialisten ab? Fontanet: Ja, daher muss man versuchen, schwierigen 
Fragen aus dem Weg zu gehen.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 358). 
199
 Comment by Blankenhorn in the Geneva Circle on 29.06.1953, to the four-power conference ini-
tiative by Churchill “Ces conséquences on été flacheuses, voire désastreuses pour l’Europe et le mon-
de libre.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 373). As Teitgen put it “Nous sommes d’accord sur la conférence 
a quatre. Churchill nous a certes joue un bien mauvais tour. ” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 374). 
200
 Own translation from “la propagande autour de la ‘détente soviétique” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 
374). 
201
 Own translation from “Cela ne veut pas dire que la partie soit perdue, mais il faut bien voir qu’elle 
sera difficile à jouer. Nous avons perdu la direction intégrale de notre politique extérieur. Les Soviets 
nous manœuvrent. […] Comment alors continuer notre politique d’intégration européenne ?” (Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004, 374, 375). 
202
 Own translation from “Il y a des choses possible tout de suite. Il faudrait demander a nos amis 
hollandais de ratifier. Ce serait déjà un pas en avant.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 375). 
203
 Own translation from “Si les Français et les Allemands sont d’avis que ce serait important au point 
de vue politique, j’insisterais de mon mieux en ce sens.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 375). 
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“It would be very advantageous to be able to tell our Socialists that yours have voted in 
favor of the ratification. The same goes for Belgium. It would be an excellent example 
and we could show that the process of integration has not been abandoned.”204 
Christian Democrats in the Geneva Circle thus continued their coordinated efforts to 
pass the EDC Treaty in national parliaments. The sought after coordination thus cov-
ered domestic issues with regard to a possible successful ratification as well as ex-
tending towards sustaining common ground vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In addition, 
the consideration of alternative solutions to the EDC was brought up. Schlichting for 
example put it characteristically as a representative of the small countries, “We are 
not absolutely against an alternative solution if the EDC should take forever”205 Teit-
gen responded that the alternative would be the reconstitution of a German army that 
would pose a threat to France and that this would be the end of the German democra-
cy. Blankenhorn replied that “this is the fundamental idea of Adenauer.”206 The EDC 
remained the only way to secure French-German reconciliation and, as Blankenhorn 
stated, “Germany would be prevented from playing ‘seesaw’ between the West and 
the East.”207 Like Ulysses and the Sirens, co-binding implied self-binding. As will be 
seen later, Adenauer still seemed to adhere to this view after the EDC Treaty had 
been rejected. In a further sense, these exchanges are significant as Teitgen, in his 
messages to both Blankenhorn and Brentano was, time and again, too optimistic on 
the ratification chances of the EDC.
208
 By the end of 1953, the situation in France 
remained complicated and Teitgen reiterated the last hope for those seeking an EDC 
ratification, 
  
                                                 
204
 Own translation from “Il serait pour nous très avantageux de pouvoir dire a nos socialistes que les 
vôtres ont voté pour la ratification. De même en Belgique. Ce serait là un excellent exemple, et on 
montrerait que la procédure d’intégration n’est pas abandonnée.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 375). 
Moreover, Blankenhorn and Teitgen talked about their domestic enemies as their common problem: 
still before the German elections 1953, Teitgen refers to antipathy towards the nationalist innuendo 
from Kurt Schumacher. to which Blankenhorn replied, “La méfiance est réciproque” (Gehler and 
Kaiser 2004, 376). Teitgen added, “Ce qui nous a fait beaucoup mal, c’est la présence au Conseil de 
l’Europe de sociaux-démocrates allemands, hommes avec lesquels il n’y a rien à faire […]” (Gehler 
and Kaiser 2004, 378). 
205
 Own translation from “Nous ne somme pas absolument hostile a une solution alternative si la CED 
devait trainer indefiniment.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 377). 
206
 Own translation from “C’est l’idée fondamentale d’Adenauer” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 377). 
207
 Own translation from “l’Allemagne sera empechée de jouer un jeu de bascule entre l’Est et 
l’Ouest” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 377). 
208
 “Il faut dire la vérité: si les élections allemandes avaient lieu et avaient abouti à la victoire de la 
coalition gouvernementale, demain le traite de la CED serait ratifie par 400 voix.” (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 376). 
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“Unfortunately, the future depends on the Socialists. This is because it is decisive wheth-
er they return into government and thus rebuild a strong majority in parliament. […] It 
has been some time since a great debate in parliament over European politics has been 
announced for the end of October. This was in summer. The parties then demanding such 
a debate now try to evade it. […] It is the tragedy of our politics that always one of our 
partners is involved in some important campaign.”209  
Houben noted, for the Belgian representatives, the determination to vote for the trea-
ties and complained about the intransigence of domestic parliaments treating the Eu-
ropean federalists as mere utopians.
210
 
 
Decline and Disintegration 
The apparent lack of influence over the EPC negotiations by the federalists was ex-
acerbated, by 1954, by internal divisions. Whereas the ELEC had disassociated itself 
from the European Movement by 1953, internal divisions within the UEF increased 
and the transnational Christian Democrats – increasingly replaced as a key venue for 
transnational contacts by the ECSC parliamentary groups – were in full-blown de-
cline. As the EPC failed, by 1954, the tenuous nature of the transnational coalition 
had become apparent. Federalist sections continued their agitation but their influence 
seemed to fade: Spinelli, for example, reflected on the increasingly nationalist tones 
in Italy and attributed the decreasing standing of federalist reasoning and the demise 
of the EPC to Stalin’s death.211 
                                                 
209
 Own translation from “Die Zukunft hängt leider von den Sozialisten ab und zwar deshalb, weil es 
[entscheidend] sei, ob sie in die Regierung zurückkehren und dadurch wieder eine starke Mehrheit im 
Parlament entstehen könnte. […] Schon vor längerer Zeit hat man für Ende Oktober eine große Debat-
te über die Europapolitik im Parlament angekündigt. Das war im Sommer. Die Parteien, die damals 
diese Debatte verlangten, versuchen heute auszuweichen. […] Ein Malheur unserer Politik ist die 
Tatsache, daß dauernd einer der Partner in einen wichtigen Wahlkampf verwickelt ist” (Gehler and 
Kaiser 2004, 387). 
210
 Houben (Belgien) “Die CVP/PSC sei entschlossen, für die Ratifizierung und für die Verfassungs-
änderung zu stimmen. […] Was die EVG-Verträge beträfe, würden die belgischen Minister sofort 
zustimmen. Sie haben es aber nicht leicht im Parlament eine Mehrheit zu finden. […] Die kleinen 
Länder fürchten nämlich die großen Länder in einer politischen und militärischen Gemeinschaft.” 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 388). Houben (Belgien) “Es müsse einmal festgestellt werden, daß die nati-
onalen Parlamente viel zu viele Schwierigkeiten bereiten. Schon rein deswegen, weil man die Europa-
frage fast überall nur am Rande behandle und die Europa-föderalisten und Europa-Vertreter, die man 
nach Strasbourg delegiere, mehr oder weniger als Utopisten bezeichne” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 389, 
390). 
211
 “Les désarroi provoque dans la politique internationale du monde occidental part la mort du Staline 
a affaibli d’un seul coup l’influence que nous avions gagnée soit directement soit indirectement sur les 
gouvernements.” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 324). 
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In federalist circles, divisions over tactics vis-a-vis the EDC dominated internal dis-
cussions. Frenay, on his own part, suggested supporting the ‘supranational’ army. In 
an article in Le Monde, he sought to quell French criticism, “On this subject, it is in 
vain to recall that the commission is very moderately supranational.”212 Such strate-
gic support did not go down well with the more radical federalists. In France, a per-
sonalist section had split away from the French section of the UEF in early 1954. 
Frenay’s moderate position was welcomed by the German Europa Union for its ‘real-
ism’ and ‘common sense’ whereas the Italian section of the MFE released a state-
ment stating to “say no to all forms of rearmament that does not satisfy us.”213 In 
France, the agitation against Mendès France and De Gaulle continued and left signif-
icant bitterness, in particular for radicals for whom Europe implied a European fed-
eration.
214
  
Distrust towards Mendès France in all federalist circles was prevalent: in early Au-
gust 1954, Mendès France was accused in publications of having entered a horse 
trade with the Soviets; his posture in the Brussels negotiations being described as 
“meticulously calculated rigidity.”215 The concentration of the debate – and indeed 
the ratification chances - on the French Assemblée Nationale particularly implied that 
for the French federalists, influence was severely limited, as by 1954, only 24 depu-
ties could be relied upon (Vayssière 2007, 327). Without any influence on govern-
mental decisions, the UEF in France had been relegated to the status of a bystander. 
Frenay could only complain about the “outrageous abstention of the government and 
its leader”, committed to “support and encourage the French European members of 
parliament that did not intend to resign themselves to the end of European integra-
tion”216  
                                                 
212
 Own translation from “Il est futile a ce sujet de ce rappeler que ce commissariat est très modéré-
ment supranational.” (Quoted in Belot 2003, 452). 
213
 Own translation from “dire non a toute forme de rearmament qi ne nous donne pas satisfaction” 
(Quoted in Belot 2003, 654). 
214
 Alexandre Marc wrote about the EDC in 1965 “Combat mal engage, livre dans des conditions 
défavorable, et pendant lequel non seulement le projet de traite, mais encore l’idée même d’Europe 
uni ont été vilipendes par une fraction nationaliste de notre opinion publique. En disant ‘nationaliste’, 
je cède a la facilite ; il faudrait sans doute parle de la fraction passéiste et chauvine.” (Quoted in 
Greilsammer 1975, 78). 
215
 Own translation from “intransigeance exactement calculée” (Quoted in Vayssière 2007, 326, 327). 
216
 Own translation from “candaleuse abstention du gouvernement et de son chef […] soutenir et en-
courager les parlementaires européens français qui n’entendent pas se résigner à la fin de l’intégration 
politique européenne” (Vayssière 2007, 329). 
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The European Movement shared a similar fate. One the one hand, individuals that 
had participated in, or were close to the transnational coalition, were still in key posi-
tions: Spaak had become Belgian Foreign Minister and was busy seeking to safe-
guard the EDC Treaty by brokering a last conference in Brussels in August 1954. 
Schuman, no longer French Foreign Minister, had to content himself with defending 
the EDC Treaty in the MRP and in public. Spinelli, and in particular the Italian fed-
eralists had lost influence over the Italian government after De Gasperi had lost a 
vote of confidence in mid-1953 and been replaced by Pella. The increased resistance 
against the Treaty that emanated, partially, from the DC amply demonstrated that the 
apparent influence had been predicated on their access to governments. 
Transnational Christian Democracy equally was endangered by insignificance: after 
a although brief interlude of participation of with Swiss and Austrian actors in the 
Geneva Circle, its Belgian, Dutch, and Italian participations decided that they no 
longer needed the venue: complaints that it only served as a condition for French-
German contacts coincided with the more important venue established through the 
European Parliament (Kaiser 2007, 266). Meetings within the NEI secretariat in 1954 
no longer saw participation from notable party figures that had access close to gov-
ernments. Private contacts persisted, however; in particular between Teitgen and 
Brentano, who continued to relay assessments of the dire situation in the French As-
semblée Nationale (See the subsequent chapter). 
No significant meetings of the Geneva Circle occurred in 1954. The NEI staged a 
congress in Bruges after the rejection of the EDC in the Assemblée Nationale in 
which Saassen thanked his “French friends for the energetic fight […] in favor of the 
European idea.”217 In the last congress of 1954, an obstinate outlook, summarized in 
the Bruges Manifesto, called for supranational institutions with real powers, for di-
rect elections for the ECSC parliament and the free circulation of ideas, goods, and 
services as preconditions for the security and wellbeing of Europe.
218
 
                                                 
217
 Own translation from “amis francais pour la lute energetique […] en faveur de l’idee europeenne.” 
(Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 421). 
218
 The manifesto (Brügger Manifest) argued that “la nécessité est plus que jamais urgente pour les 
peuples européen de prendre conscience de leur solidarité, de maintenir aussi de construire des institu-
tions supranationales avec des pouvoirs réels qui les rendent capables de diriger leur destin. C’est dans 
le cadre d’une Europe unie que ces peuples peuvent et doivent trouver l’amélioration de leur bien-être, 
le rétablissement ou le développement de leurs liberté, la garantie de leur sécurité et l’assurance de la 
paix” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 422). “Il est également nécessaire que les Gouvernement, les Parle-
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Summary 
The relative ease by which the coalition fell apart in 1954 indicates both an organiza-
tional weakness as well as the relative ideological tenuousness upon which its appar-
ently influential actions between 1951 and 1953 had been predicated. As was already 
seen for 1953, the possibility of détente that emerged with Stalin’s death made life 
more complicated as opponents of the EDC picked up on the real possibility of dé-
tente that provided for a possible neutral unarmed Germany. Thus, late 1953 and 
early 1954 amply demonstrated both the organizational weakness of the transnational 
coalition and its constituent parts as well as the tenuous compromise it was based 
upon. Once the political goal of creating a genuine ‘Political Community’ was bound 
to fail, divisions within the federalist community led to the disintegration of the fed-
eralist community, whereas the organizational transnational Christian Democracy, 
increasingly replaced by the ECSC parliament as a site for coordination, was on the 
decline as well. The lack of influence over the fate of the EDC and the EPC thus 
demonstrate that the influence of the transnational coalition was largely based on 
access to negotiating governments. Once a realistic common political goal disap-
peared, the coalition dissolved quickly. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
ments, les peuples et les nations de tous les pays de l’Europe libre réalisent aussi rapidement que pos-
sible d’élection au suffrage universel d’une Assemblée européenne et tout d’abord l’Assemblée com-
mune de la CECA […] ; la complète liberté d’échanges et de circulation des hommes et des idées ; la 
libération des échanges de marchandises, des services et des capitaux.” (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 423). 
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6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to give meaning to the structural analyses of the previous 
chapter by arguing that the indications of internal differentiation and polarization 
found in the previous chapter are best understood as indications of transnational 
ideological conflict. Thus, the main concerns of the federalist community – the most 
radical – had identified the nation-state as the root of the European problem and 
sought its abolishment in the foundation of a new federal political community. For 
the ELEC, the problem of nationalism lay predominantly in its force to hinder liber-
alization of trade and prevent taking advantage of welfare gains that a liberalized 
European market would provide for the economic recovery of Europe. The goal was 
not to abolish the nation-state but rather to find efficient institutional ways to (recon-
struct) a European Market that would stabilize the nation-state and ensure its survival 
with a focus on economic fields of cooperation alone. As a result, supranational insti-
tutions implied merely the control of ‘committees of experts’ that were to oversee the 
gradual liberalization of trade. No significant centralization was envisioned, no forms 
of ‘democratic representation’ of European citizens were sought. 
Apart from the federalists and the ELEC, the remaining transnational actors within 
the European Movement come from transnational party related organizations repre-
senting transnational Social Democracy and transnational Christian Democracy. Both 
had distinct views and concerns largely growing out of the history of their ideologi-
cal precursors. For Social Democrats, the only common concern after the war was 
the reconstruction of the welfare state in their respective countries. Apart from that, 
views differed widely. A significant portion of transnational Social Democrats 
thought that these goals required Federalist radicalism in order to rebuild Europe as a 
‘third force’ in the emerging confrontation between the blocks. At the other end, 
there were Social Democrats in virtually every country under consideration who op-
posed substantial delegation and pooling, denounced the European project as a con-
servative myth and sought national sovereignty to maintain or create a welfare state 
and reconstruct European economies. Concerns for the unity of Social Democracy 
had more moderate supranationalists ‘caught in the middle’: while supporting the 
delegation of sovereignty in principle, figures such as Spaak, Mollet, or Van der 
Goes van Naters stuck to the gradualist approach in preference for the creation of a 
wider Europe including Great Britain. In addition, these internal division made the 
reconciliation made French-German reconciliation difficult. 
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Comparatively speaking, Christian Democracy was much more uniform A shared 
concern for the unity of the Abendland, a shared sense of imminent threat from the 
Bolshewik East led to similar views on the necessity of a containment of the nation-
state and nationalist competition, but not its abandonment: thus, Christian Demo-
crats, by and large, thought that some degree of sovereignty had to be abandoned. As 
that concern grew out of a sense of threatened security, the envisioned future scope 
of European institutions would be quite broad, encompassing security as well. As a 
result, Christian Democrats held that the delegation of sovereignty had to be matched 
by some form of representation at the supranational level as well. 
Also, there was an influential transatlantic network connecting US actors that sub-
scribed to a classic causal story of the American political tradition on the vicissitudes 
of the old European continent. While there was an overwhelming cross-party consen-
sus on the need for closer cooperation between European states, in particular on the 
economic plane, less prevalent but influential positions subscribed to supranational 
blueprints, espoused by a distinct set of actors that organized in the ACUE and, hav-
ing ties to the Foreign Policy establishment and the Intelligence community, accord-
ingly effected a significant flow of funding for the Europeanist organization that pro-
vided a significant boost to their organizational capabilities. 
Finally, the European Movement, as the overarching organization assembling the 
most influential transnational pressure groups and individuals, was characterized by 
an extreme divide as well. As a result, although it may have disposed of the most 
significant resources, no uniform political pressure in a single direction would ema-
nate from this organization. Thus, the dominant conclusion is one of a complex over-
arching transnational conflict that cannot be reduced to party ideologies and provided 
ample room for conflict dynamics. Moreover, even the federalist community – large-
ly seen as ideologically homogenous in the previous chapter – was based on a politi-
cal compromise between rather diverse factions. Combined with the relative organi-
zational weakness of these organizations, any transnational coalition formed on the 
basis of the transnational networks would be temporary, formed to achieve a specific 
political goal and dissolve afterwards rather quickly. 
The second section built upon these divisions by tracing transnational dynamics of 
coalition formation between the late 1940’s and the early 1950’s. Up until 1950, a 
tenuous compromise organized in the European Movement had overshadowed foun-
dational differences between intergovernmentalists and federalists in particular. Per-
Chapter 6 Transnational Networks II: A Qualitative Assessment 
331 
 
sisting ideological differences – within Social Democracy and between the continent 
and the UK in particular – caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 
within its main institutional forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope. Spurred by the succeeding negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a con-
tinental parliament, mobilized by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the 
strategies of the major federalists and supranationalists began to converge: Federal-
ists put pressure on the Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the 
initiative of Paul-Henri Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded 
the ‘Action Committee for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 
1953); Christian Democrats put increasing pressure on Dutch and Belgian repre-
sentatives to lobby for a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; final-
ly, an identifiable elite of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact 
with Jean Monnet, successfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use 
to leverage of aid conditionality to effect a compromise among the European gov-
ernments. These transnational activities coincided with the timing of a basic shift in 
the EDC bargain that led the governments of France, Italy, Germany and the US to a 
wholehearted endorsement of the European army concept an brought a institutional 
conflict between these governments and Belgium and the Netherlands to the fore-
front. In sum, substantial transnational pressures and demands coincided with the 
shifting of government positions on the EDC institutions and the resulting changing 
conflict constellations. 
The radicalism that the course taken in Paris entailed was observed, inter alia, by 
Sassen in the Geneva Circle in October 1951, maintaining that the creation of a Eu-
ropean Army as intended required the creation of a Federation, which, being done 
under the impression of a threat, ‘could be dangerous’.219 Such warnings went un-
heard, however. Documenting evidence from common written exchanges, meetings 
and conference attendance shows sufficient evidence of strategic coordination: the 
transnational coalition dominated the transgovernmental scene, in particular between 
                                                 
219
 Sassen pointed out in the Geneva Circle on October 16
th
 1951, “Je vous présenter une observation: 
c’est sous une menace que l’Europe est en train de se créer une défense commune. Il ne faudrait pas 
que les homes laissent les événements les conduire ; cela pourrait être fort dangereux. A mon avis, il 
est faux de traiter la question de l’armée européenne de la même façon que le plan Pleven. 
L’institution d’une armée européenne implique l’établissement d’une politique extérieur commune de 
l’Europe. Si on veut instituer l’armée européenne, il faut créer une fédération.” (Gehler and Kaiser 
2004, 308). 
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1951 and 1953. Motivated by the objective to prevent the rule of ‘technocratic mili-
tary experts’, the EDC project had brought together transnational Christian Demo-
crats, Social Democrats, Federalists, and, with prominent US support in Eisenhower, 
had produced a nascent federalist moment that sought, in terms of the indentations of 
the group around Spaak, to mimic the US experience and create a European constitu-
tion through the constituent approach. These actors coming from a supranationalist 
or federalist background, chose to pursue what in their minds was the ‘appropriate’ 
avenue for implementing an ‘appropriate’ institutional design and ratification proce-
dure. The coalition seemed to have significant access to both the European govern-
ments as well as the US administration, indicating that its actors had a privileged 
position within the dynamically evolving transnational and transgovernmental rela-
tions. 
In addition, a concerted effort was made by that assembled transnational coalition to 
bypass the British Eden Plan, thus to avoid the Council of Europe and British associ-
ation with the EDC altogether. Apart from this motivation, a second key motive was 
to ensure, through the creation of the democratically acceptable political ‘superstruc-
ture’ that the Treaty would find sufficient support in the national parliaments, espe-
cially the Assemblée Nationale. However, the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Assembly, 
and particularly the reactions of French Socialists in that chamber – abstaining from 
a vote on the draft treaty – suggest that this objective was hardly achieved. In fact, it 
is feasible that the opposite occurred: by ruling out the possibility, as suggested in the 
Eden Plan, of a British association to the EDC through the Council of Europe and by 
opening up a substantial conflict over the question of economic integration, the path 
taken was risky and, as it turned out, led nowhere. 
Thus, the relative ease by which the coalition fell apart in 1954 exposed both an or-
ganizational weakness as well as the relative ideological tenuousness upon which its 
apparently influential actions between 1951 and 1953 had been predicated. Only a 
temporary similar political goal had kept the coalition intact. As was already seen for 
1953, the possibility of détente that emerged with Stalin’s death made life more 
complicated as opponents of the EDC picked up on the real possibility of détente that 
provided for a possible neutral unarmed Germany. Once the political goal of creating 
a genuine ‘Political Community’ was bound to fail, divisions even within the federal-
ist community contributed to its disintegration, whereas the organizations of transna-
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tional Christian Democracy, increasingly replaced by the ECSC parliament as a site 
for coordination, were on the decline as well. The lack of influence over the fate of 
the EDC and the EPC thus demonstrate that the influence of the transnational coali-
tion was largely based on access to negotiating governments. Once a realistic com-
mon political goal disappeared, the coalition dissolved quickly. 
In sum, transnational influence was not based on organizational strengths or a partic-
ular strong ideological cohesiveness but on a temporary agreement to pursue a simi-
lar political goal, the creation of a political community. Apparently, the early suc-
cesses were based on an ability to convince key governments to pursue and support 
such a path in the same vein as the subsequent loss of influence indicates vanishing 
access. The conclusion is thus that if there is a tractable and effective impact, it 
should be found in the dynamics of domestic conflict and the consideration underly-
ing the strategic choices made by the governments negotiating the treaty. The next 
chapter will turn to that question. 
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7. Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
The purpose of the present chapter is to pull the threads of the preceding chapters 
together by demonstrating that the course of the EDC bargain can only be sufficient-
ly explained by considering the role of transnational networks for the preference 
formation and bargaining strategies of the negotiating states. 
The first section (7.1) turns its attention to the implications of the transnational con-
flict for the domestic conflicts over European institutions in general and the EDC in 
particular. It demonstrates that there is a tractable impact, both within and across 
parties, that is mediated by the domestic political conditions and institutions. Geopo-
litical incentives certainly mattered as well. In every case, actors formulated their 
demands in the terms of perceived ‘national interests that had to take objective mate-
rial and geostrategic realities into account.’ Thus, there is a recognizable difference 
between the larger and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for com-
mon fears of autonomy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified 
when analyzing the transnational conflict. Second, in both Germany and Italy there is 
a tendency to view the supranational institutions as a means to gain recognition and 
influence, as result that will be established in the subsequent section as well.  
At the same time, the causal and strategic beliefs underlying the demand differences 
and thus the transnational conflict clearly influenced the link between material con-
text and domestic demands. By themselves, geopolitical considerations cannot ac-
count for the content of domestic demands nor the variation in the domestic conflict 
patterns. Thus, consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all 
Social Democratic parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high 
degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the 
larger continental countries were more inclined to demand the creation of suprana-
tional institutions with appropriate democratic institutions for a European Army. 
Thus, domestic elites that were active in the transnational communities pursuing su-
pranational or federal models of post-war Europe tended to do so, with exceptions, 
with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict. 
Domestic elites that were remote from these communities tend to fall within basic 
intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites by and large 
perceived the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as increasing their 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
335 
 
international influence, whereas others would favor classic Alliance solutions to the 
German problem that preserve National sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or 
deny the existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of 
balancing efforts and associated institutions (i.e. some British, French and German 
Social Democrats). 
In sum, domestic differences over preferred institutional designs for post-war Europe 
and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, were reflections of the transna-
tional conflict. In this sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described 
in chapter 2, can be seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic chal-
lenge for all European governments, there were sufficient domestic differences over 
the concrete measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individual 
actors across states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to war-
rant strategic coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over Eu-
ropean institutions. 
Does the impact of the transnational conflict on domestic politics translate into the 
preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating states? Does considering 
that impact contribute to a better understanding of the EDC bargain? The second 
section of this chapter evaluates these questions. From an intergovernmental point of 
view, as recounted in chapters 3 and 4, the shifting conflict constellations were at-
tributed to the unstable French governments, inefficient institutions and the learning 
process of the remaining governments involved in the bargain having to find a possi-
ble agreement in a geopolitically unstable environment. From a transnational point of 
view, the information presented so far would point to a different direction. Chapter 5 
has singled out at least two governments – France and Italy – whose shifting embed-
dedness in the inter-organizational networks suggests possible preference shifts. Sec-
ond, the preceding chapter has demonstrated that the differences within the transna-
tional networks contributed to the rise and fall of a tenuous and fragile transnational 
coalition that united actors with a clear-cut ideological preference for a supranational 
army. Mutual engagement and exchange of information within these circles repeated-
ly coincided with key shifts in the course of the bargain; its actors seemed to have 
either privileged access to negotiating governments or were in leading positions 
themselves. As a result, the way in which governments were affected by the transna-
tional conflict had an independent impact on the course of the bargain. 
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7.1 The Domestic Dimension of Transnational Conflict 
In how far was the transnational conflict and its participants, analyzed in the previous 
chapter, reflected in the domestic political conflict and thus the ‘demands’ for supra-
national institutions and a European Army in the negotiating states? As the previous 
chapter has demonstrated, the geostrategic ‘obviousness’ of the benefits of closer 
European cooperation did not translate into a wide consensus about concrete institu-
tional designs. In as much as the domestic debates on the EDC reflected genuine con-
flicts over the respective ‘national interests’, the EDC itself as well as the degree of 
proposed centralization and representation of its respective institutions were as con-
troversial issues nationally as they were transnationally. On the one hand, there was a 
wide acceptance of a vague notion of ‘European unity’. Polls from the United States 
Information Agency conducted between 1952 and 1963, suggest that responses cate-
gorized as supporting ‘European Integration’ in Germany were above 50% in 1950 
and rose steadily towards 70 % in the mid 1950’s. In France, positive answers to the 
same question were lower but in the majority, oscillate around 50 % (Shepherd 1975, 
69, 74). In the UK, responses to similar questions were even higher in the early 
1950’s peaking at the time of the signing of the WEU (Shepherd 1975, 83). Reflect-
ing on the results of these polls, this early period has famously been described as one 
of ‘permissive consensus’ about European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 
1970, 41, 42). Behind that permissive consensus, there was disagreement, however, 
as the previous chapter has demonstrated. In particular, the view that the organization 
of post-war Europe should follow federalist principles implying the abolishment of 
national sovereignty was, by and large, the view of a minority, although by no means 
a small one (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 Attitudes towards a European Federation, 1957 
 
Note: Taken from Rabier (1967, 446) who reports a West European Public Opinion 
Barometer (US Information Agency, Report 50, 12 August 1957) entitled “Attitudes 
towards European Union, the Common Market and Euratom”.  
Polls conducted in Belgium after the failure of the EDC suggest that domestic divi-
sions were widespread as about one quarter (26,06 per cent) of respondents indicated 
that they did not regret the failure of the EDC whereas 28,49 per cent of respondents 
reported that they did (De Vos 1987, 111). Similarly, there was a remarkable differ-
ence in Germany between public opinion and elite support for the WEU and the EDC 
(See Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Opposition and Support to EDC, Paris Agreements, and WEU in Germany 
 
WEU 
 
Paris Agreements 
 
EDC 
 
Against For Against For Against For 
All Elites 7 91  17 74  28 64 
Public Opinion 7 69  27 40  35 40 
Particular Elites 
  
 
  
 
  Medium Business 6 92  13 82  23 69 
Small Business 3 95  14 65  24 67 
Big Business 5 90  7 80  25 63 
Professionals 5 94  18 77  26 69 
Politicians 8 89  13 70  26 57 
High Civil Servants 4 96  20 80  29 63 
White-Collar Workers 10 86  26 64  33 56 
Journalists 13 85  28 62  36 64 
Military 19 81  20 70  38 56 
Source: Data taken from Deutsch (1959, 167).  
Finally, French public opinion seemed equally divided over the issue, at least during 
the time period when ratification was imminent (See Table 7.2 below). 
In sum, there seems to have been ample conflict over European institutions in gen-
eral and the EDC in particular. Before investigating in how far these domestic divi-
sions reflected the transnational conflict, the subsequent section briefly reviews insti-
tutional differences among the European countries that are relevant as mediating fac-
tors. 
Table 7.2 Attitudes towards the EDC in France (Percentages) 
 
July 1954 
 
August/September 1954 
Definitely for 19 
 
15 
Slightly for 17 
 
17 
Total for 36 
 
32 
    
Slightly against 11 
 
12 
Definitely against 20 
 
21 
Total against 31 
 
33 
    
No opinion 33 
 
35 
Source: Data taken from Shepherd (1975, 77). 
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7.1.1 The Mediating Effect of Domestic Structures 
As argued in chapter 2, the conditions for a direct impact of the transnational conflict 
on domestic conditions are directly related to the ability of a government to act ‘as if’ 
it were the representative agent of a state: the more decision-making is carried out in 
an effective hierarchical manner and the higher the effective ability of party leaders 
to enforce party discipline over domestic dissenters, the lower the openness of the 
domestic political conflict and the less susceptible it is to be impacted by transna-
tional conflict; conversely, the lower the capability of party and government leaders 
to impress their political supporters to actually follow their lead, the lower their im-
pact on the formulated ‘state preferences’. Analyzing the domestic political systems 
of the main countries under consideration in this light, reveals a nuanced picture that 
allows qualifying the hypothesized impact that the transnational conflict may have 
had on the domestic politics of the negotiating states. 
 
France 
French politics throughout the period is a veritable case of ‘cycling’ in which the 
institutional structure fails to stabilize against voting cycles and to induce roughly 
predictable politics (Shepsle 1979; Browne and Hamm 1996). By dominating the 
agenda and informally but effectively holding specific ministers accountable for their 
policies, parliamentary committees could at any moment challenge the governmental 
coalition in power. Moreover, politics in the French Fourth Republic had two major 
political forces – the Communists and the Gaullists – who were staunchly opposed 
against the French constitution and thus acted as ‘anti-system’ parties that would 
regularly vote against any government in power. As the result, those parties that sup-
ported the French constitution – the MRP, the SFIO, the Radicals, and the UDSR –
acting as the ‘Third Force coalition’ until 1952 – worked as ‘groupes charnières’: 
they had a potentially disproportionate access to power and influence but any disa-
greement among them whatsoever would topple the government (Lefort 1996, 62; 
Rosenthal and Voeten 2004). This fact was exacerbated by the fact that key parties 
within the ‘third force’ were more or less loose associations of voters. Thus, the Rad-
ical Party was more a political tradition left over from the aftermath of the French 
Revolution than a party organizations in the modern sense (O'Neill 1981; 
Hazareesingh 1994). It remained continuously plagued by divisions between a more 
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liberal left and conservative right wing and traditionally did not enforce party disci-
pline (Ibid.). As a result, some of the most ardent supporters of the EDC – such as 
Maurice Faure – and alleged opponents of the Treaty – such as eventual Prime Min-
ister Pierre Mendès France – came from that party. The UDSR, the party of René 
Pleven, was equally an association of former resistance members without a distinct 
common political ideological program or platform and gave deputies freedom to vote 
on principle (Müller-Härlin 2008, 71). Other parties, such as the Christian Democrats 
(MRP), the communists (PCF) and the Socialists (SFIO) did enforce party discipline 
rigidly, albeit with varying success (Lefort 1996). Combined with the expansive pro-
cedural rights of the Assemblée Nationale, the result was governmental instability. 
French Cabinets and thus the Prime Minister changed on average twice a year. In 
sum, the relative lack of party discipline in conjunction with the institutions of the 
Fourth Republic meant that a considerable number of small intra-party groups was, 
potentially, in the position to exert considerable pressure over the governing coali-
tions without either the party leadership or the government having sufficient re-
sources at its disposal to discipline dissent. Thus in France, domestic institutions and 
parties structured political conflict only to a relatively small degree. As a result, there 
was a relatively high potential for the expression of the transnational conflict in do-
mestic demands. 
 
Italy 
A peculiarity of the post-war Italian political system was that the post-war domi-
nance of the DC in electoral terms did not translate into governmental stability. 
Throughout his tenure as first President of post-war Italy between 1946 and 1953, 
Alcide De Gasperi had to reshuffle his cabinet seven times and ultimately fell to a 
vote of confidence in 1953. Afterwards, there were three different Prime Ministers 
from the DC until the WEU Treaty was ratified in 1955. Part of the reason for the 
lack of discipline within the DC may be found in the fact that the DC had strongly 
organized factions within the party that competed with each other for ministerial 
posts: as a result, the smaller coalition parties could force the reshuffling of Cabinets 
as well (Trautmann and Ullrich 2006, 561). The ‘right wing’ of the DC, a faction that 
positioned itself close to the Vatican, traditionally pushed against laissez faire capi-
talism and closely aligned its positions with the Vatican (Ginsborg 2003, 156). Led 
by Luigi Gedda and Giuseppe Pella, it pushed for neutralism and pressured continu-
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ously for an alliance with the right wing – a coalition of Monarchists and right wing 
neo-fascists called “Blocco Nazionale della Liberta / Partito Nazionale Monarchi-
co”. This section opposed the idealist conceptions of a federal Europe advanced by 
the centre of the party and adopted a more nationalist stance on the open issue of the 
free territory of Trieste (Masala 2001, 356).
 
Left-catholic currents under Guiseppe 
Dossetti advocated coalitions with the Liberal PRI and the centrist Social Democratic 
PSDI while favoring more neutralist conceptions of Foreign policy instead of too 
closely binding Italy in the Western Alliance (Varsori 1992, 266; Masala 2001, 353). 
Caught between these factions, De Gasperi was thus faced with a more narrow power 
base than the electoral majority suggested. Violent confrontations between the left 
and the right were frequent: between 1947 and 1954, clashes on the Streets of Italy 
had left 100 dead (Woller 2010, 249). Thus, in Italy, domestic institutions were weak 
as well: although not as volatile as in the French Fourth republic, the internal divi-
sions within the DC and the high polarization of Italian politics implied a relatively 
high potential impact for the transnational conflict on Italian domestic politics. 
 
Germany 
Domestic political institutions in Germany went through a complete rebuilding pro-
cess, much like the country itself after the war. Being occupied, the process of party 
formation party preceded the procedure for arriving at these institutions through the 
Parlamentarische Rat in Bonn in 1948. While the formative period saw a surge of 
new parties formed, parties had to be granted licenses by the Allies, and only four 
obtained these on a nation-wide basis: the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and the KPD 
(Kreuzer 2009, 678). However, old cleavages and inherited party structures had re-
mained relatively stable. The two dominant cleavages in Germany consisted in the 
divide between labor and capital and a religious divide between Protestants and 
Catholics. Labor was largely represented by the SPD; the latter was represented 
through the newly founded Christian Democratic Union of the CDU/CSU, whereas 
liberal milieu was represented by the FDP and the DP. The victory of a cobbled to-
gether coalition of the CDU/CSU with smaller liberal and conservative coalition 
partners in 1949 implied that the center of power in the Bundestag remained with 
Adenauer. At the same time, the institutional structure as it emerged gave the heads 
of state governments considerable power, positioning Germany midway between 
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confrontational logic of majority rule and consociational power sharing (Lehmbruch 
2013). Political entry was in principle open to newcomers in the foundational years 
although the electoral results meant that there were two clear centers of power and 
the number of parties would consolidate rather quickly (Kreuzer 2009). 
Due to their positions within the old cleavage structure, however, the CDU/CSU and 
the SPD quickly assumed central positions in the competition for power (Lehmbruch 
2000). The CDU/CSU, as a new party, predominantly drew on older contacts of the 
pre-war Zentrum through local church networks: a key characteristic was a carefully 
calibrated system of appointments to assuage protestant and catholic leaders while 
political conflicts were not carried out openly but in a consensus oriented manner, 
combined, in the Bundestag, with strong party discipline (Zolleis and Schmid 2013, 
423). The SPD was reconstituted by an ‘old guard’ of pre-war individuals and quick-
ly acquired a large membership base; the early leadership had a dominant position, 
organized in a “full-time executive federal committee.”220 By implication, the two 
largest factions in the Bundestag were relatively tightly controlled.  
Thus, while Schumacher could muster the organizational apparatus of the party to 
discipline the party, Adenauer quickly sought to leverage the position formally given 
to him as chancellor, exerting control over Cabinet action. The combination of agen-
da setting powers in the Bundestag, the effective party discipline of the CDU/ CSU 
and the coalition, as well as his position and powers as chancellor gave the CDU 
leadership and Adenauer in particular considerable influence (Cary 1996, 240). As a 
result, German domestic institutions were relatively strong: the leadership of both 
dominant parties was able to control the political process to a significant degree, im-
plying a more narrow scope for the expression of the transnational conflict in domes-
tic party politics. 
 
Netherlands 
In the case of the Netherlands, the main peculiarity to be considered consists in the 
Dutch political tradition of ‘Verzuiling’ that had evolved as a Dutch answer to the 
emergence of political cleavages in Europe (Andeweg 2004). The consensual charac-
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 Own translation from “hauptamtlichen geschäftsführenden Bundesvorstand” (Spier and von 
Alemann 2013, 441). 
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ter of Dutch politics implied that all major parties participated in Dutch governments, 
all of which were usually able to exert sufficient party displine (Lijphart 1975). Deci-
sions including foreign policy were decided by majority within the governing coun-
cil. The personal responsibility of ministers before the parliament and implied per-
sonal leadership of ministries and, accordingly, a high leeway for any Foreign Minis-
ter (Lepszy 2006, 335). Heated debates about Foreign Policy were by tradition less 
practiced then in other parliamentary systems and open criticism of the foreign poli-
cy of the government unusual (Lepszy 2006, 353). Leadership of the party groups 
was an influential position because the delicate governmental balance between the 
pillars had to be maintained and that was a matter of negotiation and appointment 
(Ibid.).  
 
Belgium 
In Belgium, the most salient cleavage was constituted by the conflict between Wal-
loon and Flemish populations of the country. As a historically salient conflict, it was 
amplified by the war due to accusations that the Flemish part of the country, in par-
ticular the radical Flemish Movement, was more active in collaborating with the 
German authorities during the war (De Wever 2013). The conflict was incensed by 
the Belgian royal question. In 1950, the Christian-Democratic PVC had passed a law 
allowing the return of King Leopold III which caused a violent strike particularly in 
the Walloon parts of the country that threatened the unity of the state.
221
 Apart from 
the Walloon-Flemish conflict, the religious cleavage as well as the class-cleavage 
were historically highly salient in Belgium as well. To cope with the multi-faceted 
and cross-cutting domestic divisions, Belgium had evolved a peculiar form of pillari-
zation in order to forge political compromises that somewhat resembled the Nether-
lands (Rokkan and Flora 2000, 324). In post-war Belgium, the dominant political 
forces consisted in the Catholic-Christian pillar, represented by the PSC-CVP and the 
Socialist pillar represented by the BSP-PSB (Deschouwer 2004). As a historically 
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 The EDC was linked to a highly conflictual issue in post-war Belgian politics, namely the constitu-
tional prerogatives of the Belgian king. As the return of Leopold from exile after the war had already 
sparked strikes and protests in the Flemish parts of the country, the conflict between Walloons and 
Flemish would reappear throughout the 1950’s, necessitating a constitutional change in the 1960’s 
(Woyke 2006). Since the prerogatives of the King included being the supreme commander of the 
Belgian army and appointing officers, the EDC required a constitutional change. 
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evolved system to mitigate multiple societal conflicts, the capacity of Belgian parties 
to structure politics and political conflict was relatively high and their influence 
reached beyond the legislative politics of the day. Belgian political institutions at the 
time are thus mostly described as ‘consociational’ as well: “government by elite car-
tel [would] turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democ-
racy” (Lijphart 1969). In Belgium, these features were less pronounced than in the 
Dutch case: the confrontation between the Christian Democratic PSC-CVP and the 
BSP-PSB was much more open and direct, than in the Netherlands, forming a clear 
conflict between government and opposition - in particular on Foreign Policy matters 
as demonstrated below. Consociational power sharing was repeatedly employed in 
times of crisis; at other times, attempts to govern by majority were employed if the 
parliamentary situation allowed it (Deschouwer 2006). In sum, however, given the 
strong position of political parties, the scope for an expression of transnational con-
flict would seem relatively low. 
 
UK 
British institutions at the time formed the classic case of the Westminster model, 
characterized by executive dominance of the legislative agenda and a clear conflict 
line between government and opposition as well. Strong parties helped structuring 
political conflicts (Epstein 1980). Post-war British politics was a characteristic two-
party system in which the class cleavage, represented by Labour and the Conserva-
tive Party, dominated. Both parties were organized in a highly hierarchic matter and 
generally highly effective at enforcing party discipline (McKenzie 1955; Epstein 
1980). 
There were, however, differences between both parties. Within Labour, British Un-
ions traditionally exerted a strong influence dominating large chunks of the mem-
bers, controlling candidate selection to a significant degree thus exerting a significant 
check on voting discipline (Eggers and Hainmüller 2009, 530; Driver 2011, 38). The 
positions of the party were thus formulated and enforced by “coalitions of parliamen-
tary and union elites.” (Webb 1994, 110). Within the first labor government, to be 
sure, there were a number of internal conflicts: the most intense involved challenges 
from the left-wing of the party related to the parties’ ambitious welfare program, and 
in particular German rearmament and the rising defense expenditures with the esca-
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lating Cold War. After the surprising landslide victory in 1945, Labour had em-
barked on a significant expansion of the British welfare state. Higher spending on 
defense made cuts in social programs necessary. The resulting intra-party conflicts 
led to the resignation of Aneurin Bevan, a popular figure of the left-wing of Labour, 
on April 22
nd
 1951 as Minister of Health (Middlemas 1986, 187). In general, party 
discipline was highly effective. The party leadership accepted a certain degree of 
rhetorical dissent within party parliament, but not when it came to voting.
222
  
The Conservative party had developed out of the archetype of the 19
th
 century cartel 
party to a modern mass-based politician organization. It had developed a highly cen-
tralized organization, in which the Conservative Central Office, directed by the lead-
ership of the party, exerted central control the party and initialized and determined 
most programmatic decision: absent a powerful union influence, the primary re-
source of the Central Office was the selection of candidates together with local con-
stituency committees (Eggers and Hainmüller 2009, 531). In sum, post-war British 
politics left little room for the expression of the transnational conflict in domestic 
politics. 
 
Conclusion 
As the preceding pages have shown, the domestic institutions of Western European 
countries offered varying potential for the transnational conflict over European insti-
tutions to affect the contours of domestic political conflict and thus the processes of 
demand formation. Thus, in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the UK, domes-
tic institutions were by and large effective in structuring political conflict whereas in 
Italy and France, this was much less so. In the Netherlands and Belgium, political 
cleavages where effectively expressed by political parties constituting the pillars of 
politically, religiously, and – in the Belgian case - linguistically divided societies. A 
long consociational tradition and effective party discipline imply that there is little 
scope for a transnational conflict among a small European elite to have a strong im-
pact on the dynamics of domestic conflict. A similar picture holds for the UK and 
Germany. In the UK, the dominant class cleavage was organized into a two-party 
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 As Morrison put it “Parliament would be a dull assembly if we overdid discipline” (Thorpe 2008, 
145).  
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system wherein both parties were able to muster sufficient discipline to engage in a 
clear-cut conflict between government and opposition. In the German case, the lead-
ership of the two dominant parties – the CDU/CSU and the SPD – was equally able 
to acquire the capacity of effective leadership, earn the loyalty of its followers and 
discipline dissent, leading to an equally clear-cut left-right conflict in the Bundestag 
between the governmental coalition and the opposition. 
In Italy and to a larger degree in France, the situation was different. In France, the 
‘third force’ coalition was composed, inter alia, of loose party groups such as the 
Radicals that were ineffective at enforcing party discipline. This situation was exac-
erbated by a strong systemic opposition to the institutions of the Fourth Republic 
from the communist left and the Gaullist right. Narrow governing majorities meant 
that the parties of the third force – such as the Christian Democratic MRP and the 
secular SFIO – had to enter coalitions despite the fact that they were divided over 
multiple issues. The frequent need of governments to resort to votes of confidence in 
the Assemblée Nationale – and the frequency of their failure – is indicative of the fact 
that French parties were clearly less capable of effecting discipline and the most sus-
ceptible for the transnational conflict to impact the domestic conflict across parties. 
A similar observation holds for Italy, though to a lesser degree. Caught in a similar 
fashion between a strong anti-systemic communist party and a vocal opposition from 
the right, the dominant Italian DC suffered from internal division between the left 
and the right of the party that was, for a time, abated by the De Gasperi’s leadership. 
In order to deal with these conflicts, frequent reshuffling of the Cabinet was neces-
sary despite the fact that the DC was by far the most dominant party. De Gasperi 
eventually fell over these divisions in 1953. 
In sum, while transnational political conflict, judging from the party affiliation and 
the nationalities of the actors in the transnational communities analyzed in chapter 5, 
should have affected every European country to some degree, their visibility in open 
domestic conflict and thus their significance for the formation of state preferences 
should vary. The next section seeks to uncover whether this was actually the case. 
7.1.2 Impact on Domestic Conflict 
I now investigate the degree to which the transnational conflict was reflected in the 
domestic conflict in the European states at the time. In how far did domestic confron-
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tations during the processes of formulating demands for specific institutions reflect 
transnational influences? So far, chapters 5 and 6 have presented quantitative as well 
as qualitative evidence that transnational Social Democracy was much more divided 
ideologically than transnational Christian Democracy, and that Christian Democratic, 
Social Democratic as well as Liberal parties were equally present in ideologically 
diverse groups, i.e. the federalist community, the ELEC community and the Europe-
an Movement. Thus, from the transnational perspective, there should a visible ten-
dency of intra-party conflict over institutions and the associated ‘national interest’ in 
every country. As French actors were equally distributed over the transnational 
communities, weak French institutions should produce the highest degree of internal 
strife. In Italy, the predominant influence should emanate from the federalist com-
munity leading, inter alia, to internal quarrels within the dominant DC. In Belgium 
and the Netherlands, the most significant influence should emanate from the ELEC 
community, leading to more limited intra-party disputes. British politics should me 
mostly under the influence of the ‘unionists’ from the European Movement, German 
politics under the predominant influence of transnational Christian Democracy. 
I proceed by characterizing the domestic conflicts in each country in this light.  
 
The Domestic Activities of Transnational Organizations 
The main contours of the transnational conflict that culminated into the battle for the 
EDC were felt in every country. In all countries, the early activities of the European 
Movement described in the previous chapter had led to coordinated initiatives by its 
national sections in the respective European parliaments that largely reflected the 
battle lines drawn within the European Movement. By 1950, the growing dissatisfac-
tion of continental Europeanists had found its way into national parliaments. In 
France, Socialist leaders and SFIO delegates André Philip and Gerard Jacquet found-
ed the “Conseil européen de vigilance” in September 1950, comprising members of 
the French sections of the MSEUE, the NEI, and the UEF called for “a European 
economy […], European diplomacy, […] a European army. […] We demand with all 
out might the unification of free Europe by the establishment of a federal government 
and a parliament at a very early date.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 126). The parliamen-
tary group of the EPU in Italy stipulated that “the time has come for the nations of 
Europe to transfer part of their sovereign rights to be exercised in common […]” 
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calling immediately for “a European assembly (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 203). In the 
Bundestag, members of the Europa Union successfully initiated a resolution for a 
federal pact on July 26
th
 1950, stating that the Bundestag “advocates the establish-
ment of a European Federal pact as envisaged in the Preamble and Article 24 of the 
Basic Law […]. to create a supranational federal authority based on free, direct, uni-
versal suffrage and possessing legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” (Lipgens 
and Loth 1988, 556). In the Dutch Tweede Kammer, there was a motion calling for a 
“permanent association” of states which should “be realized by means of various 
functional institutions, wherein, so far as may be possible and desirable, authority 
should be conferred on supranational bodies, especially in monetary, economic and 
social fields and in that of defence.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 390). It was only in the 
UK that a similar motion was not put forth successfully.
223
 Thus, while the transna-
tional conflict clearly found its way into national discourse and the domestic conflict, 
it was expressed in different ways. 
 
“[…] our dead, my General, 
are not dead so everything  
starts all over again.”  
Pierre-Henri Teitgen
224
  
 
France 
As Parsons has argued, there were at least three factions in France who differed with 
regard to their dominant ideological predisposition towards European institutions 
(Parsons 2002, 2003). Before the outbreak of the Korean War, there still seemed to 
be a sizable cross-party consensus in France that the institutions of the Council of 
Europe were insufficient. The consensus, initiated by deputies from the ‘Third Force’ 
after the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe de-
manded that “a genuine European political authority may be defined and set up as 
soon as possible” and was passed the Assemblée Nationale with a majority of 325 to 
249 votes (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 23). The cross-party appeal of the basic suprana-
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 On May 4
th
 1948, a motion supported by Mackay who sought at least a statement of principle from 
Labour Prime Minister Attlee was rejected (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 704). 
224
 Own translation from “[…] nos morts, mon General, ne sont pas mort pour que tout recommence 
comme avant” (Quoted in Müller-Härlin 2008, 188). 
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tional reasoning implied by the idea of ‘co-binding’ was still evident in April 
1950.
225
 
However, as soon as concrete measures for German rearmament were on the table 
with the outbreak of the Koran War, domestic conflicts in France grew quickly, pro-
ducing distinct labels for the proponents (‘cedistes’) and opponents (‘anti-cedistes’) 
of the Treaty.
226
 It quickly became a dispute over basic national allegiances and 
deep-seated values. The far-reaching nature of the EDC made the domestic conflict 
more divisive: some individuals, such as Lapie, who were supporters of early initia-
tives for abstract European unity, came out as vocal opponents (Parsons 2003, 93). 
The conflict engulfed highly prominent former members of the French resistance: 
some members of De Gaulle’s French government in exile during the war such as 
André Philip and Henri Frenay were among the most ardent federalists active in the 
transnational network and would be accused by De Gaulle of treason as these actors 
proposed to sacrifice French sovereignty in an institutional conglomerate with un-
trustworthy Germans(Belot 2003, 629, 630).
227
 In De Gaulle’s perspective, Europe 
lacked the quality of a nation, namely the ability of ‘obtaining the congenital loyalty  
of its subjects, which, at the limit, required that ‘millions would be willing to die for 
Europe’ (Belot 2003, 630).228 The theme was common among Gaullist deputies. As 
long as European unity implied a permanent enshrinement of a French advantage 
over Germany, figures like De Gaulle and Michel Serre had not opposed the measure 
publicly. As soon as the EDC put Germany and France on an equal level, the costs 
seemed too high and the agitation became vindictive (Fauvet 1956). Thus, Michel 
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 In April 1950, the French Council of the European movement put forth an “Appeal for the creation 
of a European political authority”: reasoning “recovery is impossible on a national basis” calling for 
“the establishment of a common authority in which all the democratic nations of Europe are invited to 
join and which shall be empowered to take immediately enforceable decisions, by a majority vote, in 
strictly defined spheres.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 114, 115). The appeal was supported by Léon 
Blum (SFIO), Robert Bichet (MRO), Edouard Bonnefous (UDSR), Robert Buron (MRP), Coste-
Floret (MRP), René Coty (CNIP), Gaston Deferre (SFIO), Henry Frenay, Giscard d’Estaing (CNIP), 
Pierre Oliver Lapie (SFIO), Alexandre Marc, Guy Mollet (SFIO), André Philip (SFIO), Paul 
Ramadier (SFIO), Paul Reynaud, and Teitgen (MRP). 
226
 Derived from CED (Communauté Européen de Défense). 
227
 In fact, Phillip is reputed to have said to De Gaulle in one of their first meetings in 1942 already, 
“General, as soon as the war is won I shall part company with you. You are fighting to restore national 
greatness; I am fighting to build a socialist and democratic Europe” (quoted in Lipgens 1984a, 273). 
De Gaulle publicly accused the ‘cedistes’ in February 1953 of pursuing a “plan élaboré en cachette, 
intérêts financiers qui dépassent les frontières, influence américaine, hégémonie du ‘Reich’” 
(Vayssière 2007, 319). 
228
 Own translation from “[…] le loyalisme congénital de ses sujets, pour avoir une politique qui lui 
soit propre et pour que, le cas échéant, des millions d’hommes veillent mourir pour elle.” (Quoted in 
Belot 2003, 437). 
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Serre called on the ‘sane elements’ of the Assemblée Nationale and decried the ‘de-
finitive renunciation of the whole national will’ that the EDC entailed.229 Paradoxi-
cally, the Communist PCF steered the same course and, employing a different vo-
cabulary, argued that “the love of national independence” was now key for prevent-
ing “nations from becoming an easy prey for monopoly capitalism.” (Quoted in 
Lipgens and Loth 1988, 102).  
Against the front of Gaullists and Communists, it was only the Christian Democratic 
MRP that was relatively united: MRP deputies by and large espoused essentially 
similar principles as advocated in transnational circles. Far from denouncing national 
values per se, key representatives such as Teitgen, Schuman, Coste-Floret or Bidault 
defended the European Army project in terms of French values.
230
 Consistent with 
the reasoning put forth by transnational Christian Democracy, the Soviet Union 
simply constituted the bigger and more existential threat than Germany (Müller-
Härlin 2008, 94). While the leadership of the MRP was thus relatively close – both in 
terms of their ideological commitments as well as their transnational activities – to 
transnational Christian Democracy and the transnational coalition, the rank-and-file 
of MRP deputies was less enthusiastic. Thus, the MRP had never been able to offi-
cially become a member of the NEI, sending individual deputies to its meetings in-
stead (Gehler and Kaiser 2004, 31). These divisions were, however, relatively minor 
compared to other parties within the ‘third force’. 
The French Social Democrats (SFIO), one the other hand, mirrored the internal di-
vide indicated in the previous chapters. Although the SFIO was traditionally a party 
that would impose significant sanctions against deputies breaking party discipline, 
this was insufficient to keep the party united over the EDC. The motivations behind 
this split were multiple: some sought to retain the French army, some sought to pre-
vent a German army through European institutions, whereas others were principled 
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 “les éléments sains” and “le renoncement définitive de toute volonté nationale” (Quoted in Müller-
Härlin 2008, 76). 
230
 As Teitgen put it in the Assemblée Nationale “La France […] c’est quelque chose qu’elle a dans le 
sang qui est plus que sa fierté et quelquefois son cavalerie; c’est quelque chose qui est sa mission, sa 
vocation, son destin et son devoir, et qu’elle doit accomplir, même quand elle ne veut pas, si elle tient 
à rester elle-même” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 88). The same logic was employed by Bidault “il nous reste 
assez de moyens intellectuels et techniques pour tenir notre place, au premier rang d’une communauté 
européenne, elle-même intégrée dans la communauté atlantique.” (Müller-Härlin 2008, 89). 
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opponents of any German rearmament whatsoever.
231
 The two most influential fac-
tions consisted of principled opponents of German rearmament, who were largely 
remote from Europeanist organizations (i.e. Jules Moch, Salomon Grumbach, Vin-
cent Auriol) and insisted on probing the issue of neutrality before approving of Ger-
man rearmament (Loth 1977, 285). Others, such as André Philip and Guy Mollet, 
were engaged in or sympathetic to the transnational Europeanist activities, accepted 
German armament as a necessary evil and heavily insisted on proper democratic con-
trol of the new military entity but were split on the issue whether co-binding was 
sufficient (Philip) or whether British participation was necessary (Mollet) (Orlow 
2000, 75). As a consequence, the EDC issue was the most divisive for the SFIO 
throughout the Fourth Republic (Featherstone 1988, 115). As the required majority 
within the Assemblée Nationale depended on Socialist votes, the breakdown of party 
discipline on August 30
th
 1954 – despite the widely issued threat of expulsion – 
sealed the fate of the EDC Treaty in the French Chamber. 
The Radical Party experienced a similar internal divide: its deputies included eventu-
al Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who would ‘oversee’ the rejection of the 
EDC in mid-1954 as well as such prominent ‘cedistes’ such as Edgar Faure (member 
of the European Parliamentary Union) or René Mayer (European Movement), who 
both had their own short stints as Prime Ministers.
232
 As Maurice Faure put it later, 
there simply was no coherent radical doctrine on European institutions.
233
 Many rad-
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 As Gérard Jaquet explained it, “certains étaient contre la CED, parce qu'ils ne voulaient pas de 
réarmement allemand du tout. D'autres étaient contre la CED, parce qu'ils ne voulaient pas la dispari-
tion de l'armée française. Et puis il y avait ceux qui cherchaient une troisième voie, et qui disaient: “II 
faut un réarmement allemand mais sous la forme d'une armée européenne intégrée ! Ce serait moins 
dangereux et plus efficace”. En même temps, nous disions: “Si on crée une armée européenne, nous 
faisons un grand pas dans la voie de l'unification de l'Europe, car le jour où on aura une armée euro-
péenne, on aura forcément un pouvoir politique”. II n'y a pas d'armée sans pouvoir politique. Donc on 
aura franchi une étape. Voilà les raisons qui nous poussaient dans la voie de l'armée européenne, et a 
ceux qui nous disaient: “Pas de réarmement allemand, car nous ne voulons pas d'armée allemande 
sous quelque forme que ce soit”, nous répondions: “Mais si on ne fait pas l'armée européenne, vous 
aurez l'armée allemande. Et le groupe socialiste, la dessus, s'est divise, le parti socialiste dans sa majo-
rité a pris position en faveur de la CED. J'ai même été le rapporteur de la motion en faveur de la CED 
au congrès du parti, mais le groupe parlementaire s'est divise par moitié.” (Jaquet 1997). 
232
 Faure was the last Prime Minister of the ‘third force’, a coalition of MRP, Radicals and Socialists, 
under whose auspices the ECSC was ratified. René Mayer’s government in 1953 was the last under 
which Schuman served as Foreign Minister. Other prominent cedistes included Maurice Faure (Euro-
pean Movement) and Edouard Herriot (European Movement) (O'Neill 1981, 55). 
233
 As Maurice Faure put it in an interview in 1987, “Alors, pour ce qui est des Radicaux, je vous 
répondrai en disant qu’effectivement ils étaient tellement divises qu'il est impossible de dire quel était 
la doctrine du Radicalisme.” (Faure 1987). 
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ical deputies who had supported the ECSC Treaty were opponents of the EDC be-
cause it would destroy a symbol of national identification, i.e. the French Army.
234
 
As a result of the key parties of the ‘Third Force’ being divided internally, the EDC 
rested on a shaky foundation in the French Assemblée Nationale. With the Gaullist 
and Communist Deputies opposed to the Treaty, transnational conflict over European 
institutions was amplified domestically by weak French domestic institutions and the 
political context of the Fourth Republic. Thus, domestic conditions provided fertile 
ground for the transnational conflict to impact French politics and thus produce high-
ly contradictory and conflicting institutional demands. As the subsequent pages will 
show, the domestic divisions and the frequent changes in the French governing coali-
tion contributed the absence of coherent French motives, goals, and bargaining strat-
egies parties on the EDC Treaty and provided the main source of strategic uncertain-
ty for the remaining negotiating partners.  
 
Italy 
Italian political conflict, as mentioned was characterized largely by the early domi-
nance of the Christian Democratic DC. The revolt against Mussolini in 1943 had 
produced near civil war conditions and, after the liberation of the middle and the 
north of the country, US military governments oversaw its reconstruction. Upon the 
conclusion of the peace treaty with the Allies in 1947, the new Italian constitution 
was passed in 1947, after a referendum held in 1946, favoring a republic (54,3%) 
over a monarchy (46,7%) (Woller 2010, 221). The first post-war elections then gave 
the DC almost 48% of the vote (Woller 2010, 239). The early post-war coalitions 
were composed of the DC, the republican PRI, the liberal PLI and the moderate So-
cial Democrats (PSDI). A second key characteristic was the presence of a permanent 
and sizable leftist opposition composed of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the 
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 As Maurice Faure put it in an interview in 1987, “Parce qu'il y avait beaucoup de gens qui s'étaient 
prononces contre la Communauté Européenne de Défense, mais qui dans leur esprit ne s'étaient pas du 
tout prononces contre l'Europe. Ils trouvaient que la Communauté Européenne de Défense arrivait 
trop tôt; que ce serait difficile à vendre à l'opinion publique; que probablement elle n’irait plus à la 
cause de l'unité de l'Europe, précisément par sa précipitation, par son ambition excessive; qu'elle de-
vait être le bout de la route et pas la première étape, comme je viens de le dire. Par exemple, beaucoup 
de gens qui avaient voté la ratification de la CECA, en disant que c'est une bonne direction, mais il 
faut aller dans cette voie, mais il faut y aller en montant les marches de l'escalier une aune.” (Faure 
1987). 
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left wing Social Democrats (PSI) led by Pietro Nenni as well as a significant right 
wing represented by the MSI – a collection of monarchists and former members of 
the fascist party. Both sides were strongholds of neutralism, the left especially had 
protested against Italy joining the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 (Magagnoli 1999, 36). Left 
Socialist leader Nenni argued forcefully that neutrality was a better option to ensure 
security for Italy from the Soviet Union.
235
  
The left wing of the DC had similar proponents (Varsori 1992, 266; Masala 2001, 
353). Forming around the Christian Democratic leader Guiseppe Dossetti who had 
close ties to the Christian unions, this faction was highly critical of the Atlanticist 
direction of De Gasperi’s foreign policy (Masala 1996, 148). Given the opposition 
from the left and the right, Italian membership in NATO was by no means preor-
dained, passing the Italian Chamber by only a slim margin (Mistry 2014, 143). This 
disagreement existed right within the DC: for the neutralists, the conflict between 
Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste was a particularly incendiary issue: the less the US 
and the UK supported Italian positions, the more vocal the right became in its criti-
cism (Varsori 1992, 267). 
De Gasperi and the federalist figures around him like Benvenuti, Giachero, 
Dominedo, Bastianetto, and Cingolani were associated with ‘centrismo’, the centrist 
stance within the DC, that was, from the beginning, a stronghold of federalist depu-
ties in Italy (Preda 2008, 316). Thus, De Gasperi led the Italian delegation at one of 
the first congresses of the European Federalists in Aachen in 1948 (Masala 2001, 
363). When the Italian section of the EPU joined the Italian federalists (MFE), one 
estimate of an eyewitness estimates that there were around 250 federalists in the Ital-
ian second chamber, 190 of these being associated with the Christian Democrats. The 
Italian federalists thus had a very strong influence among the DC as well as the Re-
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 Pietro Nenni asked in November 1948, “What is the European union of which Churchill and De 
Gasperi speak, and, alas, Léon Blum as well? It means German leadership of Europe. That is the ob-
ject of American policy in Europe: to make Germany the arsenal and bridgehead of tomorrow’s war.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1988, 215; 1990, 215). Opposition of joining the Brussels pact even, “we shall be 
isolated […] on the day when we join the Brussels pact, the Atlantic or the Mediterranean pact, or the 
European Union. We shall be thoroughly isolated, whereas now we still have a certain freedom of 
maneuver” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 217; 1990, 215), and “I believe that the history of the Soviet 
Union in the last thirty years teaches us that provided Italy does not turn her territory into a base of 
cooperation for other powers, he ports into safe shelters for Anglo-American navies and her airfields 
into launching grounds for attacks against the East we need have no fear of a Russian attack.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1988, 218; 1990, 215). 
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publicans and Liberals.
236
 Their program closely ressembled that of the transnational 
federalists: the parliamentary group of the EPU issued a statement in 1948 “The time 
has come for the nations of Europe to transfer part of their sovereign rights to be ex-
ercised in common […].” It called for the immediate creation of “a European assem-
bly” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 203). 
While the Italian federalists under Spinelli were among the most vocal in the transna-
tional sphere for principled reasons, De Gasperi and many among the centrist DC 
subscribed to federalist principles in a more opportunistic fashion as an institutional 
tool to ensure Italian influence and recognition. The primary reference for the Italian 
governments and its representatives remained Italian interests. Figures such as the 
eventual leader of the Italian EDC delegation Benvenuti thus espoused federalist 
principles because they presented a way to avoid the isolation of the country.
237
 The 
primary justification for the application was that they furthered the influence of the 
Italian government and the county.
238
  
The ‘federalism’ of the Italian government thus constituted a means to an end and it 
was not universally shared: a significant number doubted the continental course and 
kept insisting on the Atlantic link as vital (Ellwood 1995, 43). Instrumental federal-
ism implied that the key decisions by the Italian government related to the EDC bar-
gain were associated with conflict. Thus, in December 1951, only Ugo La Malfa was 
unequivocally supportive of De Gasperi’s course in the Italian Cabinet and De 
Gasperi had to threaten that he would declare in Strasbourg that he was speaking 
personally and not in the same of the Italian government to discipline his colleagues 
(Magagnoli 1999, 111). As in most countries, the primary opposition to the EDC 
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 In 1999, Enzo Giacchero recalled the Italian Federalists as an influential group primarily among 
the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Republicans, “II Gruppo era visto favorevolmente, 
senz’altro. Difatti la maggior parte di quei 250 erano democristiani, perche soprattutto dopo il '48, noi 
democristiani avevamo 300 deputati, mentre gli altri, i repubblicani e i liberali, tutti insieme avranno 
fatto 60-70 deputati, no di pili. Quindi, di quei 250, erano quasi... 180, 190 erano democristiani” 
(Giacchero 1999). 
237
 Benvenuti thought at the time that “[…] daß Italien allein einem Evolutionsprozeß, der sich auf 
allgemeiner Linie abzeichnet, kaum widerstehen kann” und “daß die Stellung eines isolierten Italiens 
ungünstiger als die eines an einem einheitlichen europäischen Organismus teilnehmenden Italiens 
(wäre)” (Magagnoli 1998, 31). 
238
 As Malagodi, a high ranking Italian representative at the OEEC, expressed it in August 1951, 
“Schließlich ist zu berücksichtigen [...], daß besonders für ein armes, aber bevölkerungsreiches Land 
wie das unsere die Möglichkeit einer sich proportional zu seiner Bevölkerung vollziehenden Teilnah-
me an einer gewählten und direkt verantwortlichen Versammlung ein wesentliches Korrektiv zur 
Schwäche darstellt, die durch den Mangel an wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen verursacht wird.” 
(Magagnoli 1998, 30). 
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within the government came from the Ministry of Defense (Pacciardi) and the gen-
eral staff (Marras) (Magagnoli 1999, 131).  
As a result, although federalism was most influential in Italian domestic politics, it 
was by no means hegemonic. Federalist deputies formed a sizable and influential 
portion of the Italian Camera dei Deputati, but there was opposition to their central 
course both from the left and the right, within the DC as well as from other parties. In 
the same vein as in France, the differences concerned ideological divisions over the 
proper course of Italian foreign policy were significant and led to conflicts within the 
dominant DC. As a result, there were conflicting domestic demands regarding the 
institutional setup of the alliance and the role of Italy therein. Although the extend of 
domestic divisions – and in particular within the DC – was not as extreme as in 
France but led to similar internal divisions within the Italian government and the 
Foreign Ministry, as shown below. 
 
Germany 
In line with Germany’s precarious geopolitical position, European ‘unity’ was a rhe-
torical cross-party consensus in the post-war years (Müller-Härlin 2008, 197). More-
over, the German Council of the European Movement was well embedded among the 
parliamentarians, constituting a distinct parliamentary group that reflected the cross-
party membership of the transnational organization. Its members included, inter alia, 
von Brentano and Schmid, Erler, and Adenauer (Stillemunkes 1988, 450). The Euro-
pa-Union, the German section of the UEF, had held its inaugural meeting on May 
20
th
 1949, attendees having included Adenauer, Karl Arnold (CDU), Max Brauer 
(SPD), and Eugen Kogon (Stillemunkes 1988, 454). As in other countries, the Ger-
man Council of the European Movement had initiated a resolution in October 1949 
that recommended German delegates to be send to the Consultative Assembly since 
the “strengthening of the potential European parliament against the authority of indi-
vidual sovereign states is extremely welcome.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 535). 
Despite the cross-party composition of these groups, however, the design of Europe-
an institutions was not a cross-party consensus and quickly became a relatively well-
structured conflict between government and opposition. The leadership of the two 
principal parties in post-war Germany, the CDU/ CSU and the SPD, had acquired a 
dominant role in formulating the official party lines respectively: both Konrad Aden-
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auer and Kurt Schumacher were capable of effectively disciplining renegade party 
members that were close to diverging from the official party position and did so on a 
number of occasions.  
Adenauer had taken part in the congress at The Hague, was an early regular the 
meetings of the Geneva Circle, later attended the yearly NEI congresses, remained in 
regular close and personal contact with the transnational coalition emerging around 
Paul-Henri Spaak and Robert Schuman (e.g. Schwarz 1982, 558, 560; Adenauer 
1984, 337, 998). Ideologically, his stance followed the mainstream assumptions of 
post-war transnational Christian Democracy: European integration and supranational 
institutions were a necessary response to the emerging Bolshevist threat (Schwarz 
1979, 475). In Germany, the handling of external relations was dominated by Aden-
auer who took over the formal responsibilities of the chancellorship as well as the 
Foreign Ministry from 1949 until 1955 when he relinquished the post to Brentano. 
He had managed to appoint trusted figures in key positions who shared basic ideo-
logical convictions such as Blankenhorn, Blank, Hallstein, and Brentano. In the early 
years, he would exert considerable influence especially over external and defense 
policies and the selection of personnel (Knoll 2013, 80). Moreover, the Ministry of 
Defense ‘in nuce’ – the Amt Blank – was formally a part of the Kanzleramt as well. 
Thus Adenauer personally controlled hierarchically all aspects of German post-war 
Foreign and Defense Policy. As the leadership of the German government went 
largely unchanged throughout the 1950’s, the embeddedness of the German govern-
ment, in particular the close connections to the Christian Democratic community and, 
via Brentano in particular, to the transnational coalition should be noted (see previ-
ous chapter). Adenauer’s dominance in particular led to repeated complaints from the 
Bundestagsfraktion over a lack of involvement in the formulation of German bar-
gaining strategies and positions (e.g. Baring, et al. 1974, 412). Leadership continuity 
implied that the German government pursued a consistent set of objectives that was 
heavily shaped by a similar set of values and beliefs that the German Christian Dem-
ocrats had advocated in transnational Christian Democracy. This preference, howev-
er, had to strategically contend with domestic criticism as well as international de-
velopments. 
Kurt Schumacher, on the other hand, was remote from any transnational Europeanist 
aspiration. Firmly embracing a confrontational curse to the ‘conservative, capitalist, 
clerical’ undertaking of European integration, he emphasized national unity, inter-
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governmental reconciliation and equality between nations as a precondition of his 
internationalism (Sassoon 1996, 168, 212). Thus, under his leadership, the SPD re-
frained from sending delegates to The Hague congress and even abstained from par-
ticipating in the Ad Hoc Assembly.
239
 
Opposition to the leadership course existed within both parties, and both leaders had 
to exert their power. A sizable part of the old German military elite, including figures 
such as Guderian and Manteuffel, now in the FDP, would emerge as vocally critical 
of supranational designs and the EDC, suspecting that German soldiers would be 
‘second class cannon fodder’ under Allied control (Large 1996, 104). Criticism from 
the left struck similar tones (See Der Spiegel 1951). In the CDU, a prominent source 
was directed against the radical West-integration pursued by Adenauer. Thus, Jakob 
Kaiser, Federal Minister of All-German Affairs and a leading proponent of the left 
wing of the CDU, repeatedly accused Adenauer of ‘abandoning’ Germans both in the 
Saarland and the East and, in pursuing the creation of a European Army, foreclosing 
available alternatives of neutrality and reunification that opened, for example, with 
the Stalin Note of March 1952 (Elzer 2008, 923, 924). Adenauer successfully ousted 
him from transnational activities, challenged him if his rhetoric endangered the gov-
ernment course or weakened its positions.
240
 Other opponents within the party at 
times centered on the principle of rearmament itself, such the Protestant leader Gus-
tav Heinemann who left the government once rearmament was on the agenda and 
organized public demonstrations leading to a serious rupture with Adenauer.
241
 Criti-
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 In retrospect, Adenauer attributed this to different attitudes to nationalism that made their relati-
onship highly contentious, “Gaus: Und Sie meinen, dies habe verhindert, dass Sie zu dem Führer der 
zweitstärksten Partei [Schumacher, B.F.] in ein rechtes Verhältnis kamen? Haben Sie das beklagt? 
Adenauer: Er war ein sehr subjektiver Mann. Er hat auch, glaube ich, schwer körperlich zu leiden 
gehabt. Und er war – Sie werden erstaunt sein, wenn ich das sage – ein Nationalist, und das war ich 
nicht. Gaus: War dies eine prinzipielle Schranke? Adenauer: Eine ganz prinzipielle Schranke, ja-
wohl.” (Gaus 1965). 
240
 Adenauer wrote in a letter to Kaiser on November 3
rd
 1952, “[…] Dass ich sie bitten muss, keine 
selbstständige Politik dort zu betreiben oder betreiben zu lassen” and asked angrily for clarification 
whether Kaiser had said the words - reported by RIAS that “die Saar ist so deutsch wie Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen.” He concluded on January 8th 1953, “Die 
Bemühungen ihrer Herren haben nicht nur keinen Erfolg gehabt, sie haben im Gegenteil geschadet.” 
(Adenauer 1987, 293, 303, 316). 
241
 Adenauer complained in the Kabinett on October 17
th
 1950, “Was mir aber am meisten Kummer 
macht, ist Niemöller und Heinemann. Ich muß Ihnen sagen, Herr Niemöller ist entweder geisteskrank 
oder aber, meine Herren, er ist ein Rückversicherer. Und das letztere wird sehr ernst behauptet. Was 
Herr Niemöller sich jetzt geleistet hat, das ist nackter Landesverrat und weiter nichts. Und wenn wir 
ein irgendwie gefestigtes Staatswesen hätten, gehörte er eigentlich hinter Schloß und Riegel.” (104. 
Kabinettssitzung am Dienstag, den 17. Oktober 1950 http://www.bundesarchiv.de/ 
cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1950k/kap1_3/para2_2.html) 
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cism from other quarters was less virulent, and if it did surface, rarely challenged the 
official party line on the EDC.
242
 Members of the FDP, such as Blücher, vehemently 
emphasized the issue of institutional equality, rather than challenging the suprana-
tional principle per se (Large 1996, 55). Within the CDU/CSU institutional equality 
was a precondition for the abrogation of sovereignty.
243
 The felt threat from the So-
viet Union thus overshadowed any ambition for reunification.
244
 With outbreak of 
the Korean War, by and large, the main question within the government focused on 
the principle of equality but did not question the overall course steered by Adenauer 
(Large 1996, 78).
245
  
The SPD, on the other side of the political aisle, challenged Adenauer’s course heavi-
ly. The nationalist tone struck by Schumacher – as described in chapter 6 – included 
criticizing Adenauer as ‘Kanzler der Alliierten’: the overall position of the SPD was 
to seek reunification and explore the possibility of a neutral and disarmed Germany, 
a strategy that had several critics within the party and that backfired on election day 
in 1953 (Orlow 2000, 73). The SPD accordingly opposed the ECSC and the EDC 
Treaty in the Bundestag.
246
 Overall, Schumacher and the SPD leadership questioned 
the principle of supranationality as well as the course of ‘Westbindung’. The key 
                                                 
242
 Adenauer wrote in a letter to Blücher on September 24
th
 1952, complaining that Blücher had criti-
cized publicly the small Europe solution, argued for economic contacts with the UK and Scandinavia, 
and wanted to hold this position at the FDP party congress. Adenauer was displeased and demanded 
clarification “aus einer derartigen Änderung ihrer politischen Haltung [würden sich] sehr bedenkliche 
folgen ergeben […] Sie zu bitten umgehend […] Stellung zu nehmen.” (Adenauer 1987, 278, 279). 
Adenauer was quick to reprimand nationalist rhetorical lapses. 
243
 A FDP resolution from March 1950 demonstrates the opportunistic element in ‘Europeanist’ rea-
soning in post-war Europe. It stipulated, “The continued existence and development of the Western 
way of life calls for the economic and political unity of Europe. […] The vitality of united Europe will 
depend on the enthusiasm with which the federal system is upheld. The sooner the principle of equal 
rights and mutuality are applied to the Germans also, the sooner will Germany be a dependable mem-
ber of the European order. In a true federation there is no room for under-privileged nations.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1988, 535, 536; 1990, 215). 
244
 Thus, Liberals such as Becker feared a “Vorstoß der Völkerschaften des asiatischen Raumes“ 
(Müller-Härlin 2008, 190), conservatives such as Albers (CDU/ CSU) demanded that “Europa muss 
jetzt geschaffen werden, damit es ein Schutzwall für Freiheit und Menschenrechte sein kann“ (Müller-
Härlin 2008, 192) whereas Gerstenmeier (CDU) doubted “ob dem einheitlich organisierten […] 
kommunistischen Russland und Asien ein Haufen europäischer Nationalstaaten gegenüberliegen wird, 
die sich untereinander in häuslichen Fehden […] bekriegen.“ (Müller-Härlin 2008, 192). 
245
 As Franz Josef Strauß put it in a speech in 1954, “Wir sind zu den schwersten Konzessionen be-
reit” (Quoted in Der Spiegel 1954a).  
246
 As Schumacher put it at an SPD congress in Hamburg in May 22
nd
 1950, “Charlemagne’s empire 
had an Eastern frontier, which was geographically very close to the present Iron Curtain. And we 
declare here and now that we shall fight this particular idea with the utmost determination for it im-
plies recognition of the partition of Germany and would signify, moreover, that Germany herself de-
sired and accepted that partition.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 537; 1990, 215). 
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opposition within the SPD to this course came from SPD members close to the trans-
national coalition which had independent power bases in the Länder, i.e. Wilhelm 
Kaisen of Bremen, Max Brauer of Hamburg, and Ernst Reuter of Berlin (Orlow 
2000, 71).
 247
 Others, in particular Carlo Schmid – elected vice-president of the Eu-
ropa-Union in 1949 – lacked an independent power base. Schmid kept his differences 
with Schumacher to himself out of loyalty, but suffered accordingly (Weber 1996, 
456). Those who publicly opposed Schumacher were disciplined: Brauer was effec-
tively barred from the SPD Präsidium, and Wilhelm Kaisen was removed in 1950. 
In sum, the interpretations of the implications of the West-German geostrategic posi-
tion differed widely between left and right. For the governing coalition, rearmament 
was seen as a necessary counter weight for the Soviet threat and the principle of su-
pranationality – provided that equality was assured – a key component of European 
unity (Müller-Härlin 2008, 165). As a result, the debate between the government and 
the opposition was cast by Adenauer and members of the CDU as an explicit deci-
sion for or against Europe.
248
 The criticism from the SPD largely sought to portray 
itself as for European integration but against a supranational army.
249
 A second dom-
inant theme was the lacking democratic quality of the new institutions.
250
. As a re-
sult, the protracted ratification conflicts surrounding the EDC Treaty were a partisan 
affair, including the SPD fraction calling on the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Party 
                                                 
247
 At the same congress, on May 22
nd
 1950, Max Brauer challenged Schumacher, stating explicitly in 
his speech that “I take a different view from comrade Schumacher. In my opinion, the decision against 
going to Strasbourg is mistaken and is a positive disaster […]” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 543; 1990, 
215). Reporting to the German Council of the European Movement, on March 6
th
 1949, he called for 
the “260 million inhabitants of the new union of all European states, all of which should bring in, and 
I hope will bring in, their economic resources into this new supernational structure. […] We delegates 
now have the task, each in his country, to spread and popularize this common knowledge.” (Lipgens 
and Loth 1988, 523; 1990, 215). Max Brauer in the same speech equally expressed the idea of equality 
as it would benefit the national interest “Certainly, no leading role will devolve on the Germans in this 
movement. But we can, and we ought to, be a member on equal terms of this new community promot-
ing the creation of a United Europe […].” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 524; 1990, 215). 
248
 Adenauer said, “Es ist die Entscheidung, die Sie zu treffen haben, in Wahrheit eine Entscheidung 
für oder gegen Europa“ (Müller-Härlin 2008, 210). Merkatz called for the ‘Überwindung europäischer 
Kleinstaaterei’ (Müller-Härlin 2008, 176). 
249
 As Erler stated in the Bundestag “Man komme uns doch nicht mit der Behauptung, dass Verständi-
gung mit unseren Nachbarn nur möglich ist […] wenn man sich mit ihnen in einer Armee zusammen-
schließt.“ Gerstenmaier (CDU) responded “Sie wissen genau, dass wir nicht von der Militärallianz 
reden, sondern von der europäischen Integration“ (Müller-Härlin 2008, 205). 
250
 Thus Schumacher denounced the new parliament as a “Konvent von Managern (Müller-Härlin 
2008, 209), SPD delegate Veit saw in the ECSC dominant “Elemente des Autokratischen und des 
Undemokratischen“ (Müller-Härlin 2008, 208). 
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discipline here held in the Bundestag and in the Bundesrat, with the exception of 
SPD Berlin under Reuter that voted for the EDC Treaty (Volkmann 1990, 393). 
 
Belgium 
In the case of Belgium, domestic conflict was equally a more structured affair, alt-
hough intra-party divisions were prevalent among the Social Democrats. The main 
conduit by which the transnational conflict influenced Belgian politics was the Bel-
gian Council of the Movement, founded in 1949 (Bott 1988, 277). As was the case 
with the European Movement in general, its participants subscribed to very different 
ideologies, and came from the whole Belgian political spectrum.
251
 The internal Bel-
gian conflicts between the Flemish and the Walloons equally translated into divisions 
among the Belgian federalists and prevented the early foundation of a united Belgian 
faction in the federalist movement and particularly the UEF as frequent infighting 
between the Walloon and Flemish groups hampered cooperation (Bott 1988, 272).
 
Genuinely federalist pressure groups were thus rather weak in Belgium.
 252
 
As in Germany, the key difference for the formulated demands and domestic con-
flicts over the EDC between the two major Belgian political forces – the PSC-CSV 
and the BSP-PSB – was the role of the party leadership within the transnational Eu-
ropeanist organizations. For the Christian Democrats, the party leadership, in particu-
lar the Christian Democratic Prime Ministers throughout the time were largely absent 
from transnational circles.
253
 The Christian Democratic Foreign Minister between 
1950 and 1954 was Paul van Zeeland, who had been an influential figure in the 
foundation of the ELEC and, as described in the previous chapter, was a primary 
                                                 
251
 Some of the most prominent members included Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Paul Van 
Zeeland, Social Democratic leader Paul-Henri Spaak, Etienne de la Vallée Poussin (PSC-CVP), Willy 
De Clercq (PSC-CVP) et Charles Ferdinand Nothomb (PSC-CVP) as well as Jean Rey (LP-PL), 
Georges Bohy (BSP-PSB), Désirée Lamalle (PSC-CVP), abd Raymond Rifflet (BSP-PSB). 
252
 As the journalist Ram Linssen defended the personalist doctrine “European unity based on a feder-
al and a democratic basis.” In the personalist view, according to him “Federalism has two characteris-
tics: decentralization and freedom” […].” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 307, 308; 1990, 215). 
253
 The Christian Democratic PSC-CVP dominated the Belgian Chamber of Representatives between 
1950 until the elections in 1954, disposing of the governing majority in parliament and relying on a 
sufficiently strong party apparatus to keep the differences between Walloon and Flemish Christian 
Democrats in check. At the same time, the four years saw three different Prime Ministers, none of 
which was engaged in the transnational networks: Jean Duvieusart who fell over the royal question in 
1950 and was expelled by the party; Joseph Pholien who had to resign over internal party struggles 
over economic and education policy; and Jean Van Houtte who stayed on as Prime Minister until his 
party lost the election in 1954. 
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advocate of the functionalist model, skeptical towards the extension of supranational-
ity towards security issues. Leadership of the Social Democratic (BSP-PSB) was 
occupied by Paul Henri Spaak and Fernand Dehousse, both having played a leading 
role within the transnational coalition pushing for the EDC and EPC Treaties, as de-
scribed in chapter 6. While the Christian Democratic CSV did not experience severe 
internal conflicts, the issue was very different for the Social Democrats. 
The PSC-CVP was well represented in the transnational Christian Democratic net-
work.
254
 Its representatives had espoused distinct Benelux positions by intensely 
promoting supranationalist principles in the economic sphere, but only reluctantly 
accepted similar solutions for the EDC. Thus, for Vallée Poussin, supranationalism 
did “not mean doing away with nations or imposing a uniformity which would be 
contrary to the genius and diversity of each […].” (Lipgens and Loth 1990, 316). As 
was typical of both Belgian and Dutch representatives, economic unification was the 
“rallying cry” of the PSC-CVP (Bott 1988, 271). Thus, Belgian Christian Democrats 
shared the general diagnosis, expressed by Vallée Poussin in the Belgian parliament, 
that “nationalism is everywhere a far more active force than reason, which warns us 
of the imperious necessity of creating Europe on a supranational scale […].” Howev-
er, supranationalism did “not mean doing away with nations or imposing a uniformi-
ty which would be contrary to the genius and diversity of each” (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 316). Similarly, for Paul van Zeeland, as a representative of the ELEC, the 
primary political objective in post-war Belgium was to find “a way to remodel and 
prepare the Belgian economy to save it from decline” (Dujardin and Dumoulin 2008, 
195). In sum, virtually none of the Belgian Christian Democratic leadership espoused 
radical federalist principles in the security sphere: the proposition of pooling sover-
eignty with the larger continental states in this era was met with heavy skepticism 
(Coolsaet 2002, 104). As a result, the imposition of party discipline during the vote 
on the EDC Treaty weighted heavy on those who were skeptical towards the EDC 
Treaty. For Belgian Christian Democratic Deputy Frans Van Cauwelaert, voting 
‘yes’ was an act that came close to ‘death within the soul’.255 The skepticism that 
was widespread in many quarters was shared by NEI representative Désirée Lamalle 
                                                 
254
 As shown earlier, core figures included Jules Soyeur (first General Secretary of the NEI), August 
de Schryver, Theo Lefèvre and by Etiénne de la Vallée Poussin, all representatives to the Geneva 
Circle. 
255
 “la mort dans l’âme” (quoted in Dumoulin 1987, 30). 
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who denounced the EDC/ EPC treaties in the Belgian chamber as ‘a destruction of 
national institutions’, in particular referring to the Belgian king, whose prerogative it 
was to appoint Belgian officers.
256
 Some of the Belgian delegates from the Geneva 
Circle or the NEI, such as Bernard Snoy et d’Oppuert and Auguste Schryver, put 
forth a more proactive wording, though hardly glittered with enthusiasm (Dumoulin 
1987, 27).  
The Social Democratic PSB however suffered from the same internal division as 
transnational Social Democracy did in general (Bott 1988, 280). A significant pro-
portion of the party leadership with no ties to the Europeanist transnational organiza-
tions tended to agree with the reasoning of their British and Scandinavian comrades, 
oppositing the surrender of sovereignty in particular in the field of defence. These 
included Henri Rolin, Endouard Anseele of Ghent, Achille van Acker, and Max 
Buset (Mommens and Minten 1993, 142).
257
 Their position was similar to the criti-
cism that the European Integration project had received in the Socialist International: 
they vehemently opposed any German rearmament, seemed to prefer German neu-
trality and insisted on insisted on UK participation in the institutions and thus essen-
tially on razing the treaty from its supranational elements, while, at the same time 
citing the lack of democratic control as a reason for rejection (Coolsaet 1988, 147; 
Featherstone 1988, 25; Mommens and Minten 1993, 149).
258
 The leadership under 
Spaak and Dehousse, however, advocated much more expansive designs in terms of 
the proposed centralization very early on (Mommens and Minten 1993, 142). The 
Belgian section of the MSEUE was even more radical.
259
 While Spaak had still 
                                                 
256
 “la destruction des institutions nationales, de la vie nationale, de l’esprit national belge“ (Dumoulin 
1987, 29). 
257
 Max Buset wrote in 1949 that the “amiable visionaries who have already drawn up a written con-
stitution for a superstate that does not exist and will not come into being for a long time are scarcely 
performing a service to the European peoples by offering them utopian dreams.” (Lipgens and Loth 
1990, 320). Buset preferred a limited functionalism, “What we need are not utopian mergers and vi-
sionary federations, but an international synthesis of interlocking interests, a progressive unification 
closely linked to certain very precise objectives: the adjustment of customs duties, the coordination of 
transport, the joint development of resource and especially motive power, the planning of production 
and distribution, investment control […]. These are huge, vital, and pressing tasks and the socialist 
parties are certainly entitled to demand that they should have priority on the Council’s agenda.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1990, 326). 
258
 Thus, Victor Larock stated in 1950 that “the political situation in the different countries is not sta-
ble enough for an extra-national institution to acquire the necessary authority in a short time.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1990, 325). 
259
 Its main position was that “there can be no European federation until state sovereignty is done 
with.” The pamphlet further elaborated that “the most urgent task is to create a federal European state 
which will safeguard basic human rights and make no concessions to totalitarianism.” For these pur-
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steered a course typical of the pro-European Socialist faction by seeking UK mem-
bership, he completely cast his lot on the supranational coalition by 1951 (see previ-
ous chapter). In a meeting with Eisenhower, he made unusually strong criticism of 
the behavior of the Belgian Christian Democratic government, calling Van Zeeland’s 
position was “week and inefficient” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 409). He continued by stating 
that, 
“Europeans have no confidence in their national military establishments and hence our 
present effort should present objective not as rebuilding individual French, Belgian, Ger-
man or Italian defense establishments but as new concept of united and fully integrated 
defense force for preservation West community.” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 409).  
In addition, there were significant signs of internal divisions during the built-up of 
the ratification procedure. In November 1953, a Socialist BSP-PSB congress re-
vealed similar demands that the French Socialists would insist on: British participa-
tion in the European Army, democratic control through the institutions of the EPC.
260
 
During that congress, the decision to vote for ratification of the treaty received as 451 
votes yes, 281 no, with 47 abstentions (Dumoulin 1999, 460). Motions put forth by 
Henry Rolin and Anseele considering the imposition of party discipline to vote 
against the treaty were rejected whereas Spaak’s motion, coupled with a threat to 
leave the party, convinced rank and file members that the ratification vote should be 
open (Mommens and Minten 1993, 153). The 77 delegates of the Socialist BSP-PSB 
split over the EDC vote, registering 47 positive votes, 29 negatives and one absten-
tion (De Vos 1987, 113; Haas 2004 [1958], 156). 
The skepticism of the Belgian Christian Democrats was overcome, as the subsequent 
pages will show, by a combination of Christian Democratic conviction and US con-
ditionality. The Christian Democratic PSC-CVP, having held the majority of seats in 
the Chamber of Representatives between 1950 and 1954, had to live with 10 negative 
votes and one abstention while mustering the remaining 97 votes in favor of the 
                                                                                                                                          
pose, the pamphlet stated that it was necessary to “win over […] not only the different socialist parties 
but also trade unions, cooperatives, Christian Democrats and federalists of all kinds” (Lipgens and 
Loth 1990, 328, 329). 
260
 Recommending acceptance “[…] a la condition que le Gouvernement s’engage: 1) a fournir à la 
Chambre toutes assurances quant à l’association de la Grande-Bretagne avec la CED ; 2) a proposer 
immédiatement aux gouvernements cosignataires que les modalités fondamentales de la Communauté 
Politique soient convenus entre les six gouvernement dans le sens d’un contrôle démocratique avant 
que le traite de la CED ne soit mis en vigueur ; 3) à prendre aussitôt que possible, une initiative réso-
lue auprès de nos allies pour la négociation ‘un pacte de non-agression et de sécurité mutuelle entre 
les Etats occidentaux et l’URSS” (Dumoulin 1999, 459, 460). 
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Treaty despite a traditionally strong party discipline. The Belgian Liberals saw minor 
objections during the vote as 14 representatives voted for the treaty, four against, and 
one abstained. Belgium was among the first to formally ratify the treaty (De Vos 
1987, 113; Haas 2004 [1958], 156). 
 
Netherlands 
In line with the consociational character of Dutch institutions, the degree of open 
domestic conflict over the EDC in the Netherlands was relatively narrow although 
the basic pattern of conflict fits into the general pattern. The domestic conduits of 
transnational influence were as well connected as in the other countries under con-
sideration. The Dutch section of the UEF - the “Europeesche Actie” - was established 
in 1947 under founding president Henri Brugmans; the Dutch Council of the Europe-
an Union, established in 1948, was composed of assorted members from virtually all 
parties present in the Dutch Tweede Kammer (Heinen 1988, 350). During the early 
days of the European Movement (April 1948), it introduced a motion calling for a 
“permanent association” of states which should  
“[…] be realized by means of various functional institutions, wherein, so far as may be 
possible and desirable, authority should be conferred on supranational bodies, especially 
in monetary, economic and social fields and in that of defence.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 
390). 
It added that it required “a European Assembly making possible international super-
vision at a parliamentary level” (Ibid. 403). The motion was accepted, receiving neg-
ative votes only from the Communists.
261
  
The main ideological influence in the Netherlands was not the personalist federalist 
radicalism of Henri Brugmans.
262
 Rather, there was a dominant cross-party consen-
sus on the need for economic integration and thus the need for efficient institutions to 
achieve these aims. Thus, Dutch actors from very disparate political backgrounds 
                                                 
261
 The most influential figures in the Dutch Council of the European Union represented multiple 
ideological influences: ELEC members such as Zijlstra (ARP), Kerstens (KVP), Beyen (no party 
affiliation) and Monnet associate Kohnstamm (no party affiliation); Socialists such as Van der Goes 
van Naters, Mansholt and Ruygers (PvdA); Christian Democrats such as Serrarens, Sassens and 
Romme (KVP); and liberals and conservatives such as H.A. Korthals (VVD), Bruins Slot (ARP), and 
J.R. Schmal (CHU) (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 71). 
262
 Thus, motion introduced by the “Europeesche Actie” to support the federal pact initiative of the 
UEF in 1949, did not pass the parliamentary vote in 1949 (Heinen 1988, 351). 
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proposed a series of plans aimed at economic integration of the continent, inter alia 
the Stikker Plan, the Mansholt Plan, and the Beyen Plan of 1952. Moreover, the 
heavy emphasis on economic integration equally implied a much more dominant 
functionalist tone. As a result, while matters of economic integration were largely a 
consensus matter, the atmosphere was more divisive with regard to the EDC alt-
hough the conflict was by no means as intense and open as they were in France.
263
  
Internal conflicts existed nevertheless. Within the Social Democratic PvdA, the main 
representatives of transnational Europeanist influence were Marinus van der Goes 
van Naters and Rygers (Federalist Socialist Community). Their institutional demands 
called for a more functionalist version of federalists positions, more in line with the 
decentralized ‘personalist’ version of federalism as advocated by Henri Brugmans 
(Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 125).
264
 Van Naters was Chairman of the PvdA party group 
in the Tweede Kammer from 1945 until 1951 when Socialist Prime Minister Willem 
drees forced Van Naters to resign due to a fallout ignited over differences in the ap-
proach of the Dutch government towards the EDC negotiations as the Dutch gov-
ernment had, by mid-1951, still refrained from entering the negotiations (Orlow 
2000, 77).
265
 Van Naters was supported by Socialist members of the “Europeesche 
Actie”. His main ally in the government was member of the Dutch Council of the 
European Union and Minister of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt (Van der Harst 1990). 
Opposition to this course came both from rank and file party members as well as 
                                                 
263
 As Jelle Zijlstra expressed it in an interview in 1989, “[…] European integration, starting in the 
form at that moment of the Coal and Steel Community, was not highly controversial in the Nether-
lands. People of almost all political parties, with the exception of the extreme Right and extreme Left, 
were in favor of European integration. (…) The discussion at that time centered around the European 
Defense Community. That was somewhat more controversial here than the broad idea of economic 
integration. Second, people like the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Stikker, were not very enthusi-
astic.” (Zijlstra 1998). 
264
 “Federalism wants a larger unit, but it will not let this unit result in a total collectivization [… ]. 
[…] the principles of subsidiarity, spheres sovereignty and decentralization will play an important role 
in the field of international society”. Own translation from “Het federalisme wil een grootere eenheid, 
maar het wil deze eenheid niet laten uitmonden in een totale collectiveering [...].‘dat de beginselen 
van subsidiariteit, souvereiniteit in eigen kring en functioneele decentralisatie ook iets te zeggen 
hebben op het terrein van de internationale samenleving” (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 124). 
265
 Marinus van der Goes van Naters in an interview in 1993 to Asbek Brusse and Griffitths, “Our 
knowledge about the conflicts in the cabinet on European questions we learned from Mansholt and not 
from Drees himself. Drees kept everything secret; even from the party leadership and certainly from 
the parliamentary party; something which today sounds incredible. It simply never occurred to Drees 
to talk to the leader of the parliamentary party as I happened to be.” (Asbek Brusse and Griffiths 1993, 
136). 
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from party leader and long-term Dutch Prime Minister Willem Drees.
266
 Willem 
Drees, as remote from transnational Europeanist organizations as Schumacher was, 
had already displayed a highly skeptical attitude towards the delegation and pooling 
of authority during the Schuman Plan negotiations.
267
 Partially due to Dutch institu-
tions, these divisions were not exposed publicly: by mid-1951, there had still not 
been a parliamentary debate on the issue of German rearmament, although the issue 
had been on the international agenda for about a year. Given Dutch abstention from 
the negotiations, the Party leadership, and Drees in particular, refused an official dis-
cussion, as that would “(…) lead to a political fiasco, which would not contribute to 
the strengthening of the party.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 112). 
However, as ELEC delegate Zijlstra quote from above indicated, there were more 
conflicts than is suggested by the apparently smooth ratification outcome, both with-
in the Cabinet as well as within the parties in the Second Chamber. The key to these 
differences, as suggested by Kohnstamm, lay in basic considerations about appropri-
ate Foreign Policy strategy,  
“For the Dutch to go into a continental organization was something which went against 
all our history. We had Indonesia, because we had the British fleet, the British gave it 
back after Napoleon. We were really a little boat towed by the British. The place of Eng-
land was to some extent - in the mind for example of my friend van der Beugel, Hirsch-
feld, and Stikker - taken over by America. To be with the Americans, that was the thing. 
We had a split between the Atlanticists and the European integrationists. European inte-
gration had in Parliament quite a bit of support, because the Catholic party was strong, 
always in government, and was in favor; and a part of the Socialist party was in favor. 
Not Drees himself. He thought it was all nonsense (laughs).” (Kohnstamm 1986). 
Long-term party head Willem Drees had remained remote from any transnational 
Europeanist activity. For security, he believed, the atlantic alliance and, in particular, 
the nuclear bomb was the key,  
“The deterrent of an atomic bomb is the only guarantee for Western Europe. We must 
have an understanding of this situation and try to strengthen the forces of Western Eu-
rope. This can only be achieved by continuous consultations and cooperation with the 
other countries in Western Europe.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 109). 
                                                 
266
 For example, socialist deputy Socialist Deputy J. Barents publicly called out the chairman of the 
Socialist party group “to escape from utopian federalism to reality”, noting that the “idea of European 
federation rests on false premises” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 393). 
267
 “The realization of the Schuman Plan would bring more disadvantages than advantages to Dutch 
internal interests […]. Although the participation of the Netherlands was desirable from an interna-
tional point of view, he [Drees] was not prepared to make every sacrifice.[…] National governments 
must retain some say.” (Asbek Brusse 1993, 115). 
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For the catholic KVP, Christian Democratic supranationalism was largely a consen-
sus affair. Key KVP representatives, such as Serrarens, Sassen, and eventual parlia-
mentary group leader Margret Klompé were active in the transnational Christian 
Democratic Community, in the Dutch Council for the European Movement and had 
supported the Dutch motion for a permanent ‘association of states’ of 1948 (Van 
Heerikhuizen 1998, 41).
268
 Thus, Serrarens complained in 1949 in the Second 
Chamber that the OEEC was “an intergovernmental body, on which the people 
through their elected representatives have no impact.”269 He had equal words of 
kindness for the Council of Ministers vetoing demands emanating from the Consulta-
tive Assembly.
270
 A second shared Christian Democratic trademark was the domi-
nant sense of threat from the ‘Bolshevik East’, that Sassen described as an area 
“where unprecedented vaguely dangers press from the dark depths, so is Russia for 
us, people of the West!” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 100). The assumption 
of Dutch Foreign Policy, according to Sassen, was that “egoism, chauvinism and 
nationalism can be overcome”. Thus “the consultative Council must be replaced by 
supranational bodies possessing authority”271 Parliamentary party group leader 
Romme and his successor Margert Klompé, both shared Sassen’s concerns (Van 
Heerikhuizen 1998, 135). At the same time, there were no calls for radical federalist 
schemes: in particular, Klompé and Romme were skeptical of significant delegation 
of authority that would entail a loss of control (Ibid). 
Within the remaining parties, there were more visible signs of division. Within the 
liberal VVD, Dirk Stikker – Foreign Minister until 1952 and altogether absent from 
                                                 
268
 Thus, the party program from 1952 “supported the pursuit of European, where possible, Atlantic, 
and, in the future, global federal cooperation to realize collective interests, which, in modern circum-
stances, cannot be realized separately by the States or by cooperation at the state level […].“ Own 
translation from “[…] het streven naar Europese, waar mogelijk Atlantische en in en verwijderde 
toekomst mondiale federale samenwerking ter collectieve verzorging an belangen, die in de moderne 
verhoudingen noch door de Staten afzonderlijk, noch door un samenwerking op regeringsniveau […]“ 
(Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 32). 
269
 Own translation from “[...] een intergouvernementeel orgaan, waarin de volkeren door hun gekozen 
vertegenwoordigers geen invloed hebben [...]” (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 109). 
270
 “The manner in which the Committee of Ministers wanted to halt the work of the Assembly is 
reminiscent of the attitude of some fathers who give their son give an electric toy, under the condition 
that the child is not allowed to play if Dad does not and as long as it does not do anything”. Own 
translation from “De wijze, waarop het Comité van Ministers het werk van de Assemblée wilde 
stilleggen, doet denken aan de houding van sommige vaders, die hun zoontje een electrisch spoortje 
geven, onder de conditie, dat het kind er niet mede mag spelen, als papa er niet bij is en deze niet alles 
doet“ (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 112). 
271
 “egoïsme, chauvinisme en nationalisme kunnen worden overwonnen en deze internationale 
rechtsgemeenschap, [...] moet de Consultatieve Raad vervangen worden door bovennationale, met 
gezag beklede organen“ (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 139). 
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the transnational scene – shared Prime Minister Drees’ scepticism of supranational 
institutions in general and the Pleven Plan in particular, believing it was a French 
means to ensure French continental dominance.
272
 His position, however, was chal-
lenged openly by VVD parliamentary group leaders Korthals – member of the Dutch 
Council for the European Movement – who had argued that “we should entrust mili-
tary matters to a European Minister of Defence under democratic European control.” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1988, 433). Although Korthals was not enthusiastic about the spe-
cifics of the EDC Treaty by 1953, the Soviet threat in his view did not give the Euro-
pean states sufficient time.
273
 What was required was „No small talk, we do not need 
a paper organization, but a real device, ready at day and night to defend our people, 
its right and freedoms”274 Discussions within the protestant ARP reveal a similar 
picture in which minor divisions pitted those engaged in the Dutch Council of the 
European Movement against skeptics denouncing federalist calls for the abolition of 
the nation-state.
275
 Those engaged in Europeanist organizations, such as Jelle Zijlstra 
and Bruins Slot took different positions, but interpreted the concept of a ‘federation’ 
in the same ways as Van Der Goeas van Naters, namely in line with the functionalist 
blueprints discussed predominantly in the ELEC and similarly opposed federalist 
‘utopias’ (Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 129).276 
Thus, differences within the Cabinet were sufficient so that Kohnstamm felt deliber-
ately excluded,  
“Then, between the end of the Schuman Plan and May 52, for a full year, I had a very 
disagreeable period, because I was on purpose kept out of the European army business. I 
was too European. Stikker had become Foreign Minister, and he was an Atlanticist. Add-
ed to that I must say I was not a good civil servant. I had very strong political views, and 
was in constant contact with people in Parliament, and so on. Quite rightly, they had a 
certain mistrust of what I was doing […] they said, "you'll get your salary, but there's 
nothing we want you to do" (laughs)” (Kohnstamm 1986). 
                                                 
272
 In his memoirs, Stikker wrote, “Ich konnte mich daher nicht zu dem Glauben an die Europäische 
Verteidigungsgemeinschaft durchringen, die das nächste Mittel Frankreichs war, um die Diskriminie-
rung Deutschlands aufrechtzuerhalten” (Stikker 1966, 364). 
273
 As he put it in a parliamentary debate in July 1953, “voor het te laat is, want wij hebben niet veel 
tijd meer! ” (Quoted in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 180). 
274
 Own translation from “Geen geklets hebben wij nodig, geen papieren organisaties, maar een reëel 
apparaat, dat dag en nacht klaar staat om ons volk, zijn recht en zijn vrijheden, te verdedigen” (Quoted 
in Van Heerikhuizen 1998, 180). 
275
 For example, the chairman of the ARP J. Schouten insisted in a parliamentary debate on the federal 
pact that “The division into nations and nation-states is god’s will.” (Heinen 1988, 357). 
276
 As Bruins Slot argued in 1949 in the debate over a federal pact, “A European federation would for 
the present mean the organization of European states in particular spheres, e.g. in economic and mili-
tary matters” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 419). 
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In sum, the range of open diversity of institutional demands was, compared to other 
European countries, relatively low in the Netherlands, a fact partially explained by 
Dutch domestic institutions discouraging open conflict over foreign policy issues and 
the relative weakness of full-blown federalist radicalism as was the case in Italy. By 
the same token, the skepticism of the Dutch government to the negotiations in Paris 
stands in contrast to a relatively smooth ratification of the European Army project 
(Harryvan 2009, 65). Among the parties present in the second chamber, only one of 
the 12 members of the ARP voted against the treaty, whereas the Christian Demo-
cratic KVP, the liberal VVD, and the Social Democrats voted en bloc for the treaty 
without a single abstention (Haas 2004 [1958], 157). To the degree that there were 
divisions, these were negotiated behind closed doors, as the subsequent pages will 
show. 
 
UK 
Within the UK, there were only minute and largely negligible conflicts within parties 
over the question of European institutions. More importantly, although public rheto-
ric suggests serious differences between the Tories and Labour over the issue, actual 
differences were small as well. Among the Conservative Party, a number of actors – 
such as Winston Churchill – had been instrumental in the foundation of the European 
Movement but largely adhered to the views espoused by the British Unionists that 
had caused the initial divide within the European Movement itself.
277
 Labour leader-
ship was largely absent from these initiatives. To be sure, there was a cross-party 
‘Europe Group’ initiated by more ‘radical’ representatives such as Mackay, Hale, 
and Shawcross (Labour) and Boothby, Roberts, MacDonald (Tory) (Lipgens and 
Loth 1990, 539). However, their minority status was evident already in 1948 during 
the preparation for the creation of the Council of Europe.
278
 The affiliates of this 
group were thus in the overwhelming minority within their own party. 
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 Thus, as its continental counterparts called for significant delegation and pooling of sovereignty, 
the British United Europe Committee stated in its inaugural session under Churchill’s chairmanship 
January 1947 that “Britain has special obligations and spiritual ties which link her with the other na-
tions of the British commonwealth. Nevertheless, Britain is a part of Europe and must be prepared to 
make her full contribution to European unity.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 669; 1990, 215). 
278
 In March 1948 the group sought to initiate a “motion on the creation of a federation of Europe”, the 
all-party group decided no vote should be sought in parliament, only a debate. (Lipgens and Loth 
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For Labour, the paramount conservative influence on the European Movement made 
Europe a ‘bourgeois’ undertaking that was to be opposed (Morgan 1984, 392; Ceadel 
1992,32; Judt 2005, 160). Most of the Labour deputies followed the party leadership 
by distrusting European institutions threatening to infringe upon parliamentary sov-
ereignty and their majority.
279
 Moreover, in the parliamentary Labour group and in 
parts of the Cabinet opposition there was considerable opposition to any form of re-
armament, leading to a split within Labour on the WEU Treaty (Dockrill 1991, 75). 
Contrary to the continental states, however, that split did not separate federalists 
from more intergovernmental actors, but principled opposition to German rearma-
ment (neutralists from the left-wing of the party) from the supporters of leading fig-
ure Bevin’s course of confrontation and following the US in the Cold War (Deighton 
1998). The most divisive issue was a British one. Having surprisingly won the first 
post war elections against Churchill with the promise of substantial increases in wel-
fare spending, the envisioned defence expenses increased called for by the US in the 
aftermath of the Korean War compromised the available expenses for health care in 
particular. Consequently, on April 22
nd
 1951 Aneurin Bevan – a popular figure of the 
left-wing of Labour and Minister of Health – resigned in a “party civil war” over the 
issue (Middlemas 1986, 187). Given the slim majority and the hostility of the ‘Bev-
anite’ group, Attlee decided to schedule elections by the end of 1951 (Morgan 1984, 
101). The opposition to German rearmament led, in 1954, to an alignment with the 
‘Europeanist faction’ of Mackay, Butler and Lang: fearing the establishment of a 
German national army, a pamphlet entitled “In Defence of Europe” called for a lim-
ited British troop commitment to the EDC to convince their French Socialist coun-
terparts to ratify the treaty and thus to prevent a German army (Deighton 1998, 185). 
                                                                                                                                          
1988, 699; 1990, 215). The motion sought “immediate and effective cooperation between the coun-
tries of Western Europe, and a long-term policy designed to bring into being a federation of Europe” 
First steps should have been a “Council of Western Europe consisting of representatives of the gov-
ernments of the sixteen participating countries in the European Recovery Plan” (Lipgens and Loth 
1988, 699; 1990, 215). The goal, “long-term policy should be to create a democratic federation of 
Europe, with a constitution based on the principles of common citizenship, political freedom, and 
representative government” expansive policy fields “external affairs, defence, currency, customs” 
(Lipgens and Loth 1988, 700; 1990, 215). At the debate in parliament, opened on May 4
th
 1948 , there 
was a motion supported by Mackay who sought at least a statement of principle from Labour Prime 
Minister Attlee (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 704; 1990, 215). The argument supporting the rejection ques-
tioned the definition of sovereignty and maintained that interstate cooperation was sufficient. “As a 
matter of fact, anyone entering into an alliance or a treaty does take away to an extend their absolute 
power to do as they will.” (Lipgens and Loth 1988, 705; 1990, 215). 
279
 Thus, Herbert Morrison’s alleged reaction to the Schuman Plan was, “It’s no good, we can’t do it, 
the Durham miners won’t wear it.” (See Killick 1997, 153). 
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The Conservative party had seemingly adopted a different line towards European 
institutions. The rhetoric utilized by Churchill in parliament as well as Strasbourg– 
who had called for a European Army at the Strasbourg Assembly including a ‘Euro-
pean Minister of Defense’ (Dockrill 1991, 23; Ceadel 1992, 328) – falsely suggested 
that the Tories pursued a different course. Churchill himself certainly never contem-
plated turning the Consultative of Assembly of the Council of Europe into a federal 
institution to be joined by the United Kingdom (Larres 2002, 147, 148).
280
 A recur-
ring notion was the model of the three global circles – the United States and the 
Western hemisphere, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and continental 
Europe – as guiding Tory thinking on the post war world (Kaiser 1996, 3). Churchill 
drew frequently on the concept (Jansen 1992, 173). 
There were some internal differences within the Tories: In particular, the leading 
representatives of the European Movement repeatedly questioned the all-too willing 
abandonment of the Council of Europe and the loss of British influence.
281
 The main 
difference was rather strategic however, as Eden and Churchill were generally dis-
posed to argue against any commitment towards continental Europe, placing NATO 
obligations on top of the agenda and sought to bind the United States in Europe 
(Larres 1996). Others, in particular MacMillan, were concerned to preserve British 
influence on the continent. These were not, however, significant differences over 
basic institutional preferences. Similarly, subsequent disputes within the British con-
servative government were, at their core, due to a disagreement between Eden and 
Churchill concerning the solution of the ‘German problem’: Churchill would contin-
uously advocate a four-power summit with the Soviet Union to explore the prospects 
of ‘neutralizing’ the former enemy between the two blocks, which Eden opposed 
(Young 1996, 28). 
In sum, there were serious conflicts within Social Democracy and minor differences 
within the Conservative Party. The conflict within Labour, however, had next to 
nothing to do with the transnational European conflict as its leading figures were as 
remote from the Europeanist organizations as most British Labour actors. Moreover, 
despite the rhetorical differences between Labour and the Tories, the substance of 
                                                 
280
 Churchill had already by 1930, stated that Britain should be “with Europe, but not of it” (Larres 
2002, 55). 
281
 Prominent Tory pro-Europeanists included Harold Macmillan, Maxwell Fyffe, Duncan Sandys, 
David Eccles as well as some backbenchers in Parliament such as Robert Boothby and Julian Amery 
(Massigli 1978, 267; Ceadel 1992, 323; Deighton 1998, 186). 
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these differences between the party leadership of the left and the right was relatively 
small as the absence of any significant change in the British position in 1951 amply 
demonstrated. For the Tories, as the subsequent pages will show, the differences 
were largely strategic as well, the dominant concerns being that the Alliance be pre-
served, the US commitment retained on the continent, UK commitments minimized 
as necessary, and UK influence over European institutions preserved. 
7.1.3 Summary 
To a certain degree, domestic conflict over international issues, both within and 
across parties, is to be expected and not a surprising aspect of state-preference for-
mation at all. What the preceding section has demonstrated, however, is that there is 
a tractable impact of the transnational conflict on the domestic divisions, both within 
and across parties, that is mediated by the domestic political conditions and institu-
tions. Geopolitical incentives certainly mattered. In every case, actors formulated 
their demands in the terms of the perceived ‘national interest that had to take objec-
tive material and geostrategic realities into account.’ However, by themselves, geo-
political considerations cannot account for the content of domestic demands nor the 
variation in domestic conflict. 
Thus, consistent with the basic properties of the transnational conflict, all Socialist 
parties in the European countries were marked by relatively high degrees of internal 
conflict whereas Christian Democratic parties, in particular in the larger continental 
countries were more inclined to demand the creation of supranational institutions 
with appropriate democratic institutions to create a European Army. The extent of 
the conflict varied and depended on national conditions. In Italy and France, it divid-
ed the French SFIO heavily and reinforced divisions between the two existent Italian 
Social Democratic Parties. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the 
party leadership seemed decisive: whereas the leadership in Germany and the Neth-
erlands was relatively remote from the Europeanist transnational networks, the lead-
ership in Belgium (Spaak) was part of its most active core. As a result, the German 
SPD enforced its core principles of objecting to the new European institutions and 
the pooling and delegation of sovereignty, the Dutch PvdA remained largely quiet 
over its internal divisions, and the leadership of the Belgian BSP-PSB, the party be-
ing divided as well, actively criticized the Belgian leadership of obstructing EDC 
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negotiations in 1951. Moreover, the relative lack of influence of federalist Labour 
actors – who were certainly present transnationally (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1) – 
indicates that impact is dependent not on transnational but on national embeddedness 
and support. 
At the same time, there are clearly identifiable differences that are seemingly related 
to geopolitical context. First, there is a recognizable difference between the larger 
and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for common fears of auton-
omy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified when analyzing the 
transnational conflict. Thus in the smaller European countries, radical federalist de-
mands are much less prevalent, whereas demands for further economic integration 
are largely as consensus matter, reflecting an agreement on the ‘national interests’. 
Second, in both Germany and Italy there is a tendency to view the supranational in-
stitutions as a means to gain recognition and influence, as result that will be estab-
lished in the subsequent section as well. At the same time, the causal and strategic 
beliefs underlying the demand differences and thus the transnational conflict clearly 
influences the link between material context and domestic demands as well. Thus, 
the Christian Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar objec-
tives as the Dutch multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the Social 
Democratic leadership under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the distri-
bution of capabilities and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the domi-
nant demands on the other hand, different to the direct relationship put forth by inter-
governmentalism (H1). Subjective assessments of threats where clearly related to 
institutional demands (H1). The effect, however, is dependent on the kind of causal 
stories individuals adhered to, in particular their stipulation of the intentions of other 
states. Geopolitical incentives and capabilities equally played a role as necessary 
factors (H2), but they do not sufficiently capture domestic conflict over institutional 
demands.  
Thus, domestic elites that were active in the transnational communities pursuing su-
pranational or federal models of post-war Europe tended to do so, with exceptions, 
with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic political conflict 
across all European countries and parties. Domestic elites that were remote from 
these communities tended to fall within basic intergovernmental expectations: con-
servative Italian and German elites tended to view the EDC favorably from an in-
strumental point of view as increasing their international influence, whereas others 
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favored classic Alliance solutions to the German problem that preserved national 
sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or denied the existential threat posed by the 
Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing efforts and associated institu-
tions (i.e. .some British, French and German Social Democrats). This picture is com-
plicated by the extent to which domestic institutions amplified or reduced the impact 
of the transnational conflict. Thus, in as much as French domestic conditions were 
insufficient to structure domestic conflict, the effective consociational context in the 
Netherlands silenced existing differences between the government and the Tweede 
Kammer. In sum, geopolitical factors are necessary but insufficient without consider-
ing institutional conditions and transnational influences. 
Thus, the degree of domestic conflict and differences over preferred institutional 
designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, 
was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the formation of state pref-
erences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on the quality of do-
mestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every country. In this 
sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described in chapter 2 can be 
seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic challenge for all European 
governments, there were still sufficient domestic differences over the concrete 
measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individuals across 
states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to warrant strategic 
coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over European institu-
tions. The next section will trace the impact of that conflict on the ‘bargaining behav-
ior’ of governments and thus the EDC bargain itself. 
7.2 Embeddedness, Changing Conflict Constellations and Strategic Choices:  
The Impact of the Transnational Conflict on the EDC Bargain 
Does the impact of the transnational conflict on domestic politics translate into the 
preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating states? Does considering 
that impact contribute to a better understanding of the EDC bargain? This section 
evaluates these questions. From an intergovernmental point of view, as recounted in 
chapters 3 and 4, the shifting conflict constellations were attributed to a domestically 
unstable French government, inefficient institutions and the learning process of the 
remaining governments involved in the bargain having to find a possible core in a 
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geopolitically unstable environment. From a transnational point of view, the infor-
mation presented so far would point to a different direction. Chapter 5 has singled 
out at least two governments – France and Italy – whose shifting embeddedness in 
the inter-organizational networks suggests a possible preference shifts. Second, the 
preceding chapter has demonstrated that the differences within the transnational net-
works contributed to the rise and fall of a tenuous and fragile transnational coalition 
that united actors with a clear-cut ideological preference for a supranational army. 
Mutual engagement and exchange of information within these circles repeatedly co-
incided with key shifts in the course of the bargain; its actors seemed to have either 
privileged access to negotiating governments or were in leading positions them-
selves. 
Recall that there were four basic conflict constellations that characterized the ‘nego-
tiation dance’ of the EDC bargain. First, from 1950 to 1951, there was a period of 
French isolation, as virtually all governments doubted the military effectiveness and 
sincerity of the French proposal. From mid-1951 up until and including the signing 
of the EDC Treaty in 1952, there was a confrontation between the larger (Italy, 
France, and Germany) and smaller (Belgium, Netherlands) continental states over a 
number of salient issues, in particular questions of institutional design, i.e. the envi-
sioned degree of pooling, delegation, and representation. Section 7.2.1 deals with 
that time period. After the treaty had been signed, government positions began to 
diverge over a number of issues related to the EDC Treaty itself, the issue of eco-
nomic integration as entailed in the EPC Treaty, and the conditions for the ratifica-
tion of the treaty, dealt with in section 7.2.2. As the French Assemblée Nationale 
rejected the EDC Treaty, the final period saw a convergence of bargaining positions 
resulting in a relatively quick signing and ratification of the treaty in 1954 (7.2.3). 
7.2.1 Negotiating the EDC Treaty, 1950 - 1952 
Seeking to explain why the EDC Treaty emerged as a viable option at the interna-
tional agenda and why it was signed in 1952 involves explaining the shifting conflict 
constellations between the negotiating countries between 1950 and 1952. I proceed 
in four steps. I begin tracing the emergence of the Pleven Plan and the isolation of 
French insistence on a supranational army. I then turn toward the changing positions 
of the US, Germany, France, and Italy. Third, I discuss the reaction of the Dutch and 
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Belgian governments and, in particular, the conditions under which the French gov-
ernment decided to sign the Treaty. Finally, I explain why the governments of the 
Six chose a radical procedure – the drawing up of a quasi-federalist European Politi-
cal Community to augment the EDC Treaty. I demonstrate that while geopolitical 
incentives and power considerations mattered, this dynamic cannot be explained suf-
ficiently without considering the effect of key actors close to the transnational coali-
tion, both within transnational and transgovernmental networks. 
 
German Rearmament: Supranational or Intergovernmental?  
No state within the Western Alliance would have pressed for, or agreed to, German 
rearmament without the outbreak of the Korean War. To be sure, that the issue would 
appear sooner or later was clear to any observer.
282
 Rhetorical calls for the creation 
of a ‘European Army’ with vague institutional implications as well as internal plans 
for German rearmament were ubiquitous before the Korean War, but never put into 
action: the French Foreign Minister of Georges Bidault made such suggestions in 
1948; the federalists had repeatedly called for it in the late 1940’s, the British Chiefs 
of Staff had, in early June 1950, already contemplated the need for German rearma-
ment in an internal memo (Larres 2002, 146).
283
 Adenauer had proposed a German 
contribution to a European Army in an interview with an American Newspaper in 
1949.
284
 Sforza had put forward a suggestion to create a European Army and a Euro-
pean fond for weapons procurement in May 1950 (Magagnoli 1999, 37). But the tim-
ing of the concrete initiative for German rearmament is clearly related to the out-
break of the Korean War created. In this sense, the basic intergovernmentalist rea-
soning for demands based on threat levels is correct: if the North Korean regime was 
ready to risk a confrontation with the American hegemon on the Korean peninsula, 
there were little guarantees that the Soviet Union would refrain from capitalizing on 
                                                 
282
 An editorial article in Le Monde from April 6
th
 1949 said, “Qu’on en convienne ou non, le rearma-
ment de l’Allemagne est contenue dans la pacte de l’Atlantique comme le germe dans l’œuf.” (quoted 
in Grosser 1961, 229) 
283
 George Bidault suggested to politically integrate Germany in the West and bind economic re-
sources through the creation, within NATO, of a “civilian general staff for total diplomacy and coor-
dinating political, economic, and military policies” (FRUS 1950 III, 54). 
284
 Adenauer said that Germany “soll zur Verteidigung Europas einen Beitrag in einer europäischen 
Armee unter dem Kommando eines übergeordneten europäischen Befehlshabers leisten“ and that 
“eigene deutsche Streitkräfte würden nicht mehr als eine Abteilung unter einem europäischen Kom-
mando bilden“ (Adenauer 1949). 
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its existent conventional superiority on the continent. These fears induced immediate 
calls for US troops by France, the UK, Germany, and Italy as a large swath of Allied 
troops from the war had been demobilized. Moreover, the call for supranational insti-
tutions was obviously linked to a need for security from Germany: the talks culmi-
nating in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 do not reveal that the creation of supranational 
institutions was even contemplated (De Vos, et al. 1998, 237-242). Thus, geopolitical 
incentives (H1) clearly capture the necessary conditions for the serious consideration 
of a creation of a European Army. 
However, even the initial US proposal to rearm Germany on a national basis had an 
internal competitor. Reviewing the situation in Europe, the Pentagon had concluded 
that Western Europe had to be ‘defended at the Rhine’ (FRUS 1950 IV, 353-356). 
Pentagon planners and a few prominent Congressmen were a thus in favour of Ger-
man rearmament to share the burden of increased defence expenditures entailed in 
remobilizing American troops (Large 1996, 36, 41`). The contents of the intergov-
ernmental package deal emanated from the Pentagon and included restrictions on 
German autonomy with regard to mobilizing capabilities, operational controls and 
integration into Western military planning as well restrictions on arms production, 
such as heavy weapons, including tanks. German divisions would be integrated into a 
common operational structure so as to prevent German military autonomy and a 
German General Staff. 
However, McCloy – the US High Commissioner in Germany and affiliate of the 
ACEU – internally opposed these plans and argued that the only effective defense 
would consist in the creation of a ‘genuine European army’.285 Thus, lower level of-
ficials in the State Department devised the ‘Byorade Plan’ that called for an integrat-
                                                 
285
 McCloy thought that “to defend Western Europe effectively will obviously require real contribu-
tions of German resources and men. I am absolutely opposed to re-creating any German national army 
now or in the foreseeable future. In my opinion, to do so would be a tragic mistake. […]. Also I think 
it is an illusion to suppose that the Germans have a burning desire to create a national army or that 
they would enlist or could be conscripted into such an army in substantial numbers. Indeed I am con-
vinced they are opposed to such a step. […] If France were forced to accept such rearmament, she 
might contribute much less herself to effective defense. […]There is now a real chance to solve this 
difficulty by creating a genuine European army. If done quickly, this offers the best chance to convert 
our present weakness into real strength. The French appear eager for some such action giving them the 
hope of effective defense without the risk off a German national army. Moreover the German Cabinet 
and public opinion is believed to strongly favor such a course. […] Such a course would evoke much 
more enthusiastic support and energetic action from the Europeans than reliance on national armies 
and thereby reduce the time necessary for results.” The United States High Commissioner for Germa-
ny (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, August 3
rd
, 1950 (FRUS 1950 III, 180-182). 
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ed and “really effective European Defense Force” involving “the voluntary surrender 
of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sovereignty, i.e. the 
security field”.286 The plan met heavy resistance from the Pentagon fearing delay and 
military impracticability. The State Department did not press the matter further but 
accepted the Pentagon proposal on Truman’s decision who feared that the mobiliza-
tion of Allied capabilities would be seriously delayed (Acheson 1969, 438; Dockrill 
1991, 33). Acheson – contrary to his memoirs – dismissed the Byorade plan as im-
practical and emphasized British participation in the rearmament effort which would 
only become possible through ‘traditional’ alliance politics (Trachtenberg and Gehrz 
2003).  
The reactions by European governments to the US package deal, as described earlier, 
were not overtly enthusiastic but the quid pro quo it offered – German rearmament 
and increased European defense expenditures in exchange for a significantly in-
creased US presence on the continent and US led Western command – were accept-
ed.
287
 The French government was largely isolated and pressed for time: when the 
issue was discussed among the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council in 
October 1950 in New York, Acheson singled out the French government to advance 
a concrete proposal for German rearmament by month’s end (FRUS 1950 III, 426-
431). 
This ultimatum sparked the first of many crises in French domestic politics over the 
issue of German rearmament and its concrete realization. Internally, the Quai 
                                                 
286
 The plan stated “The advent of the Schuman Plan for coal and steel and the general deterioration of 
the world situation has caused a rapid increase in the feeling to unite Europe in all fields possible, 
including the military. This situation can be further strengthened by evidence of a United States will-
ingness to accept the responsibility inherent in full participation in the European defense effort. If such 
participation is forthcoming, it is believed conditions may now be favorable in Europe for creating a 
really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany in 
the common defense of Western Europe in a manner acceptable to all concerned. This involves in 
practice the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sover-
eignty, i.e., the security field. Such would follow from the establishment of an international Com-
mander with real authority as the European Nations would, in such an arrangement, accept the fact 
that their own, units would be utilized for the common defense of Western Europe as contrasted to the 
protection of individual boundaries. If properly handled a partial surrender of sovereignty in the mili-
tary field could become a driving force toward further unification in Western Europe.” The Deputy 
Under, Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military 
Affairs and Military Assistance (Burns) (FRUS 1950 III, 211). 
287
 Bevin’s report to the Cabinet on October 6th 1950 argued that it was ‘necessary’ to accept the 
proposal in order to solidify the capabilities of the Western Alliance (DBPO II: III, 134). The Italian 
Foreign Minister Sforza feared a disintegrating alliance and thought that the package deal was the 
only viable way to ‘create Europe’ (Magagnoli 1999, 44). 
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d’Orsay had considered German rearmament by proposing that small German units 
(battalions) should be integrated into the national divisions of NATO members with-
out mentioning supranational institutions.
288
 Moreover, the issue came at a time 
when the negotiations on the ECSC were in the closing stages and a successful reso-
lution was not yet a foregone conclusion. A large portion of the French deputies ve-
hemently argued against the specter of a resurgent ‘Wehrmacht’. In this situation – 
on September 3
rd
 1950 – Monnet wrote the first note to Pleven advocating a suprana-
tional solution, following the same logic as the Byorade Plan advocated by McCloy 
earlier, by proposing a “plan Schuman développé” that could prevent the creation of 
a national German army (Duchêne 1994, 227, 228).
 289 
The similarity was not acci-
dental: Monnet had exchanges with McCloy and the US ambassador in Paris – David 
Bruce – who were observing the ECSC negotiations in Paris at the time (Duchêne 
1994, 229). This reasoning was entirely in line with Schuman: in his mind, by creat-
ing a national German army, ‘mistrust and suspicions would be reborn’ and thus de-
stroy the movements towards European reconciliation.
290
 Taking up Monnet’s sug-
gestions, Pleven sought a domestic compromise between the plans in the Quai 
d’Orsay and a “plan Schuman développé”, proposing a supranational institution – a 
European Ministry of Defense – and adopting the restrictions of German rearmament 
proposed by the Quai d’Orsay (Bossuat 1996b, 192). This, however, would be so 
obviously ineffective that it was even opposed by the French military (Bossuat 
                                                 
288
 The Quai d’Orsay issued an internal memo on August 10th 1950. The Central Europe Office of the 
Foreign Ministry suggested that France “could insist that more American troops be deployed in Eu-
rope, that NATO members receive top priority in the rearmament process, that the German forces be 
limited to two-thirds of all French forces stationed in Europe and be placed in the smallest possible 
units, and that no German general staff or national army be established” (quoted in Hitchcock 1998, 
137). These regulative dimensions reflect the considerations to prevent the resurgence of an autono-
mous German army. But there is no mentioning whatsoever of a supranational arrangement to achieve 
these goals 
289 “Je vous propose d’apporter à nos associés la contribution d’une pensée forte, constructive, déter-
minée à créer en même temps notre défense extérieure en Europe, notre développement social inté-
rieur, la paix en Orient, la constitution organisée de notre monde libre, atlantique, sous les formes 
diversifies qui correspondent aux trois mondes qui le composent: les États-Unis, l’Empire britannique, 
l’Europe continentale de l’Ouest, fédérée autour d’un plan Schuman développé. Un état de paix ainsi 
crée devrait nous permettre en quelques années, de développer et de consolider nos forces et nos res-
sources […].” (Bossuat 1992, 311). Note that the proposal is framed in terms of ‘national interest’, 
‘interpreted’ as requiring a supranational proposal. In a second note to Schuman on September 9th 
1950, while the latter was at the New York conference rejecting any agreement on German rearma-
ment on principle, Monnet proposed that Germany should participate in a West European ‘federal’ 
security organization for rearmament (Bossuat 1996b, 188).  
290
 “[…] ferait renaitre méfiance et suspicions […]” (quoted in Poidevin 1986, 314). 
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1996b, 189, 190; Creswell 2006, 30).
291
 Given the divisions in the French Cabinet – 
and particular the paramount resistance to German national rearmament by Minister 
of Defense Jules Moch from the SFIO, the military effectiveness of German troops 
was not the chief concern (Massigli 1978, 252; Elgey 1993b, 271). Thus, the Pleven 
Plan, as it was proposed, was a French political creature to prevent a German army. 
The resolution of the Assemblée Nationale that approved the Pleven Plan – stated this 
unequivocally.
292
 Schuman defended the proposal against critics: admitting that the 
plan was premature, there was no other choice for European states to ‘rid themselves 
of part of their autonomy for the sake of a collective authority’.293 
In short, the key difference between the two plans for German rearmament proposed 
by France and the US was a relative disregard for military efficiency on the French 
side: the US government followed the recommendations of its generals, the French 
government, amid rampant fears of a resurgent Wehrmacht, did not. Predictably, the 
reaction to the official proposal was overwhelmingly negative. Omar Bradley, head 
of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, pondered whether it would be possible to reject the 
plan outright (FRUS 1950 III, 410-414, 457). In the UK and the Benelux, the reac-
tions were similar (Coolsaet 2002, 104; DBPO II: I, 298, 304, 346). The British 
Prime Minister Bevin contemplated ways to get the Pleven Plan off the international 
agenda out of fear the development would weaken transatlantic ties.
294
 The Italian 
Minister of Defense Pacciardi (no transnational affiliation) was extremely skeptical 
deeming the plan entirely unrealistic, and dilettantish as did the Foreign Minister 
Sforza (Magagnoli 1999, 48). However, the reason for that assessment was that the 
Plan did not seem well thought through: the envisioned structure, it was feared, 
                                                 
291
 Specifically, battalion sized German units would be integrated in divisions, divisions being the 
lowest possible union size capable of autonomous operation. The result would have been that every 
division in the European Army – nationally homogeneous – would have its own one or two German 
battalions. This would obviously create serious problems of communication and coordination, national 
resentment notwithstanding. In other words, this is clearly a way to purposefully create 'transaction 
costs' (Elgey 1993b, 573). 
292
 ‘Ordre de Jour’ of the vote, “L’Assemblée Nationale approuvant la déclaration du gouvernement et 
notamment sa volonté de ne pas permettre que soient recrées une armée et un état-major allemands, 
repoussant toute addition, passe à l’ordre du jour.” (Quoted in L’Année Politique 1950  1950, 224). 
293
 Schuman maintained that the plan “n’est ni une manœuvre dilatoire ni un subterfuge embarrassé 
[…] Nous aurions désiré développer d’abord les soubassements économiques et politiques d’avant 
d’aborder la construction de l’édifice militaire [...].” He maintained that the time had come for the 
European states to “se dessaisir d’une parcelle de leur autonomie au profit d’une autorité collective.” 
(Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 316). 
294
 “We cannot afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus 
weakening instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. We 
must nip it in the bud.” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117). 
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would turn the European commissioner into a ‘dictator’ of sorts and thus required a 
‘European political organization’.295 
The resistance from the Allies to the Pleven Plan was in vein: during the first discus-
sions of the Plan, Jules Moch made it very clear that he was not inclined toward 
compromise.
 296
 US Secretary of State Acheson in turn threatened to withhold any 
additional troops for Europe if negotiations on German rearmament did not proceed 
(FRUS 1950 III, 426-431, 429, 430).
 297 
Out of options, the subsequent compromise – 
the co-called Spofford compromise – did little to improve the deadlock but allowed 
at least the continuation of talks (Fursdon 1980, 112, 115). Negotiations would be 
conducted along two tracks. At the Petersberg, the Allied High Commissioners 
would bargain with Germany on the terms of regaining sovereignty and its military 
integration in the West. In Paris, France would invite all ‘interested parties’ to nego-
tiate the Pleven Plan. The only reason that even this compromise made it through the 
French cabinet was that the US would immediately move four divisions to Western 
Europe, as well as the agreement that no final decision on German sovereignty would 
be would be reached without French assent (Elgey 1993b, 281; Hitchcock 1998, 
157). After intense threats to withhold US troop commitments (FRUS 1950 III, 426-
431, 429, 430), the French decision to allow independent negotiations on German 
rearmament on the Petersberg came by way of a dramatic debate amid complaints of 
US pressure (Loth 1977, 288). 
Part of the reason or the compromise was that French agreement to German rearma-
ment was geopolitically essential.
298
 Thus, the need for continued negotiations. A 
                                                 
295
 The conclusion was that “die Bildung europäischer Streitkräfte das Resultat einer europäischen 
politischen Organisation sein müßte, weshalb sich Italien nicht mit dem Konzept einer europäischen 
Armee identifizieren kann, wie sie von Frankreich zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt gewünscht wird.” 
(Magagnoli 1999, 58). 
296
 During the negotiations, Moch had placed his wife instead of the members of the French delegation 
behind him. She was dressed in black to remind everybody of the losses of the Moch family to the 
Gestapo, and she gave him advice rather than members of the French delegation (FRUS 1950 III, 426-
431).  
297
Secretary of State (Acheson) to Embassy in France, November 3
rd 
1950, “If Moch’s position accu-
rately reflects attitude Fr Govt, it seems clear that there is little hope agreeing on any mil sound plan 
for defense Western Eur including Western Ger since other Eurs themselves think plan polit and mil 
unsound quite aside from Ger aspect of problem. It therefore seems imperative you put problem 
squarely before Pleven and Schuman in order ascertain how Fr Govt intend proceed, and ascertain 
whether Moch’s quasi-dictatorial intransigence accurately reflects Fr Govt’s true attitude and posi-
tion.” (FRUS 1950 III, 426-428) 
298
 “Militärisch könnte man etwas frech formulieren: man konnte Mitteleuropa verteidigen ohne einen 
französischen Soldaten, aber nicht ohne das französische Territorium, weil man die Tiefe dieses Lan-
des braucht.“ (De Maizière 1990, 38). 
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second reason was the ambiguous reaction by the German government despite the 
fact that the Pleven Plan contained openly discriminatory features vis a vis Germany.  
From the German point of view, the Pleven Plan explicitly entailed discriminatory 
features that left German units as potential ‘cannon fodder’ and second class soldiers 
and thus violated the demand for equal treatment that the Himmenroder Denkschrift 
had called for and that would be a corner stone of the German position 
(Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 5). More importantly, the negotiations at the Pe-
tersberg were clearly more salient, as they entailed the provisions of the eventual 
‘Deutschlandvertrag’ that would return formal sovereignty to Germany and end the 
occupation. Thus, Adenauer opened these negotiations himself and staffed the Ger-
man delegation with the nucleus of the Defense Ministry ‘in spe’, such as Blank, 
Speidel, and von Kielmansegg (Large 1996, 118). 
However, both Adenauer’s public reaction as well as Brentano’s in the Bundestag 
session after the Pleven Plan was announced reflect the expressed desire to avoid 
setting up a national German army despite the fact that the US ‘package deal’ en-
tailed that option.
299
 A key role consisted in the coordinating role that McCloy 
played: on October 28
th
 1950, McCloy telephoned Monnet, Schuman, and Pleven the 
conclusion of which was that the Pleven Plan sought no delay, that it guaranteed the 
prevention of a German national army and a General Staff, that it would be based on 
equality of rights, entail no discrimination, and that national armies should be left 
only in those countries that had ‘commitments overseas’.300 Thus, the principal 
tasked given to the German delegation was to gain time, but to negotiate ‘positively’ 
(Schwengler 1997, 393).
301
 The strong criticism that Adenauer’s course attracted 
                                                 
299
 “Wir wollen nicht remilitarisieren, wir wollen keine deutsche nationale Armee als Mittel zur 
Durchsetzung machtpolitischer Ziele. Wir wollen einen Beitrag zu einer europäischen Armee im Zuge 
der Integration Europas leisten. Wir wollen bereit sein, uns innerhalb einer solchen europäischen Ge-
meinschaft den gleichen Aufgaben, den gleichen Verpflichtungen zu unterziehen wie die anderen, und 
wir wollen hierzu bereit sein nicht im Sinne und im Wege der Remilitarisierung, wohl aber im Sinne 
des Anrufs an das deutsche Volk, sich seine Freiheit zu erhalten und in eine solchen gemeinsamen 
Armee mitzuarbeiten.” (von Brentano 1950). 
300
 In his diary, Blankenhorn reports McCloy paraphrasing Schumacher thus, “Das Entscheidende sei, 
daß Garantien gegen die Errichtung einer nationalen deutschen Armee geschaffen würden. […] Es sei 
aber selbstverständlich, daß eine deutsche Beteiligung an der Verteidigung Westeuropas […] auf der 
Basis der Gleichberechtigung ohne jegliche Diskriminierung erfolge.“ (quoted in Blankenhorn 1980, 
116). 
301
 Instructions were, “Die deutsche Delegation sollte im Sinne einer positiven Einstellung zum Ge-
danken einer europäischen Armee verhandeln, aber Zeit gewinnen, ohne sich festzulegen“ (131. Ka-
binettssitzung am 23. Februar 1951)  
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both in parts of the military circles as well as among the opposition led to intense 
secrecy around the negotiations.
302
 The German government kept its options open. 
The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands made their preference for an inter-
governmental solution known. Stikker proposed integrating all troops stationed in 
Germany under the NATO Command, responsible to the North Atlantic Council 
(Van der Harst 1990, 143) Van Zeeland proposed a plan that resembled the solution 
put forth by the Quai d’Orsay, suggesting that national armies be conserved and 
German units integrated into NATO divisions (see FRUS 1951 III, 762 and FRUS 
1950 III; Coolsaet 2002, 112). Both plans went nowhere. The Dutch government 
decided merely to ‘observe’ the negotiations in Paris, as Drees and Stikker did not 
think the plan would ever materialize (Harryvan and van der Harst 2000, 173). 
The Italian and Belgian governments decided to participate, but, in a similar fashion 
as the German delegation, were skeptical. The Italian Minister of Defense Paccardi 
intended merely to wait until the unavoidable failure of the conference.
303
 In sum, 
when the negotiations on the EDC opened in Paris, they did not begin with high 
hopes for an agreement. Robert Schuman, in his opening remarks of the Paris confer-
ence, admitted that the Pleven Plan seemed to generate much less enthusiasm than 
the Schuman Plan: mentioning the pervasive criticism that the proposal started with 
integration in the realm of defense before a political structure had been set up, he 
maintained that the proposal was to prevent Europe from returning to a ‘fragmenta-
tion that had become anachronistic and absurd.’ Europe had to move beyond an ‘out-
dated nationalism’.304 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1951k/kap1_2/kap2_17/para3_17.html?highlight
=true&search=Pleven&stemming=true&field=all#highlightedTerm >. 
302
 The early exchanges between Adenauer and McCloy at the Petersberg were kept secret and even 
withheld from cabinet meetings. Documents from the EDC negotiations in Paris were kept secret in a 
safe in Blankenhorn’s office and could be consulted only upon request. (104. Kabinettssitzung am 
Dienstag, den 17. Oktober 1950)  
< http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1950k/kap1_3/para2_2.html >. 
303
 Pacciardi to De Gasperi on February 2
nd
 1951, “Der richtige Weg, um zu einem politisch geeinten 
Europa zu gelangen, ist meines Erachtens nicht derjenige einer mehr oder weniger symbolischen Eu-
ropa-Armee, […] Viele Fragen könnten gelöst werden, wenn […] man nicht von einem europäischen 
Verteidigungsminister spräche.” (quoted in Magagnoli 1999, 54). And Quaroni in January 1951 “Las-
sen wir sie [The EDC negotiations, BF] von den Amerikanern torpedieren oder von den Deutschen 
oder von den Franzosen selbst; aber wir sollten keine pointierten Standpunkte einnehmen, auch wenn 
wir im Grunde wollen, dass diese Konferenz mißlingt.” (quoted in Magagnoli 1999, 53). 
304
 In his opening speech at the EDC conference, Schuman pronounced, “Cette fois ci, il n'en est pas 
autrement, et je crois même démêler dans l'accueil qui nous a été fait, un peu moins d'enthousiasme et 
plus de scepticisme […]. Allons-nous contrarier cet effort qui a été trop longtemps retardé, compliquer 
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Yet, the timing of the first steps of both the Petersberg negotiations and the negotia-
tions in Paris suggests that the negotiations were based on an uneasy compromise: in 
both cases, ‘Interim Reports’ were scheduled to be compiled in June 1951, around 
the same time that elections for the Assemblée Nationale were expected (Leffler 
1992, 413). There was little hope that any substantial result could be obtained before 
that date. 
 
Summary 
In sum, changing geopolitical circumstances were necessary conditions for the Allies 
to consider German rearmament, specifically at the time they did. Moreover, the fact 
that supranational institutions were considered as a solution equally follows the logic 
of ‘cobinding’ entailed in the intergovernmental view. It is notable, however, that 
such proposals emanated from a clearly identifiable source, namely Monnet and 
Schuman in France and the US officials McCloy and Bruce, individuals that had 
been linked to the transnational coalition and a  distinct, shared institutional prefer-
ence. 
To be sure, similar and even more radical federalist proposals circulated in the trans-
national sphere. Their lack of influence in 1950 is, however, equally attributable to a 
belief in the lack of an actual possibility that such a radical new undertaking could 
yield effective and efficient deterrence on the continent. Thus, the US administration, 
following the Pentagon subscribed to that view, the Benelux did, even the French 
military thought so, and the Italian and German governments, although more cau-
tious in their skepticism voiced for the Plan, did so as well. In short, a key concern 
was the efficiency and effectiveness of the Pleven Plan. As second concern was that 
the proposal was advanced by the French government merely to gain time. As shown 
above, this concern was valid: the Pleven Plan rested on an uneasy compromise be-
                                                                                                                                          
une entreprise si vaste et si difficile en elle-même? [...P]eut on concevoir et mettre en œuvre une ar-
mée européenne avant que l'Europe soit constituée, au moins dans ses éléments essentiels? Comment, 
en d'autres ternes, organiser une armée et l'entretenir avant qu'il y ait une autorité politique euro-
péenne, un Gouvernement et un Parlement européens ou les deux réunis? […]Nous croyons qu'en tout 
état de cause, quelles que soient les solutions intercontinentales ou mondiales adoptées par ailleurs, il 
y a une Europe à organiser, une Europe à faire sortir d'un morcellement devenu anachronique et ab-
surde, une Europe qui doit dépasser le stade des nationalismes surannés. Cette vérité, nous l'avons 
reconnue et nous la proclamons dans le domaine de l'économique et du politique; elle vaut aussi pour 
l'organisation de la défense, lorsqu'on recherche une structure militaire permanente.” (Schuman 
1951b). 
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tween principled opponents of German rearmament, such as Jules Moch, lower level 
officials in the Quai d’Orsay who proposed intergovernmental solutions that held 
German forces to a level inferior to those of France, and individuals, such as Schu-
man and Monnet that sought to assuage fear of a resurgent German army by propos-
ing a supranational solution. The severity of the French domestic conflict yielded a 
compromise to keep negotiating, without prejudging the result. Few outside of 
France expected the conference in Paris to succeed.  
 
“[…] to have a European army, 
is to renounce a national army” 
Robert Schuman
305
  
 
Paving the Way for a European Army 
In early 1951, there were two options still on the table: a NATO solution, seemingly 
preferred by virtually every country in the Western Alliance and an EDC solution 
advocated by the French government. At the same time, signals from the German and 
Italian delegation suggested openness in principle to the supranational solution, but 
skepticism as to its feasibility prevailed. By the end of 1951, the lines of conflict had 
shifted, however. The EDC was the only ‘game in town’ and conflicts between 
France, Germany, and Italy on the one hand and Belgium and the Netherlands on the 
other hand almost brought the negotiations to a standstill. 
In Germany, already the first secret conceptual preparations for rearmament, starting 
in 1948, assumed an eventual German contribution to a European force but did not 
specify concrete institutional configurations. Such preparations were conducted in 
conservative circles in Germany – with Adenauers’ allowance – and partially driven 
by military figures such as Speidel to emphasize the linkage between the Soviet 
threat in Europe and the need for German rearmament.
306
 These considerations over-
lapped with the later plans in the secret Himmenroder Denkschrift, emphasizing that 
the primary goal was equal recognition, both politically and militarily, but did not 
formulate an explicit institutional design, in particular not along supranational lines 
                                                 
305
 Own translation from “[…] avoir une arme européenne, c’est renoncer à l’armée nationale” 
(Quoted in Poidevin 1986, 321). 
306
 The first notable such plans were made in the so-called Laupheimer circle by Hans Speidel: Ullrich 
Steiner, Max von Fürstenberg, Hans-Christoph und Friedrich Schenk von Stauffenberg, Paul Binder, 
Hans Speidel, Johann Kindt-Kiefer (NEI, Geneva Circle) (Häußler 1999, 194, 196). 
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(Himmenroder Denkschrift 1950, 5). The assumption was that Germany would mo-
bilize its own troops. Thus, the military circles did not call for a supranational or fed-
erated army. Nor had Adenauer publicly specified what he meant by a ‘European 
army’ when he proposed in 1949 that German forces should participate in it (Large 
1996, 48, 49).
307
 At the same time, Adenauer and his associates such as Blankenhorn 
and Brentano – for example in the Geneva Circle – had insisted that they did not 
want a national army, but made it clear that they sought recognition as equal part-
ners. The Pleven Plan itself was at odds with these conditions: equality meant equal 
abrogation of sovereignty in military matters for all participants. A supranational 
army based on equality mutatis mutandis implied that France and the remaining part-
ners would do so as well. It was only after the Pleven Plan was substantially altered, 
only after a supranational solution had become feasible, that the German government 
turned into a principled, even stubborn promoter of the idea. This stubbornness lasted 
well into 1954: in a recorded conversation between Adenauer and Spaak during the 
London conference – after the EDC had already been rejected in the French Assem-
blée Nationale – Adenauer told Spaak, 
“I am truly convinced, one hundred percent indeed, that a German national army which 
Mendès France forces upon us will greatly endanger Germany and Europe – when I 
should not be any longer, I do not know what will become of Germany, if we are not able 
to bring Europe into being before that.”308 
The idea of co-binding and self-binding, repeated by Blankenhorn several times in 
the Geneva Circle – applied to both German as well as French ‘nationalists’, espe-
cially out of a geopolitical fear of a rapprochement with the Soviets (Schwarz 1995, 
480).
309
 But in early 1951, the instructions for the German delegation reflected the 
                                                 
307
 Adenauer said that Germany “soll zur Verteidigung Europas einen Beitrag in einer europäischen 
Armee unter dem Kommando eines übergeordneten europäischen Befehlshabers leisten” and that 
“Eigene deutsche Streitkräfte würden nicht mehr als eine Abteilung unter einem europäischen Kom-
mando bilden” (Adenauer 1949). 
308
 Own translation from “Ich bin fest davon überzeugt, hundertprozentig davon überzeugt, daß die 
deutsche Nationalarmee, zu der uns Mendès France zwingt, eine große Gefahr für Deutschland und 
Europa werden wird – wenn ich einmal nicht mehr da bin, weiß ich nicht, was aus Deutschland wer-
den soll, wenn es uns nicht doch noch gelingen sollte, Europa rechtzeitig zu schaffen”, quoted in 
(Loth 2004, 47). This quote was part of a conversation overheard, unbeknown to Adenauer, by Spiegel 
Journalist Lothar Rühl (Der Spiegel 1954b, 5; Loth 2004, 47). 
309
 “Verlassen Sie sich nicht darauf, Herr Bech. Es ist ein großer Irrtum, auf Frankreich zu zählen, 
wenn das Spiel der europäischen Nationalstaaten wieder beginnt. Die französischen Nationalisten sind 
ebenso wie die deutschen bereit, allen bösen Erfahrungen zum Trotz die alte Politik zu wiederholen. 
Denen ist Deutschland mit einer Nationalarmee lieber als Europa, wenn sie nur ihre eigene Politik mit 
den Russen machen können. Und die deutschen Nationalisten denken genau so; sie sind bereit, mit 
den Russen zu gehen” (Der Spiegel 1954b, 5). 
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fact that the Pleven Plan sought an interim period, in which Germany would not be 
an equal partner. As the French delegation showed no signs of a willingness to com-
promise, even in principle, on the issue of equality and troop sizes, the delay tactic 
initially worked, at least until the publication of the first summary reports on the state 
of the negotiations in Paris and the Petersberg on June 6
th
 and 7
th
 respectively. The 
ECSC Treaty had been signed in April 1951. The French elections on June 10
th
 1951 
brought 97 Communists and a surge of 120 Gaullists in the Assemblée Nationale and 
weakened the parties of the Third Force significantly (Williams 1964, 494). 
As two options were still on the table, the accompanying events and transnational 
activities steered the negotiations over the terms of German rearmament decisively in 
one direction, paving the way for a compromise. The Interim reports had agreed on a 
basic outline of the institutions that were to be created by copying the basic designs 
of the ECSC Treaty. Beyond that, the Interim reports contained no advance on ques-
tions of troop sizes, troop mobilization, and, in particular, the time frame for the 
complete equal treatment of German and Allied troops under the statute (Fursdon 
1980, 112, 115). The conditions for agreement, inter alia, voiced openly in the Ge-
neva Circle and other public outlets were quite clear: for Germany, equal treatment, 
for the US, military effectiveness and thus a change in the size of nationally homog-
enous troop sizes. 
The first reaction by US Secretary of State Acheson to the Interim Reports steered in 
the direction of a NATO solution combined with increased pressure on France to 
accept German troops (FRUS 1951 III-b, 801-803; Schwartz 1991, 223; Large 1996, 
125). The US Ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, and US High Representative in 
Germany McCloy saw the issue differently. In a series of telegrams sent back and 
forth between the Department of State and the French embassy US ambassador 
Bruce charged Acheson to adopt the European Army solution – Bruce argued that 
France would accept all major concessions necessary for the US and the other Allies 
(Large 1996, 124, 125).
310
 In getting the French government to agree to these condi-
                                                 
310
They include: Acheson to Bruce, June 28 1951 and Acheson memorandum July 6, 1951 (FRUS 
1951 III, 802, 804, 816) Bruce to Acheson, July 3, 1951 and Spofford to Acheson, July 8, 1951 (all 
ibid., pp. 803-804, 806, 814, 818, 822) Also see conversation between Hallstein and Bruce on Al-
phand and French tactics in June 1951 in which Bruce indicates that ‘he convinced’ Alphand (AAPD 
1951, 340, 341). Note that Bruce and McCloy were associated with the pro-European unity Ford 
foundation whereas Spofford was among the Board of the American Committee on United Europe 
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tions, however, he had the same problem as Schuman had: the tenuous French do-
mestic agreement on the Pleven Plan rested on conditions that made its international 
acceptance impossible. Most importantly, the most vocal opponents to German re-
armament from the SFIO, such as Jules Moch, had only agreed to delay the decision. 
Similar maneuvering paved the way. In June 1951, when there was no acting French 
government in the aftermath of the elections, the head of the French delegation, Her-
vé Alphand – subsequently affiliated with the transnational coalition described in the 
previous chapter – was tasked by Schuman to indicate to the American ambassadors 
and to Monnet that he would compile a report for the next government which would 
contain the necessary compromises to make successful negotiations possible 
(Poidevin 1986, 320). Alphand shared the same views as Monnet had used: the EDC 
would “increase [French] security and power in Europe”.311 
On August 8
th
, a new French government was invested. George Bidault of the MRP 
(NEI and Geneva Circle) replaced Moch as Minister of Defence and the overall posi-
tion of the government slightly in a pro EDC direction (Massigli 1978, 280). On Au-
gust 14
th
 1951, Alphand filed the ‘Alphand report’ containing the essential compro-
mises, such as an acceptance of division sizes and the principle of institutional equal-
ity between France and Germany (FRUS 1951 III-b; Parsons 2003, 73; Creswell 
2006, 63).
 
Alphand and Schuman acknowledged the Alphand report as basis for fur-
ther negotiations for the EDC in Paris on August 23
rd
 1951, partially side-stepping 
the French generals as well as the Conseil de Ministres who, apparently, did not see 
the complete report, in particular not the acknowledgment of French-German equali-
ty (Massigli 1978, 287; Parsons 2003, 73). The Cabinet, however, did insist that no 
single German soldier should bear arms until the EDC was ratified.
312
 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                          
(AUCE). Due to their contacts to Monnet, it was argued earlier that they belonged to the transnatlantic 
transgovernmental network (see previous chapter). 
311
 “The international position of a country like France will not be diminished in the slightest because 
she belongs to a united Europe. On the contrary, in increasing her security and power in Europe she 
will be better able to play the role of a great world Power with permanent interests in Africa and 
Asia.” (Alphand 1953). Alphand attended the press conferences of the European Movement in June 
1952, calling for the ECSC Assembly to form the nucleus, to draft a document for a treaty that can 
then be accepted by the governments (Vayssière 2007, 301). 
312
 Parsons (2003, 73) does not mention that the military had seen the Alphand report (Creswell 2006, 
64). According to Creswell, the Chiefs of Staff produced a ‘verbal report’ of their demands on August 
27
th
 1951 (Ibid.). According to Auriol (Auriol and Nora 1975, 410), the meeting of the Conseil des 
Ministres on the same day makes no mention of the Alphand report. The decision reached (Ibid. 722) 
was to insist on the European Army, insisting that no German troops would be mobilized until the 
EDC was ratified, and “sans en faire une condition sine qua non, la France souhaite que l’Angleterre 
participe a la C.E.D.” According to Parsons (2003, 73), citing Elgey (Elgey 1993b, 295), no further 
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need for further British or American troops on the Rhine would not be dropped, nei-
ther by the Cabinet, nor did Schuman do so when acknowledging the Alphand report 
(Creswell 2006, 63, 65). Accordingly, Acheson grew weary because he doubted the 
military effectiveness of a supranational army and was sceptical of France retaining 
an effective veto-power over the outcome of the negotiations – a quite appropriate 
hunch as it turned out (FRUS 1951 III-b, 843-846).
313
  
Within the American administration, the remaining skepticism of the Pentagon was 
swayed when SACEUR commander Eisenhower, a highly prominent figure, ap-
proved of the European army project after an alleged conversation with Monnet.” 
(Massigli 1978, 282; Elgey 1993b, 288; Duchêne 1994). Eisenhower had initially 
opposed the Pleven Plan rather vigorously (Sulzberger 1969, 615; Ambrose 1983, 
508). Monnet had pointed out to Eisenhower that the issue was “more of a human 
problem than a military one”. To constitute a “solidarity of destiny”, “the French and 
the Germans should wear the same uniform” (Winand 1993, 28). The fact that Eisen-
hower – as Commander in Chief of US forces in Europe – endorsed the European 
Army project in the American National Security Council on August 1st 1951 was 
decisive in overcoming opposition from the Pentagon and the JSC regarding the mili-
tary effectiveness of a supranational army (Duchêne 1994, 231; Bossuat 1996b, 197; 
Creswell 2006, 61). The new direction that the defense of Europe would take was 
fixed on August 9
th
 1951.
314
 At an ensuing tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the US, France, and the UK, it was agreed that German rearmament would be 
achieved through the creation of a supranational ‘European Army’. 
For Adenauer, the French move was credible as it corresponded to signals relayed to 
him earlier by McCloy and conformed to pledges made to Adenauer by both Bruce 
and McCloy that they would be able to convince the US administration to support it 
                                                                                                                                          
domestic consultations would take place until the debate in February. Massigli (1978, 287) – not cited 
here by Parsons – similarly ‘accuses’ Alphand and Schuman of bypassing the Cabinet. As Auriol – 
hardly a champion of the EDC – indicates that there was no serious disagreement concerning the fur-
ther negotiations, and as the demands by the French generals were virtually ignored at the further 
negotiations, causing increasing resentment by the military – this interpretation seems highly plausible 
(Auriol and Nora 1975, 410).  
313
 Acheson insisted that the EDC had to be subsumed under NATO command structure and not ‘un-
duly’ interfere with military effectiveness, i.e. the EDC must not “constitute a separate European field 
army but would be based on the idea of European contingents which could be disposed of by the Su-
preme Allied Commander in Europe in accordance with military necessity” (quoted in Winand 1993, 
27). 
314“Report of the Allied High Commissioners concerning the Establishment of a New Relationship 
between the Allied Powers and Germany on August 9
th
 1951 (FRUS 1951 III-a, 1501-1511). 
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(Schwartz 1991, 228).
315
 This indication was sufficient for Adenauer to change 
course: the delegation that had hitherto negotiated the terms for German rearmament 
on the Petersberg was transferred to Paris (Large 1996, 131). This move caused some 
consternation as Blank had been instructed to insist on equality rather vehemently. 
French officials thus nick-named Blank’s arrival as 'La Bombe Blank' (Massigli 
1978, 277; Schwartz 1991, 229). Moreover, there were still open issues: Adenauer 
continued to seek German membership in NATO but would be rebuked, time and 
again, by the Allies and specifically France (Gersdorff 1993). 
In addition to shifts in the positions of the French and German governments, the Ital-
ian government reacted to these events in a radical manner. The Italian government, 
in part due to a significant presence of federalist deputies, faced domestic demands to 
advocate federalist solutions, in particular after the outbreak of the Korean War.
316
 
This course of action was received skeptically, in particular by Foreign Minister 
Sforza. The fact that the US now supported the EDC alternative prompted reconsid-
eration, initially out of fear for the reputation and influence of the Italian government 
in the Western sphere.
317
 Minister of Defense Pella continued to be skeptical. The 
head of the Italian generals Marras warned against the “fatal abrogation of a delicate 
and important element of our sovereignty.” (Magagnoli 1999, 77). Others doubted 
the necessity of giving up the “last remainder of political independence” (Magagnoli 
1999, 76). 
                                                 
315
 On June 19
th
 1951, Bruce said this to Hallstein, “Er [Bruce] sei es selbst, der Herrn Alphand den 
Rat gegeben habe, durch Vorlegung eines solchen Berichtes einen Eindruck von den Fortschritten, die 
seit Beginn der Verhandlungen erzielt worden seien, zu vermitteln. Er habe das selbst getan, weil er 
den Eindruck habe, daß der Petersberg-Bericht namentlich in Washington eine starke Aktivität ausge-
löst habe. Er habe geglaubt, im Einklang mit der französischen Regierung, aber auch mit der deut-
schen Regierung vermeiden zu müssen, daß dabei die Bemühungen um die europäische Armee völlig 
unter den Tisch fielen. Er, Bruce, sei in seinem Vorgehen in voller Übereinstimmung mit McCloy, der 
wohl auch dieselben Gesichtspunkte in Washington vertreten werde.” (AAPD 1951, 340, 341). 
316
 In reaction to Korean war, meeting of the Italian Parliamentary group for European union on Octo-
ber 12
th
 with De Gasperi and Sforza, out of which came a resolution calling for a new federal pact, the 
radicalness of which was still approached cautiously by De Gasperi and Sforza (Lipgens and Loth 
1988, 257; 1990, 215), stating that it “invites the government to support and promote every initiative 
that may lead to the early conclusion, as a first step, of an initial convention among the countries con-
cerned for the constitution of a parliament and a federal Council of government.” (Lipgens and Loth 
1988, 259; 1990, 215). 
317
 Sforza on June 26
th
 1951, “Es scheint mir der Augenblick gekommen zu sein, daß man sich mit der 
Europa-Armee auch an höchster Stelle beschäftigt. Solange man auf die Skepsis der Amerikaner zäh-
len konnte, brauchte man diese Frage nicht ernst zu nehmen. An dem Tag aber, an dem es eine Idee 
und ein Projekt gibt, die die Billigung der Amerikaner besitzen, sehe ich nicht, wie wir uns zurückzie-
hen könnten.” (Magagnoli 1999, 71). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
391 
 
These views did not necessarily correspond to De Gasperi’s: his utterances reveal 
from the beginning a cautious approach to the Pleven Plan and the Italian delegation 
had taken a similarly cautious approach in Paris.
318
 The bad outing of the DC in low-
er level elections in 1951 prompted a reshuffling of the Cabinet during which De 
Gasperi replaced Foreign Minister Sforza (Bredebach 2013, 190). Spinelli had al-
ready submitted a memorandum to De Gasperi, in which he criticized the current 
state of the negotiations as inaugurating a “shadow without a body” that had “no pos-
sibility to make a successful contribution” without subordinating the European army 
to a European federal system (Magagnoli 1998, 40). The consideration of a complete 
political union, moreover, suggested to some a distinct advantage in term of Italian 
influence. Malagodi, an official in the Palazzo Chigi wrote, 
“Finally, it should be taken into account that – especially for a a poor, but populous coun-
try like ours – the possibility of proportional representation in an elected and directly re-
sponsible Assembly is an essential corrective to the weakness caused by the lack of eco-
nomic resources.”319 
For the Italian government the domestic shift brought a particular federalist interpre-
tation into focus that, in addition, seemed to correspond to a particular interpretation 
of Italian advantage. Thus, when the federalist Ivan Matteo Lombardo (UEF) was 
appointed the new head of the Italian delegation in Paris he quickly pointed out that 
Italy sought a complete federation instead of a partial European Army.
320
 The pro-
posals for the EDC – entailing, as it were, a European Minister of Defense and a 
common budget – were now unacceptable to the Italian government “without creat-
ing, in return, a body at the federal level to which the divested powers of the national 
Assemblies would be entrusted and that would have the same authority to exercise 
them like the national.”321 The creation of such a federal organization was now, in 
                                                 
318
 At a meeting with Pleven and Schuman in March 1951, De Gasperi welcomed the Pleven Plan as 
possible “base permanente per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa.” (Bredebach 2013, 188). 
319
 Own translation from “Schließlich ist zu berücksichtigen, daß besonders für ein armes, aber bevöl-
kerungsreiches Land wie das unsere, die Möglichkeit einer sich proportional zu seiner Bevölkerung 
vollziehenden Teilnahme an einer gewählten und direkt verantwortlichen Versammlung ein wesentli-
ches Korrektiv zur Schwäche darstellt, die durch den Mangel an wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen verur-
sacht wird” (Magagnoli 1999, 82). 
320
 “Die Bildung einer möglichst umfassenden europäischen Föderation sollte der Europa-Armee 
vorangehen oder zeitgleich mit ihr verlaufen, ihr aber auf keinen Fall folgen.” (Magagnoli 1999, 83). 
321
 Own translation from “sans créer en contrepartie sur le plan fédéral un organisme auquel serait 
confiés les pouvoirs dont les Assemblées Nationales se dessaisiraient et qui auraient l’autorité de les 
exercer au même titre que les Parlement nationaux.” (Magagnoli 1999, 101). 
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the Italian viewpoint, a precondition for any agreement.
322
 The new radicalism of the 
Italian government was not based on an overwhelming consensus. Apart from feder-
alist members of the government - such as Ugo La Malfa (UEF, ELC) and Lombardo 
– the Cabinet, specifically Minister of Defense Guiseppe Pella agreed to the new 
course only reluctantly. As the Italian demands were opposed in Paris in particular 
by the representatives of the smaller nations, De Gasperi’s course was challenged 
repeatedly and he had to threaten with resignation in December 1951 (Magagnoli 
1999, 111; Bredebach 2013, 194). 
 
Summary 
Thus, the shift from French isolation to a convergence, if not similarity, of the posi-
tions of the three bigger states was due, first and primarily, due to a shift in the US 
position that had begun to see in the EDC a more effective option for its long-term 
interest, a change that was not so much based on new information but on successful 
efforts to convince the US administration by McCloy, Bruce, and Monnet. At the 
same time, this shift was accompanied by maneuvering within the French govern-
ment instigated by Schuman, Monnet, and Alphand. Without knowing the composi-
tion of future governments and parliamentary majorities, this move was based on a 
calculated risk as much as it was based on the ideological preferences of these actors. 
In a basic sense, their views corresponded to those of the German Christian Demo-
cratic leadership. Finally, seeing a path towards a viable compromise on a European 
Army and US support firmly behind it, federalist lobbying and domestic reshuffling 
in Italy brought additional supporters of the radical federalist blueprint into the fold. 
While in early 1951 two options for German rearmament had been on the table, in 
late 1951 the supranational solution was the only game in town. The necessary key 
was US power. Behind US power were the sufficient factors: the influence that 
Monnet could exercise on Eisenhower, the ability of Bruce and specifically McCloy 
to convince Adenauer of the intended equal treatment of Germany behind the French 
                                                 
322
 De Gasperi after Lissabon meeting, early 1952, “Die italienische Regierung ist sich des Umstandes 
bewußt, daß die Verbindung der sechs EVG-Staaten uns in kurzer Zeit zur Vervollständigung der 
politischen Integration führen muss, indem sie eine Organisation föderalen Charakters verwirklicht. 
Dies ist der Punkt, dem die italienische Regierung grundlegende Bedeutung beimißt. Ein einfaches 
Zusammenlegen unserer Kräfte wäre kein effizientes Instrument; eine solche Union könnte keinen 
dauerhaften Beistand haben, wenn sie nicht von den notwendigen weiteren politischen Entwicklungen 
begleitet wird.” (Magagnoli 1999, 129). 
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proposal and, finally, the federalist influence over the Italian government to endorse 
radical institutional blueprints. 
In all of these cases, actors sought to identify ‘national interests’: there is no evidence 
of a uniform move towards ‘identical’ interests in view of a ‘identical’ European 
ideal leading to actors discounting any notion of national power and influence. The 
German government clearly sought recognition, the Italian government anticipated 
increasing influence, and the reasoning endorsed by Schuman and Monnet equated 
European institution with French leadership of the continent. Yet, in the lager Euro-
pean continental countries as well in the US, those who had participated in or were 
closely linked to European transnational and transatlantic communities that had and 
would advocate supranational institutions as solutions to basic international coopera-
tion problems in Europe had pushed their governments in a similar direction. In this 
sense, without considering the activities of Monnet and McCloy seeking to convince 
the US administration of the ‘necessity’ of an EDC are as important as the domestic 
divisions in France in steering the bargain along the EDC track. In hindsight, the 
French advance to accept the principle of equality between France and Germany 
would lead to serious domestic conflict.  
The positions of the bigger three governments in Paris had thus shifted: partially as a 
result of maneuvering to convince the US government to reconsider its position on 
the European army; partially as a result of changing embeddedness as De Gasperi 
explicitly appointed a federalist leader of the Italian delegation and a principled op-
ponent of German rearmament – Jules Moch – left the French government. This cre-
ated a new situation in which the EDC was supported by the leadership of the US 
and the three larger continental countries. 
 
Negotiating and Signing the EDC Treaty, 1951-1952 
The shifting positions of the larger countries and the US had consequences for the 
smaller countries. The new position of the US administration meant that threats of 
aid cuts absent an agreement to German rearmament would henceforward be applied 
to both governments. Thus, the Belgian government, and Van Zeeland in particular, 
already feared that the EDC would have to be accepted “by political order” (De Vos, 
et al. 1998, 296). The Belgian decision to participate in the negotiations was, from 
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the beginning, associated with instructions to safe-guard as much sovereignty as pos-
sible, as Van Zeeland wrote to the Belgian delegation that “[t]he principle of unanim-
ity can be the last backup, if only as a threat to national interests in danger.”323 The 
Belgian government insisted repeatedly that, in principle, it would not want to ex-
ceed the degree of military integration laid down in the Brussels Treaty of 1947, and 
that the complete application of the principles of the ECSC to defense – following a 
“modern theory held in France by Schuman, Monnet, and [the leader of French EDC 
delegation, B.F.] Alphand” – was unacceptable. In the words of a member of the 
Belgian delegation, De Staercke, the absence of the UK government from the treaty 
merely reinforced “suspicion [of the] long terms motives [of] both [the] French and 
Germans.”324 Thus, the Belgian delegation continued to vehemently reject the notion 
of an EDC command structure that was independent of NATO, and sought to pre-
serve unanimity decisions in the Council as far as possible (Deloge 2000). Preserving 
a multi-member commissariat as well as subsuming the EDC forces under NATO 
command was a key precondition for the Belgian government for assent to the EDC 
Treaty (Coolsaet 1988, 152). In sum, the government preferences ‘supplied’ by the 
Belgian Christian Democratic government were in line with both the intergovern-
mentalist expectations for the smaller countries. 
Equally so in the Dutch case. The Dutch Foreign Minister had, still in January 1951, 
made it very clear that he opposed the European Army and thought that its French 
masterminds were in way over their heads.
325
 Stikker concurred with Dutch Prime 
                                                 
323
 Own translation from “Le principe d’unanimité peut être la dernière sauvegarde, ne fût-ce comme 
menace, d’intérêts nationaux en danger.” (Coolsaet 2002, 114). 
324
 Conversation noted on January 21
st
 1952 in the Belgian Documents, at a meeting between Belgian 
EDC delegation chiefs (de Staercke), Van Zeeland, and US ambassador in Brussels Murphy, “Mon-
sieur de Staercke expose que la Belgique est prête à entrer dans l’armée européenne, mais seulement 
sur les bases qui ont été définis, dès le début, lors du Conseil Atlantique de Bruxelles et que le dégrée 
d’intégration militaire, financière et politique que la Belgique accepte est entièrement suffisamment 
pour constituer cette armée. Nous ne pouvons aller plus loin, dans un sens, sans violer la constitution. 
Il y a, en France, ajoute monsieur de Staercke, une théorie moderne dont le protagoniste est monsieur 
Schuman et une tendance absolutiste, qui est celle de messieurs Monnet et Alphand, consistant à 
transposer le plan Schuman dans la Communauté Européenne de Défense. C’est là une superstructure 
trop lourde.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 313, 314). 
325
 He pointed out to the US amabassador that he believed that “Western Germany and closely tying it 
in with West essential. He would even be willing for them to join NATO but realizes this premature 
and French would oppose. He said German rearmament essential to "forward strategy" and defense as 
far to east in Germany as possible. Without rearmament German defense line would be on Rhine-Issel 
which is "totally unacceptable to Netherlands". He is opposed to concept of European army and also 
thinks it an error for French to call conference at this time since it will not succeed and will aggravate 
existing disagreements and divisions of opinion not only over Germany but also over French concept 
of European Federation which UK, Scandinavians and Dutch oppose. He believes that Pleven, FonOff 
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Minister Drees that the supranational inclination of the French delegation was far too 
radical for the French parliament and that the French government was taking consid-
erable risks with regard to a possible ratification of such a radical proposal (Van der 
Harst 1990: 148).
 326
 Moreover, it was both Drees’ and Stikker’s primary concern 
that the UK should participate in any defense organization tasked with the rearma-
ment of Germany (FRUS 1951 III-b, 736). A significant source of disquiet was, as in 
the case of the Belgian governments, fear of dominance of the larger powers.
327
 
However, several Dutch deputies were more positively inclined towards the EDC – 
such as Van der Goes van Naters – and inquired why the Dutch government had re-
frained from participating in the negotiations as US support of the EDC prompted a 
reconsideration within the Cabinet. Spierenburg, the head of Dutch ECSC delegation, 
argued that “the creation of a European army had proved to be the only solution for 
the important problem of German rearmament” (Harryvan and van der Harst 2000, 
174). Drees and Stikker were opposed, whereas Mansholt argued in favor (Ibid.). 
The memo that announced Dutch participation in the negotiations expressed the in-
ternal compromise: there was to be no common budget or at least the possibility of 
complete Dutch control over it by veto; at least one commissioner in a multimember 
Board would have to be Dutch, and EDC command should be in every respect sub-
ordinated to NATO. Such institutions did not require a parliament and are, again, 
entirely in line with intergovernmentalist expectations (H2). 
Thus, both the Dutch and Belgian governments participated in the EDC negotiations 
for lack of a better option and sought to limit its supranational character and retain 
unanimity as much as possible.
328
 As a result of the shift in the Italian positions, the 
brokered agreement on equality and troop sizes between the French and German 
                                                                                                                                          
and Monnet are behind French plan[s] which are characterized as unrealistic and impractical.” (FRUS 
1951 III-b, 414). 
326
 Stikker “pointed out that in France, De Gaulle is opposed to it and so are the French Communists. 
West Germany, under the decreasing power of Adenauer is for it, but not Schumacher. Furthermore 
who can tell if the Socialists will not be in power when it comes time to submit any EDF ratification 
bill before the Bundestag at Bonn?” (FRUS 1951 III-b, 889).  
327
 As Drees put it, “Large countries have so many worries that they do not often sufficiently consider 
those of the smaller countries” (in cabinet, quoted in Asbek Brusse 1993, 122).  
328
 Van Zeeland notes in a Belgian-Dutch exchange to Stikker on October 25
th
 1951 that he “souhaite 
la réussite des négociations de Paris. Nous n’avons en effet d’autre alternative que la résurrection 
d’une armée allemande.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 300). Silvercruys, the Belgian ambassador in Washing-
ton, cabled to Van Zeeland in December 1951 “Les Etats Unis réagissent vivement devant les retards 
de l’Europe à s’unir. Un échec du plan d’armée européenne compromettrait la politique d’aide à 
l’Europe. Craintes d’un retour a l’une ou l’autre forme d’isolationnisme.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 254). 
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governments, and the US administration now firmly behind the EDC, the lines of 
conflict had shifted and now conformed to the basic expectation from an intergov-
ernmentalist point of view.
329
 
A major part of the reason that these differences could be resolved at all was US 
pressure to do so. By April 11
th
 1952, Acheson started to press for faster negotiations 
as the appropriations of the Mutual Security Agency – controlling the flow of aid to 
Europe – were scheduled to be debated by Congress. Acheson thus wanted the EDC 
to be signed by May. In effect, US domestic politics set the deadline for the EDC 
Treaty (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 26, 27).
330
 
A number of issues were, however, still unresolved. On the institutional level, the 
fact that the envisioned treaty would delegate substantial ‘core state powers’ raised 
the criticism that the treaty did not conform to basic democratic standards and pre-
supposed a political organization, a sentiment that Schuman had already expressed at 
the beginning of the conference.
331
 Second, essentially all negotiating governments 
sought British association or closer participation in the Treaty. Both conditions 
emerged, inter alia, as key hindrance in France for a successful ratification of the 
EDC Treaty. 
In light of the continuing conflicts and the fragile domestic situation by early 1952, 
French Prime Minister Edgar Faure – member of the EPU and supporter of the EDC 
– sought approval of the Assemblée Nationale for the impending signing of the EDC 
Treaty by a vote of confidence that barely passed, partially because a number of So-
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 Murphy’s report of the same conversation: The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Depart-
ment of State. [SECRET] Brussels, January 19
th
 1952, “Van Zeeland declared that as matters now 
stood some, members govt and parliament were lukewarm in favor of Eur army giving it lip service 
only and that it wld not take much talk to effect that larger powers pressuring smaller to make issue 
most unpopular in Belg. Brit abstention alone discouraged many and there is abundant suspicion long 
term motives both French and Germans. He has been sounding out key members of House and Senate 
and finds great reserve and much opposition. There is, he said, increasing sentiment that Swiss are in 
happy position and perhaps Belg cld copy them. Present govt instructions to deputy go as far as legal 
position permits and ‘if Belg next Tuesday is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude Belg will leave 
it’ and in doing so govt is certain of parliamentary and public support.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 588). 
330
 Acheson to Bruce on April 11
th
 1952, “this session of Cong will end at the very latest by Jul 3 and 
possibly several days earlier. If the contractual agreements with Ger are to be ratified at this session, 
they must, therefore, be laid before Senate by the middle of May at the very least. […] I stress the 
point of signing both sets of agreements.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 641). 
331
 “Ceux qui avec nous admettent un tel objectif nous font une autre objection: peut-on concevoir et 
mettre en oeuvre une armée européenne avant que l'Europe soit constituée, au moins dans ses élé-
ments essentiels? Comment, en d'autres ternes, organiser une armée et l'entretenir avant qu'il y ait une 
autorité politique européenne, un Gouvernement et un Parlement européens ou les deux réunis?” 
(Schuman 1951b). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
397 
 
cialist and Radical deputies abstained from supporting their government.
332
 The vote 
was associated with a number of conditions for the ratification of the eventual treaty: 
that the army should be controlled by a supranational authority that had to answer to 
democratically legitimated representatives; that unanimous decisions within that au-
thority should be minimized; and that, without being conditional, the UK should par-
ticipate in the EDC to address the most basic concerns for the ratification of the trea-
ty.
  
This was a circle that simply could not be squared.
333
 In particular, once the content 
of the Treaty was circulated, it became clear that the asymmetry between France and 
Germany no longer existed: French troops could not be withdrawn at will to conduct 
the ‘operations’ independently, for example in the escalating war in Indochina. The 
military was immediately opposed, and a figure like a Maréchal Juin, a living legend 
from the War, exclaimed his opposition to the EDC publicly (Soutou 1993, 503). 
Among the French Chiefs of Staff, some sought a transitional period in the estab-
lishment of the EDC, others began advocating German entry into NATO (Ziebura 
1997, 99; Creswell 2006, 82). Repeated calls for British troop associations were nev-
er answered in a satisfactory manner. Accordingly, members of the Cabinet were 
outraged at US pressure to conclude the negotiations and French representatives tried 
to frantically obtain more conditions (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b; Massigli 1978, 323). 
With hindsight, the main defects of the EDC were in place when the negotiators 
rushed to an agreement over the distribution of forces. The situation in the US Senate 
would never allow committing further troops; never mind the commitment of troops 
                                                 
332
 The outcome was positive outcome 327 to 287 in with deviations (MRP 7, Radicals 11, UDSR 1) 
most pronounced in the SFIO; here, against the party resolution, 20 deputies abstained (Elgey 1993b, 
312). 
333
 Among the chief elements in the ordre de jour, obligating the French government, “de prévoir dans 
les protocols annexes du traité la mise en place progressive des unites au fur et à mesure que pourra 
matériellement être établie ;’organisation commune.” Moreover, “L’Assemblée demande que tout soit 
mis en œvre pour assurer: (1) la subordination de l’armée européenne à un pouvoir politique suprana-
tional à compétence limitée mais réelle, responsible devant des représentants des Assemblées ou des 
peuples européens, et invite le government à prende dans ce sens toutes initiatives necessaries. (2) la 
sticte limitation et l’énumeration précise des cas où des peut jouer la règle d’unanimité, ainsi que 
l’établissement d’un budget commun vote par l’Assemblée et non soumis à un droit de veto. Elle 
maintient son opposition à la reconstitution d’une armée allemande et d’un état-major allemands. 
Elle invite le gouvernement à renouveler tous ses efforts avec la volonté profonde d’aboutir en voue 
d’obtenir la participation dans a Communauté européenne de Défense s’autres nations démocratique, 
et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne; cette solution constituant une garantie qui répond pleinement 
aux soucis exprimés par l’Assemblée national comporterait naturellement l’étude et la mise au point 
des institutions et des modalités les plus susceptibles d’en assurer la réussite.” (Quoted in Fauvet 
1956, 26, 27, original italics). 
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beyond the reach of the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives. In drafting a reply to 
France on May 3
rd
 1952, Acheson thus dutifully insisted on a precise wording con-
cerning the placement US troops in NATO (that the US would ‘contribute its fair 
share’ (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 647). 
British troops joining the EDC was totally out of the question as well. It was per-
ceived as inconceivable by the British Chiefs of Staff and would not have gone 
through parliament (Dockrill 1991, 110). Churchill, although advocate of ‘European 
Army’, certainly did not have supranational institutions in mind believing that they 
were not an effective solution to the defence problem (Young 1996, 59, 91).
334
 Nor 
did anyone else in his cabinet for that matter. 
 
Summary 
As a result, the final treaty violated two of three conditions that the Assemblée Natio-
nale had put forward. The Treaty reduced vetoes to a minimum and submitted the 
control of the budget to a parliament, but, as indicated by Art. 38, it did not submit 
the Army to a complete political authority yet, nor was British participation obtained. 
The resulting treaty bound French troops at a time when French colonial ambitions – 
in particular in Indochina – called for greater flexibility. Its virtual equality, rather 
than persistent French superiority over German forces, was the very state of affairs 
that the Quai d’Orsay had sought to prevent in 1950. As a result, the French govern-
ment, including Schuman, decided to ‘accept’ because it decided not to ratify the 
treaty in that form (Fauvet 1956, 28; Grosser 1961, 243; Auriol and Nora 1970, 368; 
Duchêne 1994, 233; Creswell 2006, 90).
335
 
                                                 
334
 A cabinet memorandum from November 29 1951 reiterates a favorite expression, “I should doubt 
very much the military spirit of a ‘sludgy amalgam’ of volunteers or conscripts to the defend the 
EDC.” (Jansen 1992, 65). 
335
 As the French government failed to obtain the conditions set forth by the Assemblée Nationale, 
Schuman was heavily criticized; an argument ensued in the Cabinet whether refusing the signature 
was possible (Auriol and Nora 1970, 357; Clesse 1989, 122). Schuman agreed that new conditions 
with regard to the British and US security guarantees would have to be obtained (Maier 1990, 448; 
Elgey 1993b, 323; Hitchcock 1998, 168). On May 21
st
 1952, the Commission des Affaires étrangère 
of the Assemblée Nationale even proposed to reject the Treaty entirely. The French generals approved 
signature provided that a transitional period would be subsequently introduced, and France acquired 
the right to withdraw troops in case of an emergency in the colonies (Creswell 2006, 94). All of the 
conditions above would subsequently be reiterated by French governments, including that led by 
Pierre Mendès France. 
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The risk that the governments had taken was thus considerable. The sentiment had 
already been expressed by Stikker before the Dutch government even sent its own 
delegation. Moreover, as in 1951, without US pressure to sign the treaty, several con-
flicts regarding the institutions could not have been resolved formally by a signed 
EDC Treaty, the most important being political and democratic control and British 
participation as called for, inter alia, by the Assemblée Nationale. 
 
A European Political Community? Two Options for Article 38 
As the preceding section has shown, the months preceding the signing of the EDC 
Treaty were accompanied by significant US pressure. The core problem consisted of, 
first, the unheeded calls for US or British troop commitments and, second, the unfin-
ished nature of the institutions of the EDC as Art. 38 called for a ‘federal or confed-
eral’ structure that was to take the place of the ‘present transitional organization’.336 
As already alluded to in the previous section, even before the Treaty was signed, 
efforts in the transnational sphere had taken shape that united the hitherto uncoordi-
nated attempts from the transnational federalists, actors from the transatlantic trans-
governmental network including Monnet, federalist members of transnational Chris-
tian Democracy, and the new leadership of the European Movement (chapter 5, sec-
tion 5.2.2). Spaak reassembled the leadership of the federalists and the transnational 
Christian Democrats under the umbrella of the European Movement into a transna-
tional coalition that pushed heavily for the federalist direction entailed in Art. 38. 
Criticism of the ‘undemocratic nature’ of the EDC institutions was by no means lim-
ited to these actors. The issue had already been discussed in ECSC negotiations 
(Rittberger 2001); it drew repeated criticism from opponents of the Treaty in domes-
tic settings. Allusions to Art. 38 served as a suitable response.
337
 While the concrete 
                                                 
336
 Article 38 of the EDC Treaty stipulated that the “definitive organization which will take the place 
of the present transitional organization should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of 
the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure, based upon the principle of the separation 
of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system” (Art. 38 EDC Treaty  1952). 
337
 Adenauer in the Bundestag, September 1952, “Dann hat Herr Kollege Brandt gesagt: Wir sind für 
die Integration Europas, aber welches Europa, was soll der Inhalt sein? Da muß man doch nun auf die 
Dynamik der Entwicklung vertrauen. [...] Gerade der Art. 38 des EVG-Vertrages ist der Artikel, in 
dem die Schaffung eines europäischen Parlaments in Aussicht genommen ist. Das ist doch die Quelle 
der dynamischen Entwicklung. Diesen Art. 38 betrachte ich als einen der allerwichtigsten Artikel des 
ganzen Vertrages über die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Er zeigt, daß es nicht etwa mit 
den militärischen Dingen und mit der Montanunion sein Ende haben soll, sondern, daß nun wirklich 
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design of the Treaty followed the ECSC blueprint in its delineation of relatively ex-
tensive parliamentary powers, Art. 38 suggested explicitly that the EDC structure had 
to be temporary. As was the case with the decision for rearmament and the broad 
institutional outlines of the EDC, two paths were available for the road that the ‘insti-
tutional wrapping’ of the EDC was to take.  
One path – following the federalist blueprint – consisted in calling for a constituent 
Ad Hoc Assembly on the basis of the ECSC institutions that would be established in 
August 1952 – was already discussed in the previous chapter, documenting the coor-
dinated transnational attempts to push the negotiating governments in that direction. 
At the same time, in the UK there were internal strategic differences between 
Churchill, Eden, and MacMillan and the British Chiefs of Staff over the best way of 
addressing European developments. Churchill found the idea of a four-power summit 
more appealing to pursue the possibility of German neutrality, in particular in reac-
tion to the Stalin Note in March 1952 but he was opposed by most of his cabinet 
(Young 1996, 54, 98-100). For Eden, the concern was rather to ensure that the basic 
security interests, in particular US interests, were met and a functioning Western 
Alliance created. During the scramble for the signing of the EDC Treaty he had al-
ready proposed to extend the NATO obligations of collective security to the EDC 
with approval from the Cabinet (Eden 1960, 40, 43; Creswell 2006, 89). The funda-
mental concern, apparently, was not to appear ‘anti-European’, thus motivating the 
series of unilateral declarations of EDC support by the Cabinet (Dockrill 1991, 
92).
338
 
The considerations for the Eden Plan were developed on the basis of concerns for the 
‘European credentials’ of the British government. Thus, Eden argued, it “might help 
to remove any remaining misapprehension that the United Kingdom Government had 
been lukewarm in their support of a European Defence Community.” (Dockrill 1991, 
95; Young 1996, 86). Similar motivations guided the granting of an extension of the 
NATO articles specifying the extension of collective security to the EDC (Elgey 
                                                                                                                                          
ein Europa, und zwar, Herr Kollege Brandt, ein demokratisches Europa geschaffen werden soll. Die-
ser Art. 38 ist von allen anderen abgesehen so unendlich wertvoll, daß ihn, glaube ich, kaum ein Eu-
ropäer verneinen dürfte.” (Fischer 1990, 428). 
338
 Without at least a unilateral declaration, Eden expressed this worry in a Cabinet meeting, “the 
failure of the Paris conference would be blamed on us and we should incur, however unjustly, much 
odium […]. We thus have a strong interest in bringing the Paris conference to a rapid and successful 
conclusion.” (DBPO II: I, 839-841). 
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1993b, 324; Creswell and Plano Clark 2007, 89). It would only come in the form of a 
‘unilateral statement’ attached to the EDC Treaty and would certainly not exceed the 
already present security guarantees under NATO (Watt 1985, 89). Opposition within 
the Cabinet emerged from the COS and Churchill, maintaining that it was unwise to 
promise this unilaterally in advance of the United States, but ultimately concurred 
(Mager 1990, 21). Thus, for Eden, the goal was to speed up negotiations from the 
‘outside’ and to allow progress for a European Political Community (EPC) (DBPO 
II: I, 839-841). The essentials of the Eden Plan would have set up the Council of Eu-
rope for the Six in matters for their concern and would have allowed continuous con-
sultations among the Six and the other members. The Cabinet endorsed Eden’s per-
spective. A memorandum conveyed the idea on April 11
th
 1952.
339
 The British Cabi-
net thus began to actively consider alternative proposals against the EDC as signs 
were discernible that ratification might not succeed (Jansen 1992, 79; Macmillan 
2003, 192). In Eden’s words, these would have to include “technical military ar-
rangements agreed upon without a political superstructure.” (Eden 1960, 34). The 
Chiefs of Staff objected heavily against a potential commitment of British troops 
(Dockrill 1991, 110; Jansen 1992, 79). This was the first time that the Foreign Of-
fice, under the impression of repeated French pleas for a troop association, began to 
contemplate a UK troop commitment. To surmise whether the Eden Plan would have 
contributed more to the eventual ratification of the EDC Treaty than the aborted EPC 
project is speculation as it is unclear whether the COS – and Churchill – would have 
agreed at that point in time. 
What is clear is that this path was never pursued. The US State Department was ini-
tially ‘of two minds’ about the pros and cons of the Plan and decided to ‘remain si-
lent’ for the time being.340 It is instructive that Schuman’s initial reaction was tenta-
                                                 
339
 The memo said that “the Council of Europe should be remodelled so that its organs could serve as 
the ministerial and parliamentary institutions of the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community 
and any future organisations of the same structure. At the same time, the Council of Europe would 
continue to serve as a consultative body and as a forum for intergovernmental and parliamentary co-
operation in Western Europe.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 61). Moreover, it proposes a ‘two-tier’ system 
so that during negotiations relating to supranational institutions, only the Six would be present, 
whereas on other issues, 15 members would continue to be present (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 60-65). 
340
 On May 2
nd
 1952, in reaction to the Eden proposals Sec. State to Embassy in France, “Dept of two 
minds best method handling Eden proposals.” On the one hand, no ‘significant institutional develop-
ment’, on the other hand, “plan might have important psychological effect by committing non-
member countries to closer relations with EDC and Schuman Plan” Hence, “In view of foregoing, we 
inclined believe best course for US is not to comment on plan at this stage but see how discussion 
shapes up and proposals evolves in Depts mtg.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-bI, 73, 74). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
402 
 
tively supportive of the Eden Plan, advising his delegate at the COE Council, 
François Seydoux, that the Eden Plan proposal was to be submitted to the COE As-
sembly to study it (Kim 2000, 103). Within the Quai d’Orsay, opinions were split: a 
group around Alphand – former leader of the French EDC delegation who had close 
ties to Monnet and participated in the campaign of the European Movement de-
scribed earlier – thought the Eden proposals were meaningless. The French ambassa-
dor in London, René Massigli, who had been skeptical of the EDC project from the 
outset, thought the proposals made sense as they addressed a basic French concern to 
tie the UK into the emerging institutions (Kim 2000, 103). The current French cabi-
net under Pinay, however, suffered from similar internal divisions as the previous 
governments: the Cabinet resolution was thus a compromise between these two 
views, as Pinay came down in favor of Monnet’s proposal (Kim 2000, 75, 105).341  
For the German and Italian governments, the view of the Eden Plan was relatively 
clear: both essentially followed Monnet’s reasoning. Spinelli had begun to lobby De 
Gasperi and Lombardo already in February 1952, urging them to press for an early 
convocation of a constituent assembly without awaiting the signing of the EDC Trea-
ty or its ratification (Magagnoli 1999, 140). From the point of view of the Palazzo 
Chigi, the Eden Plan would cause a loss of Italian influence over the negotiations and 
would only downgrade a ‘federalist initiative’ to a ‘talking shop’.342 The German 
reaction was similarly negative (AAPD 1952, 528). The Auswärtige Amt had institu-
tionalized an “Allgemeinen Ausschuss” that was to discuss and advise on the EPC in 
spring 1952, members were Ophüls and the Federalists Kogon, Friedländer, Blessing 
(Kim 2000, 75, 323). In an internal paper, Ophüls justified this stance by warning of 
the danger that the Eden proposal would split the Six and prevent the foundation of a 
federation that had to be geographically limited (Kim 2000, 75, 100). The State De-
partment finally followed Monnet’s reasoning, similarly recommending the rejection 
of the Eden Plan to “avoid any watering down of supranational principles.” (FRUS 
                                                 
341
 “1) Zwecks rascher Ausarbeitung eines solchen Entwurfs für eine politische Behörde ist die Ver-
sammlung der Montangemeinschaft auf diese besondere Maßgabe nach des Vertrags über die EVG zu 
erweitern; 2) Vertreter der Länder, die Mitglieder des Europarats und an der Montangemeinschaft 
nicht beteiligt sind, sind unter noch festzulegenden Bedingungen einzuladen.” (Kim 2000, 75, 96). 
342
 More importantly, Taviani thought that “der Europarat ist derartig entwertet, daß sich eine födera-
listische Initiative zu sechst in seinem Schoß als der übliche Debattierclub präsentieren würde.” 
(Magagnoli 1999, 142). 
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1952-1954 VI-b, 198). As a result, the Eden plan was aborted and the approach ad-
vocated by the transnational coalition adopted in the ECSC Council.
343 
 
The fact that the Quai d’Orsay was split as well as the fact the French Socialist leader 
Mollet initiated the vote in the Assemblée Nationale reflects the fact the proposal was 
not as meaningless or dangerous as these reactions made them out to be. For the Bel-
gian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, the solutions advocated, inter alia, by his do-
mestic rival Spaak certainly went too far.
344
 Van Zeeland resigned to ensuring that 
Belgian interests would be defended by delegate Wigny in the Ad Hoc Assembly 
(Coolsaet 2002, 117). The Dutch government remained silent for a while as the elec-
tions of June 1952 necessitated personnel changes. Once the Dutch government had 
been reassembled in September 1952, a change of personnel occurred as Jan Willem 
Beyen replaced Stikker as Foreign Minister. At the meeting of the ECSC Council 
that passed the Luxembourg resolution for the Ad Hoc Assembly, Beyen, to the sur-
prise of everyone, assented and stated that he would himself participate in a lower 
level committee to prepare its work (Harryvan 2009, 40). 
 
Summary  
In sum, once the EDC Treaty was signed, there were two alternative paths for ad-
dressing the widely perceived ‘transitory state’ of the EDC institutions. In particular, 
the widely perceived lack of a proper subjection of the new military authority to 
                                                 
343
 The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State in Paris on July 23
rd
  1952 that the 
“Italian Emb informs us that in last night's talk with De Gasperi, Schuman accepted all major Italian 
amendments […] and that common French-Italian proposal on European political authority will be 
presented to six ministers probably tomorrow afternoon. De Gasperi also saw Adenauer this morning, 
and was very impressed with firm stand which Germans intend to take on importance moving rapidly 
ahead to create common political authority. Adenauer was also as strongly opposed as ever to use of 
Council of Europe Assembly. Our source seemed very encouraged by these developments. He be-
lieved that solid French-German-Italian front can be maintained on this issue at tomorrow's (Thurs-
day's) meeting. Only serious difficulty he foresees will be Dutch effort to keep this matter completely 
off ministers agenda on grounds that in absence Dutch Government, Stikker cannot take any commit-
ments. De Gasperi expressed himself as strongly in favor close United States association with work of 
Schuman Plan Assembly on political authority. De Gasperi discussed this question also with Adenau-
er, who agreed entirely. De Gasperi will probably make proposal […] when French-Italian proposal 
on political community is discussed by ministers.” (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 131, 132). 
344
 As Van Zeeland reported to Eden in October 1952, “La Belgique n’est pas prête, et en tout cas pas 
désireuse, de se laisser entrainer à des solutions qui fussent de nature à créer une autorité supranatio-
nale, de caractère susceptible de supprimer la souveraineté des différents Etats et à faire disparaitre 
éventuellement le rôle de ces Etats comme intermédiaires entre les individus qui les composent et 
cette autorité supranationale.” (Quoted in Dumoulin 1999, 67). 
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democratically ‘appropriate’ institutions necessitated, as Article 38 put it, ‘confederal 
or federal’ structures. Accordingly, two alternative proposals were on the table: a 
confederal alternative with the Eden Plan and an avowedly federal alternative, advo-
cated by the assembling transnational coalition. The confederal alternative was dis-
carded, in favour of the path advocated by the new transnational coalition of federal-
ists and European supranationalists around Spaak.  
The irony is that although the intention behind the creation of the Ad Hoc Assembly 
was to increase the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty, it would arguably affect 
the opposite in France. Domestically, the course taken in Europe did not fare well for 
the French government, in particular with a few renegade Gaullist deputies that the 
Pinay government relied upon and whose votes were bitterly needed for survival. In 
October 1952, a congress of the Radical Party saw prominent party leaders such as 
Edouard Herriot and Pierre Mendes France publicly oppose the EDC Treaty (Kim 
2000, 75, 196). This loss of support led to a failed vote of confidence in December 
1952 and to the failure of the Pinay government (Elgey 1993b, 93).  
Summing up, the first two stages of the bargain reveal that the factors emphasized by 
both the intergovernmental as well as the transnational perspectives are required to 
account for the course of the bargain sufficiently.  
Thus, actors continued to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material cir-
cumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. The German government and, more 
explicitly, the Italian government clearly perceived a supranational army to be in 
accordance with a particular view of the ‘national interest’. Without the Korean War 
and a perceived Soviet threat, negotiations on a European Army in particular and 
German rearmament in general would not have begun, conforming the necessary 
status of Hypothesis 3. Without US pressure exerted on European governments to 
come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken longer, confirming 
the necessary status of Hypothesis 1. Without French internal differences that al-
lowed the credible signal of domestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have 
taken the course that was seemingly preferred by all governments except the French 
in 1950, namely German entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional 
safeguards as suggested by the ‘package deal’, confirming the necessary status of 
Hypothesis 5. Finally, there are clearly discernible differences between the smaller 
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and the larger countries that, from 1951 onwards, clearly fall in line with intergov-
ernmentalist expectations. 
These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that key developments cannot 
be accounted for sufficiently from the intergovernmental point of view without tak-
ing into account the evidence in line with transnationalist hypotheses (H7 – H10). 
The French divisions implied that a particular version of the French national interest 
– shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – vehemently pushed for a European army 
against mounting domestic scepticism and at considerable risk, in particular whether 
it would be possible to muster sufficient domestic support for their own project. The 
supranational option, initially considered and discarded by the US government, was 
taken in 1951 then largely on account of the activities of Monnet and Schuman in 
France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a French-German agreement on institutional 
equality and convincing their own government to pursue that course – the outlines of 
which had been exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous 
chapter has demonstrated – and federalist pressure on the Italian government to re-
consider its position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were 
ideologically close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices in 
the national interests; in every case, there were other compatriots – especially in the 
military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in as much as 
French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assessment transmit-
ted and coordinated within transgovernmental and transnational circles pushed the 
bargain along a supranational track. 
Moreover, as the rejection of the Eden Plan demonstrated, transnational influence 
was predicated on access to governments. Thus, Spaak’s proposal for a distinct con-
stitutional Assembly was beaten in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope but accepted by the governments of the Six. Adopted as a strategy to improve 
the ratification chances of the EDC, this move would backfire soon. 
7.2.2 The Battle for the EDC, 1952-1954 
In as much as the EPC Treaty did little to increase the ratification chances in France, 
the ratification conflicts that followed the signing of the EDC Treaty and the submis-
sion of the EPC Draft to the governments of the Six was marked by contradictory 
developments. In Germany, the somewhat tortuous ratification process started in 
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March 1953 with the Bundestag’s first affirmative vote and ended in March 1954 
when the Bundesrat approved a constitutional amendment. In the Netherlands, the 
Tweede Kammer voted affirmatively in July 1953, the Senate in January 1954. The 
Belgian Chambre des Représentants voted for the Treaty in November 1953 the Sen-
ate in March 1954 (Griffiths 2000, 166).  
However, there was hardly any progress in Italy and France. In both cases, the EDC 
was withheld from the floor by parliamentary committees until June 1954. The rela-
tively straightforward line of conflict between the three larger and the smaller conti-
nental states dissolved, as domestic changes changed the ideological compositions of 
both governments. In both instances, geopolitical incentives – such as the conflict 
over Trieste, the escalating war in Indochina, and the perspective of détente after 
Stalin’s death – combined to decrease the available support, both in parliament and 
in government, of the EDC Treaty. As governments shifted to the right, ideological 
distance came with lack of influence and the radicalism of the previous years back-
fired. As governments had inherited a Treaty they did not or could not ratify, the only 
option was delay. 
In addition, whereas the US administration under Truman had been immensely skep-
tical of the EDC, the Republican presidency under Eisenhower – whose endorsement 
of the EDC had been critical in 1951 – implied a shift in preferences: whereas the 
previous administration preferred the fastest way to German rearmament over any 
particular solution, the Republican administration preferred the EDC over any alter-
native form of German rearmament. Personal ties to Monnet implied that it bought 
completely into the Manichean view of the transnational coalition. As a result, the 
planning for alternatives proceeded only in the UK. Internal considerations amply 
show that the British government perceived, accurately, that a troop commitment 
might become necessary but was not inclined, without further pressure, to offer such 
a commitment voluntarily. As a result, the fate of the EDC Treaty, became increas-
ingly bogged down in France and Italy, amid increasingly obvious conflicts over the 
EPC. 
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No Alternatives to the EDC? British Preferences and German Rearmament 
In hindsight, it is simple to point out that the missing link for French acceptance of 
German rearmament had been a credible British troop commitment in conjunction 
with sufficient oversight over German arms production and training. The repeated 
pleas for such a troop commitment were surely not lost on the British governments. 
What was the internal planning in the UK Cabinets?  
British governments pursued a consistent set of objectives throughout the bargain, 
although the government leadership shifted in 1951 from a Labour government under 
Bevin to a new Tory government under Churchill. This shift implied that the rela-
tionship of the British governments to the European Movement changed. Whereas 
the Labour government had been among the most vocal critics of the European 
Movement and the Council of Europe, the Tory government, headed by Churchill, 
entailed the leadership of the British Unionists in the European Movement. There 
was, however, little consequence for the basic preferences that the British govern-
ments pursued. For the UK, although the country had been among the victorious 
powers of the Second World War, the challenge of decolonization, the financial 
strains of ‘Empire’, the emerging Cold War, the dependency on the United States for 
security from the Soviet Union, and the aspiration to remain a ‘great power’ provided 
the basic coordinates of British foreign policy that were based on a bipartisan con-
sensus (Morgan 1984, 239; Adamthwaite 1995, 22ff.; Deighton 2002, 104). Thus, the 
most basic and continuously most salient objective for all British governments was to 
keep the US committed to the Western Alliance, both in terms of material and finan-
cial aid, to preserve the Alliance, and to minimize UK commitments to the continent 
while maximizing UK influence over European institutions and concomitant political 
developments (Deighton 2002). Basic preferences for associated institutional designs 
remained firmly within an intergovernmental model. The main source of differences, 
in particular within the Conservative government, was the question of how to best 
handle the EDC strategically to ensure these aims were met, as already seen with 
regard to the Eden Plan. 
These concerns were already apparent in the reaction to the Pleven Plan. The British 
Chiefs of Staff had contemplated German rearmament quite early (Larres 2002, 146). 
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Foreign Secretary Bevin had already explicitly expressed his desire “for Germany to 
come into a more general framework than a pure European one.” (DBPO II: I, 9).345 
As the Pleven Plan was proposed, the reaction of the British government was over-
whelmingly negative, especially that of Foreign Secretary Bevin whereas Prime Min-
ister Attlee and the COS were concerned not to appear as the ‘destroyer’ of the EU 
unity movement (DBPO II: I, 298, 304, 346). The initial gist of the internal delibera-
tions was rather how to get the Pleven Plan off the international agenda out of fear 
the development would weaken transatlantic ties.
346
 As a result, subsequent British 
positions would largely follow the development on the continent and, in particular, 
US demands, agreeing to any necessary – and non-binding – unilateral commitments 
of support but refraining from substantial continental commitments.  
Thus, the Labour government agreed to the Spofford compromise in late 1950, pro-
vided that limits on German rearmaments would prevent German dominance, no 
German staff would be created, and that substantial limits on arms production in 
Germany would be imposed (Dockrill 1991, 53). These ‘conditions’ did not signifi-
cantly depart from American positions as put forth in the package deal. This basic 
attitude went unchanged when the Tories received the majority in parliament in late 
1951. Churchill, although advocate of ‘European Army’, certainly did not have su-
pranational institutions in mind believing that they were not an effective solution to 
the defence problem (Young 1996, 59, 91).
347
 This attitude persisted well into 1952. 
The motivation behind the Eden Plan, as shown above as well, was primarily moti-
vated by the concern that the issue of German rearmament was brought to a success-
ful agreement. 
However, the British government, as any government during the negotiations, re-
ceived ambiguous information regarding the ratification chances of the EDC Treaty 
                                                 
345
 The reactions caused some officials to retrospectively criticize their self-perceived outlook at the 
time, “We still were thinking in terms of Britain, and of standing between the United States and West-
ern Europe and Russia and so on; as being an independent great power […]. After all, for I don’t 
know how many hundreds of years Britain had kept out Europe. And suddenly to ask it to change, to 
give up its external, its worldwide role in order to join with a Europe which was down and out, re-
quired a vision which I am quite sure I hadn’t got, and I doubt whether very many people in the Unit-
ed Kingdom had.” (Quoted in Hennessy 1993, 401). 
346
 “We cannot afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus 
weakening instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. We 
must nip it in the bud.” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117). 
347
 A cabinet memorandum from November 29, 1951 reiterates a favourite expression, “I should doubt 
very much the military spirit of a ‘sludgy amalgam’ of volunteers or conscripts to the defend the 
EDC.” (Jansen 1992, 65). 
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quite early. As a result, internal preparations for the eventuality of a failure of the 
EDC Treaty had begun quite early as well. The alternative solution was already im-
plicitly mentioned by Van Zeeland to Eden in a meeting between them in London in 
October 15
th
 1952, “It would have the advantage […] to make better use of the assets 
given in the Treaty of Brussels and to revive a little bit the organs of the Brussels 
Pact.”348 Eden saw complications – as Germany was not a member, hence delibera-
tions would be difficult. A memorandum by the COS from December 12
th
 1952 
agreed that, “In the event of failure we must be ready to fill the gap with a new plan 
for the defence of Europe.” (Quoted in Jansen 1992, 65).  
As a result, the British COS started planning for alternatives based on the assumption 
that France would eventually reject the EDC, opting for a NATO solution without 
'open discrimination' against Germany taking over the operational, institutional, and 
material restrictions from the EDC (Mager 1990, 53). As a Cabinet memo of 1953 
noted, “The crux of the problem is the French request for assurance that British forc-
es and American forces will remain on the Continent in substantial numbers for a 
protracted period or in other words that Germany’s forces as they become available 
will not substitute for the British and American forces now on the Continent.” 
(Dockrill 1991, 136). For the British government, any solution that could even feasi-
bly bind more troops on the continent would have to come, in Macmillan’s words, in 
the form of a “confederation and against the 6 Power Federation.” (Macmillan 2003, 
276). By early 1953, British officials were internally busy with looking for possible 
alternatives to the EDC along these lines (Dockrill 1991, 130). By July 23
rd
 1953, a 
secret working paper had been circulated in the Foreign Office titled “Restrictions on 
German rearmament which might be feasible in the event of German admission into 
NATO (Mager 1990, 71). It said, “The ideal solution would be to transplant into 
NATO as many of the essential EDC safeguards as we can persuade the Germans to 
accept as the ‘price’ of joining the leading Western ‘club’ as a full member.” (Ibid.). 
In November 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted a military agreement that 
would institutionalize operational cooperation between the EDC and British troops, 
not exceeding existing unilateral NATO obligations (Dockrill 1991, 134). These 
planning processes continued: the Western Organizations Department of the Foreign 
                                                 
348
 Own translation from “l’avantage qu’il aurait […] a faire meilleur usage des atouts que nous donne 
le traite de Bruxelles and a revivifier quell-que peu les organismes du pacte de Bruxelles.” (De Vos, et 
al. 1998, 11). 
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Office on February 5th 1954 issued a statement on two alternatives to the EDC: ei-
ther Germany would enter NATO directly and ‘agree’ voluntarily to limits on arms 
production; the other alternative was integration through a series of contractual 
commitments to limit German sovereignty on arms, operational and institutional au-
tonomy; in effect, a German army should not be able to fight autonomously (Mager 
1990, 63; Jansen 1992, 83). The proposal mentions that a British troop commitment 
– the withdrawal of which would not be based on sovereign decisions – might be-
come necessary (Mager 1990, 66). The COS preferred – with regard to the FO – by 
March 3rd 1954 the NATO solution without troop commitment (Ibid., 68). As it 
turned out, strategic planning had already identified the salient alternatives. A key in 
these developments seems to have been Massigli, the French ambassador in London 
and a long standing EDC critic belonging who had begun in 1952 to report to the 
British Cabinet that the ratification chances of the EDC were eminently slim 
(Massigli 1978, 334). 
Foreign Office officials, however, did not officially advance any proposal; it was 
argued that this would make the United Kingdom a scapegoat for the failure of the 
European project, a similar motivation as that behind the Eden Plan (Dockrill 1991, 
111; Jansen 1992, 70). These effects were anticipated not only on the European scene 
but also in Anglo-American relations: Churchill himself seems to have almost per-
sonally offended prospective US Secretary of State Dulles on January 8
th
 1953 at a 
meeting in Washington by suggesting that NATO could provide an alternative to the 
EDC (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 884). Moreover, as long as the official line pursued by 
the US administration and other European cabinets – including the French govern-
ments – was that the ratification of the EDC was on the agenda, there was no suffi-
cient incentive for the British government to consider more costly proposals. British 
concessions merely followed the intensity of the French ratification conflict. Thus, in 
1953, the British government reacted to advances for a troop commitment issued by 
the French ‘Meyer protocols’ by issuing a public statement stating that troops would 
be maintained on the continent 'as long as necessary' and announced that it would 
support the demand that the NATO treaty is made coterminous with the EDC Treaty. 
Further, it was agreed to ‘consult’ the EDC Council in case the United Kingdom was 
considering a withdrawal of troops from the continent (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 746-
747). In February 1954, on Eden's insistence, more concessions were made: a per-
manent British representative to the Council of the EDC, one armoured division 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
411 
 
within EDC corps and participation of RAF units in EDC units (Dockrill 1991, 136). 
Yet, this would prove unsatisfying for the French representatives because these 
troops were integrated through the operational NATO command; they could thus be 
withdrawn by unilateral decision (Fursdon 1980, 253; Watt 1985, 98). Thus, these 
commitments, again, did not constitute credible commitments and failed to satisfy 
central French demands. The agreement was signed on April 13
th
 1954 (Massigli 
1978, 424; Fursdon 1980, 256; Young 1996, 92). 
 
Summary 
As the preceding pages have demonstrated, the British government, in seeking to 
ensure both the successful resolution of the negotiations on German rearmament as 
well as minimizing the required restraints on its own autonomy, had identified the 
salient alternatives relatively early. By late 1952, already, it was determined that the 
EDC might fail and that, in that event, a new British offer would have to be made. At 
the same time, it is clear that the decision to submit British troops to ensure a suc-
cessful resolution was, in the Foreign Office at least, considered very early and met 
opposition primarily from the Chiefs of Staff. In this sense, the British governments, 
from the Labour government to the Tories, arguably displayed a stable sense of the 
‘national interest’: ensure that the negotiations on German rearmament succeed, 
compromise as little autonomy as possible. In light of the apparent anticipations of a 
failure of the EDC, the neglect of that eventuality, in particular by the US govern-
ment, seem puzzling indeed. 
 
US Preferences and the Suppression of Alternatives 
On the other hand, progress reinforced convictions of a possible success that the new 
US administration would enforce with increasing vigor. In November 1952, the US 
presidential elections resulted in a watershed victory by Eisenhower for the Republi-
can side (Ambrose 1983, 571). The majority in both Houses of Congress was now 
firmly in Republican hands. The fundamental content of Eisenhower’s campaign had 
been a ‘mandate for change’ that spoke to an ‘old-fashioned’ pre-Cold War republi-
canism in which isolationist tendencies were coupled with a suspicion of an overtly 
strong security state (See chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Eisenhower’s main commitments 
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lay in rebalancing national security to address pressure from the Republican Con-
gress – including McCarty – to adopt a more ‘hawkish’ stance toward the Soviet Un-
ion while trying to cut military spending (Reichard 1975, 15 ff.).
349
  
Eisenhower’s designated Secretary of State Allan Foster Dulles was, as described in 
the previous chapter, a long term ‘acquaintance’ of Monnet and shared the basic no-
tion of the need for European states to delegate and pool sovereignty according to the 
supranational blueprint (see chapter 6, section 6.1.3). For both Eisenhower and Dul-
les, the EDC was a highly salient feature in their plans to balance security and re-
source commitments. Thus, Eisenhower argued that the necessary American “aid to 
Europe would be on the decline if we could get Europe to go in for political and eco-
nomic union. If Europe would do what it should do, conceivably it could by itself 
defeat Russia.” (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 436). The insistence was based on a radical 
application of a federal principle sharing for material reasons, a somewhat radical 
vision of the federalist causal story of Europe. Thus, while the Democratic admin-
istration under Truman and Acheson had opted for the EDC as a second best option 
for a perceived lack of available alternatives, the new Eisenhower administration had 
an intense preference for a European Army, indeed, for a European federation. For 
Dulles, the EPC was the main key “to permit the ratification of the EDC” (Winand 
1993, 32). Surely, it was not lost on US officials that the EDC’s prospects for ratifi-
cation were slim, and some form of leverage over France had to be found (FRUS 
1952-1954 V-b, 694). Moreover, the bargaining position of the US government was 
paradoxically precarious: the key to its European objectives rested with the ratifica-
tion of the EDC that was, in turn, dependent on a few deputies in France. This fact 
was not lost on Dulles who initially asked his planners to ‘come with alternatives’ to 
improve the US bargaining position.
350
 But the search for alternatives was remarka-
bly limited. The most notable of these strategies was the decision to threaten the Eu-
ropeans with a US relapse into isolationism. The threat was partially credible: Re-
publican members of congress would initiate several bills in accordance with that 
                                                 
349
 Eisenhower proposed a budget for 1954 that was 8 billion less than Truman’s previous one (Hogan 
1998, 386). 
350
 In the discussion, especially Dulles is asking for alternatives, outside options, to improve the bar-
gaining position of the US since the decision to endorse the EDC earlier had simply given the initia-
tive the Six in Paris, “We need something that is in our own control. The alternative may not be nice, 
but otherwise we are dependent upon the Europeans. We are not thinking of how to give up the EDC; 
the question is how to get the EDC. An alternative is necessary if we are to get it.” (FRUS 1952-1954 
V-b, 713). 
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threat: among them the Bicker amendment that was rejected by the Senate partially 
on account of Democratic votes (Reichard 1975, 58; Tananbaum 1985). 
The geopolitical core of this threat was a so-called ‘peripheral strategy’ in which the 
US would withdraw its troop to air bases around continental Europe and rely on nu-
clear deterrence. Aid cuts were ruled out as well. Eisenhower and Dulles, against the 
advice of Nixon (vice-president) and Stassen (Director of the Mutual Security Agen-
cy) doggedly maintained that France and aid for Indochina should remain the top 
priority for the Mutual Aid Program (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 288).
351
 Despite contrary 
internal pronouncements, the US was trying to ‘buy’ the EDC. Similar calculations 
even led to considerations that cutting military aid in the reduced budget for 1954 
would be counterproductive and, in effect, lead to higher net expenditures in the 
long-term (FRUS 1952-1954 II, 457-463; Hogan 1998, 400, 401).
352
 
A second alternative was deliberately ruled out as impossible: threatening France 
with German NATO membership.
353
 That assumption of impossibility was not, how-
ever, universally shared: apart from Nixon and Stassen in the National Security 
Council, representatives from the Pentagon and the Chiefs of Staff were increasingly 
sceptical about the usefulness of the EDC (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 712). Moreover, 
some officials in the State Department itself disagreed. Already in March 1953, a 
ranking member of the Policy Planning Staff argued that the radical nature of the 
negotiated treaties should be recognized and thus alternative courses for German 
rearmament – such as the NATO option – be pursued.354 Dulles and Eisenhower con-
                                                 
351 The argument, advocated by Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dunn, was that aid was essential for Indo-
china – and that EDC success would establish the conditions under which Europe could become inde-
pendent from US aid (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1298-1300). 
352 Republicans, especially isolationists in the House were seeking to challenge that assessment. On 
June 16th, the House Foreign Affairs Committee introduced the ‘Bicker amendment’ demanding to 
withhold half of all aid to nations failing to ratify the EDC Treaty (Reichard 1975, 71). It would not be 
passed until 1954 when it was already becoming clear that the EDC was going to be rejected. 
353
 Paul H. Nitze, now head of the Policy Planning Staff, explicitly pointed out that the PPS had been 
preparing alternatives “on the assumption that EDC ratification was delayed so long as to be tanta-
mount to rejection and that German participation in NATO was impossible.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 
713). 
354
 Leon W. Fuller – author of the described Fuller report – departed from these assessments on the 
necessity of the EDC by issuing an memo on March 17 1953 entitled “An Alternative U.S. Course of 
Actions respecting EDC and a German settlement” The essential perception is, “An important aspect 
of EDC which Americans, perhaps, fail to perceive with sufficient clarity, is that it is basically a per-
manent, organic reform of a revolutionary nature but proposed as an emergency device to meet an 
urgent critically dangerous situation. It is obvious, for one thing, that we are pressing Europeans to do 
something that is inconceivable we would do ourselves. The British stand aloof for much the same 
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tinued to pre-empt any secret planning for a NATO alternative within the Policy 
Planning Staff of the State Department. 
355
 The Belgian ambassador in Washington 
thus pointed out that the EDC had become the ‘eleventh commandment of US for-
eign policy’356 
In part, the problem stemmed from the fact that Dulles and Eisenhower took serious-
ly only those European voices that fit into a particular narrative of events. One key 
conduit were US officials David Bruce and Tomlinson, both having ties to the ACUE 
and both now liaised with the ECSC as special representatives on Monnet’s insist-
ence (Winand 1993, 39, 40).
357
 Monnet had maintained from the beginning that there 
was no conceivable alternative to the EDC. Secretary of State Dulles and Eisenhower 
met repeatedly with Monnet discussion matters relating to the ECSC throughout the 
time (i.e. FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b, 248, 337). As indicated in the previous chapter, 
although the published record does not indicate prolonged discussions of the EDC, it 
was most certainly the case see (See chapter 6, section 6.1.3). The US policy to issue 
threats of withdrawal culminated when Foster Dulles, in early 1954, warned of an 
‘agonizing reappraisal’ of US Foreign Policy. 358 The speech was prepared, inter alia, 
                                                                                                                                          
reason – for them, as for us, a merger of national sovereignty respecting defense in a supra-national 
federation is unthinkable.” (Quoted in Larres 2001, 87). 
355
 The problem of lacking alternatives was brought up at the NSC on August 13
th
 1953. Dulles argued 
that to even consider alternatives would be dangerous in case of a leak. The Pentagon and the JCS 
wanted to advise the Planning Department to consider alternatives if the EDC would fail (FRUS 1952-
1954 VII, 502, 503). The decision was made to advice the PPS to work out alternatives, yet by the end 
of September, these plans are called back (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 540, 541). The main argument was 
that domestic developments in France, which are not mentioned in the record – had increased the 
chances of ratification. It is possible that a close survival of the new French government under Laniel 
in the Assemblée Nationale had influenced these considerations. However, shortly thereafter, on Oc-
tober 8
th
 1953, the new French Prime Minister Laniel wrote to Eisenhower that ratification was only 
possible after an agreement on the Saar had been obtained and a closer association of the British had 
been achieved (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 819-820). As a reaction, the administration again considered 
whether alternatives to the EDC should be prepared. Dulles declined. Stassen asked whether it was not 
prudent to make alternative plans. Finally, Eisenhower replied that he was extremely sceptical wheth-
er there was any real alternative to French EDC member ship (FRUS 1952-1954 VII, 542). Churchill 
explicitly expressed his preference for a NATO solution in mid 1953, he similarly receiving a rebuttal 
from Eisenhower (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 792). 
356
 “La CED était devenue le onzième commandement de la diplomatie de Washington.” (De Vos, et 
al. 1998, 377). 
357
 Eisenhower on Bruce, “As for Ambassador Bruce, continued the President, he was one of the most 
loyal of our officials and perhaps the shrewdest judge of the French character he had ever met. The 
President said he wholeheartedly agreed with Bruce's statement that we were trying to get timid men 
to overcome their own doubts. There were far too many Frenchmen who genuinely despaired of ever 
building an adequate defense of Western Europe against the Soviets.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 888).  
358 “If, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective, if France and Ger-
many remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave 
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by Robert Bowie, member of the Spaak Committee (Winand 1993, 50). The view 
was reinforced in contact with actors sharing that mindset: the tone prevailed in con-
versations with Adenauer;
 359
 it marked the disapproval of advances by Churchill to 
consider a NATO alternative or a neutral Germany.
 360 
When in doubt, the conclusion 
inevitably returned to aid for Western Europe, to off-set the lack of ‘political deter-
mination’ of European States to build-up their military capabilities (FRUS 1952-
1954 II, 215-218). 
 
Summary 
The assessment that there was no alternative to the EDC was, in hindsight, false. By 
dominating the strategic assessments in the American administration, the new Re-
publican administration displayed a peculiar bias in terms of the threats and pressures 
issued to European governments. By concentrating the direction of aid conditionality 
on the EDC signatories alone, by pre-empting internal reconsiderations and revalua-
tions of US policy towards German rearmament, and by linking the granting of aid to 
further support of the EDC ratification, the US government based its policy on a dis-
tinct view of the continent that it shared with key individuals in the transnational 
coalition. By preempting a reconsideration of this policy, this mindset was the key 
for not pursing alternative NATO solutions – as the British government did – and, as 
the subsequent section will show, generated incentives for opponents of the Treaty in 
France and Italy to delay the ratification of the treaty.  
 
Shifting Lines of Conflict in France and Italy 
In both France and Italy, domestic shifts in governmental coalitions altered the gov-
ernments’ views of the EDC Treaty, as already suggested by the network analysis 
conducted in chapter 5. With linkages to the Federalist Communities and the transna-
tional coalitions cut by late 1953 and early 1954, the French and Italian governments 
                                                                                                                                          
doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place for safety. That would compel an ago-
nizing reappraisal of basic United States policy.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 463).
 
359
 After Dulles had visited Germany, Adenauer wrote back to Dulles on February 11
th
 1953 confir-
ming their mutual conviction that “[…] der eingeschlagene Weg allein die Vorraussetzungen für eine 
friedliche und gesicherte Entwicklung des europäischen Kontinents schafft.“ (Adenauer 1987, 339). 
360
 “Churchill himself feels that one can only fight for a nation and, therefore, feels that other people 
react the same way. He may very well be wrong about this.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 713).  
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were paradoxically paying lip service to the ratification of a Treaty they did not want 
in order to garner US support for unrelated Foreign Policy objectives. To be sure, 
there were differences between both countries. While there was probably a majority 
for the Treaty in Italy, this was much more doubtful in the French case.  
In Italy, the conflict over the Free Territory of Trieste had been a lingering issue 
since the Peace Treaty of 1947 divided the city into two spheres of influence between 
the Allies and Yugoslavia that were supposed to come under control of the United 
Nation. This question remained unresolved until October 1954 as the UN Security 
Council could not agree on a common governor and the city remained divided be-
tween the two blocks (Hametz 2005, 35). The Allied decision to divide the territory 
caused violent clashes between nationalistic students and Allied security forces in 
Trieste in November 1953.
361
 Both the left and the right decried this state of affairs 
for different reasons: the more nationalistically inclined of the right wing of the DC 
vehemently advocated a return of the city under Italian rule and heavily denounced 
Allied policy. For many officials in the Pallazo Chigi, the Trieste question was an 
issue both of national identity and strategy, namely to preserve Italian influence in 
the Mediterranean area (Di Nolfo 1992, 533). The left, including DC representatives 
from the left wing of the party that had close ties to the Christian Unions, equally 
sought an independent Italian Foreign Policy (Kisatsky 2005, 112).  
The conflict affected the EDC bargain largely because it contributed to the destabili-
zation of De Gasperi’s position within the DC and the internal split hampered agree-
ment within the parliamentary committee of the Camera dei Deputati that had begun 
to discuss the Treaty in February 1953 (Magagnoli 1999, 211). Both members of the 
right wing of the DC, as well as several officials in the Palazzo Chigi – such as 
Quaroni – had become increasingly weary of the lack of support from the Allies for 
the return of Trieste under Italian control (Di Nolfo 1992, 531, 532). As a result, 
within the DC, there were influential views to postpone the ratification of the EDC 
                                                 
361
 This conflict was exacerbated by the fact that the Yugoslavia under Tito followed an increasingly 
independent policy from Stalin: as part of a strategy to exploit this difference, the British and Ameri-
can administrators announced in October 1953 that administration of Trieste would be divided into an 
Italian and Yugoslavian zone. The announcement led to a series of serious violent clashes between 
nationalistic students and Allied security forces in ‘zone A’ of Trieste (Ballinger 2003, 91). 
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until the ‘problem of Trieste was solved’.362 Thus, De Gasperi had to agree to a tor-
tuous ratification procedure, requiring the assent of four committees within the Cam-
era dei Deputati that would delay to process significantly (Magagnoli 1999, 213). 
Only two of those had submitted the Treaty to the floor by June 1954, both recom-
mending acceptance. 
The lingering divisions over the EDC intensified throughout 1953 as the Trieste issue 
became more salient (Magagnoli 1999, 207). The Italian Generals, for example, had 
from the beginning preferred a NATO solution and direct integration of German 
troops into NATO and now publicly started to reject the EDC in domestic newspa-
pers. DC member close to the unions, such as Giulio Pastore, came out publicly 
against the EDC (Magagnoli 1999, 216). In the Italian elections of 1953, although 
the DC again came out as strongest party, the liberal Republicans (PRI) and the right 
wing Socialist (PSDI) lost a large portion of their votes. Having hitherto supported 
the ‘centrismo’ of De Gasperi’s Foreign Policy and the federalist turn of 1951, he 
could no longer rely on their votes. Losing a vote of confidence in late 1953, De 
Gasperi never returned to power. 
His successors Giuseppe Pella proceeded to construct a coalition with the right wing 
coalition of the Monarchist and Fascist deputies (MSI). As Pella put it shortly after 
his investiture, Italy would demonstrate “the determination to defend national inter-
ests that arise from obvious and elementary principles of justice”.363 This was a dif-
ferent tone that was completely contrary to De Gasperi’s positions, as he did not shy 
away from threatening to leave the Allied Camp, lest Trieste would be returned to 
Italy.
364
 During these conflicts, Spinelli would decry the “hysteric nationalist 
                                                 
362
 Zoppi in the Foreign Ministry called for postponing the ratification until “das Triestproblem in 
seiner Gesamtheit gelöst und die gegenwärtig zugespitzte Lage der italienisch-jugoslawischen Bezie-
hungen entschärft ist.” (Magagnoli 1999, 138). 
363
 Own translation from “die Entschlossenheit zu Verteidigung der nationalen Interessen, die offen-
kundigen und elementaren Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit entspringen.” (Magagnoli 1999, 239). 
364
 Referring to the US and the UK in a public speech on September 1953, “Diese beiden Mächte 
haben nicht länger ein wie damals isoliertes und besiegtes Italien vor sich. An dessen Stelle befindet 
sich ein erneuertes Italien, ein Italien, das mit ihnen in der Atlantischen Allianz vereint ist. Es ist daher 
an der Zeit, daß sie den Anachronismus ihrer gegenwärtigen Stellung als Exekutoren des Friedensver-
trages begreifen. Und man soll sich nicht Illusionen hingeben bezüglich einer hypothetischen Bereit-
schaft […] unsererseits, das Triest-Problem ungelöst zu lassen. All, Verbündete und Nichtverbündete, 
sollen wissen, daß dieses Problem keine weiteren Verzögerungen mehr erlaubt. Dieses Problem hat 
Auswirkungen auf unsere gesamte internationale Politik und stellt den Prüfstein unserer Freundschaf-
ten dar.” (Magagnoli 1999, 241). 
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screams” and the “nationalist whims” of the Pella government.365 Federalists such as 
Tarchiani and La Malfa came out vigorously for the EDC Treaty (Magagnoli 1999, 
278). De Gasperi wrote concerned public letters, whereas Christian Democratic 
newspapers were divided over the new position of the Italian government 
(Magagnoli 1999, 241). 
Moreover, officials in the Pallazo Chigi were divided over the ratification chances of 
the EDC Treaty as well. In November 1953, the Italian ambassador in Paris, Quaroni, 
submitted that the ‘Interim Protocols’ or ‘Mayer Protocols’ for the EDC Treaties 
submitted by the French government in 1953 would have little effect, that the feder-
alist approach of the EDC was dead and that there was a broad majority for a differ-
ent ‘confederal’ solution in the French Chamber (Magagnoli 1999, 253).366 Quaroni 
recounted a number of rather pessimistic encounters in Paris, describing the ratifica-
tion prospects of the treaty as highly dubious.
367
 The Italian ambassador in Brussels 
thought the same (Magagnoli 1999, 155). Both urged the Italian government that it 
should be prepared to accept revisionist offers that would detract from the “suprana-
tional element and strengthen the national part” and to signal such readiness to the 
French government (Magagnoli 1999, 257). Other voices in the Palazzo Chigi, such 
as the Italian ambassador in London Manlio Brosio, thought that supporting the EDC 
had proven counterproductive and that a “revised EDC is better than none”.368 
                                                 
365
 Own translation from “hysterisches nationalistisches Schreien” and “nationalistische Launen” 
(Magagnoli 1999, 277). 
366
 “Die Protokolle sind nichts anderes als ein ‘guess‘ vonseiten der französischen Diplomatie und 
besonders von Alphand, welche Einwände von den Parlamentsausschüssen erhoben werden können. 
Der ‚guess‘ ist insofern richtig, als keines dieser Zusatzprotokolle vom Parlament verworfen wird; er 
ist insofern nicht richtig, als es beim gegenwärtigen Stand der Dinge keinen triftigen Grund gibt, um 
anzunehmen, daß sich die französische Nationalversammlung damit begnügen und […] keine weite-
ren Protokolle verlangen wird.” (Magagnoli 1999, 171). 
367
 Suspicion of the ratification prospects was widespread: already after the signing of the EDC Trea-
ty, “Tatsächlich hatten die Franzosen damals, als sie ihre Ideen lancierten, geglaubt, etwas Unmögli-
ches zu erreichen: Deutschland die Nicht-Diskriminierung zu gewähren, ihm aber die susbtantielle 
Gleichberechtigung auf irgendeine Weise vorzuenthalten. Alles ist schiefgegangen – nach Ansicht 
derselben Franzosen, die eigenartiger Weise nicht wußten, auf welches Abenteuer sie sich einließen 
und die jetzt in Anbetracht der Wirklichkeit der Europa-Armee die Zähne zusammenbeißen.” 
(Magagnoli 1999, 139). 
368
 Brosio in January 1954, “Wenn man einen Teil der unitarischen Prinzipien der EVG opfern muß, 
um zu erreichen, daß Westdeutschland in den Westen eingegliedert und wiederbewaffnet wird, dann 
ist es diesen Preis wert.” (Magagnoli 1999, 255). Quaroni “Wir haben auch zu Recht unsere Stellung 
als Klassenbester im Hinblick auf die amerikanischen Desiderata, nämlich europäische Integration, 
EVG, Liberalisierung der Wechselkurse, etc, markiert. […] Was ich aber bezweifle, ist, daß uns diese 
Stellung als Klassenbester bei den Fragen geholfen hat, die uns direkt interessieren.” (Magagnoli 
1999, 163). 
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Quaroni, in turn, was heavily criticized in the federalist circles around Lombardo for 
his allegedly ‘ridiculous recommendations’.369  
Despite these internal debates, the approach of the Italian government to the US and 
its stance on EDC ratification remained similar. Relying on a “damaged, shaky and 
disunited government”, Pella perhaps linked the Trieste issue more vocally to the 
EDC, but he was not able to maintain power for long (FRUS 1952-1954 VIII, 385). 
After a brief interlude, the next head of the Italian government would be Scelba, rely-
ing on a similar coalition. However, his approach to the US and EDC ratification 
remained similar: when in conversations with US officials, he seemed committed to 
the ratification of the EDC but continued to insist that no positive vote could be ex-
pected before the ‘Trieste question’ was resolved. 370 
In France, the domestic situation was even more dramatic. The issue of the EDC di-
vided the parties and public opinion (Rioux 1983, 26).
371 
On March 31
st
, a major 
public éclat occurred when the ‘maréchal’ Juin, a living legend from the War, ex-
claimed his opposition to the EDC publicly (Clesse 1989, 147; Elgey 1993b, 588; 
Soutou 1993, 503). He was hence dismissed by the government which led to a public 
rally in Paris.
372
 Among the French Chiefs of Staff, some sought a transitional period 
in the establishment of the EDC, others began advocating German entry into NATO 
(Ziebura 1997, 99; Creswell 2006, 82). Several officials at the Quai d’Orsay, out of 
                                                 
369
 “[…] einige der lächerlichen Vorschläge Quaronis.” (Magagnoli 1999, 156). Only Lombardo reac-
ted vehemently, coming out against such offers, writing to Benvenuti, “Es kann niemandem entgehen, 
daß dort, wo die EVG auf die eine oder andere Art […] durch die mehr oder weniger unsinnigen Er-
satzlösungen […] beiseite gelegt wird, die gesamte Sicherheitskonstruktion zum Einsturz gebracht 
würde […].” (Magagnoli 1999, 258). 
370
 Scelba to Dulles, “[…] stated unequivocally and confidentially that unless Trieste solved satisfac-
torily for Italian public and Parliament, would be impossible pass EDC despite government and dem-
ocratic parties full realization EDC essential to Italy. Added while he had tried to divorce EDC and 
Trieste, this proved impossible because of internal political factors.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 954).  
371
 Gaullist deputy Diethelm, “Nous ne sommes donc pas morts puisque nous pouvons encore 
dètruire.” (Rioux 1983, 20). Prominent actors voice harsh opposition at the congress of the Radicals 
while at the simultaneous congress of the Socialist Guy Mollet fails to enforce traditional party disci-
pline against prominent EDC opponents Jules Moch and Daniel Mayer. Guy Mollet concluded that the 
congress decides that the SFIO’s position towards the EDC is, “Ni refus ni acceptation” (Fauvet 1956, 
28). The final decision at the MRP congress demanded the treaty “ne soit ratifié que s’il comporte les 
garanties demandées par l’Assemblée nationale, notamment une garantie efficace des Etats-Unis et de 
la Grande-Bretagne en cas de secession allemande.” (Ibid.). 
372
 General Ely, his sucessor, was less hostile to the idea of supranational defence (Vial 2000).
 
He 
expressed the three circle idea, seemingly guided in his affirmation of the European army to be guided 
by the assumption to constitute a third power pole. However, a larger portion of the military coupled 
the opposition against the EDC with its general contempt for the regime.
 
Juin represented the current 
in the army that could not envision a France, a Europe without colonies, a strong western link, a 
‘impériaux-atlantiste’ (Vial 2000, 141). 
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fear for French great power status, began to openly advocate a national German army 
controlled by NATO (Kim 2000, 207). After the failure of the Pinay government in 
December 1952, subsequent governments would increasingly rely on Gaullist votes 
for their investiture, which made the prospects of ratification ever more unlikely as 
both the Meyer and Laniel Cabinets were essentially based on a domestic stalemate 
over the EDC. René Mayer was invested on January 8
th
 1953, gaining power through 
the eerie combination of votes from about 80 Gaullists and the M.R.P (Clesse 1989, 
127). Thus, Mayer was forced to try “by ingenious equivocation to convince the 
M.R.P. that he favored the European Army and the Gaullists that he did not.” 
(Williams 1964, 419). Beginning with Meyer’s cabinet in 1953, every French gov-
ernment had to commit to not turn a vote on the EDC into a vote of confidence in 
order to muster the necessary votes (Rioux 1983, 20). Having made several commit-
ments upon his investiture, first and foremost that France would retain control of its 
national army and that he would reiterate the requests for British security guarantees 
to the EDC, he submitted the ‘Mayer Protocols’ to be amended to the EDC Treaty.373 
Although the Mayer protocols were essentially accepted, failing to achieve the Brit-
ish security guarantee as well as moratorium on qualified majority decisions in the 
council doomed his tenure. As soon as Mayer started to display a willingness to push 
for ratification once the additional protocols were signed, the Gaullist deputies he 
had relied on for his investiture voted against him on May 21
st
 (Fauvet 1956, 34; 
Clesse 1989, 133). 
Apart from a British troop commitment, the protocols submitted that the French gov-
ernment could withdraw troops from the common army in case of an emergency. 
One particular emergency at the time was the escalating war in Indochina. Retaining 
Indochina as part of the Union Française was a key issue in France, widely shared, 
for example, in the party of the most ardent Europeans, the MRP (Thomas 2003). As 
the war escalated, more French troops were needed, and, in particular, more aid from 
                                                 
373
 “The main elements included that the weights of the votes in the EDC council should be ‘frozen’, 
that is, remain at their current level independent of a country’s financial of military contribution to the 
European Army. Second, the protocols called for more autonomy French troops, specifically the right 
to withdraw them from the EDC in case of emergency without a being subject to a majority veto in the 
council.
 
This had been subject to the necessity of agreement in the Council by a qualified majority of 
two thirds of the vote and a possible veto from SACEUR so far. Third, the protocols, again, asked for 
a British security guarantee, a ‘binding’ guarantee for the duration of the EDC treaty. Fourth, the 
French government let the United States know that “a general understanding would have to be reached 
with the United States on administration, organization and procedures in connection with end-item 
assistance.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 702-704). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
421 
 
the US to conduct the war successfully. The French government hardly had the re-
sources to back the war and survive a vote on the costs that such a decision would 
have entailed. The link between the war in Indochina and the EDC became apparent 
even before the EDC was signed. Military officials were continually requesting more 
expenditure for their effort in Indochina and stipulated that France had to maintain 
relative dominance within the EDC, with increasing success (Creswell 2006, 86). 
The vulnerability of French governments, depending on US aid for their survival and 
their budgets, became ever more pronounced as the war in Indochina escalated. In 
effect, Indochina turned into an ambiguous source of bargaining leverage, both for 
the US and for France (Aimaq 1996, 2000). The Eisenhower administrations ‘no-
holds barred’ insistence on the creation of a European Army implied that French 
governments managed, again and again, to sell the promise of eventually ratifying 
the EDC in exchange for commitments of increased resources and currency 
(Fleischer 2013). It is estimated that, overall, the United States ended up providing 
about 80 per cent of the resources committed in Indochina (Rioux 1983, 35; Wall 
1991, 188). Thus, even opponents of the EDC Treaty did not have an incentive to 
press for a rejection of the Treaty.
374
 
After Mayer, the Laniel government pledged to seek another satisfactory commit-
ment by Britain (Creswell 2006, 126). Although the new Cabinet relied on more 
Gaullists than the Mayer Cabinet, the deadlock was similar. Two ministers (Paul 
Reynard and Édouard Corniglion-Molinier) threatened with resignation, the latter if 
Laniel sought ratification, the former - affiliate of the EPU and the European Move-
ment - if Laniel did not (Elgey 1993b, 374). Part of the deal that Laniel had struck 
with a number of Gaullist deputies, was to appoint Bidault instead of Schuman as 
Foreign Minister. While Adenauer wrote to Schuman with regret, the basic dilemma 
of the French government was unchanged.
375
 
 
                                                 
374
 The Socialist Jules Moch and the Gaullist General Marie-Pierre Koenig – both opponents of the 
EDC - were appointed as parliamentary rapporteurs to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of 
the National Assembly (Clesse 1989, 129). This ensured that the EDC would be ‘bottled up in com-
mittee’ (Massigli 1978, 362; Creswell 2006, 103). 
375
 Adenauer wrote to Schuman on January 9
th
 1953 after Schuman had left the French government 
that “dank ihrer Arbeit [wird] die europäische Idee, die nur lange ein unerreichbares Ideal zu bleiben 
schien, zu einer Realität unseres Lebens werden. […] Die Bundesregierung wird unter meiner Leitung 
jedefalls alles in ihren Kräften stehende tun, um das Werk in Zusammenarbeit mit den verantwortli-
chen Persönlichkeiten der französichen Regierung fortzuführen.“ (Adenauer 1987, 317). 
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Summary 
Thus, both in France and in Italy, domestic coalitions shifted increasingly to the right 
and cabinets inherited a Treaty they no longer sought. In Italy, while there was prob-
ably a narrow majority for the EDC, the Treaty became entangled in disputes be-
tween left and right parties and even within the DC: the less the Allies seemed will-
ing to support Italy in Trieste, the louder the voices for neutralism as the conflict 
escalated into violent clashes between Italian students and Allied forces in Trieste 
itself. With the most ardent Italian federalists cut off from Italian cabinets, the EDC 
Treaty was no longer a priority. In France, subsequent coalitions increasingly relied 
on immediate US aid for Indochina as well as Gaullist deputies that were entirely 
opposed to ratifying the EDC Treaty. The domestic divide within the government 
precluded decisive action in either direction. As a result, the Italian and French gov-
ernments who had been among the most ardent supporters of both the EDC and the 
EPC delayed the ratification of the EDC Treaty. 
 
The EDC Treaty Delayed 
Thus, the domestic developments in France and Italy dimmed the chances for ratifi-
cation. In Italy, the federalist line of reasoning no longer seemed to fit with the gov-
ernment’s perception of Italian interests. In France, the increasing strength of the 
Gaullists and the public agitation against the EDC even among parties of the gov-
ernment decreased the influence that actors like Monnet, Schuman, Reynaud, and 
Mayer had on French positions. Moreover, the negotiations among the Six on the 
EPC Draft Treaty amply showed that circumstances had changed. In addition, Sta-
lin’s death had consequences on the international scene that, if anything, delayed the 
EDC ratification in France and strengthened its opponents. Moreover, the strategy 
adopted in 1952 to bolster the ratification chances through the creation of a European 
Political Community backfired. 
Even before the Ad Hoc Assembly of the Draft Treaty, a domestic shift occurred in 
the Netherlands that would complicate the reception of the EPC Draft Treaty among 
the Six. Due to domestic conflict over public schooling after the elections of June 
1952, Dutch Prime Minister Drees had to rearrange the Cabinet: Dirk Stikker left his 
post as Foreign Minister, and the responsibilities of the Foreign Minister was split. A 
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member of the Catholic party Joseph Luns took over bilateral affairs and internation-
al organizations (NATO) whereas Beyen – who was not a member of any party – 
took over European affairs on the behest of Drees.
376
 Beyen had been economic ad-
visor to the Dutch government in exile in London during the war, exposed to Mi-
trany, briefly engaged with the ELEC and left for Washington to work for the newly 
founded World Bank in 1946 (Harryvan 2009, 43). The shift meant that the Dutch 
Foreign office was no longer led by Stikker who had been eminently critical of the 
EDC Treaty. Stikker was a clear-cut functionalist, skeptical of supranationalism, 
sought technical delegation whereas political control was supposed to remain inter-
governmental, as envisioned in the OEEC (Stikker 1951). Beyen’s case is peculiar: 
he did not participate in any transnational Europeanist organization due to his ab-
sence in Washington. Ideologically, he was close to ideas circulating in the ELEC: he 
participated in a ‘Studie-Groep for Reconstructie Problemen’, instigated by Paul 
Rijkens, head of the British Dutch Company Unilever and a close affiliate of Joseph 
Retinger, the Polish Exile who founded the ELEC with Paul Van Zeeland (Grosbois 
2004, 354, 355). It is thus no coincidence that the results of the Study Group actively 
advocated European Monetary integration during the war already. When Beyen en-
tered the Dutch government, his intense preference for economic integration became 
clear rather quickly and led to considerable conflict within the Dutch Cabinet as 
Beyen, although not an ardent supporter of the EDC banked on its ratification and 
sought to use the ongoing developments surrounding the EPC Draft Treaty to push 
for economic integration (Harryvan 2009, 43). Beyen intermediately set up an inter-
departmental committee in the Dutch government to work out the implications of 
what was to become the ‘Beyen Plan’, a call for gradual customs union as well as 
monetary integration and supranational institutions to regulate the merging of the 
economies (Harryvan 2009, 47). As a result, a Dutch memo to the Six of December 
1952 made any Dutch approval of the EPC Treaty dependent on the Treaty incorpo-
rating these demands (Kim 2000, 192).
377
 The plan was thus in line with consensus 
Dutch economic interests. Already in June 1950, Stikker himself had promoted a 
                                                 
376
 As Zijlstra put in an interview in 1998, “In 1952, Drees did not want a catholic Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The Europe of the Six was in his opinion already so catholic-dominated, with Adenauer, 
Schuman, de Gasperi, he was against it. And Romme won. Now the compromise was to have two 
ministers of foreign affairs, with Mr Luns, who was Mr Romrite's man, and Beyen, who was a coun-
tervailing power.” (Zijlstra 1998). 
377
 “La réalisation progressive, moyennant des délais préalablement fixe, d’une Union Tarifaire, de-
vrait figurer dans ce traite.” (Harryvan 2009, 48). 
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plan that called for the sectoral expansion of free trade within the confines of the 
OEEC (Griffiths 1990, 22).  
While the economic clauses were part of an overarching consensus within Cabinet 
and the Dutch chamber, there were conflicting views on the ratification chances of 
the EDC and thus the status of the EPC itself. The essential viewpoint of the Dutch 
government towards the EDC itself was unchanged. As Beyen explained during the 
ratification debate, the Dutch government “would have preferred to permit the Ger-
man rearmament it considers essential to take place in a broader, i.e. Atlantic con-
text.” (Van der Veen 2009, 18). It had “accepted the EDC because otherwise the is-
sue of German rearmament was not acceptable to France.” (Ibid.). Moreover, the 
Dutch government, as all Western Allies, faced US pressure to ratify the EDC Trea-
ty.
378
 While both Drees and Beyen shared the conviction that economic integration 
was the priority goal, Beyen thought that the EDC would pass, whereas Drees did 
not. In a Cabinet meeting in May 1953, Drees thus opposed further negotiations on 
the EPC Treaty because he thought that the EDC Treaty would fail and then the 
elaborate EPC structure without a real value and the ECSC only would be left stand-
ing. Beyen, Mansholt and Zijlstra thought differently (Asbek Brusse 1993, 124). 
Beyen banked on the EDC being ratified and defended his proposals going into the 
negotiations over the EPC (Harryvan 2009, 52).  
The first intergovernmental congresses on the EPC Treaty, however, revealed rela-
tively quickly that the renewed insistence on economic integration would stop the 
EPC Treaty in its tracks. Although the German and Italian delegations submitted 
their agreement in principle, the first conferences that reviewed the EPC Draft Treaty 
went nowhere (Fischer 1990, 293). One proposal was accepted quickly: the Dutch, 
French, and Belgian delegations proposed that the Senate of the EPC, instead of be-
ing appointed by National Parliaments, should consist of delegations of state gov-
ernments (Fischer 1990, 297; Rittberger 2006). Apart from these tentative agree-
ments, no further compromises could be reached. The Dutch government had made 
acceptance conditional on acceptance of the Beyen Plan, to which the French gov-
                                                 
378
 Complaints of pressure from the US : Meetings between Dutch and Belgian Delegations on Fe-
bruary 11
th
 1953 (including Beyen and Zeeland), “Monsieur Beyen rapporte qu’à La Haye, le Secré-
taire d’Etat américain a demandé au gouvernement néerlandais si ce dernier ne voyait pas las possibi-
lité d’obtenir l’approbation du traite par les chambres néerlandaises sans tenir compte des propositions 
que le gouvernement français demandera aux autres partenaires de la Communauté Européenne de 
Défense d’approuver.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 334). Beyen responded negatively. 
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ernment was opposed (Bossuat 1996b, 203). The Quai d’Orsay was entirely opposed 
to Beyen’s proposal on all three counts, fearing lower living standards in France as a 
result and recommended that the French government entirely abstain from the supra-
national proposals on economic integration currently circulating (Krüger 2003, 299). 
Bidault made it clear to Adenauer that the extreme treaty and the call for economic 
integration were counterproductive to appease the French Assemblée Nationale. 
Adenauer concurred.
379
 The counterproductive effect of the radical nature of the EPC 
for the EDC ratification had become apparent. Adenauer admitted as much to a dis-
appointed Brentano.
380
 Nothing that would risk EDC ratification was to be undertak-
en.
 
The extreme differences between the Dutch and French positions specifically 
made any further negotiations virtually futile. 
There were other issues. In March 1953, news of Stalin’s death were followed by an 
internal power struggle in the Soviet Union and, subsequently, public signals by the 
political leadership that, at least potentially, suggested that a different course might 
be pursued by the Soviet leadership.
381
 Among the governments of the Six, this event 
did not change much; among skeptics of the EDC, the event suggested that German 
neutrality, after all, might be feasible. Churchill was particularly adamant, taking 
advantage of his temporary control of the Foreign office at the time.
382
 Churchill 
                                                 
379
 “Man kann die Politische Gemeinschaft so betreiben, daß daraus Schwierigkeiten für die Verteidi-
gungsgemeinschaft entstehen. Man kann sie aber auch so betreiben, daß die Verteidigungsgemein-
schaft dadurch gefördert wird" to which Adenauer replied, “Wir müssen den zweiten Weg wählen." 
(Fischer 1990, 289). 
380
 Von Brentano – as former chairman of the Constitutional Committee – was disappointed with 
Adenauer’s acceptance of the toning down of the EPC Draft Treaty, specifically in terms of the Sen-
ate. Adenauer replied that “Nur ungern haben wir den Gedanken aufgegeben, die europäische Eini-
gung über alle Zwischenstufen hinweg mit einem Male zu verwirklichen. Aber es hat sich unzweifel-
haft gezeigt, daß ohne diese Zwischenstufen für absehbare Zeit nicht auszukommen ist.” (Kim 2000, 
324). 
381
 In his speech at Stalin’s funeral March 9th 1953, Malenkov used a tortuous interpretation of ‘Marx-
ist-Leninist ideology’ suggesting that there was a chance for an agreement. Malenkov stated that “the 
Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct a consistent policy of the preservation and 
strengthening of peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a 
policy of international cooperation and the development of business-like relations between all coun-
tries, a policy proceeding from the Leninist position concerning the possibility of prolonged coexist-
ence and peaceful competition between two different systems—the capitalist and the socialist (sic!)” 
(Roberts 2008, 3, 4). Later at a session of the supreme soviet “there was no disputed or unresolved 
problem that could not be resolved on the basis of mutual agreement between interested parties. This 
applies to our relations with all states, including our relations with the United States of America. A 
state interested in the preservation of peace can be confident, now and in the future, of the durability 
of the peace policy of the Soviet Union” (Ibid., 4). 
382
 Eden was hospitalized on April 12
th
 1953 for five weeks because of a gallbladder of operation 
(Eden 1960, 51; Watt 1985, 96). In his diary, Blankenhorn recounts a conversation with Frank Roberts 
– the UK ambassador in Bonn – who was worried about Eden’s sickness, as Churchill apparently 
 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
426 
 
took over command of the Foreign Office which would indicate a subtle shift in Brit-
ish policy for a time. He set out to lobby Eisenhower via repeated telegrams for hold-
ing a four-power conference with the Soviet Union to discuss the question of Germa-
ny, that were repeatedly rebutted (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-b; Young 1996, 153). On 
May 11
th
 1953, Churchill, on his own initiative held a speech in the Lower House 
asking for a four-power conference, and exploring the solution of a neutralized Ger-
many (Larres 2002, 223; Macmillan 2003, 231).
383
 In reaction to Churchill speech on 
May 11
th
 1953, a small faction of the SFIO – led by EDC opponent Jules Moch - 
introduced a successful motion against the will of the government to the Assemblée 
Nationale obliging the government to approach the US government and follow 
Churchill's proposal (Massigli 1978,372-380; Elgey 1993b, 373; Young 1996, 166). 
As a result, the French government argued – not entirely untrue – that the present 
government was most likely to ratify the EDC whereas, if power talks were not 
granted, the present government would fail (Wall 1991, 266; Young 1996, 190). 
While the Soviet reaction to these advances took time, the odd result was that in pre-
paring for a four-power conference, the French and US delegations were entirely in 
agreement that this was, in all likelihood, futile. Bidault declared that without ap-
proval of the troop demands and a settlement of the Saar dispute with Germany, no 
ratification would be 'psychologically' possible.
384
 The Belgian government equally 
did not believe that Stalin’s death did anything to change Soviet objectives.385 The 
German government and Adenauer were highly worried about the prospect of a pos-
sible neutralization, the German opposition denounced the lacking effort to explore 
possibilities for reunification (Schwarz 1979, 480). This fear was unjustified.
386
 
                                                                                                                                          
worked on alone during that time and no one but Eden in the Cabinet had influence over him on For-
eign Policy matters (Blankenhorn 1980, 155). 
383
 In the process Churchill increasingly alienated his Cabinet members, especially Lord Salisbury and 
Eden (Larres 2001, 93). John Colville, private secretary of Churchill noted that the speech was made 
without the FO seeing it (Young 1996, 159). 
384
 The French government had reissued proposal for the Saar is a settlement of the Saar issue and a 
guarantee – formally – of Anglo-American troop presence on the continent for at least 20 years 
(Clesse 1989, 76). 
385
 “En dépit d’un certain nombre de gestes rassurants faits par le nouveau gouvernement de l’Union 
Soviétique dans le domaine international, il n’y a encore à l’heure actuelle aucune raison de croire que 
les objectifs ultimes de la politique soviétique aient change le moins du monde.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 
419). 
386
 At the eventual four-power conference in Berlin in early 1954, Blankenhorn stated that it was Bi-
dault who gave “die beste Rede über das westliche Sicherheitssystem und die Wertung der EVG und 
NATO […]. Man kann die Rolle Bidaults auf dieser Konferenz nicht hoch genug einschätzen.“ 
(Blankenhorn 1980, 189). 
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Thus, Stalin’s death did not have a uniform or clear effect on the preferences of the 
Western governments. While it encouraged and certainly contributed to delay, so did 
other issues, for example the still unresolved conflict over the Saar. By late 1953, 
Adenauer and Bidault were busy working out a solution on account of a suggestion 
put forth by Van der Goes van Naters on the Europeanization of the Saarland. These 
efforts would initiate a last concerted effort involving prominent actors of the trans-
national coalition to save the EDC and ensure its ratification.
 387  
 
Summary 
In sum, the developments after the EDC Treaty had been signed and the EPC draft 
Treaty submitted were paradoxical. First, although the EDC ratification in Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and even Germany made progress, the fate of the EDC seemed suf-
ficiently uncertain to prompt the UK Cabinet to debate repeatedly about possible 
alternative solutions. France and Italy seemed particularly troubling. The underlying 
ideological convictions of both the French and the Italian governmental coalitions 
shifted. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed to the federalist interpretation of 
the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied support in Trieste and relying on in-
creasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratification procedure was delayed 
significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on Gaullist support and public agi-
tation against the EDC Treaty In both cases, thus, geopolitical incentives and a shift-
ing proximity of governmental cabinets to the transnational coalition mattered. The 
latter ensured that ideological preferences for supranational solutions to the German 
problem became less salient as geopolitical developments such as Stalin’s death 
made it seem less and less imperative. Again geopolitical incentives, as summarized 
in H3 and H4, are necessary but insufficient: thus, Stalin’s death and the perspective 
of détente did not alter the ratification prospects in Germany, the Netherlands, or 
Belgium. In France and Italy, domestic instability shifted the control of parliamen-
tary majorities and governments away from the influence of individuals in proximity 
                                                 
387
 On November 25th, Laniel staged a vote of confidence. An orde de jour against Laniel sought to 
initiate a vote prohibiting any debate on EDC without German acceptance of the Saar and formal 
British commitment. Laniel introduced an opposed proposal associated with a question of confidence 
showing the degree of division within almost all the parties at the time. The order introduced called 
for ‘continuity of government policy’, which was sufficiently meaningless to attain approval (Clesse 
1989, 139; Elgey 1993b, 381). 
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to the transnational coalition and thus, in line with Hypothesis 8, shifted French and 
Italian bargaining positions. 
Finally, the US government in particular exhibited a peculiar ideological bias: 
whereas Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the supranational army 
solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that had, earlier, 
been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal to consider, 
internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of senior officials 
in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic planning 
preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which had in 
fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to delay 
ratification particularly In France and Italy. A similar picture of necessity and suffi-
ciency emerges with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important con-
straint as was the domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the 
transnational coalitions to push the bargain along the supranational track was predi-
cated on both. Without considering that coalition, however, the course of the bargain 
cannot be sufficiently explained. Thus, by 1953, the EDC ‘bargain’ had reached an 
impasse. The subsequent widespread regret over the inability to resolve that impasse 
before the rejection of the Treaty in 1954 testifies to the dysfunctional constellation 
of incentives that had come about. 
7.2.3 The EDC in 1954: A Missed Chance? 
In hindsight, it is puzzling that the troubling signals from Italy and most prominently 
from France were largely ignored. The remarkable feature of the events surrounding 
the rejection of the EDC Treaty and its resolution in the WEU Treaty is the repetition 
of a certain pattern. During the last days of the Laniel government, Monnet sought 
the cooperation of the leader of the French Socialists Guy Mollet to obtain the assent 
of the French Socialists to the Treaty. Despite obvious signs to the contrary, individ-
uals in the German government (Adenauer, Brentano, Blankenhorn), the leadership 
of the French MRP (Teitgen, Schuman), Spaak, and the key figures in the US admin-
istration all thought that this last effort had been successful, only to be proven wrong 
once the EDC was voted off the parliamentary agenda in France. As this section 
shows, the failure of these individuals to take Mendès France by his word – that there 
was no majority for the EDC – was a paradoxical precondition of the quick resolu-
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tion of the bargain thereafter. It showed, for the last time, the source of the main inef-
ficiency, namely a tendency by governments led by actors ideologically close to the 
transnational coalition to process information in a rather biased manner, excluding – 
politically not cognitively – the viability of alternatives to the supranational army. It 
was only when Mendes France proved the failure of that strategy, that the European 
governments, facing the failure of the Alliance, produced the solution that had eluded 
them for four years although it had been, arguably, available throughout. 
 
A Last Compromise? The Last Efforts to Save the EDC 
By early 1954, the ratification procedures in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
seemed under way. At the same time, the impending difficulties in France were ap-
parent. It was already described that the US government had based its activities on a 
particularly Manichean view of the EDC and German rearmament. In Italy, figures 
who had been sceptical – like Quaroni - of the whole undertaking from the begin-
ning, assessed the likelihood of ratification negatively. Even Van Zeeland seemed to 
veer in on that interpretation.
388
 In and around the German government, a similar 
tendency prevailed: Adenauer followed Dulles in that he explicitly forbade any con-
siderations of alternatives in written form in and around the Auswärtige Amt and the 
Amt Blank. As Ulrich de Maizière – member of EDC delegation and ‘Referent’ for 
the EDC in the Amt Blank – recalls, the fear was that it would leak out and torpedo 
the EDC ratification chances. Yet, there were ample signs from ‘German diplomats’ 
about the difficulties in France but, in his words, “the responsible people in the Ger-
man government wouldn't believe it.”389 These negative interpretations started com-
                                                 
388
 Assessments of alternatives to the EDC by Van Zeeland in an internal classified exchange to the 
ambassador on December 3
rd
 1953, “Les solutions autres que la Communauté Européenne de Défense 
sont l’entrée directe de l’Allemagne a l’Organisation du Traite Atlantique Nord, une Allemagne plei-
nement indépendante et libre de toute alliance, le recours par les Etats unis a la défense périphérique, 
une entente directe entre les Etats-Unis et l’Allemagne. L’examen de ces solutions de remplacement 
entraine inéluctablement pour conclusion la nécessite de la Communauté Européenne de Défense qui, 
sans être parfaite, offre une solution pratique raisonnable et suffisante aux exigences de la situation 
telle qu’elle s’impose à nous” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 264). 
389
 Answering the question whether about the signs of impending ratification difficulties, he respond-
ed, “I would say we got some warning, many warnings, and German diplomats in France they told the 
government that France wouldn't agree and these warnings began in the end of '53 and the beginning 
of '54, but the responsible people in the German government wouldn't believe it. And we tended not to 
believe it, we had the hope till the last month, and Adenauer didn't allow that we made plans, or think-
ing about alternatives, because he knew that if we would think about the alternative within the Foreign 
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ing in from the German embassy in Paris by early 1953 already.
390
 In 1953, Adenau-
er had briefly toyed with the EDC of a separate UK-US-German agreement which 
was utterly rejected by Eisenhower and Dulles: from then on, a failure of the EDC, in 
Adenauer’s mind, equaled a failure of the Alliance and Adenauer largely followed 
the advice from Blankenhorn and Brentano (Baring, et al. 1974, 137; Schwarz 1995, 
96). Both had maintained the contact to Teitgen in the Geneva Circle.  
The one-sided optimism still prevailed when the French Laniel government was in 
power. As the failure of the EPC was becoming apparent by early 1954, Monnet, 
Bruce, and Alphand undertook a last concerted to mobilize sufficient Socialist votes 
for the Treaty (Kim 2000, 90). The French Socialist leader Guy Mollet had been the 
primary Socialist opponent of Spaak in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, as he sought a British association and support in exchange for German re-
armament with the Eden Plan. Seeing that the EPC was going nowhere, Monnet con-
sulted with Mollet to make headway – again – to the two most important conditions 
for ratification that the Assemblée Nationale had put forth already in 1952: democrat-
ic control and British participation (Kim 1990, 90). Thus, apart from a renewed call 
for a more definitive British troop commitment, Monnet and Bruce brokered an 
agreement between Bidault and Mollet to take up Article 38 in a different manner: 
once the EDC Treaty was ratified, the governments of the Six were to draw on Arti-
cle 21 of the ECSC Treaty to create a European Parliament, based on direct elections, 
to which both the ECSC High Authority and the EDC Commissioners would be re-
sponsible.
 391
 This proposal was first agreed to by Adenauer in a personal conversa-
tion with Bidault in March 1954 and later accepted by the representatives of the Six 
                                                                                                                                          
Ministry […] it would become public and then France would say, the Germans do not believe them-
selves on the EDC. And therefore, we didn't prepare any alternative.” (De Maizière 1990). 
390
 In February 1953, Botschaftsrat Walter maintained, “Entnehme aus Gesprächen, daß Beurteilung 
allgemeiner Lage ungewöhnlich pessimistisch.” (AAPD 1953, 205). In April 1953, he wrote, “[…] 
glaube angesichts der Entwicklung, der wir hier in Frankreich gegenüberstehen, nichts überflüssiges 
zu tun, wenn ich auch schriftlich nochmals auf die Gefahr hinweise, die der EVG – und der Europa-
Gedanke laufen wird.” (AAPD 1953, 343). In December 1953, the Gesandschaftsrat Frank main-
tained that there were about 300 deputies for and 300 deputies against the Treaty. Thus, “könne man 
es nicht verantworten, die Hoffnung auf die Ratifizierung noch länger hinauszuschieben.” (AAPD 
1953, 1085-1087). By early 1954, the Gesandschaftsrat Frank maintained that at least 30 votes were 
lacking in the Assemblée Nationale (Baring, et al. 1974, 410). 
391
 The resolution of the Interim Committee stated, “Wenn alle beteiligten Parlamente über die Ratifi-
zierung des EVG-Vertrages entschieden haben und die letzte Ratifikationsurkunde hinterlegt ist, wer-
den die sechs Regierungen in Anwendung des Artikels 21 des Vertrages vom 18. April 1951 die not-
wendigen Vorkehrungen treffen, um die gegenwärtige Versammlung zu ersetzen, d.h. die in allgemei-
nen Wahlen gewählt wird und der die Hohe Behörde der Montanunion und das Kommissariat der 
Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft verantwortlich sein werden.” (Kim 2002, 92). 
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in the EDC interim committee (Kim 2002, 92). Moreover, on Eden’s insistence, the 
UK government agreed to send a permanent British representative to the Council of 
the EDC and pledged to contribute one armoured division and several RAF units to 
the EDC corps (Dockrill 1991, 136). Still, these troops were integrated through the 
operational NATO command; they could thus be withdrawn by unilateral decision 
(Fursdon 1980, 253; Watt 1985, 98). Nevertheless, the French Conseil des Ministres 
decided on May 18
th
 that it would ask the party leaders to ‘prendre toutes disposi-
tions’ concerning the Anglo-American guarantees, the Saar statute, the additional 
protocols, and the Bonn and Paris treaties (Fursdon 1980, 256). 
The problem, however, was that the Socialist deputies were no longer inclined to see 
the EDC in favorable eyes. In April 1954, 59 of the 107 SFIO delegates in the As-
semblée Nationale signed two public manifestos against ‘the small clerical and reac-
tionary Europe’ and ‘against the EDC for the liberty of the vote and the fraternal uni-
ty of the fatherland’.392 The French Socialists reflected the division within transna-
tional Social Democracy rather accurately. Mollet and the more federalist Socialist 
deputies such as Jacquet and Philippe decided on a confrontational course. They 
called for a party congress in May, and, submitting a resolution that would oblige 
Socialist deputies to vote for the EDC, they won by a margin of 1969 votes for, 1215 
against and 264 abstentions (Loth 1993, 41). Mollet threatened with expulsion from 
the party for deputies straying from this line. Alphand and Monnet thought that suffi-
cient votes for the EDC had been secured (Kim 2000, 96). Adenauer thought the 
same.
393
 Discussions between Bruce and the newly appointed Belgian Foreign Minis-
ter Spaak reflected the same assessment. 
394
 This assessment is a perfect resemblance 
                                                 
392
 “Contre la petite Europe cléricale et réactionnaire” and “Contre le traité actuel de la CED. Pour la 
liberté de vote et l’unité fraternelle du Parti” (Kim 2002, 96). 
393
Adenauer still thought, “Immerhin könne man in Frankreich mit einer Mehrheit von etwa 30-40 
Stimmen rechnen, wobei 2/3 der sozialistischen Stimmen in die zustimmende Mehrheit eingerechnet 
sei” (Adenauer 1995, 69). 
394
 The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community 
(Bruce) to the Department of State on June 2
nd
 1954, “Had dinner in Brussels last night with Spaak, 
DeStaercke and Rothschild (Spaak's Chef de Cabinet). Spaak thinks votes now available in French 
Assembly to pass EDC and that recent favorable events such as MRP and Socialist Congress and by-
elections in Pas de Calais and Maine-et-Loire make it desirable and imperative for every effort be 
made to bring matter to vote in French Parliament soonest possible before this new impetus has spent 
its force. […] If by middle of June French Government has not disposed of above two conditions and 
definitely fixed early date for EDC debate, Spaak proposes to communicate with Secretary on subject 
discussed by them in Geneva-namely what constructive action might be taken by Benelux, German, 
British and American Governments to bring French to their political senses.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 
965). 
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of what Teitgen related to Blankenhorn in the Geneva Circle in 1953 (chapter 6, sec-
tion 6.2.3). He described a similar interpretation to Brentano on July 13
th
 1954 
(Baring, et al. 1974, 39). This assessment would prove fatal: when the EDC Treaty 
was voted off the parliamentary agenda in France on August 31
st
 1954, 53 Socialist 
delegates concurred with the majority, even in the face of a threatened expulsion 
from the party (Haas 2004 [1958], 456). 
One might speculate whether a similar vote, linked to the survival of the Laniel gov-
ernment, would have yielded different results. No clear answer can be given, for ob-
vious reasons, but it seems unlikely. The SFIO was not in the governing coalition 
under Laniel and the more concrete threat of party expulsion did not have any effect. 
However, events quickly disposed of the Laniel government before the EDC Treaty 
could be submitted to the floor. French troops had been trapped by Viet Minhin 
troops in Indochina at Ðiện Biên Phủ since March 1954. After the French govern-
ment failed to convince the US government of the need for direct invention, Ðiện 
Biên Phủ fell on May 7th 1954 in the middle of the Geneva conference on Korea and 
Indochina (Elgey 1993b, 587). A huge outcry in France followed and the strategy 
prepared by the government quickly unraveled. On June 9th, the ‘Commission des 
Affaires Etrangères’ in the Assemblée Nationale submitted the EDC to the floor, 
publicly recommending to reject the EDC Treaty amid significant agitation against 
the government (Elgey 1993b, 636). On June 12
th
, the French deputies refused confi-
dence in the Laniel government by 306 over 293 votes on the government policy in 
Indochina (Elgey 1993b, 174). On June 17
th
, Mendès France was invested as Prime 
Minister by 419 votes assembled from the Gaullists, the Radicals, the Independents, 
the UDSR (Roussel 2007, 227). 
Upon his investiture, he had delivered the promise to ‘resolve’ the issue of Indochina 
and the issue of the EDC by August 1954 (Rioux 1983, 49). The settlement of the 
Indochina war at the Geneva conference was highly successful, splitting, after a dis-
astrous defeat, zones of influence at the 38
th
 parallel with Soviet Assent (Eden 1960, 
117; Roussel 2007, 242). 
As Mendès France had been amongst those radicals to have begun the charge against 
the French government, the outside pressure immediately intensified (Roussel 2007, 
247). Most prominently, the Gaullist General Koenig was appointed as Minister of 
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Defense while Mendès France took over the Quai d’Orsay himself (Roussel 2007, 
228).
395
 Thus, the Ministry of Defense, the Quai d’Orsay, and the French government 
itself were, for the first time, led by avowed opponents of the EDC Treaty, no longer 
by Christian Democrats or actors with other ties to the European Movements. Mon-
net’s influence had practically ceased to exist. Under previous governments, figures 
such as Mayer, Teitgen, Reynaud, and Schuman ensured that the reasoning of the 
transnational coalition and particularly Monnet had influence in the French govern-
ments, but this was no longer the case (Kim 2000, 324). No doubt, the new leader of 
the French government and the Quai d’Orsay did not seek or want the ratification of 
the unwanted treaty. However, in as much as the supporters of the Treaty were mar-
ginalized in his Cabinet, his government still relied as much on deputies with hetero-
geneous preferences as his predecessors. He was not free to reject or dismiss the 
EDC outright. 
The new French Prime Minister would not be kindly remembered by the most ardent 
proponents of the EDC Treaty. The federalists and Christian Democrats were emi-
nently suspicious of his intentions (chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). In his memoirs, Spaak 
complained that Mendès France was not enough of a ‘European’ to ‘fight the battle’ 
for Europe and appreciate the ‘goodwill’ others had shown.396 Blankenhorn did not 
trust his ‘European credentials’, Adenauer did not either: he even suspected Mendès 
France to relay French-German exchanges directly to Moscow.
397
 The French head 
of the MRP, Teitgen, spoke particularly negative about Mendès France to Brenta-
no.
398
 The antipathy was still apparent in his memoirs.
399
 Both Dulles and Adenauer 
                                                 
395
 Blankenhorn on Mendès France, “Ob es nun gelingt, eine europäische Zusammenarbeit wieder 
herzustellen, wie sie in den Zeiten Schumans und Bidaults bestand, ist bei der im wesentlichen von 
nationalen Interessen bestimmten Persönlichkeit von Mendes France zweifelhaft.” (Blankenhorn 
1980, 191). 
396
 “Mendés-France war nicht genug Europäer, um den Kampf zu führen, Hätte er, anstatt sich über 
den ihm zuteil gewordenen Empfang zu beklagen, wie er es tat, besser zu schätzen gewußt, was seine 
Partner ihm alles zugestanden hatten, dem wirklich guten Willen, seinem Standpunkt entgegenzu-
kommen, dann wären die Dinge wohl anders verlaufen.” (Spaak 1969, 215). 
397
 Adenauer reported to have said after a conversation with Mendès France, “Jedes Wort, das heute 
gesprochen worden ist, ist jetzt schon in Moskau.” (Schwarz 1995, 153). And Blankenhorn wrote in 
his diary on August 23
rd
 1954, “Mendès France hat offensichtlich kein persönliches Verhältnis zu den 
europäischen Verträgen. Wie Ophüls mir erzählt, wirft er den Ausdruck ‚international‘ und ‚suprana-
tional‘ ständig durcheinander.” (Blankenhorn 1980, 192). 
398
 On July 13
th
 1954, Brentano wrote Adenauer, relaying Teitgen’s assessment. According to the 
French Christian Democrat, Mendès France had “seine Investitur mit unredlichen […] Machiavelli 
und […] Hitler Methoden erreicht.” (Baring, et al. 1974, 139). 
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were highly suspicious that Mendès France had agreed with the Soviets in Geneva to 
scuttle German rearmament in exchange for Soviet assent (Guillen 1996, 81). There 
is no archival evidence supporting this assertion and subsequent events tell a very 
different tale (Ibid.). In as much as his government relied on heterogeneous prefer-
ences of the French deputies, he sought to broker a domestic compromise. As it turns 
out, the mistrust towards Mendès France ensured that this effort was sure to fail. 
Because of these suspicions, Spaak, in apparent contrast to his predecessor at the 
helm of the Foreign Minister, sought a new compromise, sharing the basic assess-
ment that there was no way by which France could accept German entry into 
NATO.
400
 To Spaak that scenario resembled the French occupation of the Ruhr after 
the First World War.
401
 Seeking reconciliation, Spaak met Mendès France at the end 
of June 1954: Mendès France pointed out that he did not believe that the EDC had a 
parliamentary majority and that he was searching for a compromise between those 
deputies that preferred the EDC and those that did not.
402
 He stated that that a modi-
fication of the treaty was necessary that would touch its substance. Spaak interrupted 
him and warned him that this would not be accepted by the other signatories. The 
discussion, according to Spaak, did not produce any result whatsoever.
403
 It was be-
                                                                                                                                          
399
 “Gegen Mendès France war ich mit tiefer Bitterkeit erfüllt. Ich hatte Zweifel, daß in Frankreich 
europäische Politik betrieben würde, solange Mendès France an der Macht war. Nach meiner Über-
zeugung war Mendes-France antieuropäisch eingestellt.” (Adenauer 1980, 307). 
400
 Spaak about Mendès France, “[…] ich war bereit, ihm bis zur äußersten Grenze des Möglichen zu 
helfen. Leider sollten wir bald feststellen, daß sich diese Grenze oft schwer bestimmen läßt.” (Spaak 
1969, 222). 
401
 “Il est absolument indispensable qu’on laisse les pays signataires de la CED faire une dernier effort 
afin de sauver celle-ci.” (Spaak to the Belgian ambassador in Paris, June 24th 1954 De Vos, et al. 
1998, 367). The reason: Spaak shared the view that the available alternatives would be detrimental to 
everyone’s interests, “Il y a au moins deux politiques de rechange qui sont, à l’heure actuelle, prêtes 
de se concrétiser, l’une qui consisterait à offrir immédiatement aux Allemands leur entrée au NATO 
sur un pied d’égalité. Vous savez que la France pourrait opposer à cette mesure son droit de veto et il 
n’est pas difficile d’imaginer les réactions qui se produiraient si la France, après avoir refusé la CED, 
refusait l’entrée de l’Allemagne au NATO. L’autre proposition qui est très certainement étudiée a 
l’heure actuelle, aussi bien à Washington qu’à Bonn, serait de rendre à l’Allemagne sa souveraineté 
absolue. Les Américains, et probablement les Britanniques, cesseraient d’être puissances occupantes 
en Allemagne. La France seule le resterait. Nous serions ainsi ramenés, mutatis mutandis, à une situa-
tion, qui semblerait à celle de l’occupation de la Ruhr.” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 367, 368). 
402
 And repeats the same argument, that there is no real majority and, “Qu’à supposer, ce qu’il ne croit 
pas, qu’une toute petite majorité puisse se faire sur un vote affirmative, cette majorité est insuffisante 
pour imposer l’application du traite a l’ensemble de la France. Il [Mendès France, BF] recherche donc 
une solution de compromis en provoquant des discussion entre Français favorable et Français hostiles 
à la CED” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 370). 
403
 “Qu’à son avis [Mendès France, BF] ces formules de rechange pouvait aller depuis une ratification 
du Traite moyennant certaines conditions d’application, jusqu’a une modification profonde du texte 
même jusqu’a un changement de substance. A ce moment, je [Spaak] l’ai interrompu avec quelque 
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coming clear that a solution would be very difficult to find but both agreed it was 
worth the effort and called for a conference of the EDC signatories in Brussels in 
August 1954. 
The amount of mistrust Mendès France generated is partially understandable as his 
tenure was based on public commitment, made in the Assemblée Nationale, that the 
EDC should be substantially revised (Roussel 2007, 247).
 
By itself, this is not partic-
ularly remarkable given that staunch EDC opponents like Koenig were in his Cabi-
net. Without a colonial war to pursue, opponents of the EDC – like Koenig – no 
longer needed to appeal to the US administration for immediate help. At the same 
time, Mendès France’s situation was not significantly different from his predeces-
sors: although he himself did not want the EDC, his cabinet – and particular his own 
party, the Radicals – contained a sizable number of ‘cedistes’, among them figures 
like Rene Mayer (European Movement) or Edgar Faure (European Movement and 
EPU), meaning that he could not bank on surviving a vote of confidence either way, 
no matter what he proposed. Thus, Mendès France tried to find a compromise be-
tween the two opposing forces to renegotiate the EDC Treaty and mobilize sufficient 
support for ratification (Elgey 1992, 205; Roussel 2007, 291). As these efforts failed, 
Mendès France would side with the cedistes led by Bourgès-Maunoury, stipulating 
not to reject the EDC outright, but to seek renegotiations with the Allies.
404
  
No doubt, Mendès France did make sure that his political alternatives remained in-
tact. However, there is no evidence of plotting the demise of the EDC whatsoever. 
His maneuvers sought to secure all possible solutions: if the EDC could not be 
amended, a second-best NATO solution needed a British troop commitment. Know-
ing this to be the most important element to mobilize French assent to German re-
armament, the French government made first tentative contacts with the British gov-
                                                                                                                                          
vivacité pour lui faire remarquer qu’à mon avis de changement importants des textes et encore plus 
des changements de substance n’avaient aucune chance d’être admis par ses partenaires. Qu’il devait 
prendre en considération la situation dans laquelle se trouvent les pays qui ont déjà ratifie le Traité et 
qu’il ne devait pas oublier non plus que dans les différents pays, des raisons précises avaient été don-
nées à la ratification de la CED, et que celles-ci ne pouvaient pas disparaitre d’un nouveau texte.” (De 
Vos, et al. 1998, 371). 
404
 One July 30
th
, Bourgès-Maunory, associated with the ‘cedistes’ in the Radical Party, suggested to 
‘avoir un drame’ with the proponents of the EDC to win over the moderate opponents of the EDC by 
proposing a temporary suspension of the supranational powers of the commissariat and demanding a 
transitional period in which the EDC would remain purely intergovernmental (Roussel 2007, 292, 
293). This was, in effect, a compromise that strikingly resembled the conditions called for by the 
French generals throughout 1953. The proposals that Mendès France suggested to the Cabinet a cou-
ple days later followed this prescription. 
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ernment in order to probe what would happen in the event that no viable domestic 
compromise could be found.
 405
 The responses to such advances by Spaak and Dulles 
were, as seen above, rather hostile, as Mendès France’s assertion of a lacking majori-
ty was simply not taken seriously. The British response, on the contrary, indicated 
that they would welcome talks (DDF, 81; Roussel 2007, 295).
 406 
The essential problem of any alternative to the EDC that included the UK was that 
the British troop commitment would have to be credible: if the British government 
continued to insist on the right to unilaterally withdraw these troops serving as secu-
rity chips against Germany, no progress over the status quo would be achieved. A 
credible commitment entailed some forming of pooled decision over the right to 
withdraw these troops. However, any form of pooling seemed to remind the British 
government of the European Army concept itself (Jansen 1992, 87). No wonder that 
the British Cabinet hesitated. As long as there was a possibility for the EDC ratifica-
tion, there was no need to consider such a move.
407
  
Seeking alternatives, a secret Anglo-American Study Group of lower level officials 
had been set up in July 1954, tasked with studying what could be done if the French 
government rejected the EDC. The result was, oddly, that the seeking some decou-
                                                 
405
 On July 30
th
 1954, Massigli, French ambassador in London, wrote that he had told Eden upon 
Mendès France’s request that the EDC would be put before parliament, and, in case it failed, that the 
French government had something ‘different’ mind, “être amené à envisager une solution différente, 
pour laqualle un échange de vue franco-anglais serait encore plus nécessaire.” (DDF, 81). 
406
At a tripartite meeting on July 13
th
 1954, Dulles made an explicit threat to Mendès France: he stated 
that aid would – due to Congress initiatives – no longer be forthcoming if the EDC would not be ap-
proved in its present form. When Mendès France answered that there was hardly a majority in the 
French Chamber, Dulles did not accept this. Both subsequently engaged in a historical debate, with 
Dulles comparing the EDC with the close ratification of the American constitution (sic!) (FRUS 1952-
1954 VI-a, 1433-1436). Internally, Dulles even expressed the same suspicions that Mendès France 
had struck a secret deal with the Soviets to bring the EDC down in exchange for his diplomatic victo-
ry at Geneva (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1030). The gloomy reactions documented are indicators that 
there was a certain 'one-sidedness' in the interpretations of possibilities that would soon somewhat 
'paralyse' the State Department (Hoopes 1973, 247; Schwabe 1993, 53). 
407
 Again, differences accrued in the Cabinet concerning the policies to be pursued in case the EDC 
would fail. The discussion ensuing between Eden, Churchill, the Defense Minister Viscount Alexan-
der, centered on the question of what would happen if France actually left NATO. Churchill proposed 
that the planning should go ahead, considering a NATO without prospective French participation 
(Mager 1990, 72). The Minister of Defense Viscount Alexander disagreed. He argued that, with re-
gard to potential American reactions and the prospective loss of the French territory and its strategic 
significance for the defense of Western Europe, France had to be included. “With our worldwide 
commitments, we could not possibly offer additional forces to replace French forces withdrawn, and I 
am sure that the Americans would not be prepared to increase their forces in Europe.” (Mager 1990, 
74). Churchill had proposed to have a trilateral alliance between the United States, Britain and Ger-
many that Alexander rejected. Yet, no final resolution concerning formal commitment was made. 
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pling of Bonn agreements and EDC so that Germany be sovereign without rearma-
ment (Winand 1993,58). This, however, would be unacceptable to Adenauer. 
In the end, Mendès France pursued both alternatives, that is, the possibility of a re-
vised EDC and talks with the UK about an alternative course of action with equal 
vigor. On August 13
th
, the French Cabinet had a 7 hour discussion on the necessary 
proposals to be added to the treaty in order to secure ratification (Roussel 2007, 297). 
Apart from asking Britain again for formal troop commitment on the continent, the 
agreement called for a purely intergovernmental transition period for eight years in 
which the powers of the Commissariat were limited and majority voting would be 
suspended. These suggestions were in accordance with the proposals from Bourgès-
Maunory’s ‘cediste’ faction. In addition, the compromise called for the deletion of 
‘federalist’ Art. 38 of the Paris Treaty (DDF, 147-150; Hitchcock 1998, 254). These 
proposals would be submitted to the Allies in order to renegotiate the EDC at a con-
ference in Brussels. This decision split the Cabinet: the Gaullists Koenig, Lemaire, 
and Chaban-Delmas resigned from their minister posts (Elgey 1992, 207). In sum, 
the French government adopted the line conceived by Bourgès-Maunory. Mendès 
France essentially tried to broker a compromise, accepting the Gaullists’ resignation 
in the end. 
The problem remained: Adenauer remained suspicious, and, in agreement with 
Spaak, rejected a suggestion from Mendès France to meet with the German chancel-
lor before a decision would be made concerning the EDC (Creswell 2006, 154). 
Mendès France reiterated his position to Dulles, provoking an even less diplomatic 
reaction.
408
 In particular, Mendès France maintained that,  
                                                 
408
 Dulles to Mendès France, “[...] if Germany would not be permitted to participate in Western Euro-
pean Defense, he believed that the next Congress would not appropriate a dollar for European military 
aid connected with NATO.” He mentioned that that would result in ‘strongest pressure’ to have pe-
ripheral defense, with ‘incalculable’ damage (FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1433 – 1434). Mendès France 
insisted that there was, at present, no majority for ratification; he did not want to have the EDC ratify 
with a ‘slender’ majority to which Dulles responded, “The Secretary said that he understood that the 
Constitution of the Third French Republic had been passed by only one vote. With respect to the U.S. 
Constitution, two of the key states, New York and Virginia, had ratified the Constitution with only 
one vote. He therefore felt that history proved that a very small majority in such matters did not indi-
cate that the results would be disastrous. Mr. Mendès France said that the issues with respect to the 
adoption of the Constitution of the Third Republic were oversimplified, and the Secretary said that he 
had only repeated what he had heard and was not an expert on this matter. However, he believed the 
reference he had made to the close votes connected with the adoption of the U.S. constitution was 
approximately correct.” Mendès France responded he would not risk it, but try to get a larger majority 
(FRUS 1952-1954 VI-a, 1435-1436). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
438 
 
“[t]here was no possibility of posing the question of confidence as that required prior 
agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet would not be able to reach agreement on 
the question of confidence in any form. He then said that this posed an embarrassing situ-
ation for him as the members of the government would then have to decide how they 
would vote. […].” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074).  
Neither Spaak, nor Adenauer, nor Dulles believed him. Only Italian ambassador 
Quaroni believed Mendès France and suggested to consider his proposals, but the 
Italian Minister of Defense Taviani thought that the protocols deprived the Treaty of 
its nature (Magagnoli 1999, 288). Beyen’s reaction was similar 
As Mendès France’s proposal was relayed to the EDC signatories ahead of the Brus-
sels conference, Hallstein complained to the Belgian ambassador in Bonn that these 
were a ‘Brüskierung’ of the previous efforts, highly ‘irritated’ the German govern-
ment, and that Adenauer was still unsure whether he should even attend (De Vos, et 
al. 1998, 369). In his memoirs, Adenauer held steadfast to the view that the proposals 
were simply not earnest.
 409
 Although Adenauer participated in the Brussels confer-
ence, he refused a number of advances by Mendès France to have direct French-
German discussions to work out a compromise (Gersdorff 1993, 317; Schwarz 1995, 
108). Seeking a resolution, he followed David Bruce’s assessment that the proposals 
were unacceptable, would damage the ‘cause of Europe’ and that one now had to 
choose between the alternatives.
410
 Only after the conference had closed and rejected 
the offer by Mendès France, did he meet with him.  
The more interesting aspect of Mendès France’s proposals, however, is that the 
‘united front’ against Mendès France rejected an agreement which, in essence, did 
nothing more than foreshadow the agreement contained in the Treaties of Rome and 
the subsequent ‘Luxembourg compromise’. As Spaak’s notes from the conference 
indicate,  
  
                                                 
409
 “Ich hielt Mendès France für zu intelligent, als daß er sich nicht dessen bewußt wäre, daß es hier 
um grundlegende Abänderungen ginge, die die anderen Parlamente nicht hinnehmen konnten. Mendès 
France bestritt dies, wie mir Spaak sagte, obwohl seine Argumente sehr schwach waren. Die französi-
schen Sozialisten würden ihm nicht zustimmen, die MRP ebenso wenig. Die Gaullisten würden auch 
dagegen stimmen. Wie sollte er dann eine Mehrheit finden?” (Adenauer 1980, 276). 
410
 In his memoirs, Adenauer wrote, “Es wäre auch für den europäischen Gedanken besser, mit der 
EVG endlich - ob positiv oder negativ - zu einem Ergebnis zu gelangen. Auch Spaak hatte das Gefühl, 
die Amerikaner hätten nun genug und drängten nicht mehr auf Kompromisse. Ich gab Spaak davon 
Kenntnis, daß mir ein maßgeblicher Amerikaner, David Bruce, eindeutig erklärt hatte, ein Kompro-
miss sei unmöglich. Man müsse jetzt wählen. ” (Adenauer 1980, 278). 
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“To this end, France has proposed a system that gives her, as indeed all other countries as 
well, a real veto power […]. To the French system, I have three objections to make: 1) 
This system is in fact a provisional system since it devices a suspension of the Treaty for 
eight years in one of its most essential parts […] 2) For general reasons explained on mul-
tiple occasions, veto power paralyzes international assemblies. We have been through too 
many examples; 3) In the French system, the utmost arbitrariness rules, since each state is 
free at any time to make any decision when its vital interests are at stake [sic!].”411  
Anticipating the failure of the Brussels conferences, Mendès France had arranged for 
talks with Eden and Churchill after the Brussels conference in Chartwell on August 
23
rd
 1954 (MAE 1955, 135-138). In these talks, Mendès France indicated that he was 
not going to turn the vote on the EDC into a vote of confidence, that the Cabinet 
would dissolve in that case, and that a quick alternative solution would have to be 
found to prevent the US from adopting a peripheral strategy.
 412
 Eden agreed. 
Churchill was surprised to hear that Mendès France “was much keener about NATO” 
(Winand 1993, 60). He concluded that the Americans “ought to have seen that EDC 
was hopeless a year ago.” (Winand 1993, 60). In essence, Mendès France proposed 
“a little box in NATO”, to contain German rearmament and to restore full sovereign-
ty to Germany (Creswell 2006, 155). Thus, it was only after the Brussels conference, 
when it had become clear that the conditions for the EDC would never be met, that 
the eventual WEU solution began to take shape behind closed doors. As soon as the 
British realized that – if the EDC would in fact be rejected – a permanent troop 
commitment would be necessary in order to prevent the United States from adopting 
the peripheral strategy, UK officials starting considering integrating Germany and a 
limited number of British troops under the control of the Brussels Treaty of 1947.
413
 
It took four years of haggling over the EDC and the clear prospects of the failure of 
                                                 
411
 Own translation from “A cet effet, la France a proposé un système qui lui donne, comme d’ailleurs 
aux autres pays, un véritable droit de veto […]. Au système Français, j’ai trois objections à présenter: 
1) Ce système étant un système provisoire en réalité, consacre une suspension du Traite dans une de 
ses parties essentielles pour huit ans […] 2) Pour des raisons d’ordre général expliquées à de multiple 
reprises, le droit de veto paralyse les assemblées internationales. Nous n’en avons eu que trop 
d’exemples ; 3) Dans le système français, l’arbitraire le plus complet règne, puisque chaque Etat est 
libre de décider à tout moment devant n’importe quelle décision que son intérêt vital est en cause 
[sic !].” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 374). 
412
 In a memo to the US ambassador, Mendès France is reported of saying that “there was no possibil-
ity of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the 
Cabinet would not be able to reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said 
that this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have 
to decide how they would vote. […].” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074). 
413
 Macmillan asked how to make the NATO solution more appealing if “for this purpose, N.A.T.O. 
could be made at least appear to have been modified in the direction of the European idea. Was it 
possible, for example, for Germany formally to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which continued to 
subsist within the North Atlantic Treaty?” (Maier 1989, 225). 
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the Western alliance for the realization to take effect. Roughly similar solutions start-
ed to circulate in the French government.
414
 Thus, knowing that alternatives were 
indeed available, it is no wonder that Mendès France did not press for a vote of con-
fidence in the French Assemblée Nationale. Supposing that his primary goal was to 
stay in power, and not risk his tenure because of a European Army, this makes sense 
indeed. There is no need to recount in detail the well-known process by which the 
EDC was rejected in the Assemblée Nationale (Roussel 2007, 312).
415
 It would, 
henceforth, come to be known as the ‘crime du 30 août’ (Clesse 1989). After the 
rejection, on August 31
st
, former Gaullist ministers, Koenig, Lemaire, and Chaban-
Delmas reentered the government, replacing three ‘cediste’ ministers who, disap-
pointed over the procedure, left the government, among them Bourgès-Maunory 
(Rioux 1983, 55). 
It is difficult to speculate whether an agreement on Mendès France’s conditions 
would have made the EDC possible. It is certain, however, that the immediate reac-
tion was one of utter disappontment. A close advisor to Adenauer, Felix von Eck-
hardt, stated that ‘he had never seen the chancellor so depressed.’(Schwarz 1995, 
112).
416
 Dulles congratulated his ‘dear friend’ Spaak for his ‘efforts’ to save the 
EDC.
417
 
                                                 
414
 When Mendès France eventual US reactions to a rejection of the EDC he suggested the possible 
alternative “This agreement would have no discriminations against Germany and would have no su-
pranational features […] a little box in the big NATO […] He felt that because of the tie-up with Eng-
land this would be a way of getting the French parliament and people to accept German entry into 
NATO.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1074). Thus, the ‘tie-up’ with ‘England’ along an institutional di-
mension had already been established. On August 25
th
, French ambassador in London Massigli indi-
cated that, after having talked to British officials, he was told that the United Kingdom would be will-
ing to enter into closer association within a ‘little box within NATO’ and was considering troop com-
mitment that had been a crucial French demand all along (DDF, 209, 210, 217). 
415
 When the EDC was voted down “Communists and Gaullists alike locked arms and serenaded the 
chamber with the Marseillaise.” (Creswell 2006, 158). 
416
 In his memoirs, Adenauer wrote of a “Schwarzer Tag für Europa“ (Adenauer 1980, 289). 
417
 Dulles wrote to Adenauer on August 31
st
 1954, “My DEAR FRIEND: The action of the French 
National Assembly in rejecting, even without full debate, the European Defense Community Treaty is, 
I know, a bitter disappointment to you as it is to me. David Bruce has relayed your comments to me. 
You have done everything that anyone could do to bring about the realization of this bold concept 
which held such hopeful significance for the future of Europe and our Western Alliance. I want you to 
know how deeply I and my fellow Americans appreciate your strenuous and imaginative efforts over 
the years and in particular during these last critical weeks. The qualities of true statesmanship which 
you have displayed have won the admiration and respect of all of us.” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-a, 1119). 
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Summary 
In many ways, these events reveal the irreconcilable situation that had been created. 
The basic conditions that – during the heyday of the ‘third force’ in France – had 
been advanced by the French Assemblée Nationale had never been fulfilled to any 
extend acceptable even for these parties to ratify the Treaty. Adenauer and others at 
the Brussels conference put their last hope on the fact that the French Socialists 
would be able to successfully enforce party discipline although about half its depu-
ties that had already committed publicly to vote against the EDC. Doubting the ‘Eu-
ropean credentials’ of the new French government, the resulting refusal to negotiate 
seriously the conditions put forth by Mendès France made sure that the only politi-
cally viable strategy for the French government was to ensure that a politically viable 
alternative would exist once the EDC was rejected. 
 
The ‘London Miracle’ and the WEU Treaty 
418
 
The immediate reaction by the State Department was to reiterate that the “prevention 
of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be 
dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging 
certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.”419 Despite such 
assertions, the eventual solution to the ‘German problem’ emerged relatively quick. 
Two days after the meeting at Chartwell, as already indicated, the French ambassa-
dor Massigli wrote to Mendès France reiterating the potential compromise (DDF, 
209, 210, 217). On August 26
th
, Eden circulated a memorandum opposing what 
Churchill had contemplated earlier, namely the isolation of France to press the 
French into acceptance. Eden called for an eight-power conference followed by a 
                                                 
418
 From a note by Belgian Ambassador Silvercruys to Paul-Henri Spaak on January 13
th
  1954, “La 
confiance restaurées par le miracle de Londres […].” (De Vos, et al. 1998, 379). 
419
 “The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts: (a) the effective defense of 
Continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, including 
the Germans themselves, would avoid national re-armament in a form which could be misused by 
resurgent militarism; (b) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be dis-
criminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by 
others as part of a collective international order; (c) The prevention of war between neighboring na-
tions which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promis-
es or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institu-
tions.” (Drafted by Dulles) (FRUS 1952-1954 V-a, 1120). 
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NATO conference. No mentioning of permanent commitments was made (Mager 
1990, 79). What was clear, in difference to the United States, was that Eden thought 
it would be of prime importance to act swiftly if ‘Germany was not to be lost’ (Maier 
1989, 225). On August 27
th
, the cabinet convened to discuss what to do after the 
French had rejected the plan. Churchill stated that France might accept a NATO so-
lution. Macmillan asked how to make the NATO solution more appealing,  
“[…] if, for this purpose, NATO could be made to at least appear to have been modified 
in the direction of the European idea. Was it possible, for example, for Germany formally 
to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which continued to subsist within the North Atlantic 
Treaty?” (Quoted in Maier 1989, 225). 
Eden, Macmillan and the Foreign Office preferred this solution, since it might enable 
bipartisan consensus (Deighton 1998, 184). Thus, a quite broad consensus emerged 
within the Cabinet although some such as Minister of Commonwealth, Viscount 
Swinton, opposed any plans that would bind the British closer the continent. The 
Cabinet agreed to have Eden pursue the Brussels alternative (Mager 1990, 89). 
Although there had been plans set up by the British and US governments for the con-
tingency that the EDC would be rejected – essentially stipulating that German sover-
eignty should be restored, coupled with a unilateral renunciation of sovereign pre-
rogatives of rearmament by Adenauer – the US High Commissioners “were taken by 
surprise when Adenauer rejected these proposals […].” (Noack 1977, 85; Dockrill 
1991, 141; Deighton 1998, 189). Adenauer now insisted on German sovereignty, 
rejected a revival of the EDC and demanded entry into NATO, taking up the cautious 
promises made by Mendès France at the end of the Brussels conference (Herbst 
1996, 101).
420
 He concluded that it was time to demand full sovereignty, “We adhere 
to our previous European stance. It was successful until now. It has led us to the for-
eign policy position we are currently taking. We can now issue demands to the three 
occupying powers […].“421 These demands took up the skepticism of the military 
                                                 
420
 These conditions were developed in the Kabinett already on September 1
st
 1954, “1) Fortsetzung 
der Politik der europäischen politischen Integration. Zurückstellung der militärischen Integration in 
Konsultation mit den Ländern, die die EVG ratifiziert haben oder unmittelbar vor der Ratifizierung 
stehen. 2. Souveränität. 3. Teilnahme an der westlichen Verteidigung ohne Diskriminierung. 4. Ab-
schluß von Verträgen über Aufenthalt von Truppen anderer Länder in der Bundesrepublik. 5” (Son-
dersitzung der Bundesregierung am Mittwoch, den 1. September 1954)  
< http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1954k/kap1_2/kap2_33/para3_1.html >. 
421
 Own translation from “Wir halten fest an der bisherigen Europa-Politik. Diese Politik hat Erfolge 
gehabt. Sie hat uns zu der außenpolitischen Stellung geführt, die wir einnehmen. Wir haben jetzt For-
derungen an die drei Besatzungsmächte zu stellen […].” (Sondersitzung der Bundesregierung am 
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planners at the Amt Blank, who feared an ‘organizational disaster’ in the European 
army, mirroring similar assessments at the Allied headquarters in Europe (Large 
1996, 214). Spaak, in a virtual reversal of his earlier position, now made the proposal 
to renegotiate the EDC Treaty by cutting the power of the Commissariat, to expand 
the range of decisions to be taken by the Council, and to institutionalize a similar 
moratorium on QMV as Mendès France had proposed (Gersdorff 1993, 320). In the 
Assemblée Nationale, Mayer, Pinay, and Reynaud initialized a motion that sought to 
oblige the government to take up Spaak’s proposal.422 Monnet would eventually 
warn Dulles that the British suggestions were “a camouflage and [a] dangerous de-
coy because it would give [the] impression that European unity can be achieved 
without transferring powers of decision to common institutions.” (Winand 1993, 62). 
Although Blankenhorn supported this view, Adenauer insisted on his line (Schwarz 
1995, 112). 
The British government reached its conclusions quite fast (Mager 1990, 49; Jansen 
1992, 172). A week later, the British cabinet was already debating to revive the Brus-
sels Treaty, to create a “European box inside an Atlantic box” (Dockrill 1991, 142; 
Macmillan 2003, 353). The Brussels Treaty had the advantage of not ‘seeming’ su-
pranational, whereas the nutshell of the institutional solution was, in fact, suprana-
tional. Britain would station troops on the Rhine to allay French security concerns. 
The right to withdraw these troops, as well as control over German military organiza-
tion would be exercised by the Council of the Brussels Treaty, thereby extending 
majority decisions to extremely limited issues. The essential solution had material-
ized.
423
 The only substantial objections came from Churchill (Mager 1990, 102; 
Jansen 1992, 174). While the Quai d’Orsay had reached the same conclusion, Eden 
toured European Capitals to mobilize support for German integration into NATO 
under the control of the Council of the Brussels Treaty. Although Eden and Churchill 
still had doubts – thus Eden did not mention the specific stage of planning to Mendès 
                                                                                                                                          
Mittwoch, den 1. September 1954) < http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k 
/k1954k/kap1_2/kap2_33/para3_1.html >. 
422
 “Strategy meeting of pro-EDC elements in Assembly had disclosed their growing cohesion and 
determination to block any alternative policy which Mendes might propose. Group led by Schuman, 
Rene Mayer, Pinay and Reynaud had decided to introduce motion for adjournment of debate and 
resumption of negotiations in the light of Spaak proposals […]” (FRUS 1952-1954 V-b, 1084). 
423
 On September 27
th
 1954, Eden prepared the memorandum for the Cabinet, “[…] it will be neces-
sary for the French to face some unpleasant realities. They will have to accept German sovereignty 
and German membership of N.A.T.O. and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If 
they are to do this, they must be given some striking quid pro quo.” (Mager 1990, 118). 
Chapter7 Transnational Conflict, Domestic Conflict, and the EDC Bargain 
 
444 
 
France in Paris – the British cabinet, with the exception of Churchill, slowly began 
realizing the necessity of a British troop commitment (Mager 1990, 113; Deighton 
1998, 191; Hitchcock 1998, 198, 256). Securing ratification in France this time was 
the last chance to save the alliance and prevent the US from pulling its troops out of 
continental Europe. These fears were aggravated by continuing threats from Dulles 
to adopt the ‘peripheral strategy’. The last resistance in the British Cabinet were 
largely overcome when Foreign Secretary deputy Nutting and the British ambassador 
in Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb agreed and told Eden that troops were necessary upon his 
arrival in Paris.
424
  
When the Brussels conference convened, two announcements provided for a ‘break-
through’, providing for the agreement that the Allies had missed for four years. Eden 
announced that All British armed forces currently on the continent – about four divi-
sions and several hundred air planes – would not be withdrawn against will of a ma-
jority of members of the WEU (also Eden 1960, 166; Dockrill 1991, 145).
425
. Aden-
auer had agreed to a voluntary abrogation of the right to produce ABC-weapons and 
other heavy equipment – Germany had won a considerable amount of autonomy, and 
was now a member of NATO (Herbst 1996, 103). More importantly, given that the 
France’s gravest security concerns had been addressed, and that Germany had bene-
fited from the new arrangement, an agreement on the Saar was finally found at the 
same time (Elgey 1992, 254). René Massigli’s reaction was, “for fifty years – ever 
since 1905 – French public opinion has waited for this announcement: and at last we 
have it.” (Mager 1990, 122). Spaak apparently related the Kielmansegg, “Tell your 
chancellor, he is a greater European than I am.” (Large 1996, 218). The Italian dele-
gation was initially highly critical of Eden’s compromise proposals. However, as the 
objective was to avoid another breakdown of the negotiations, it had little choice but 
to accept the Treaty (Magagnoli 1999, 303). Beyen, disappointed, gave in to “a lam-
entable but undeniable reality” (Harryvan 2009, 71). Spaak, relieved about the break-
through, sought to instill a rudimentary parliament as a last resort (De Vos, et al. 
                                                 
424
 “Jebb and I had had a talk before Eden’s arrival and had found that we both agreed that the only 
hope of getting Mendès France to accept our Brussels Treaty solution was a British guarantee to leave 
our troops on the Continent for the duration of the Treaty. We put this to Eden who reacted like a 
kicking mule.”(Mager 1990, 110). 
425
Macmillan in his diary, “So the great plan is launched for which we have worked at Strasbourg and 
elsewhere for more than 5 years. The federal system of the EDC is dead; the confederal system of 
Western European Union is very much alive [...] It has been a real pleasure to see England leading 
Europe.” (Macmillan 2003, 363). 
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1998, 396). Blank maintained that the WEU was an immense success, having over-
come French resistance to allow Germany “playing an equal role on the stage of in-
ternational politics.” (Large 1996, 224). 
Still, the ratification of the new arrangement did not go smoothly in France. Leaders 
from the right complained about insufficient safeguards on German rearmament 
(Roussel 2007, 372). Palewski (Gaullists), some leaders of the URSS, and Edouard 
Herriot demanded another effort for talks with before admitting Germany to NATO 
(Roussel 2007, 373). As the debate opened on December 20
th
, opposition emerged 
again in the ranks of the Radicals and other prominent members of the chamber 
(Massigli 1978, 489). Not linked to a vote of confidence, the rejection of the first 
motion on the Paris agreements ruined the deputies’ Christmas. As a reaction, there 
were Allied threats, most prominently from Eden, that German rearmament would 
proceed with or without France (Massigli 1978, 491; Roussel 2007, 374). After being 
turned into a vote of confidence the treaty initiating the new Western European Un-
ion was ratified in France on December the 28
th 
(Roussel 2007, 375). Blankenhorn 
concluded, “I wish we had been in contact with this man for a longer time. A lot of 
misunderstandings could have been prevented. We have seen the things happening in 
Paris a bit too much through the eyes of our MRP friends.”426 In Germany, opposi-
tion to rearmament mounted, before the vote on the WEU was passed by a comforta-
ble margin in February 1954. Mendès France was ousted from government in Febru-
ary 1955 because of a failed vote of confidence before the WEU Treaty entered into 
force in May 1955.  
 
Summary 
In as much as the influence of supranational and federalist ideas advocated by core 
actors of the transnational coalition led the bargain along the EDC track, they effect-
ed a peculiar bias in the ways in which actors particularly in Germany and the US but 
other individuals such as Spaak processed information. US decision makers seemed 
to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the German leadership 
seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the increasingly bleak 
                                                 
426
 Own translation from “Ich wollte wir hätten schon lange mit diesem Mann Kontakt. Viele Mißver-
ständnisse wären uns erspart geblieben. Wir haben die Dinge in Paris halt ein wenig zu sehr durch die 
Brille unserer MRP Freunde gesehen.” (Blankenhorn 1980, 198). 
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assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Belgian Foreign Minis-
ter, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors, providing evidence 
that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments. The one-sided way in 
which the strategic assessments reflected similar assessments as had been circulated 
by Teitgen to Blankenhorn and Brentano in the Geneva Circle. 
They were on particular display when the governments of the Six received new con-
ditions put forth by Mendès France. The isolation of the new French government 
from the transnational circles – as already suggested by the structural analyses in 
chapter 5 – certainly did coincide with altered preferences: Mendès France did not 
seek or prefer a supranational army. At the same time, he sought a sincere compro-
mise. That sincerity, however, was doubted heavily, in particular among those actors 
in government who had heavily invested in the realization of the EDC. As a result, 
Mendès France was met with extreme mistrust and accusations of having made se-
cret deals with Soviet leaders to demolish the EDC Treaty. The conditions that Men-
dès France put forward – most importantly the abolishment of Art. 38 and a morato-
rium of eight years on majority decisions in the EDC Council of Ministers – were not 
even considered seriously by the assembled foreign ministers in Brussels in early 
August 1954. By sticking to a widely held view that there was a majority in the 
French Assemblée Nationale, actors such as Adenauer and Spaak rejected an institu-
tional compromise they would, grosso modo, agree upon four years later. In as much 
as these actors’ ideological proximity and mutual trust successfully may have been 
the precondition for the successful reconciliation among former enemies of the war, 
it provided for inefficiencies as well.  
As it turned out, it was only through a round-about rejection of the ill-fated treaty 
that the broad basis for agreement could emerge. Faced with prospect of the failure 
of the Alliance, the French and the British governments engaged in a crucial quid pro 
quo: British troops for German entry into NATO. Moreover, Adenauer’s insisted to 
leave the EDC Treaty in its grave amply demonstrates that the strong preferences for 
a supranational army – still shared by his associates, Blankenhorn and Brentano a 
few days after the treaty was rejected – was not a question of principle. If German 
sovereignty could be had, national interests trumped European ambitions. 
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7.3 Summary: Power, Ideas, and Information 
This chapter has drawn together the various threads of this dissertation. In the first 
section, I have demonstrated that the transnational conflict over European institutions 
described structurally and ideologically in chapters 5 and 6, was felt in all European 
countries, although to varying degrees. To be sure, geopolitical incentives certainly 
mattered. In every case, actors formulated their demands in the terms of the per-
ceived ‘national interest’ that had to take objective material and geostrategic realities 
into account. Moreover, there are clearly identifiable differences that are seemingly 
related to geopolitical context. First, there is a recognizable difference between the 
larger and the smaller countries on the continent that accounts for common fears of 
autonomy loss in the smaller countries, a tendency already identified when analyzing 
the transnational conflict. Thus in the smaller European countries, radical federalist 
demands are much less prevalent, whereas demands for further economic integration 
are largely as consensus matter, reflecting an agreement on the ‘national interests’. 
Second, in both Germany and Italy, there is a tendency to view the supranational 
institutions as a means to gain recognition and influence. 
At the same time, the causal and strategic beliefs underlying the demand differences 
and thus the transnational conflict clearly influenced the link between material con-
text and domestic demands. There is a tractable impact of the transnational conflict 
on the domestic divisions, both within and across parties, that is mediated by the do-
mestic political conditions and institutions. Thus, consistent with the basic properties 
of the transnational conflict, all Socialist parties in the European countries were 
marked by relatively high degrees of internal conflict whereas Christian Democratic 
parties, in particular in the larger continental countries were more inclined to demand 
the creation of supranational institutions with appropriate democratic institutions to 
create a European Army. The extent of the conflict varied and depended on national 
conditions. In Italy and France, it divided the French SFIO heavily and reinforced 
divisions between the two existent Italian Social Democratic Parties. In Germany, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands, the role of the party leadership seemed decisive: 
whereas the leadership in Germany and the Netherlands was relatively remote from 
the Europeanist transnational networks, the leadership in Belgium (Spaak) was part 
of its most active core. As a result, the German SPD enforced its core principles of 
objecting to the new European institutions and the pooling and delegation of sover-
eignty, the Dutch PvdA remained largely quiet over its internal divisions, and the 
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leadership of the Belgian BSP-PSB, the party being divided as well, actively criti-
cized the Belgian leadership of obstructing EDC negotiations in 1951. Moreover, the 
relative lack of influence of federalist Labour actors – who were certainly present 
transnationally (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1) – indicates that impact is dependent not 
on transnational factors (H6), but on national embeddedness and support (H7).  
Thus, the Christian Democratic leadership in Belgium pursued essentially similar 
objectives as the Dutch multiparty government but was challenged heavily by the 
Social Democratic leadership under Spaak. In sum, there is a disconnect between the 
distribution of capabilities and the geopolitical incentives on the one hand and the 
dominant demands on the other hand, different to the direct relationship put forth by 
intergovernmentalism (H1). Domestic elites that are active in the transnational com-
munities pursuing supranational or federal models of post-war Europe tend to do so, 
with exceptions, with regard to the problem of German rearmament within domestic 
political conflict. Domestic elites that are remote from these communities tend to fall 
within basic intergovernmental expectations: conservative Italian and German elites 
tend view the EDC favorably from an instrumental point of view as increasing their 
international influence, whereas others favor classic Alliance solutions to the German 
problem that preserve national sovereignty (i.e. the Gaullists in France), or deny the 
existential threat posed by the Soviet government and thus the necessity of balancing 
efforts and associated institutions (i.e. .some British, French and German Social 
Democrats). This picture is complicated by the extent to which domestic institutions 
amplified or reduced the impact of the transnational conflict. Thus, in as much as 
French domestic conditions were insufficient to structure domestic conflict, the ef-
fective consociational context in the Netherlands silenced existing differences be-
tween the government and the Tweede Kammer. 
In sum, the degree of domestic conflict and the differences over preferred institution-
al designs for post-war Europe and the ‘German question’, within and across parties, 
was sufficient to potentially affect governments and thus the formation of state pref-
erences in its own right, albeit in a varied manner, depending on the quality of do-
mestic institutions and mediated by the geopolitical context of every country. In this 
sense, the rationale for transnational networking, as described in chapter 2 can be 
seen relatively easily: amid a relatively clear geostrategic challenge for all European 
governments, there were still sufficient domestic differences over the concrete 
measures of how to meet that challenge. Similarities between individuals across 
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states, as described in the previous chapter, were sufficient as to warrant strategic 
coordination and to constitute a nascent transnational conflict over European institu-
tions. 
The second section then proceeded to ask whether the signs of the transnational con-
flict within the processes of ‘demand formation’ within the bargaining states translat-
ed into distinct patterns preference formation and strategic choice of the negotiating 
states? Does considering the transnational conflict and its implications contribute to a 
better understanding of the EDC bargain? This chapter has shown that the relation-
ship between the intergovernmental and the transnational hypotheses is one of neces-
sity and sufficiency.  
Thus, actors continued to pursue perceived ‘national interests’ and thus material cir-
cumstances and geopolitical incentives mattered. The German government and, more 
explicitly, the Italian government clearly perceived a supranational army to be in 
accordance with a particular view of the ‘national interest’. Without the Korean War 
and a perceived Soviet threat, negotiations on a European Army in particular and 
German rearmament in general would not have begun, conforming the necessary 
status of Hypothesis 3. Without US pressure exerted on European governments to 
come to an agreement, the negotiations would likely have taken longer, confirming 
the necessary status of Hypothesis 1. Without French internal differences that al-
lowed the credible signal of domestic constraints, the negotiations would likely have 
taken the course that was seemingly preferred by all governments except the French 
in 1950, namely German entry into NATO accompanied by suitable institutional 
safeguards as suggested by the ‘package deal’, confirming the necessary status of 
Hypothesis 5. Finally, there are clearly discernible differences between the smaller 
and the larger countries that, from 1951 onwards, clearly fall in line with intergov-
ernmentalist expectations. 
These considerations, however, equally demonstrate that key developments cannot 
be accounted for sufficiently from the intergovernmental point of view without tak-
ing into account the evidence in line with transnationalist hypotheses (H7 – H10). 
The French divisions implied that a particular version of the French national interest 
– shared by Monnet, Schuman and others – vehemently pushed for a European army 
against mounting domestic scepticism and at considerable risk, in particular whether 
it would be possible to muster sufficient domestic support for their own project. The 
supranational option, initially considered and discarded by the US government, was 
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taken in 1951 then largely on account of the activities of Monnet and Schuman in 
France, McCloy and Bruce in brokering a French-German agreement on institutional 
equality and convincing their own government to pursue that course – the outlines of 
which had been exchanged freely for a while in the Geneva Circle as the previous 
chapter has demonstrated – and federalist pressure on the Italian government to re-
consider its position. In every case, governments staffed with individuals that were 
ideologically close to the emerging transnational coalition deemed their choices in 
the national interests; in every case, there were other compatriots – especially in the 
military establishment of each country – who saw it differently. Thus, in as much as 
French domestic constraints and US power mattered, ideas and assessment transmit-
ted and coordinated within transgovernmental and transnational circles pushed the 
bargain along a supranational track. 
Moreover, as the rejection of the Eden Plan demonstrated, transnational influence 
was predicated on access to governments. Thus, Spaak’s proposal for a distinct con-
stitutional Assembly was beaten in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope but accepted by the governments of the Six. Adopted as a strategy to improve 
the ratification chances of the EDC, this move would backfire soon. 
Although the EDC ratification in Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Germany made 
progress, the fate of the EDC seemed sufficiently uncertain to prompt the UK Cabi-
net to debate repeatedly about possible alternative solutions. France and Italy seemed 
particularly troubling. The underlying ideological convictions of both the French and 
the Italian governmental coalitions shifted. In Italy, the cabinets no longer subscribed 
to the federalist interpretation of the Italian ‘national interests’; seeking Allied sup-
port in Trieste and relying on increasingly nationalist deputies for support, the ratifi-
cation procedure was delayed significantly. French Cabinets relied increasingly on 
Gaullist support and public agitation against the EDC Treaty In both cases, thus, ge-
opolitical incentives and a shifting proximity of governmental cabinets to the trans-
national coalition mattered. The latter ensured that ideological preferences for supra-
national solutions to the German problem became less salient as geopolitical devel-
opments such as Stalin’s death made it seem less and less imperative. Again geopo-
litical incentives, as summarized in H3 and H4, are necessary but insufficient: thus, 
Stalin’s death and the perspective of détente did not alter the ratification prospects in 
Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. In France and Italy, domestic instability 
shifted the control of parliamentary majorities and governments away from the influ-
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ence of individuals in proximity to the transnational coalition and thus, in line with 
Hypothesis 8, shifted French and Italian bargaining positions. 
Finally, the US government in particular exhibited a peculiar ideological bias: 
whereas Truman administration had been highly skeptical of the supranational army 
solution, Eisenhower and Dulles wholeheartedly followed the ideas that had, earlier, 
been advocated by McCloy, Bruce and Monnet. In particular, the refusal to consider, 
internally, possible alternative courses of action against the advice of senior officials 
in the Policy Planning Staff is a case in point. This bias in strategic planning 
preempted more serious consultations with the British government – which had in 
fact begun to prepare for the failure of the EDC – and produced incentives to delay 
ratification particularly In France and Italy. A similar picture of necessity and suffi-
ciency emerges with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important con-
straint as was the domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the 
transnational coalitions to push the bargain along the supranational track was predi-
cated on both. Without considering that coalition, however, the course of the bargain 
cannot be sufficiently explained. Thus, by 1953, the EDC ‘bargain’ had reached an 
impasse. The subsequent widespread regret over the inability to resolve that impasse 
before the rejection of the Treaty in 1954 testifies to the dysfunctional constellation 
of incentives that had come about. 
In as much as the influence of supranational and federalist ideas advocated by core 
actors of the transnational coalition led the bargain along the EDC track, they effect-
ed a peculiar bias in the ways in which actors particularly in Germany and the US but 
other individuals such as Spaak processed information. US decision makers seemed 
to discard information regarding the dim ratification chances; the German leadership 
seemed to trust its sources in the Geneva Circle more than the increasingly bleak 
assessments from the embassy in Paris. Even Spaak, by 1954 Belgian Foreign Minis-
ter, converged on similar strategic assessments as these actors, providing evidence 
that these circles coordinated their strategic assessments. The one-sided way in 
which the strategic assessments reflected similar assessments as had been circulated 
by Teitgen to Blankenhorn and Brentano in the Geneva Circle. 
They were on particular display when the governments of the Six received new con-
ditions put forth by Mendès France. The isolation of the new French government 
from the transnational circles – as already suggested by the structural analyses in 
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chapter 5 – certainly did coincide with altered preferences: Mendès France did not 
seek or prefer a supranational army. At the same time, he sought a sincere compro-
mise. That sincerity, however, was doubted heavily, in particular among those actors 
in government who had heavily invested in the realization of the EDC. As a result, 
Mendès France was met with extreme mistrust and accusations of having made se-
cret deals with Soviet leaders to demolish the EDC Treaty. The conditions that Men-
dès France put forward – most importantly the abolishment of Art. 38 and a morato-
rium of eight years on majority decisions in the EDC Council of Ministers – were not 
even considered seriously by the assembled foreign ministers in Brussels in early 
August 1954. By sticking to a widely held view that there was a majority in the 
French Assemblée Nationale, actors such as Adenauer and Spaak rejected an institu-
tional compromise they would, grosso modo, agree upon four years later. In as much 
as these actors’ ideological proximity and mutual trust successfully may have been 
the precondition for the successful reconciliation among former enemies of the war, 
it provided for inefficiencies as well.  
As it turned out, it was only through a round-about rejection of the ill-fated treaty 
that the broad basis for agreement could emerge. Faced with prospect of the failure 
of the Alliance, the French and the British governments engaged in a crucial quid pro 
quo: British troops for German entry into NATO. Moreover, Adenauer’s insisted to 
leave the EDC Treaty in its grave amply demonstrates that the strong preferences for 
a supranational army – still shared by his associates, Blankenhorn and Brentano a 
few days after the treaty was rejected – was not a question of principle. If German 
sovereignty could be had, national interests trumped European ambitions. 
Thus, the factors summarized by the intergovernmental hypotheses 1 to 5 are neces-
sary to understand the general incentives characterizing the bargain but insufficient 
to explain its course. A sufficient explanation can only be achieved by considering 
the transnational framework. A similar picture of necessity and sufficiency emerges 
with regard to bargaining power: US power was an important constraint as was the 
domestic volatility of French governments (H4). The ability of the transnational coa-
litions to push the bargain along the supranational track – captured by hypotheses 9 
and 10 was predicated on both. At the same time, without the privileged access of the 
transnational coalition to governments and its ability to insert its reasoning into the 
strategic considerations of the bargaining governments, the bargain would have 
played out differently. 
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8. Conclusion 
Political integration in post-war Europe began with a rhetorical ambition. Although 
expressed in vague words and meaning and open to interpretation, the ambition of 
‘European unity’ was ubiquitously subscribed in most elite circles in the European 
ruins of the Second World War. As the tensions of the Cold War nurtured an increas-
ing sense of threat in Western Europe, that ambition resulted in two treaties being 
signed in Paris in 1951 and 1952. While the former – the ECSC Treaty – was and 
remains the historically recognized landmark that launched the integration project, 
the latter is a largely apocryphal part of the integration narrative. Some scholars in-
terpret its intended scope as well as its failure to be a result of utopian federalist am-
bitions; others attribute it to a distinct geopolitical situation in post-war Europe. As 
the review of the available scholarly literature – undertaken in chapter 3 – pointed 
out –both versions fit within a larger grand explanation of European integration re-
sulting from the distinct geopolitical environment of the Cold War and a need for 
credible commitments between the French and German governments as well general-
ly converging economic interests. Despite different emphases in the scholarly litera-
ture, the agreement is that the EDC was due to peculiar circumstances. Some refer to 
an unusual geopolitical situation due to the Korean War, others point to a brief mo-
ment of exceptional influence of federalist ideas. The commonality in both views is 
expressed in a textbook introduction to European integration history which points out 
“[…] the collapse of [the EDC] and the failure of subsequent initiatives along similar 
lines clearly indicate the limits on European integration in the 1950s and beyond.” 
(Dinan 2004, 27). While superficially correct, the preceding chapters have demon-
strated that the causes of the EDC were more intricate. Grappling with the puzzle of 
the EDC sheds light on a number of substantive questions, both with regard to the 
history of European integration in particular as well as more general issues pertaining 
to the role and impact of ideas and transnational networks in interstate bargaining. 
 
The Puzzle of the EDC 
As chapter 4 has pointed out, the EDC period presents an interesting puzzle for con-
ventional theories of intergovernmental cooperation. Devised as a solution to the 
‘German problem’ in post-war Europe, the contents of the EDC Treaty and the asso-
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ciated European Political Community were radical and went far beyond the degree of 
pooling, delegation, and democratic representation that is in place today (Rittberger 
2009). On the other hand, the organization it was replaced with – the Western Euro-
pean Union – presents a text-book case to the credible commitments problem in in-
terstate cooperation and fits remarkably well with conventional arguments that ex-
plain institutional design choice by recourse to efficiency arguments. Accordingly, 
the question that arose was: Why did the negotiating states pursue such radical 
course of action? Why propose the creation of a supranational armies among former 
enemies five years after the Second World War when an obvious institutional solu-
tion, expected by conventional theories of intergovernmental cooperation, was in 
plain sight all along? 
As this dissertation has shown, seeking to understand these intricacies sheds light not 
only on the contingency within the historical trajectory of the European project but 
also on more substantive issues. As chapter 6 has demonstrated, the sources of that 
explanation lie in the fact that the political rhetoric about ‘European unity’ emanated 
from the first politically effective and transnationally motivated project of unification 
on the European continent. At the same time, the basic purpose of this project, its 
goals and its implied institutional solutions were disputed: the ‘idea of Europe’ was a 
transnationally contested idea and the center of attraction for a transnational political 
conflict among the European elite that cut across the inherited traditions of European 
party families.  
The consequences and implications of that conflict, this dissertation has argued, can-
not be sufficiently described by the standard intergovernmentalist framework of in-
ter-state cooperation, be it related to European integration or to more general and 
global issues. The contours of that framework have been fleshed out in chapter two 
in detail. The general applicability and usefulness of intergovernmentalism is predi-
cated on its core assumptions, most importantly the presence of an organizationally 
well-functioning nation-state whose population is united by a distinct national ideol-
ogy. While these constraints still qualify intergovernmentalism for a large class of 
important issues, chapter 2 argued that there are fairly clearly identifiable conditions 
under which the framework less useful. Most importantly, it does not provide tools 
for understanding the emergence and the possible effects that influential transnation-
al and transgovernmental coalitions may have on the preference formation and bar-
gaining behavior of democratic governments. Thus, the case of the EDC amply 
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demonstrates that under conditions in which an intergovernmentalist explanation 
should fare reasonably well – namely explaining bargaining processes and prefer-
ences for institutional design in relation to security cooperation problems among 
democratic states – it is indeterminate. Lacking an account of the role of political 
conflict within that problem, intergovernmentalism offers little guidance to explain 
the emergence and the effect of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions.  
 
Theorizing the Role of Transnational Networks 
In order to better understand the impact that the multiple transnational networks have 
had on the EDC negotiations, chapter 2 devised an analytical framework for the ex-
planatory problem of the EDC. I argued that transnational coalitions may be a politi-
cal asset within domestic conflict as they provide information, allow the coordination 
of political strategies, and thereby may help achieving cooperative bargaining solu-
tions that would be off the table otherwise. In addition, however, it was pointed out 
that the nation-state presents an institutional and ideological barrier to transnational 
coalition-formation: as national institutions for political competition provide the pri-
mary reward for political actors – vote and office through national parties and coali-
tions – the incentive to defect from agreed upon political strategies is relatively high. 
Nationalist ideologies create divergent and mutually exclusive values and thus make 
the formation of similar goals unlikely. Past histories of national conflict, differing 
languages hinder the formation of trustworthy reputations. 
Thus, in the absence of supranational institutions for political conflict and decision-
making (parties, parliaments, and governments), the rewards of engaging in transna-
tional networking to form transnational coalitions are existent but limited. Only ac-
tors who put a high price on similar political goals for cooperation such as common 
institutions across differing states face strong incentives to engage in transnational 
activities that imply political commitments and strategic coordination.  
The implications of the existence of transnational networks of actor coalitions make 
for observable implications that are distinct form intergovernmentalism. First, since 
sincere political agents commit to institutional solutions transnationally, their domes-
tic political positions may put them at odds not only with actors from different politi-
cal parties but also with actors from similar parties or party families who prefer dif-
ferent institutional solutions to the cooperation problem at hand. As a corollary, in-
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tergovernmental factors accounting for state-preferences – power differences and 
domestic party coalitions – are insufficient without taking into account the transna-
tional embeddedness of governments. Rather, it is the embeddedness of individuals 
within identifiable clusters of transnational networks that explains their positions in 
domestic conflict. Accordingly, it is the success or failure of transnationally embed-
ded actors – rather domestic parties – that explains shifting state preferences. 
Second, taking the effect of network structures seriously implies rejecting a naïve 
interpretation of networks as efficient information transmitters. Since trust is the 
main condition as well as the main currency of transnational coordination and com-
mitment, the uses of strategic information by governments depart from an expected 
intergovernmental logic. If governmental actors are embedded in transnational net-
works with trusted actors that share similar valued institutional goals, they will tend 
to trust their information more than information stemming from domestic sources 
that are processed by actors who tend not to share similar goals. It was argued that 
such situations can induce patterns of learning that are described in current models of 
learning in trust networks: if actors trust only likeminded actors and discard infor-
mation from sources that, in their view, do not share similar goals, a systematic ten-
dency for biased information processing results. Thus, dominance of transnational 
networks by like-minded actors may create false assessments of basic political situa-
tions and prospects for success. 
 
The Structure and Dynamics of Transnational Coalition Building 
In order to assess these implications and the explanatory value added, chapters 5 and 
studied the Europeanist transnational network in post-war Europe from a quantitative 
and a qualitative perspective. Drawing on individuals’ affiliation with the dominant 
transnational organizations and the resulting information on overlapping member-
ships in post-war Europe, it produced three main results.  
First, it identified the most central individuals within the transnational network, the 
clustering of the network, and inferred governments changing embeddedness within 
those clusters. It showed that the rather dense transnational network displayed a no-
table ‘elite’ of well-known individuals who were presumably influential in the trans-
national sphere. Both the density of the network as well as its composition suggest 
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that the transnational organizations constituted important ties among the political 
elite in post-war Europe across countries as well as across party families.  
Second, chapter 5 identified six distinct transnational groups of actors that share 
more similar cross-affiliations with each other than with the rest of the network. Of 
the six clusters identified, three are distinctly oriented towards party families, the 
remaining three clusters are primarily based on non-party family related transnational 
pressure groups. In combination with the visual inspection of these graphs, chapter 5 
thus showed that the network data reveal structural indications of a transnational con-
flict. Thus, whereas the Christian Democrats form a single group, the transnational 
Social Democrats are split into two, indicating a much stronger internal polarization 
of the Social Democrats than that of the Christian Democrats. Finally, the composi-
tion of these clusters reveals an interesting fact: on the one hand, their composition is 
sufficiently similarly distributed across countries and party families to warrant the 
conclusion that their influence – if it exists – cuts across state borders and party or-
ganizations within the respective states. At the same time, the federalist cluster is 
overwhelmingly dominated by Italian actors, whereas the distribution of Dutch and 
Belgian actors resembles the affiliations of British actors, not those of the three big 
continental states, although these conclusions are associated with considerable uncer-
tainty. 
Third, chapter 5 analyzed the embeddedness of the governments of the main Europe-
an countries within these clusters over time. The most important result established 
was somewhat unsurprising: the Christian Democratic cluster presents the transgov-
ernmentally best connect group of actors between 1950 and 1952 by a rather wide 
margin, irrespective of the centrality indicator used to establish the result. Due to a 
number of domestic changes, this dominance declines rapidly by the end of 1952. 
Based on actors’ formal memberships, there is no clear-cut cluster that dominates 
transgovernmental relations thereafter. In addition, more subtle differences exist: 
based on their governments’ embeddedness within these clusters, one would expect 
clear differences between France and Italy on the one hand, and Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and the UK on the other hand. Whereas the former share a similar affiliation 
with the Federalist community and the European Movement between 1950 and 1953, 
the latter exhibit a primary attachment to the European Movement and the ELEC 
community.  
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In order to place the structural results in a qualitative context, Chapter 6 then focused 
on the actual content of the exchanges between the individuals identified in the pre-
vious chapter. Drawing on the existing literature on the main institutional ideas driv-
ing the European project in the 1950’s, it differentiates three sets of valued orienta-
tions towards the nation-state and associate institution blueprints allowing to distin-
guish in order to differentiate ideas and values committed to. These ‘models’ follow 
typical rhetorical commitments to certain values and common political goals. Where-
as a commitment to democratic values is present in all cases, associated commit-
ments to the normative implications of nationalism – the “[…] principle which holds 
that the political and national unit should be congruent […]” (Gellner 1983, 1) – and 
thus the post-war notion of ‘Europe’ differ. On one side of the extreme, intergovern-
mentalists praise the continuing relevance of national governments; on the other side, 
federalists denounce nationalism as the prime ‘evil’ that caused the war. Both ex-
tremes come with concrete institutional commitments: a ‘Council of States’ on the 
one hand, a completely new federated political community on the other hand. ‘Su-
pranationalism’ is a more amorphous medium category that nonetheless contains 
distinct elements: partially sharing the federalist diagnosis, it seeks novel institutions 
to ‘preserve’ the nation-state. For this category, public commitments to curtailing the 
nation’s sovereignty – through pooling and delegation – are essential. 
Analyzing the content of these commitments yields two results. First, in line with the 
structural analyses of the previous chapter, the ‘distribution’ of actors committed to 
any model cuts across party families and countries. Hence, Craig Parsons observation 
of cross-cutting lines of conflict in France generalizes across the continent, but sig-
nificantly less so to the UK (Parsons 2002, 2003). The internal structural differentia-
tion presented in the fifth chapter is consistent with this observation: whereas the 
transnational Social Democrats are characterized by intense internal conflicts be-
tween actors subscribing to all three models, the European right contains these dif-
ferences unevenly distributed among Conservatives and Christian Democrats. 
Whereas the former are more present in the European Movement and ELEC cluster – 
mostly representing the intergovernmental model – Christian Democrats rarely 
committed themselves to nationalist principles and the intergovernmental solution. 
The internal conflict rather focused on differences between supranationalists and 
federalists. The remaining network clusters are equally divided: actors in the Europe-
an Movement cluster are heavily polarized along those lines; the ELEC cluster is 
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shown to be divided between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists; the Feder-
alist cluster, unsurprisingly, is relatively unified along these lines, although signifi-
cant internal dissent exists between moderates and radicals. Finally, it is shown that 
transatlantic exchanges were dominated by the federalist and, to a certain extent, the 
supranational model. 
As rhetorical commitments are conceptualized as the building-blocks of transnational 
trust, the sixth chapter equally demonstrates how that ideological similarity led to 
informal coalition building, with varying success, in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. 
In particular, this chapter identifies an emerging loose transnational coalition be-
tween federalists and supranationalists from all major party families, which, by 1951 
at the latest, began to coordinate. Up until 1951, a number of factors seemed to point 
towards a larger, less centralized Europe. In particular, the allegiances a number of 
previously identified central transnational Social Democrats had favored a wider 
Europe, reflecting their ‘internationalist’ solidarity with British and Scandinavian 
Social Democrats, which drove them at odds with Liberal and Christian Democrats 
that sought a supranational Europe. However, persisting ideological differences – 
within Social Democracy and between the continent and the UK in particular – 
caused frequent conflicts that reached a climax by 1951 within its main institutional 
forum, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Spurred by the succeed-
ing negotiations of the ECSC and the prospect of a continental parliament, mobilized 
by the prospect of a creation of a European Army, the strategies of the major federal-
ists and supranationalists finally began to converge: Federalists put pressure on the 
Italian government to create a democratic federation; at the initiative of Paul-Henri 
Spaak, an alliance of Social Democratic federalists founded the ‘Action Committee 
for the European Constituent’ (Europäische Bewegung 1953); Christian Democrats 
put increasing pressure on recalcitrant Dutch and Belgian representatives to lobby for 
a European intergovernmental compromise on the EDC; finally, an identifiable elite 
of US officials positioned on the continent, in direct contact with Jean Monnet, suc-
cessfully lobbied its government to endorse the EDC and use to leverage of aid con-
ditionality to effect a compromise. Documenting evidence from common written 
exchanges, meetings and conference attendance shows sufficient evidence of strate-
gic coordination: the transnational coalition dominated the transgovernmental scene, 
in particular between 1951 and 1953. Most importantly, it became evident that within 
this transnational coalition, a certain interpretation of the EDC ratification chances 
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prevailed: actors with close ties to the transnational coalition – including leading 
figures such as Adenauer, French MRO President Teitgen, US Foreign Secretary 
John Foster Dulles, mutually assured each other that there was no alternative to the 
EDC and the chances of a ratification of the EDC Treaty were good enough. No sub-
stantial revision of the Treaty was required for it to pass, ignoring the information 
about the heated domestic conflict in the French domestic political arena. 
 
What Effect Did Transnational Networks Have on the EDC Bargain? 
In order to uncover the effect that transnational coalition-building had both on the 
preference formation and the formation of bargaining strategies, the final chapter 7 
argued that it is only through considering the implications of the transnational 
framework that one can explain the puzzle of the EDC sufficiently. As argued in 
chapter 4, the institutions of the WEU that resolved the problem of German rearma-
ment in lieu of the EDC are a ‘text-book’ case of the realist and transaction-costs 
based theory of institutional design, solving the issue of German rearmament through 
balancing and credible commitments through pooling (a permanent troop commit-
ment by the UK to the continent controlled by a majority in the WEU Council) and a 
WEU ‘agency’ that, in theory, had the right of inspecting German arms at any time. 
From an intergovernmental perspective, it remains largely puzzling why the institu-
tionally obvious solution (the WEU) remained elusive whereas an institutionally 
more risky and demanding option (the EDC) remained on the table between 1950 
and 1954. 
The general conclusion is that the relationship between the two sets of hypotheses 
largely boils down to a relationship of necessity and sufficiency. Thus, the intergov-
ernmental hypotheses on demand formation (H1), supply conditions (H2), position 
shifts and strategic adaptation (H3) and bargaining power (H5, H6) capture important 
aspect of the bargain. Without considering their transnational counterparts, however, 
it remains elusive. The fate of the ‘EDC track’ in the negotiations is tied to the vary-
ing influence of the actors of the transnational coalition identified in the sixth chap-
ter.  
First, examining the domestic conflicts in the negotiating countries demonstrates that 
the interpretation of ideological conflicts within the transnational sphere is translated 
into the political systems of the negotiating states as actors more closely attached to 
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the national model did not participate in equal fashion within the transnational net-
work. Domestic perceptions and rhetorical strategies of conflict still center on securi-
ty, the nation, and democratic principles. Domestic conflicts, however, are largely 
fought over different preferred institutional models. Within these conflicts, actors 
engaged in the transnational sphere advocate similar ideas in the domestic setting. In 
sum, the fact that the three ideological ‘models’ of Europe cut across party differ-
ences in all continental states warrants the conclusion that the transnational networks 
identified earlier were ‘carriers’ or channels of ideologies that affected domestic poli-
tics. The scope for this impact varied as it depended largely on party leaders’ prefer-
ences and their institutional and personal ability to enforce party discipline (H7) and 
did not overtly depend on the ideological cohesion or the resources of a distinct 
transnational group (H8). For example, Socialist parties on all continental countries 
experienced significant internal conflicts. Few party leaderships, however, possessed 
institutional power and personal reputation like German SPD leader Kurt Schumach-
er, who followed a nationalist electoral strategy. On the other side of the aisle, Aden-
auer used similar measures to enforce party discipline, but employed them based on a 
different ‘preferred model’ of Europe. In contrast, French parties at the time were 
notorious – with a few exceptions – for their lack of party discipline. Hence, internal 
conflicts occurred in a more pronounced and open manner. Finally, the demands put 
forth by domestic political actors varied according to the degree that central suprana-
tionalist or federalist actors were in a position to employ domestic political organiza-
tions for their own advantage. Hence, the ‘input’ side to state-preferences is best ex-
plained by the transnational framework. 
Second, turning to the supply side, it was shown that the changing constellations of 
conflict occurring throughout the five years are best explained by reference to – 
changing – governments embeddedness in transnational clusters (chapter 5), their ties 
to the informal transnational coalition (chapter 6), and the outcomes of domestic con-
flicts within governments.  
Until the first half of 1952, the negotiations are marked by a clear line of conflict 
among the Six, namely between Germany, France, and Italy on the one hand, and the 
Benelux on the other hand, the former seeking substantial amounts of pooling and 
delegation within the European Army, the latter unified in their resistance against 
extensive pooling, insistence on control mechanisms through the EDC institutions 
and externally through NATO. This conflict can, obviously, be explained by refer-
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ence either to power differences between states or to governments ideologies: both 
the Italian and French governments had substantial ties to the Federalist cluster, 
whereas the governmental leadership of France and Germany had strong ties to the 
most active supranationalist elements in the Christian Democratic Community. 
Dutch and Belgian leaders, as both the previous chapter showed, were transnationally 
much more reluctant in committing to the full-blown supranational idea. This line of 
conflict between the larger and smaller nations decreased significantly by late 1953 
and early 1954. Since material conditions remain constant, this fact is best explained 
by shifting government ideologies linked to shifting embeddedness of all govern-
ments in the previously identified transnational clusters and their affinities to the 
transnational coalition. Hence, Italy and France delayed ratification motions as more 
nationalistically inclined Gaullists and (Italian) Monarchists entered the governmen-
tal coalition and caused significant internal conflict. The Belgian government became 
one of the most ardent supporters of the EDC once Paul-Henri Spaak became For-
eign Minister in early 1954. It is thus shown that shifting material conditions or 
changing threat levels cannot account for these changes sufficiently. 
Third, it is argued that only the transnational account captures the bargaining behav-
ior and the observable patterns of influence, thus accounting for the paradoxical bar-
gaining course. In particular, only a focus on the influence of the transnational coali-
tion on states’ bargaining behavior can account for the fact that the negotiations 
honed in on the EDC alternative in 1951 rather than pursue the NATO alternative 
that most governments still sought most feasible by 1950. Taking the scheduled elec-
tions in France as an opportunity, the chapter reconstructs a coordinated attempt by 
members of the transnational coalition, including lower level US officials, the leader-
ship of the French delegation in Paris, as well as Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer, 
to effect a number of key compromises by the US and French governments that ef-
fectively eliminated the NATO option.  
As a result, an intergovernmental compromise emerged, achieved by two means that, 
effectively, were used by key transnational and transgovernmental actors. First, by 
effecting a change in the official stance of the US government – that had hitherto 
planned along the lines of a German NATO membership – the conditionality of US 
aid would henceforth provide a powerful lever to bring more skeptical governments 
– notably the Dutch and the Belgian ones – in line with the new supranational option. 
The second means was based on beliefs: the most volatile and domestically uncertain 
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country was, by all accounts, France. Thus, any judgment on a feasible bargaining 
resolution implied some judgment what it would take to effect an agreement. By 
convincing the US government to push for an EDC solution as well as by a manipu-
lative use of the negotiation mandate by the French leader of the delegation, the EDC 
track was presented as the most feasible option. Subsequently, as the transnational 
coalition grew in force, its main raison d’être was based on the assumption that it 
was steering a course without alternatives. This assumption was enforced: partially 
by US aid conditionality that made it potentially costly for the skeptics to pursue 
alternatives; partially through persuasion within transgovernmental circles – most 
notably the Christian Democratic community; and partially through domestic disci-
pline within parties and, at times, within the Foreign Policy apparatuses. 
Especially the latter undertaking became increasingly impossible against notable 
domestic opposition in all of the continental countries, especially in France. Already 
in 1952, the first skeptics started to argue that the signed treaty would never be rati-
fied. There is certainly indirect evidence that the prospects of a failed ratification 
were feared, for example, as Adenauer forbade written considerations of the eventu-
alities of such an occurrence within his own Foreign Policy apparatus. In the end, the 
conviction that the EDC was the correct course proved fatal since with conviction 
came bias.  
Initially, though, there was success. The ratification in Belgium and the Netherlands 
went relatively smoothly, on account of persuasion and US pressure on the Dutch 
and Belgian governments to submit the treaty to their parliaments. The German elec-
tion of 1953 gave an overwhelming majority to Adenauer and thus negated the ef-
forts of EDC opponents, notably the Christian Democrats, to prevent the EDC by 
appealing to the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH). At the same time, ratification efforts 
stalled in France and Italy, as the respective governing coalitions became increasing-
ly nationalist. Most notably in France, the issue became increasingly acerbic and 
volatile. However, those associated with the transnational coalition throughout Eu-
rope – whether in government or not – did not take these obvious signs seriously. 
The political trust that had accumulated through concerted efforts for the previous 
three years now backfired: by relying on biased information submitted through in-
formal channels established through transnational contacts, the situation in France 
was perceived erroneously. It is shown that in July 1954, the new French Prime Min-
ister Mendès France made an honest attempt to secure a successful resolution of the 
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issue by submitting a revision of the EDC Treaty that would have likely resulted in a 
successful ratification but would have entailed a significant decrease in the amount 
of sovereignty pooled at the European level. This effort was roundly rebutted as a 
number of European and American leaders – notably Adenauer and, by now, Spaak, 
suspected foul play: mistrusting the intentions of and being convinced that the EDC 
alternative would ultimately muster sufficient votes, they roundly rebuffed Mendès 
France’s offer. Finding a highly hostile international environment that accused the 
French leader of manipulation and dishonesty, Mendès France chose not to stake his 
governmental survival on an unpopular treaty and – secretly – explored an alternative 
solution, namely German integration into NATO in exchange for a British troop 
commitment. Obtaining a sufficient answer from the UK, the French government 
allowed the EDC Treaty to be voted off the agenda in the French Assemblée Natio-
nale. 
It was only after the EDC project had been thrown to shambles, that actors ‚discov-
ered‘ the supposedly ‘obvious’ solution. Actors subscribing to federalist and suprana-
tionalist ideologies were heavily disappointed, as the quotes above amply demon-
strates. Once faced with the dilemma of either agreeing to a NATO solution or risk-
ing the survival of the Western Alliance, the ‘obvious’ solution of the WEU followed 
quickly. The disappointment subsequently expressed by ‘supranationalist’ actors 
demonstrates that they would have preferred even a more moderate EDC solution: 
their distrust towards the French government, however, proved fatal and produced 
considerable regret. Although the counterfactual consideration – what had happened 
had the European governments accepted is a difficult argument – there is a fairly 
consistent picture. The early successes that culminated the ECSC and EDC Paris 
Treaties were brought about the support and pressure of the powerful segment among 
the Western political elite. The failure of the EDC was largely due their overconfi-
dence and the selective use of information that prevented a more modest institutional 
solution – encapsulated in Mendès France’s proposal during the Brussels conference 
– to materialize. There was no essential necessity in the failure of the EDC. The con-
tents of the proposals put forth in Brussels – as far as the institutional dimension was 
concerned – did not deviate substantially from the Treaties of Rome. In fact, the 
EDC Treaty, although aborting the hugely ambitions EPC project, would still have 
entailed a more powerful parliament. British participation, from a formal point of 
view, could easily have been integrated into a reduced version of the Treaty along the 
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model entailed in the WEU. Early ambition and influence, in the case of the EDC, 
resulted in inefficiency, disappointment and regret. The subsequent steps towards the 
economic path of European integration were successful because the painful lesson of 
the EDC was heeded. Had leading governments in Bonn, Washington, Rome or per-
haps Brussels and Den Haag heeded sceptic voices earlier, a Treaty on a European 
Army might have been ratified. The widespread utterances of regret after the alleged 
crime of August 30
th
 – the day the French Assemblée Nationale rejected the treaty – 
suggest that this would have been the preferred outcome of most members – or actors 
close to – the supranational transnational coalition. 
 
Contribution and Lessons Learned for Future Research 
The primary implication is that the EDC bargain is not a period produced only by 
distinct geopolitical circumstances or short-lived influence of radical federalists. Ra-
ther it resulted from an in intricate combination of geopolitical threats in the emerg-
ing cold war and the emergence and activities of a transnational coalition composed 
of Socialists, Christian Democrats, liberals, and radical federalists all seeking the 
same goal: a European supranational army embedded in democratic supranational 
institutions. Second, to the extend this can be said of past events, the EDC was not a 
project that was doomed to fail: rather, it was the persistent single-mindedness of the 
members of the transnational coalition who were in important places that prevented a 
more moderate compromise to emerge earlier and that would have made ratification 
more likely although still difficult.  
Additionally, having analyzed the EDC from a transnational perspective adds addi-
tional credibility to the necessity of considering European integration as a transna-
tional and supranational polity from the beginning (Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et 
al. 2008). The present dissertation has sought to contribute to this debate by consider-
ing the EDC from a distinct analytical framework that allows for devising testable 
hypotheses that can be directly juxtaposed to the main theoretical rival of intergov-
ernmentalism. Applying them successfully to the EDC case thus lends credibility to 
that perspective and provides a possibly fruitful future avenue to reconsider addition-
al landmark IGC’s in the history of European integration in which historical work 
and the improvement and fine-tuning of the available theoretical understanding can 
go hand in hand. Thus, a primary result of this dissertation is that the conflict of ideas 
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that Craig Parsons has analyzed for the case of France was in actuality a transnation-
al conflict among the political elite of Europe (Parsons 2002, 2003). That conflict did 
not manifest itself equally across the main party families of Christian Democracy and 
Social Democracy and was mediated by specific national contexts. In this sense, this 
dissertation has contributed to an emerging view of post-war Europe that reempha-
sizes the role of ideas and transnational networks for the origins of European integra-
tion (Lipgens and Loth 1977; Kaiser and Starie 2005; Kaiser, et al. 2008; Kaiser, et 
al. 2010). Thus, future research on the role of ideas and transnational networks in the 
history of European integration may benefit from combining a distinct theoretically 
informed approach with a mixed-methods design that identifies both the structural 
aspects of networks as well as the content of rhetorical exchanges transmitted within 
them. A particularly interesting question consists in continuing to trace the impact, if 
any, that transnational contacts and efforts at building and maintaining trust had dur-
ing the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome and throughout the remaining key stag-
es in the history of European integration. 
An additionally interesting perspective for future research may be to inquire in how 
far that conflict structured political conflict across Europe. Whereas the present focus 
was limited to the political elite in Europe, the conflict identified strongly resembles 
similar lines of contemporary political conflict in Europe identified recently (Kriesi 
1998; Kriesi, et al. 2012). Whereas the literature talks about the transformation of 
cleavages in Western Europe, having identified the outlines of a similar cleavage 
across the political elite in Europe opens up the question whether one of the source of 
currently identified transformations can in fact be traced back to post-war Europe. 
Finally, it has drawn attention to the fact that the concept of transnational networks 
requires conceptual clarity and can profit from explicitly considering formal work on 
learning dynamics in networks in as much as the development of intergovernmental-
ism has profited from the consideration of formal game theory. At the same time, it 
has drawn attention to the fact that quantitative and qualitative empirical methods 
can be and should be beneficially combined. As it was beneficial for the specific his-
torical problem to combine theoretically guided research drawing on theoretical ar-
guments as well as methods across theoretical and methodological divides of the 
discipline, a similar approach is recommended for work study the role and impact of 
transnational networks on other problems. On the empirical plane, combining quanti-
tative and qualitative methods may serve to correct insufficiencies as well as provide 
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independent information on a similar problem. Thus, varying transnational ideologi-
cal fragmentation could be demonstrated both quantitatively – via the clustering of 
actor’s overlapping membership patterns – as well as qualitatively by analyzing ideas 
circulating within networks. 
Third, the explicit consideration of the structural aspects of learning in networks 
yielded the consideration of a mechanism – related to the ‘wisdom of crowds’ effect 
(Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2004)– that showed that a naïve treatment of transnational 
or regulatory networks that discounts questions of trust structures as well as the lack 
of the heterogeneity of available, widely used in the current literature, is deeply prob-
lematic. Thus, situations in which key decision makers rely on ideologically homog-
enous sources of information may tend to produce errors of judgment and suboptimal 
outcomes. In the present case, it produced an error of judgment that, essentially, pre-
vented the creation of a specific configuration of institutional elements, judged from 
a normative perspective, was far more superior with regard to its envisioned degree 
of democratic representation, than any solution proposed thereafter. 
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Appendix 
Table A Parties and Party Family Classification According to Parlgov 
Country Abbreviation Party Name English Party Name Party Family 
NL ARP Anti-Revolutionary 
Party 
Anti-Revolutionaire 
Partij 
Christian Democracy 
FRA ARS Republican and Social 
Action (Conservatives) 
Action républicaine 
et sociale 
Conservative  
BEL BSP-PSB Belgian Socialist Party Belgische Socialis-
tische Partij – Parti 
Socialiste Belge 
Social Democracy 
GER CDU Christian Democratic 
Union 
Christlich Demo-
kratische Union 
Christian Democracy 
NL CHU Christian Historical 
Union 
Christelijk-
Historische Unie 
Christian Democracy 
FRA CNIP National Centre of 
Independents and 
Peasants (Conserva-
tives) 
Centre national des 
indépendants et 
paysans 
Conservative 
UK Conservative Conservatives Conservatives Conservative 
GER CSU Christian Social Union Christlich Soziale 
Union 
Christian Democracy 
LUX CSV Christian Social Peo-
ple's Party 
Chrëschtlech Sozial 
Vollekspartei – Parti 
populaire chrétien 
social 
Christian Democracy 
BEL CVP Flemish Christian  
Peoples Party 
Christelijke 
Volkspartij 
Christian Democracy 
GER (Saar) CVP (Saar) Christian Peoples' 
Party Saarland 
Christliche 
Volkspartei des 
Saarlandes 
Christian Democracy 
ITA DC Christian Democrats Democrazia Cristia-
na 
Christian Democracy 
US Democrats Democrats Democrats None 
LUX DeP Democratic Party Demokratesch Par-
tei – Parti Dé-
mocratique – De-
mokratische Partei 
Liberal 
GER DP German Party Deutsche Partei Conservative 
GER (Saar) DPS Democratic Party  
Saarland 
Demokratische 
Partei Saar 
Liberal 
GER FDP Free Democratic Party Freie Demo-
kratische Partei 
Liberal 
GER FU Federal Union Föderalistische 
Union 
Conservative 
GER GB/BHE All-German 
Bloc/League of Expel-
lees and Deprived of 
Rights 
Gesamtdeutscher 
Block/Bund der 
Heimatvertriebenen 
und Entrechteten 
Conservative 
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Country Abbreviation Party Name English Party Name Party Family 
ITA Gruppo 
Misto 
Group of partyless 
members of the Italian 
Senate and the Camera 
dei Deputati 
 None 
FRA IOM Independents from 
Overseas 
Indépendants 
d'outre-mer  
None 
NL KVP Catholic Peoples Party Katholieke 
Volkspartij 
Christian Democracy 
UK Labour Labour Labour Party Social Democracy 
UK LP Liberal Party Liberal Party Liberal 
BEL LP-PL Liberal Party Liberale Partij – 
Parti libéral 
Liberal 
LUX LSAP Luxembourg Socialist 
Workers' Party 
Lëtzebuerger Sozia-
listesch Arbechter-
partei – Parti Ouv-
rier Socialiste Lu-
xembourgeois 
Social Democracy 
ITA MIS Monarchist Party Blocco Nazionale 
della Liberta / Parti-
to Nazionale Mo-
narchico 
Conservative 
FRA MRP Popular Republican 
Movement 
Mouvement ré-
publicain populaire 
Christian Democracy 
ITA MSI Italian Socialist 
Movement 
Movimento Social-
ista Italiano 
Fascist 
ITA PLI Italian Liberal Party Partito Liberale 
Italiano 
Liberal 
ITA PRI Republican Party Partito Repubbli-
cano Italiano 
Liberal 
FRA PRR/RS Radical Socialist Party Parti répulicain 
radical et radical 
socialiste 
Conservative 
BEL PSC-CVP Francophone Christian 
Social Party and Flem-
ish Christian People's 
Party 
Parti Social Chrétien 
– Christelijke 
Volkspartij 
Christian Democracy 
ITA PSDI Italian Democratic  
Socialist Party 
Partito Socialista 
Democratico Ital-
iano 
Social Democracy 
ITA PSI Socialist Party Partito Socialista 
Italiano 
Social Democracy 
ITA PSUP Socialist Party of  
Proletarian Unity 
Partito Socialista di 
Unità Proletaria 
Communist/Socialist 
NL PvdA Labour Partij van de Arbeid Social Democracy 
FRA RDA Rally of Democratic 
Africa 
Rassemblement 
Démocratique Afri-
cain (RDA, African 
Democratic Rally) 
None 
US Republican Republican Republican None 
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Country Abbreviation Party Name English Party Name Party Family 
FRA RGR Rally of Republican 
Lefts 
Rassemblement des 
gauches républi-
caines 
Conservative 
FRA RPF Rally of the French  
People 
Rassemblement du 
peuple français 
Conservative  
(Gaullist) 
FRA RPR Rally for the Republic Rassemblement 
pour la République 
Conservative 
FRA RS Social Republicans Républicains Sociax 
(RS) (Gaullists ARS 
after 1956)  
Conservative  
(Gaullist) 
NL SDAP Social Democratic 
Workers' Party 
Sociaal Democra-
tische Arbeiders 
Partij 
Social Democracy 
FRA SFIO French Section of the 
Workers' International 
Section française de 
l'Internationale 
ouvrière 
Social Democracy 
GER SPD Social Democratic 
Party of Germany 
Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
Social Democracy 
GER (Saar) SPS Social Democratic 
Party of Saarland 
Sozialdemokratische 
Partei des Saar-
landes  
Social Democracy 
ITA SVP South Tyrolean Peo-
ple's Party 
Südtiroler Volkspar-
tei 
Conservative 
FRA UDF Union for French  
Democracy 
Union pour la dé-
mocratie française 
Conservative 
FRA UDI Democratic Union of 
Independents 
Union démocratique 
des indépendants 
Conservative 
FRA UDSR Democratic and Social-
ist Union of the Re-
sistance 
Union démocratique 
et socialiste de la 
Résistance 
Liberal 
FRA Unité de la 
République 
Unity of the Republic (Algerien) none 
FRA UNR Union for the New 
Republic 
Union pour la nou-
velle République 
(UNR) 
Conservative  
(Gaullist) 
FRA UP Progressive Union Union progressiste Communist/Socialist 
GBR UUP Ulster Unionist Party Ulster Unionist 
Party 
Conservative 
NL VVD People's Party for 
Freedom and Democ-
racy 
Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en 
Democratie 
Liberal 
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